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Universities are increasingly adopting a neoliberal framework for education—one that 
is centred on employability, graduate outcomes and skills. Within this framework, 
teaching, assessments and subjects must adhere to the laws of the market; this 
prepares students for their roles in private or corporate firms and instils suitable kinds 
of skills for graduate employment. However, minimal attention is paid to the needs of 
students as holistic people, citizens, public advocates or members of their local 
communities, nor is attention paid to their contribution to democratic society. 
Specifically, subjects in the humanities and social sciences are designated as 
functionally useless, impractical and irrelevant. 
The neoliberal style of education has recently come to dominate Australian law 
schools. Presently, law schools focus heavily on skills, and they avoid deep training in 
the liberal arts or training students to think for themselves and critique the law they 
learn. Various academics have addressed this crisis in legal education. They have 
proposed, on the one hand, a return to a classical and liberal arts style of education in 
which law is conceptualised in its political, social and economic context. Conversely, 
they have also proposed a focus on critical theory and critical perspectives of law. 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the adoption of a liberal arts approach to legal 
education through the research and proposal of a new law school curriculum in 
Australia. This includes proposing new teaching methods, assessments and subjects. 
This proposed broad liberal arts education in law aims to teach students to think for 
themselves and to develop their critical and analytical skills, sense of justice and 
injustice, their ability to comprehend and critique the law and their hard and soft 
transferable skills that are necessary for the broad range of jobs they will accept after 
graduation (beyond private and corporate practice). Specifically, this thesis aims to 
consider how and why law can be taught as part of a wider study of politics, history, 
civics, psychology and philosophy, and how it can consequently prepare students to 
become well-rounded citizens in their future jobs.  
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Eat law, talk law, think law, drink law, babble of law and judgments in your 
sleep. Pickle yourselves in law—it is your only hope. 
Karl N Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush1 
Debates regarding the purpose of legal education have occurred for centuries.2 
Typically, these debates fall into one of three perspectives: firstly, that law should be 
taught as a liberal art or social science that is part of a wider study of politics, 
philosophy and history;3 secondly, that law should be taught as a vocation or trade 
that prepares students for their future jobs as lawyers;4 thirdly, that law should be 
taught as a combination of the first two, in which vocational training is embedded in a 
‘soft skills’ curriculum of liberal arts electives, critical thinking and critical values 
(e.g., ethics and public service).5 
 
1 Karl N Lewellyn, On Our Law and Its Study (Oceana Publications, 1969) 96. 
2 David Barker, A History of Australian Legal Education (Federation Press, 2017) 1–5, 10, 25; Ralph Michael 
Stein, ‘The Path of Legal Education from Edward I to Langdell: A History of Insular Reaction’ (1981) 57 
Chicago–Kent Law Review 429. 
3 There are various methods and variations denoting what this might mean in terms of practice and in terms of 
teaching law as a liberal art or science. For example, Martha Nussbaum suggested that law should be taught 
alongside the humanities and in partnership with humanities departments to encourage ‘democratic citizenship’, 
including ‘critical thinking’ about the ‘political issues affecting the nation’. In comparison, Margaret Thornton 
critiques the ‘amoral’ and ‘depoliticized stance of legal positivism’ and praises how ‘liberal arts’ legal education 
produces students who can ‘think for themselves’. However, she also noted that it is unclear what a liberal arts 
education ‘means today’. A more in-depth discussion regarding the definition of liberal arts and sciences in this 
context occurs at the end of this Introduction. For more on this topic, see Martha Nussbaum, ‘Not for Profit: Why 
Legal Education Needs the Humanities’ (Speech, Annual Hal Wooten Lecture, UNSW Faculty of Law, 11 August 
2011) 3–5, 7–8, 11 <https://www.law.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/imce/files/wootten/prof_martha_nussbaum_-
_2011_hal_wootten_lecture.pdf>; Margaret Thornton, Privatizing the Public University (Taylor and Francis, 
2011) 59–61. 
4 Kurt Saunders and Linda Levine, ‘Learning to Think Like a Lawyer’ (2005) 29(121) University of San Francisco 
Law Review 1. This perspective is often implicit in texts suggesting that law students are future lawyers and that 
legal education is thus about training future lawyers; Thomas D Morgan, ‘Educating Lawyers for the Future Legal 
Profession’ (Research Paper No 189, George Washington University Law School Public Law Scholarly 
Commons, 2005) 26 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=881846>. It is also implicit in texts highlighting the ‘breadth’ of 
skills in law-related areas rather than highlighting the values or the idea of pursuing knowledge for its own sake; 
Fiona McLeod, ‘Looking to the Future of Legal Education’ (Speech, Australian Academy of Law Conference, 13 
August 2017) 3. For a further discussion regarding the divide between theory and practice, see Timothy P Terrell, 
‘What Does and Does Not Happen in Law School to Prepare Students to Practice Law: A View from Both Sides of 
the Academic/Practice Dichotomy’ (1991) 83(3) Law Library Journal 493. 
5 William Twining praises the National Bar School in Bangalore, India, which ‘integrates a multidisciplinary 
approach to legal study with clinical experience, placements and skills training’; William Twining, ‘Preparing 
Lawyers for the Twenty’ (1992) 3(1) Legal Education Review 1. In comparison, liberal arts values (e.g., critical 
thinking, philosophical thinking, communication and writing) can be reframed as ‘skills’ that fit into a vocational 
curriculum’s framework (in which skills are the main goal of learning) rather than being considered ends in their 
own right. This is often implicit in the texts themselves. In this way, for example, these texts consider critical 
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The aim of this thesis is to investigate the adoption of a liberal arts approach to legal 
education in Australia. To do so, this thesis considers alternative, diffuse ideas of 
teaching law as a liberal art that have arisen from both historical examples and 
modern innovations, along with ideas from modern pedagogical theory, humanities 
educational theory and critiques of legal education by past and present students. 
Specifically, this thesis proposes alternative teaching methods, assessments and 
subject lists that differ from a traditionally vocational orthodoxy. It concludes with the 
proposal of a new law school curriculum—one that has been rebuilt from its 
foundation to focus on a humanities-based learning experience that is empowered by 
the latest technology and teaching methods. This curriculum will aim to broaden, not 
narrow, student learning. 
In this Introduction, core concepts will be introduced and defined, including the 
concepts of doctrinal knowledge, vocationalism and the liberal arts and sciences. This 
section begins by explaining how and why Australian law schools teach law in a 
vocational manner, and it investigates the limitations of vocational teaching. The 
thesis later substantiates how neoliberal economics has come to correlate with a rise 
in a vocational style of education in law schools. Finally, this Introduction concludes 
by outlining the arguments and solutions that have been proposed in this thesis. 
1) The Dominance of Doctrine 
Law schools in Australia have taught law in a ‘doctrinal’ and/or ‘vocational’ manner 
for much of their modern history.6 It is important to define these two terms in the 
context of legal education. In some cases, the two terms can be and are used 
interchangeably; however, in other, and this thesis will argue, more crucial cases, the 
two terms must be kept distinct. The concept of ‘doctrinal’ used in this thesis refers to 
the learning of existing systems or rules, such as the system of precedent or the case 
 
thinking a skill that should be taught for a vocational benefit rather than as an end in its own right. For example, 
see Michelle Sanson and Thalia Anthony, Connecting with Law (Oxford University Press, 2018) 2, 5–9. 
Alternatively, liberal arts subjects could be added as additional compulsory courses, or critical thinking can be 
emphasised in existing classes. This method blends the vocational approach with liberal arts add-ons. For example, 
see David M Moss and Debra Moss Curtis (eds), Reforming Legal Education: Law Schools at the Crossroads 
(Information Age Publishing, 2012) 15. 
6 Nickolas J James, ‘A Brief History of Critique in Australian Legal Education’ (2016) Melbourne University Law 
Review 37; Barker (n 2). 
 
3 
method.7 Doctrinal also refers to black-letter law or the study of law as a science unto 
itself, without any contextual information on the origin or effect of law on society.8 In 
contrast, the concept of ‘vocational’ in this thesis refers to teaching law for the 
purpose of job training or helping students become future lawyers.9 
A vocational education can be taught by way of doctrine, in which the doctrine 
focuses on skills or knowledge essential to students who are entering the legal 
profession. For example, doctrinal knowledge can include legal principles that can be 
applied to a real-life client’s factual circumstances.10 However, doctrinal education 
can also extend beyond mere vocational skills to a highly theoretical realm that is 
somewhat impractical for the daily job of a lawyer (e.g., discussing legal principles in 
the abstract).11 Further, doctrine can also be taught in a manner that extends beyond 
deductive and inductive reasoning altogether, in which even ‘non-legal’ theoretical 
questions are considered in class (as they are nevertheless questions of doctrine).12 
In contrast, vocational education focuses on producing future lawyers by teaching 
students skills that can be used in the job (e.g., legal research and other specialist 
skills required in the profession of law).13 These skills can relate to general legal 
practice, but they can also extend to public service and corollary professional 
responsibilities and duties.14 In this way, vocational education can also prompt types 
of thinking regarding ethics and responsibility that may not arise in a doctrinal 
educational framework. It can be concluded that although vocational and doctrinal 
educational frameworks can often overlap, they differ in distinct ways that can lead to 
diverse educational outcomes (depending on which framework is prioritised). 
 
7 Terry Hutchison and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 
17 Griffith Law Review 1, 101. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Fiona Westwood and Karen Barton (eds), The Calling of Law: The Pivotal Role of Vocational Legal Education 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2014) 36. 
10 For more on the case method, see Peggy Cooper Davis, ‘Desegregating Legal Education’ (2010) 26 Georgia 
State University Law Review 1275. 
11 Henry Schlegel, ‘More Theory, More Practice’ (1988) 13 Legal Service Bulletin 71. 
12 Mathies Siems, ‘Legal Originality’ (2008) 28(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 147. 




Various academics, including Margaret Thornton, Martha Nussbaum, Nick James and 
Lawrence Busch, have argued that doctrinal and vocational education frameworks, 
when taught on their own, are detrimental to students, graduates and greater society.15 
Their arguments can be categorised into three beliefs: first, that vocational education 
does not meet its own premise of preparing students for future jobs, as most law 
students do not enter the legal profession;16 second, that doctrinal and/or vocational 
education leads students away from other areas of knowledge (e.g., social justice, 
critical thinking, the humanities, ethics and the liberal arts);17 third, that doctrinal 
and/or vocational education entrenches social hierarchies and prevents students from 
becoming actively engaged in their communities as democratic citizens.18 Each of 
these arguments will be addressed in the subsections below. 
a) The Myth of ‘Future Lawyers’ 
First, it should be stated that the belief that law schools exist to prepare all, or even 
most, law students for future jobs as lawyers is statistically inaccurate. Less than 50 
per cent of Australian law graduates enter the legal profession.19 After five years, a 
further 50 per cent leave their law careers in major law firms due to high staff 
turnover rates.20 In other words, most law graduates will eventually work in an area 
other than legal practice five years after graduating from law school.21 Part of the 
reason for this is the oversupply of law graduates.22 Each year, approximately 12,000 
 
15 There are distinctions regarding the extent to which these academics cite both frameworks; Thornton (n 3); 
Nussbaum (n 3) 3–5; James (n 6); Lawrence Busch, Knowledge for Sale: The Neoliberal Takeover of Higher 
Education (MIT Press, 2017). 
16 Letter from Margaret Thornton to Law Admissions Consultative Committee, Law Council of Australia, 31 
March 2015 <https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/files/web-pdf/LACC%20docs/30.Submission%20-
%20Professor%20Margaret%20Thornton.pdf>. 
17 Nussbaum (n 3) 3–5. 
18 Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (NYU 
Press, 1983). 
19 Thornton (n 19); Tamara Walsh, ‘Putting Justice Back into Legal Education’ (2008) 17(1–2) Legal Education 
Review, 126; Erina Cervini, ‘Law and the New Order’, Sydney Morning Herald (online at 12 June 2012) 
<http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/law-and-the-new-order-20120611-205o5.html#ixzz3g9Px7ltB>; Joel Barolsky, 
‘Good Times Roll but Law Graduates Miss Out on a Harvey Specter life’, Financial Review (online at 31 January 
2019) <https://www.afr.com/opinion/good-times-roll-but-law-graduates-miss-out-on-a-harvey-spector-life-
20181213-h1920w> (‘Good Times Roll’). 
20 Beyond Billables, ‘The Hidden Costs of Law Firm Attrition’, Beyond Billables (Web Page) 
<https://www.beyondbillables.com/blog/the-hidden-costs-of-law-firm-attrition>. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Barolsky, ‘Good Times Roll’ (n 19). 
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students graduate from Australian law schools (or 7,583 students, if practical legal 
training and graduate students are excluded).23 They enter a job market that permits 
only 60,000 working lawyers.24 Simply stated, there are not enough law jobs for all 
law students to practice law. The boom of law schools over the past 30 years has 
contributed to this professional graduate glut. In the 1980s, only 12 law schools 
existed in Australia; presently, there are over 38—or 44, if accounting for universities 
with more than one campus (e.g., James Cook, Deakin, Notre Dame and the 
Australian Catholic University).25 
Teaching a vocational training in law might thus not adequately prepare students for 
their actual future jobs. If law schools aim to prepare students for their future careers, 
then law schools should broaden their education to adequately accommodate other 
professions that law students may enter into such as politics, the media and business.26 
b) Vocation as a Conversion Process 
The second argument against vocational education in law schools is that it leads 
students away from other areas of knowledge, including their own interests. This 
argument is supported by the relevant statistics. When law students are surveyed in 
their first year, they indicate a greater concern for public service, charity and human 
rights.27 However, by the end of their degrees, the same students indicate a greater 
concern for employment, money and prestige.28 In other words, law school changes 
their convictions. Anthony Kronman recognised this trend in the United States (US) 
as early as the 1990s.29 He contended that a law graduate in the 1990s would become 
 
23 Ibid; Neil McMahon, ‘Law of the Jungle: Lawyers Now an Endangered Species’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(online at 11 October 2014) <https://www.smh.com.au/national/law-of-the-jungle-lawyers-now-an-endangered-
species-20141011-114u91.html>; Edmund Tadros, ‘Graduate Glut: 12,000 New Lawyers Every Year’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online at 14 February 2014) <https://www.smh.com.au/business/graduate-glut-12000-new-
lawyers-every-year-20140214-32qnm.html>; Michael Douglas and Nicholas van Hattem, ‘Australia’s Law 
Graduate Glut’ (2016) 41(2) Alternative Law Journal 3–5; Council of Australian Law Deans, ‘Data Regarding 
Law School Graduate Numbers and Outcomes’ (Online Document, 2017) 1–2 <https://cald.asn.au/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/Factsheet-Law_Students_in_Australia.pdf>. 
24 Tadros (n 23). 
25 Thornton (n 19). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Sandra Janoff, ‘The Influence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning’ (1991) 76 Minnesota Law Review 193. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard University Press, 1993) 1. 
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much more concerned with being an ‘expert in law’ rather than with committing his 
or her time to public service or charity.30 Students began demanding more corporate 
law electives rather than electives in social justice and human rights.31 
At least one academic has warned students against attending law school altogether if 
they care about social justice.32 In a document titled ‘For Those Considering Law 
School’, Dean Spade warned that law school is ‘a very conservative training and 
rarely a critical intellectual experience’.33 He argued that by the time students 
graduated, they would have been transformed, taught to entrench existing systems of 
‘maldistribution’.34 The curriculum, by design, compels this through a vocational 
focus: 
Law school is like a language immersion program, but one in which the 
language you are learning is the language of rationalizing white supremacy, 
settler colonialism, patriarchy and capitalism. The traditional pedagogy of 
law school relies on humiliating students if they bring in other ways of 
thinking or knowing about the world, thereby whittling them down to a 
shadow of their former selves and reshaping them to make them think inside 
a very narrow box.35 
Students have raised similar concerns in the Australian context in recent years and 
have urged law faculties to revise the content, style and direction of legal education.36 
Many have argued that legal education should move beyond vocational training and 
become more human centred and empathetic; it should encompass greater goals of 
public service, charity and human rights, as well as teach critical racial, gender and 
 
30 Ibid 1–2. 
31 William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Stevens and Sons, 1994) 24. 
32 Dean Spade, ‘For Those Considering Law School’ (Online Document, October 2010) 
<http://www.deanspade.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/For-Those-Considering-Law-School.pdf> (‘For Those 




36 Annan Boag et al, Breaking the Frozen Sea: The Case for Reforming Legal Education at the Australian 
National University (Law School Reform Committee, 2010); Marie Iskander, ‘The Ugly Truth about Being a Law 
Student’, Lawyers Weekly (online at 3 October 2013) <https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/opinion/14765-the-
ugly-truth-about-being-a-law-student>; Joshua Krook, ‘Clerking Mad’, Honi Soit (Web Page, 12 May 2014) 
<https://honisoit.com/2014/05/clerking-mad/>; Critical Legal Students Network, University of Sydney, ‘About’ 
(Facebook Group, 2013) <https://www.facebook.com/groups/494410394007875/about/>; Justin Pen, ‘Consider 
the Law School’, Honi Soit (Web Page, 13 March 2014) <http://honisoit.com/2014/03/consider-the-law-school/>. 
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identity theories.37 The Breaking the Frozen Sea report, written by law students at 
Australian National University (ANU) in 2010, is one example of a thorough, wide-
ranging critique.38 The report’s four authors argued that law at ANU is being taught in 
a detached way, in which students learn to separate their own concerns about 
morality, ethics and social problems from the cases they study.39 In their words: 
We discovered that the ‘law’ was a series of rules, handed down by old men 
on the bench to lawyers who ‘neutrally’ applied it. Law school was a 
process of learning and memorizing what ‘is’—not dreaming of what could 
be, not arguing for what should be. Our lived experiences were irrelevant to 
our learning. Law hovered in a strange vacuum, outside of society, culture, 
politics, and even history.40 
The official faculty response to the Breaking the Frozen Sea report was critical, with 
few concessions.41 An ANU faculty committee tasked with reviewing the report 
found that it reflected an unrepresentative proportion of students’ views.42 By 
contrast, the report had surveyed 350 students, with a further 60 students and faculty 
members being consulted.43 The faculty’s committee described the report as 
‘outdated’ and disagreed that the ANU Law School only focused on commercial law 
alone.44 However, a significant concession was made. ANU Law School 
acknowledged that ‘a commercial legal practice paradigm dominates the curriculum’, 
according to some academics.45 The faculty also acknowledged the importance of 
improving legal education,46 and specific mention was made regarding improving 
student mental health and wellbeing.47 
 
37 Boag et al (n 36). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid iii–10. 
40 Ibid iii. 
41 Australian National University Faculty, ‘Academic Staff Response to Breaking the Frozen Sea’, Law School 
Reform: ANU International Law Society (21 November 2012). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Boag et al (n 36). 






One ANU academic, Bruce Baer Arnold, further suggested that the students’ report 
was underwhelming and unoriginal.48 He contended that the authors of the report 
were ‘self-involved, naive and aimless princesses’ with ‘collective angst’, and he 
wished that fewer such students attended his law school.49 Arnold also claimed that 
the central contention of the report—that law schools produced hierarchy, privilege 
and a focus on private practice—was not a unique finding, and that it did not indicate 
how students may themselves be facilitating this hierarchical process.50 Arnold finally 
suggested that the report highlighted more problems than it solved, and that the 
problems were not as significant as the authors believed them to be.51 
c) Vocation as Training for Hierarchy 
The third argument against vocational legal education is that it might entrench 
hierarchies. Duncan Kennedy famously proposed this argument in a self-published 
‘polemic’ against US law schools in the 1960s.52 Kennedy’s view will be discussed in 
further detail below, including its application in the Australian context. In brief, he 
argued that law school involves a process of preparing students for their future role in 
the market as enforcers of the status quo—as guardians of hierarchical injustices.53 As 
an example, he noted how law students were not confronted by questions of class, 
gender and racial inequalities in the classroom, even though these inequalities lie at 
the heart of the law.54 Instead, students were taught an apolitical understanding of the 
law, in which judicial decision-making occurs devoid of any political context.55 
Similarly, law professors rarely, if ever, revealed their true political leanings in the 
classroom.56 
 





52 Kennedy (n 18). 
53 Ibid 30–40. 
54 Ibid 3. 




Similar work on hierarchy has been written since Kennedy’s polemic. Dean Spade, 
for instance, suggested that ‘most legal work maintains systems of maldistribution’.57 
Becoming a lawyer is more likely to aid the status quo in society rather than to lead to 
broad, revolutionary changes to institutional racism, inequality and other issues.58 
Law schools typically train students in conservative modes of thinking by prioritising 
the memorisation of rules over critical thinking.59 In Spade’s view, ‘No one exits law 
school without having been changed and conservatized at least a bit’.60 He affirms 
that ‘it took years of social movement engagement for [him] to shed some of the 
internalized dominance behaviors [that he] gained in law school’.61 
When neoliberal values are prioritised above everything else in law school, then 
questions about distribution and social equality are ignored.62 As one example, South 
Africa had great economic metrics during the apartheid, but it was also rife with 
injustices. Considering economics alone is thus not enough to determine whether a 
legal order is successful.63 Instead, law students should receive a broad and critical 
education in the political and empathetic side of the law.64 They must ‘deliberate well 
about political issues’, ‘think about the good of the nation as a whole’ and, crucially, 
‘have concern for the lives of others’ rather than just for themselves.65 
2) The Liberal Arts and Social Sciences 
A vocational education in law can be contrasted to the opposing idea of pursuing 
learning or knowledge, for its own sake.66 This is typically known as a liberal arts 
education or an education in the liberal arts and/or social sciences.67 It is important 
here to briefly define what these two concepts mean, for they are often used 
 





62 Ibid 4. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid 8. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Mark William Roche, Why Choose the Liberal Arts (University of Notre Dame Press, 2010) 15. 
67 William Deresiewicz, ‘The Neoliberal Arts’ (September 2015) Harper’s Magazine 2.9. 
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synonymously. In this thesis, a liberal arts education refers to a broad-minded, 
interdisciplinary education of a non-vocational nature that is mostly understood to 
include subjects from the humanities (e.g., history, philosophy and literature).68 Note 
here that although these subjects are often defined as non-vocational, they do have 
career outcomes (i.e., students can become historians, philosophers or novelists). 
However, a liberal arts education is considered an interdisciplinary activity in which 
students use their base subject not necessarily as an end point for a career, but as a 
launching pad from which to investigate broader questions that extend across multiple 
disciplines.69 To create a liberal arts curriculum is to create a curriculum full of these 
‘big questions’ that students must confront.70 As Roche elucidated: 
Even as students bring great questions with them to college, the university 
cultivates in them a curiosity about questions they had yet to consider: Why 
are there wars? What is the highest good? Is it better to suffer or to commit 
an injustice? What are the best conditions for human flourishing? What are 
the defining characteristics of the just state, and how might we most 
effectively change our state to approximate that ideal? What are the great 
artworks of the ages?71 
The term ‘liberal arts’ is often used synonymously with the term ‘social science’—or, 
more accurately, it is understood to include the social sciences.72 If liberal arts is 
interdisciplinary by nature and extends to ‘knowing the best which has been thought 
and uttered in the world’, then it would, by nature, include ‘a free and right use of 
reason and [the] scientific method’, which includes humanities subjects that use the 
scientific method of research.73 However, this definition of a liberal arts education is 
so broad that it would include vocational topics that are not necessarily 
interdisciplinary (e.g., the best business thoughts of all time). For greater clarity, a 
 
68 Ibid; Roche (n 66); Kara A Godwin and Philip G Altbach, ‘A Historical and Global Perspective on Liberal Arts 
Education: What Was, What Is, and What Will Be’ (2016) 5 International Journal of Chinese Education 8 (‘A 
Historical and Global Perspective on Liberal Arts Education’). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Roche (n 66) 17. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Godwin and Altbach, ‘A Historical and Global Perspective on Liberal Arts Education’ (n 68); Deresiewicz (n 
67); Sarah Morrisey, ‘The Value of a Liberal Arts Education’ (2013) 8 Philosophy, Politics and Economics 
Undergraduate Journal 131 (‘The Value of a Liberal Arts Education’). 
73 Morrisey, ‘The Value of a Liberal Arts Education’ (n 72). 
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line can be drawn between the liberal arts and the social sciences by defining what is 
meant by the term ‘social sciences’. 
In this thesis, the term ‘social sciences’ refers to subjects in the humanities that 
combine a close study of society with the scientific methods of qualitative and 
quantitative research methodologies.74 This includes subjects such as political science, 
economics, anthropology, sociology, psychology and geography, among others.75 
What unites these subjects as social science subjects (as opposed to liberal arts 
subjects) is a focus on ‘contemporary human societies, economies, organizations and 
cultures’, understood through the systematic collection of data and information.76 The 
‘science’ aspect is evidenced in the theories or model hypotheses that are tested 
against the qualitative and/or quantitative data collected.77 
It should also be noted here that the social sciences are closely related to the liberal 
arts. In some ways, they can even be considered a subset of the liberal arts educational 
philosophy, as they also prompt students to consider ‘big’, interdisciplinary questions 
about human society.78 The topics of these questions can range from ‘how our own 
society works—from the causes of unemployment or what helps economic growth, to 
how and why people vote, or what makes people happy’.79 For example, Nicholas 
Christakis, a professor of medical sociology at Harvard, combines his medical and 
sociological interests to question ‘how the social becomes biological’.80 He does so 
‘to explain, for instance, the evolutionary basis for phenomena such as emotional 
contagion (the way one person’s mood can “rub off” onto another)’.81 
 
74 ‘What is Social Science?’, Economic and Social Research Council (Web Page, 2021) 
<https://esrc.ukri.org/about-us/what-is-social-science/>; Simon Bastow, Patrick Dunleavy and Jane Tinkler, The 
Impact of the Social Sciences: How Academics and Their Research Make a Difference (SAGE Publishing, 2014) 4 
(‘The Impact of the Social Sciences’). 
75 ‘Social Science Disciplines’, Economic and Social Research Council (Web Page, 2021) 
<https://esrc.ukri.org/about-us/what-is-social-science/social-science-disciplines/>. 
76 Bastow, Dunleavy and Tinkler, The Impact of the Social Sciences (n 74). 
77 Ibid. 
78 John Harvard, ‘“Hard Problems” in the Social Sciences’ (July–August 2010) Harvard Magazine 
<https://harvardmagazine.com/2010/07/hard-problems-in-the-social-sciences> (‘“Hard Problems” in the Social 
Sciences’); ‘Solving the Social Sciences’ Hard Problems’ (27 April 2010) Harvard Magazine 
<https://harvardmagazine.com/2010/04/social-sciences-hard-problems>. 
79 ECSRC (n 77). 




The concept of a liberal arts education is still contested in terms of its modern 
definition. As such, an exploration of the definition’s history could offer greater 
clarity.82 The concept of a liberal education—that is, a broad-minded, 
multidisciplinary education that goes beyond vocational goals alone—dates as far 
back as the ancient Chinese and ancient Greeks.83 In ancient China, both Confucian 
educational philosophy (551–479 BCE) and traditional Chinese higher education 
(771–221 BCE) emphasised education as a ‘broad understanding of knowledge’ that 
ranged across different fields and that included moral and philosophical ideals at its 
core.84 For example, Confucius believed that education was a way to ‘cultivate and 
develop human nature so that virtue and wisdom and ultimately moral perfection 
would be attained’.85 Similarly, several of the ancient Greeks (e.g., Socrates and 
Cicero, in the tradition of the sophists) believed that a broad-minded education should 
be embedded in the humanities and that excellence should be pursued beyond just a 
narrow specialist and vocational goal.86 For example, Cicero outlined an artes 
liberalis education that included ‘the study of music, literature and poetry, natural 
science, ethics and political science’.87 However, in both ancient China and ancient 
Greece, a liberal education was also often linked to the vocational goal of crafting 
political leaders or public servants.88 To varying degrees, through the ancient Chinese 
civil service examinations and the ancient Greek political system of democracy 
(which eliminated aristocracy in place of civic leaders), a liberal arts education (no 
matter how broad-minded) was considered a means to a vocational end.89 It was 
 
82 Bruce Kimball, The Liberal Arts Tradition: A Documentary History (University Press of America, 2010), see for 
instance ‘Section VIII: Experimentation and Search for Coherence, 1910s–1930s’; Daniel E Kleinman, ‘Sticking 
Up for Liberal Arts and Humanities Education’ in Feisal G Mohamed and Gordon Hutner (eds), A New Deal for 
the Humanities: Liberal Arts and the Future of Public Higher Education (Rutgers University Press, 2016). 
83 For more on ancient Chinese education, see Godwin and Altbach, ‘A Historical and Global Perspective on 
Liberal Arts Education’ (n 68) 9–10. For more on the ancient Greeks, see Martha C Nussbaum, ‘A Classical 
Defense of Reform in Liberal Education’ in Bruce Kimball (ed), The Liberal Arts Tradition: A Documentary 
History (University Press of America, 2010) 67; Christina Elliott Sorum, ‘The Problem of Mission: A Brief Survey 
of the Changing Mission of the Liberal Arts’ in American Council of Learned Societies, Liberal Arts Colleges in 
American Higher Education: Challenges and Opportunities (ACLS Occasional Paper, 2005). 
84 Godwin and Altbach, ‘A Historical and Global Perspective on Liberal Arts Education’ (n 68); Ruth Hayhoe, 
‘Knowledge and Modernity’ in Ruth Hayhoe (ed), China’s Universities and the Open Door (M.E. Sharpe, 1989). 
85 Ruiqing Du, Chinese Higher Education: A Decade of Reform and Development (1978–1988) (Martin’s Press, 
1992) 2. 
86 Sorum (n 83) 28, 31. 
87 Ibid 31. 




believed that someone who trained broadly in either cultural or moral terms would be 
well placed to serve in the civic roles of their society.90 However, this should not 
undervalue the fact that this type of education was still interdisciplinary in nature and 
drew directly from topics in the humanities.91 
In the common-law legal educational context, the concept of a broad-minded, liberal 
education based on moral or cultural ideals would surface again in the seventeenth-
century in England. Specifically, a liberal education was taught at the Inns of Court in 
London from the 1680s, aiming to transform law students into ‘gentlemen’.92 A 
gentleman’s education involved more than mere vocational training in law; it included 
training on the ‘moral and social’ aspects of life, including the fine arts, ‘music and 
dance’.93 The notion of a gentleman’s education might be considered a vestige of the 
landed gentry or of a specific class of British society, one of the few groups with 
access to higher education at the time.94 In modern times, people might regard the 
notion of a ‘gentleman’s education’ as discriminatory to other genders, races or 
classes outside the white aristocracy.95 However, this does not necessarily signify that 
the education taught at the Inns of Court in London was not liberal. It was still a 
broad, multidisciplinary education that extended beyond purely vocational aims to 
produce students with a broader understanding of their own culture and place within 
their culture, regardless of how elitist that culture might have been. 
A liberal arts education is still often considered a privilege for a certain class of 
society—and this notion of privilege is still a contested part of its definition today.96 
Jesse Vogt, writing as a liberal arts student, suggests that ‘the possibility to enjoy a 
 
90 Ibid. 
91 Sorum (n 83) 28. 
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Change (Beacon Press, 1997) 86, 97. 
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liberal education may be a given privilege that comes with little sense of 
responsibility for … people from mainly Western societies that are financially and 
mentally supported by relatives’.97 The implied argument is that only those who can 
afford to ignore a vocation can afford to enrol in a non-vocational course. However, a 
contrary argument was voiced by the civil rights activist, WEB du Bois,98 who argued 
that ‘future leaders in the African-American community deserved a college level 
liberal education—that is, the best kind of higher education, not just narrow 
occupational training’.99 This line of thinking partially originates from the history of 
various slave states in the American south, in which laws prevented the teaching of 
black men and women to read and write.100 These laws were enacted in response to a 
race riot in 1831 on the basis that reading and writing encouraged African-American 
slaves to seek their own liberation.101 Whether a liberal arts education is purely a 
matter of privilege or a form of emancipation—or indeed both, a form of privileged 
emancipation—is a continued discussion today.  
 
97 Vogt (n 96) 45. 
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(2004) 90(2) Liberal Education 6. 
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Liberal Arts as a Proposed Alternative to Neoliberal Legal 
Education 
The aim of this thesis is to propose the adoption of a liberal arts law school 
curriculum in Australia by drawing on the numerous modern and historical examples 
of law schools and legal educators who have taught law as a liberal art. As discussed 
in the previous section, it is worth noting that the notion of teaching any topic as a 
liberal art or science is contested today—and this notion has changed throughout time. 
To this end, this thesis will investigate a modern liberal arts law school education that 
teaches students to both think for themselves and develop critical and analytical skills, 
a sense of justice and injustice, an ability to comprehend and critique the law and hard 
and soft transferable skills. Specifically, this thesis considers how and why law can be 
taught as part of a broader study of politics, history, civics, psychology and 
philosophy, and how and why doing so would prepare students to become well-
rounded citizens for the broad range of jobs they will accept after graduating law 
school. 
This thesis makes an original contribution to the field by providing concrete steps that 
lead from the theoretical arguments of how to teach law to the practical aspect of 
implementing a new curriculum. It combines various ideas of teaching law from 
history and modern innovation, as well as ideas from education theory, humanities 
education and critiques by past and present students. Specifically, this thesis proposes 
new and alternative teaching methods, assessments and subjects that differ from 
traditional recommendations in both their scope and breadth. This thesis concludes by 
proposing an entirely new law school curriculum rebuilt from the ground up to focus 
on humanities-based learning that is empowered by the latest technological and 
teaching methods. 
This thesis contains three parts. Part 1 analyses the history of legal education in 
common-law countries, revealing competing views of legal academics—some of 
whom advocated for a vocational education while others advocated for a liberal arts 
education in law. It is possible to draw out, from this analysis, a few diffuse examples 
of a liberal arts pedagogy used historically in the law school setting. These examples 
act as a springboard for the argument advanced in this thesis, setting out the 
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possibility of a liberal arts law school and what the adoption of a liberal arts 
curriculum in Australia might look like--albeit one which substitutes modern teaching 
and assessment methods for traditional historical arts and humanities approaches--
linked to modern educational standards (as discussed in Part 3). Part 1 considers the 
early education of lawyers at the English Inns of Court, followed by a discussion of 
the apprenticeship method and the introduction of law as a subject in universities. The 
early law schools in common-law jurisdictions (the US, Australia, the United 
Kingdom and Canada) will also be analysed, including the first common-law law 
school in England at Oxford, the first law school in the US at the College of William 
and Mary, and the first law schools in Australia in Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide, 
respectively. Part 1 concludes by reviewing the core compulsory subjects in Australia 
(the ‘Priestley Eleven’) and their effect on preventing curriculum reform. 
Part 2 will explore modern legal education in Australia. This part analyses the 
neoliberal and instrumental aspects of modern Australian law schools and examine 
how a neoliberal education affects students. It identifies a neoliberal style of 
education in Australian law schools in terms of the content, style and assessments of 
the curriculum, which lends itself to a vocational style of teaching law. Part 2 will 
address the common objections to, and counterarguments of, a liberal arts law 
curriculum, including the notion that law schools should only teach pure law and that 
the responsibility for a broad-minded education lies elsewhere—or, briefly, that all 
law students are essentially future lawyers. Finally, this part will argue that by 
focusing on employment outcomes rather than on public service, community service 
or public advocacy, a neoliberal legal education might affect students in terms of their 
moral education, or society, in terms of the ethical conduct of future law graduates. 
Part 3 will propose a new kind of law school in Australia—one in which law is taught 
as a broad liberal art or science, embedded in the contextualised education of politics, 
history and philosophy. It will do so by considering alternative teaching methods and 
assessments and combining ideas from the past and present. The aim is to offer 
students a chance to learn how to think for themselves, think critically about the law 
and propose new ideas for law reform. Finally, Part 3 concludes by proposing a new 
law curriculum that, if adopted, would represent the values of a liberal arts education, 
enshrined in the types of subjects that students study at law school. The proposed 
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subjects are unique in terms of how they combine a long history of liberal arts 
education with newer approaches to law, including technology and gamification. 
The thesis concludes with the contention that a new liberal arts law school in 
Australia would require discarding the current compulsory subjects (the Priestley 
Eleven) in favour of new electives and humanities subjects. The current curriculum 
would require significant change and overhaul, and black-letter law subjects and the 
case method would require significant changes in terms of their structure, their 
assessment and content. Legal principles would need to be contextualised in class 
with philosophical questions about the law’s origins, purpose and effect. Finally, it is 
argued that the Socratic method should be reversed, empowering students to question 
their professors, judges and the law itself. 
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Part 1: A History of Legal Education in Common-Law 
Countries 
The history of legal education in common law countries is one of transformation. 
From the Inns of Court in London to modern universities, from informal ad hoc 
teaching to formalised accreditation, and from law schools’ experimentation with 
various techniques and methods to the dominance of a single method of instruction. 
The history is also a battle of ideas. Ideas of what the law is, how it should be taught 
and the kinds of students that a law school should produce. Law schools have 
frequently been the battleground for fierce intellectual rivalries, where opposing 
schools of thought have battled for supremacy and control over the future of the 
curriculum.1 The major battle has been between those who consider law a liberal art 
and those who consider it a science or trade, where law is taught with an instrumental, 
technocratic or doctrinal mindset. Admittedly, there have been other beliefs, such as 
the notion that law should be taught as a ‘gentlemanly’ art or as part of a Christian 
mission or to cement the status quo. However, even in these few instances, the main 
battle has occurred between the idea of teaching law broadly and teaching it narrowly. 
Over time, the latter group has largely prevailed, creating the modern legal education 
system known today—one that is influenced by the belief that law is a technical skill 
that should be taught narrowly as a vocation or trade. 
The vocational philosophy of law arose for many reasons, including the formalisation 
of legal training over the last 200 years, the creation of professional peak bodies, the 
addition of rules and regulations to teaching and learning and the creation of 
admission requirements, examinations, grades, graduate attributes and university 
procedures.2 From the 1980s onwards, the semi-privatisation of universities—and 
universities’ consequent drive to compete for students in a market—has led to an 
 
1 Alan Hunt, ‘The Theory of Critical Legal Studies’ (1986) 6(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 11; PE Nygh, 
‘Memorandum to: Law School Staff’, as quoted in Gill H Boehringer, ‘Historical Documents’ (1988–1999) 5 
Australian Journal of Law & Society 57. 
2 Margaret Thornton, Privatizing the Public University (Taylor and Francis, 2011) 3; Wendy Brown, Undoing the 
Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (MIT Press, 2015) 190–2. 
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increased focus on numerical outcomes above all other considerations.3 The new 
neoliberal paradigm has influenced and established educational methods, and it has 
interfered with more experimental legal education reform.4 The more formal the 
curriculum became, the more rigid it became, and the more immune it became to 
experimentation and innovation. The early experimental nature of some legal 
educators at the first law schools (who taught law as a liberal art, a political activity, a 
simulation environment or a mock legislative assembly) and the even earlier 
haphazard and personalised apprenticeship method have given way to the 
solidification of accreditation methods, the establishment of core units of study and 
compulsory subject requirements, and the rise of the case method of instruction.5 The 
result has been a shift towards a standardised method of instruction, with standardised 
and compulsory subjects for all law schools. Today, all Australian law schools teach 
the Priestley Eleven and have adopted the same core subject list.6 
Reformers who sought to change legal education after its initial solidification into a 
more vocational degree (arguably between 1890 and 1920) frequently faced derision 
for trying to upset the status quo.7 The case method was believed to produce lawyers 
who thought in the right way, possessed the right skills and were fit to serve their 
roles in the market economy. In at least one case, an attempt was made to eliminate 
competing views out of history.8 This occurred when WPM Kennedy, the first dean of 
the University of Toronto Faculty of Law and a liberal arts law dean, was omitted 
from the history books of the law school itself and related documents by his 
successor, Caesar Wright, a more vocational law dean.9 As the number of law schools 
increased in common-law countries, a narrower image of legal education developed. 
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This produced a more technical training environment that did not always 
accommodate critical thinking and reasoning. 
This section will explore key early examples of liberal arts educators and law schools 
in common-law countries, later examples of vocational and professionally focused 
law schools, and the transitionary moments at each law school. The example 
educators discussed in this section have been chosen because they embody the 
competing ideas mentioned earlier or because they founded law schools that were 
based on one of the competing ideas (or a hybrid approach of both). Although not a 
conclusive history of law schools, this section will emphasise key turning points at the 
selected representative law schools over time, in which the schools typically shifted 
from a liberal art educational focus towards a vocational focus. The analysis has been 
limited to common-law countries so that an understanding can be gained of how the 
case method influenced changing educational models. The selected countries include 
the UK, the US, Canada and Australia. Most of this account will consider the era 
during which legal education can be said to have been in a molten state (between the 
1800s and 1930s). 
This historical examples presented in this part of the thesis contextualise the liberal 
arts education in law. The examples form the background to Part 3, which explores a 
modern version of a liberal arts law school in Australia, as adapted to modern 
pedagogical theory and teaching and assessment methods. It is not argued here that 
historical methods should be applied to a modern law school without adaptation. 
Looking to history merely provides the critical distance by which to evaluate modern 
practices and consider alternative curriculum options that have arisen in the past. 
This section contains four parts. The first part presents the origins of modern legal 
education in the common law—from the 1200s in England, to the apprenticeship era 
of the Middle Ages, and then to the 1800s and establishment of common-law courses 
at English universities. The second part examines the US law school, the first of 
which was founded by George Wythe and Thomas Jefferson, and their bold ideals for 
a political school of law centred on the liberal arts. The third part investigates legal 
education in the 1800s and early 1900s and recounts the ensuing battle of ideas 
between those who considered law a liberal art and those who considered law to be a 
science. Finally, the third part suggests how the case method (specifically through the 
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introduction of casebooks, along with case-based assessments) and vocational training 
emerged in Australia and the other English colonies. 
1) Early Law as a Liberal Art 
a) From the Inns of Court to Apprenticeships to Law Schools 
From the Dark Ages to the Middle Ages, legal education in England was centred on 
Roman and canon law.10 Training in law was informal and undertaken outside of a 
centralised system.11 Although much can be written about legal education in this 
period, there is little to mention of the training of lawyers in the common law, which 
only began in the 1200s.12 
The history of legal education in the common law began at the Inns of Court in 
London in the 1200s.13 Established as institutions that provided ‘legal training’ to 
aspiring lawyers, the Inns were residential premises located conveniently close to 
Fleet Street and the royal courts.14 Students were trained by observing barristers and 
‘observing proceedings in court’ while also debating each other in residence as they 
held moots and mock trials.15 The training provided was informal, and it varied on a 
case by case basis.16 This changed after the invention of the printing press, when the 
Inns of Court offered students ‘manuals and books’ to aid them in their studies.17 By 
the fifteenth century, ‘readings and lectures’ in law were presented by senior students 
and practising lawyers.18 This was a more formal style of education, but it remained 
informal by modern standards because it lacked any formal requirements aside from 
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‘attendance at a required number of meals’.19 Vestiges of this education still exist in 
the Inns today, with prominent members of the profession still holding lectures and 
talks. However, the more formal aspects of legal training have since shifted to the 
newer English universities.20 
The Inns were considered elitist institutions.21 Their aim was not to produce law 
clerks or employees in the modern meaning of the term but to create ‘gentlemen’ for a 
particular class of society.22 Students were trained not only in law but in the ‘moral 
and social’ aspects of life, including the fine arts, music and dance.23 This was similar 
to the broader focus of tertiary education in England in the 1600s, in which education 
mainly acted as a foray for the rich.24 The major universities at the time were more 
like ‘summer camps’ for the landed gentry, many of whom ‘rarely [bothered] to 
graduate’ and spent most of their time ‘gaming and feasting’ instead of studying.25 
Those aspiring to become lawyers at the Inns were of this higher-class background 
and voluntarily sought a career in law rather than out of necessity for wealth or 
prestige.26 
The Inns aimed to produce ‘gentlemen’ who were broadly trained in art and music, 
and this can be considered different from the kind of ‘broad-minded’ aims that liberal 
arts colleges possess today.27 While the Inns were motivated by class or social status 
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in their teaching, a liberal arts college today is motivated by the cultural enrichment of 
the individual or the creation of ‘citizens’ or well-rounded human beings.28 However, 
in both cases, the content that is taught amounts to a broad-minded education in 
music, art and critical thought.29 Although early examples of a liberal education might 
be different from their modern counterparts, this thesis includes them in order to 
understand how legal education became what it is today. 
The Inns can be considered a medieval precursor to the modern law school and the 
apprenticeship method of training—mainly because the Inns trained students through 
lectures and court observation (much like the training that occurs today).30 However, 
the Inns were not the same as modern law schools. Their aim of producing 
‘gentlemen’ can be considered outdated, even discriminatory, in the present day 
because it excluded female practitioners.31 Moreover, the link between the Inns and 
the court was far closer than that of a modern law school and the modern court, and 
the ‘summer camp’ atmosphere differs markedly from the modern law student’s 
experience of rigorous study, high stress, competition and discipline.32 The different 
economic, cultural and social circumstances of students in both is worth further 
consideration, but it is beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
Legal education at the Inns ended at the start of the English Civil War in 1642, after 
which it was replaced by apprenticeships in barristers’ chambers and law firms.33 
Apprenticeships involved students ‘observing all the work’ of a solicitor before trying 
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their ‘own hand at the work’.34 By 1729, English law required attorneys and solicitors 
to spend five years in a legal office before they could be admitted to a practice.35 
The work of apprentices was often dull and repetitive;36 they mainly ‘took care of 
paperwork’, ‘ran errands’, noted precedents and scrambled to learn ‘as best they 
could’ between these various tasks.37 The quality of the training provided depended 
almost entirely on the personality of the supervising solicitor.38 The most interesting 
training accounts can be derived from the American colonies.39 The American 
colonies never had an Inns of Court equivalent, and from 1700, legal education was 
taught exclusively through apprenticeship.40  
One key to a positive experience was whether or not the supervising solicitors 
provided their apprentices with a diverse reading list.41 This would lead to extensively 
different experiences, both positive and negative. One of the most famous examples 
of a positive experience is that of the young Thomas Jefferson, who was apprenticed 
to the solicitor, George Wythe, in 1762.42 Under Wythe, Jefferson was trained not 
only in the law (mainly English texts, including Blackstone’s Commentaries) but also 
in books on ‘history, moral philosophy and ethics’ and the philosophy of 
governance.43  
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However, the drawbacks of the apprenticeship model were apparent in the extensively 
different experiences of various apprentices—from a positive, broad-minded training 
like Jefferson’s to the daily ‘drudgery’ and boredom of other apprentices.44 Having to 
rely on a supervisor’s personal preference in books limited a truly broad-minded 
education. One risk was that a supervising solicitor would only train an apprentice in 
his own office’s narrow area of law rather than in law as a general field. Jefferson was 
fortunate in his experience, as Wythe owned a large private library from which 
Jefferson could borrow books on various topics.45 The variations in training in the 
apprenticeship model were due to a lack of any formalised accreditation or structure 
that denoted how someone should apprentice.46 There were no examinations, rules or 
credentials for students or supervisors,47 and apprentices received no lectures or 
centralised training.48 In the absence of a central curriculum, many students relied on 
famous English law books as a substitute such as Blackstone’s Commentaries.49 
However, this lack of broad reading resulted in training that was frequently practical 
and technical in nature, rather than training that illuminated the broader contextual 
background and theory of the law.50 
Those who defended the apprenticeship model at the time argued that law was a 
technical skill that could only be learned on the job rather than in a school or 
university.51 The famous legal theorist AV Dicey suggested at the time that only 
‘from actual business’ could a student learn how to discern the facts of a case and 
apply ‘the appropriate principles of law’ to a new set of circumstances.52 
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Consequently, when the notion of university law schools emerged, Dicey described 
them as completely impractical.53 He stated: 
The merits, in short, of the present [apprenticeship] system may all be 
summed up in the one word ‘reality’. It brings a student in contact with the 
real actual business, and fosters in him qualities which cannot be produced 
by any theoretical teaching, however excellent [emphasis added].54 
Decades earlier, William Blackstone argued the opposing view. Blackstone was 
appointed the first professor of common law at Oxford in 1758, and he established the 
first university-based law school in the common-law world.55 According to 
Blackstone, the apprenticeship model was inadequate in its scope, means and aims. 
Apprenticeships only gave students a practical understanding of the law, rather than 
an understanding of the ‘principles upon which the rules of practice [were] 
founded’.56 Instead of a vocational education, Blackstone asserted that students 
should study law at a university that was founded on the liberal arts, in which law 
could be taught as part of a broader field of study.57 
In his Commentaries, Blackstone wrote that law could only be taught as part of a 
broader liberal education at a university rather than as a ‘mechanical part of business’ 
in an apprenticeship.58 The study of law would ‘flourish best in the neighbourhood of 
[and] in assistance drawn from [the] other arts’.59 Law could be combined with a 
study of logic and reasoning, legal history, comparative law, ‘experimental 
philosophy’ and the classics of Greece and Rome.60 Blackstone asserted that trusting 
peoples’ lives and the governance of a country to men without a liberal education and 
without a wider reading of the liberal arts would be dangerous and lead to the creation 
 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid 8. 
55 Boon and Webb (n 5) 85; Wilfred Prest, William Blackstone (Oxford University Press, 2008) 150 (‘William 
Blackstone’). 
56 Christopher Brooks and Michael Lobban (eds), Lawyers, Litigation & English Society Since 1450 (Bloomsbury, 
1998) 153; Kronman (n 44) 20. 
57 William Blackstone, ‘Introduction’ in William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon 
Press, 1765–1769). 
58 Ibid 30. 




of bad laws.61 However, Blackstone’s claims should be interpreted in their proper 
context—with the knowledge that the notion of a liberal arts education has changed 
dramatically over time.62 
Although he claimed to value the liberal arts, Blackstone’s actual methods of 
instruction at Oxford were relatively scientific and grounded on legal principles, as 
evidenced in his lectures in the 1750s that ultimately culminated in his famous 
Commentaries.63 At Oxford, Blackstone did not teach on the basis of cases; he taught 
by summarising legal principles as they existed at the time.64 Although different from 
modern law schools, this was still a fairly formalistic education. He frequently cited 
statute law instead of case law to highlight how the law specifically operated.65 He 
also encouraged law students to obtain their own scientific method of understanding 
the law, rather than proscribing a specific method himself.66 This scientific method 
contrasts against the idea of teaching law as more of an art. To obtain this scientific 
understanding, Blackstone suggested that students should consider the ‘origins’ and 
original purposes of the law rather than view the law as a ‘mechanical practice’ of 
government.67 Specifically, his Commentaries criticised the failings of several legal 
cases and suggested various law reforms.68 His approach to law was to write in an 
essay format, in a way that ‘even laymen could read without disgust’, so that his 
writing was easily accessible to students.69 Consequently, his Commentaries have 
stood the test of time. They were widely celebrated at the time and are still widely 
regarded today; they also became the basic teaching materials of the original US law 
schools.70 
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Blackstone’s initial forays into university education had a minimal immediate 
influence on legal education in the subsequent decades.71 It would be 50 years until a 
second law school, Cambridge, would start a curriculum in ‘English Law’.72 The first 
full degree in law would emerge 76 years after Blackstone’s lectures—as a Bachelor 
of Laws (LLB) at the University College in London in 1826.73 By 1846, the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Legal Education wrote that there was ‘no legal 
education [in England] worthy of its name’.74 The Committee recommended that legal 
education should be taught at the major English universities, combining both 
professional and broader educational aims and teaching culture and vocational skills, 
while producing ‘gentlemen’.75 
Following the Committee’s findings, Queen’s College Birmingham created a law 
department in 1849.76 The college offered the first English LLB, taught by Charles 
Rann Kennedy.77 Kennedy believed that students should be taught law as part of a 
broader ‘classical education’.78 His law faculty stated that it was ‘highly desirable’ for 
future solicitors and attorneys to be trained in ‘Classics, Mathematics and General 
Science’ before they commenced their study of law.79 To this end, entry into Queen’s 
College Law School required a Bachelor of Arts as a first and/or combined degree.80 
Students in the law faculty were taught using Blackstone’s and Kent’s respective 
Commentaries; however, they were also taught English legal history, Bentham’s 
treatise on morals and the role of Parliament and the church in creating new laws.81 
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Charles Kennedy insisted that the law faculty should cater to the ‘general student’ and 
that law should be considered a general degree originating from the faculty of arts.82 
To this end, he taught the ‘science of jurisprudence’ while aiming to create a 
‘cultured’ people in his students.83 He insisted that law should be studied as ‘an 
institution of [the student’s country]’ and that it had an intimate relationship with 
politics, ‘natural and … moral law’ and the study of ethics.84 In this, he aimed for the 
creation of cultured gentlemen who were not only trained in the law, but who had a 
wider understanding of the world in which the law operated. 
Charles Kennedy’s term as a professor at Queen’s College was short lived however, 
and much of what he worked to achieve was abandoned.85 He resigned from the law 
school after two years, having only taught nine students, mainly due to conflicts with 
the legal profession and his own personal circumstances.86 
After the experiments at Queen’s College, degrees at other universities in England 
soon followed.87 The ABA in jurisprudence began at Oxford in 1852, followed by an 
LLB at ‘Cambridge … in 1855, and Durham … in 1858’ and at ‘Owen College 
Manchester in 1880 and University College Liverpool in 1892’.88 
Examinations ‘for solicitors and attorneys’ were established in England in 1860, in 
part due to a new Royal Commission into legal education in 1855.89 These initial 
examinations cemented the modern law school in England and initiated the 
beginnings of the formalisation of legal education, which continued for the next 200 
years. 
Despite the emergence of new degrees and examinations, students would continue 
undergoing apprenticeships after their studies. This remains the case in the present 
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day, as trainee solicitors in England are still required to fulfil a ‘training contract’ or 
period of apprenticeship after graduating from a law school.90 The vocational nature 
of legal education was therefore enshrined as a core requirement—England ended up 
adopting a hybrid approach of both formal education followed by an apprenticeship.91 
No direct path existed historically—or exists in the present—between law schools and 
the legal profession in England, and there are no formal examination requirements 
that can supplement the requirement of an apprenticeship at a law firm.92 
b) The First US Law School 
The first US law school was established in 1779 at the college of William and Mary 
in Virginia93 by the then governor of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson asked his 
former mentor and supervisor, George Wythe, to become the first professor of law in 
the country.94 Wythe brought the same approach to legal education as he had when he 
apprenticed Jefferson.95 His intent was to teach law in its wider context, allowing 
students to read landmark legal texts (e.g., Blackstone’s Commentaries) while also 
considering a greater scope of law in political theory, classical literature, civics, 
history and economics.96 Wythe instructed his students to visit parliament frequently, 
as well as ‘attend other lectures at the college’.97 He suggested that law could only be 
understood within this wider understanding of the liberal arts. In this way, Wythe 
mimicked the earlier thoughts of Blackstone.98 Indeed, the law school at William and 
Mary can be considered a spiritual successor to Oxford’s original approach. 
That being said, at William and Mary, Wythe was arguably more experimental than 
the earlier approach of teaching law at Oxford. He believed that law related directly to 
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politics and government and that this relationship should be taught at the school.99 
From the start, Wythe established a mock legislative assembly at the school, in which 
students debated legislative proposals, proposed amendments and law reform and 
learned about legislative procedures—with Wythe acting ‘as speaker of the house’.100 
He also trained students to read in the fields of government and public policy, which 
augmented their practical training in law.101 
At the time, Thomas Jefferson described Wythe’s law school as one of the foremost 
places to ‘train students to take positions of leadership in the national councils of 
America’.102 He was more prescient than he could have imagined when he made the 
comment. Wythe’s students ultimately assumed almost every senior position in 
America’s fledgling government.103 These positions included two presidents, 
numerous judges, a chief justice of the Supreme Court, a federal secretary of state and 
a federal attorney-general, among other legislators.104 His class arguably contained 
the most successful generation of law students in US history.105 His methods, 
unconventional as they might seem today, appear to be the origins of this success. 
Wythe’s training had an indelible influence on the young and aspiring Jefferson, who 
has revealed much in his own writings about how Wythe taught. The two men thought 
similarly when it came to the study of law.106 When a mentee asked Jefferson about 
the study of law, he recommended a diverse reading list, much like Wythe would 
have done in his place.107 His reading list included an extensive range of topics, such 
as ‘history, politics, physics, oratory, poetry, criticism’ and more, all of which 
Jefferson considered essential for forming ‘an accomplished lawyer’.108 This notion of 
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a broadly trained lawyer has been lost in recent times, and it is interesting that 
Jefferson’s ideals of law are more ‘cosmopolitan’ in their scope and teaching than the 
ideals of a modern law school today.109 Indeed, Jefferson’s ideal law school was 
‘liberal, well-rounded in both its legal and general aspects, and supported by well-
chosen readings’.110 He did not believe that law school was a place for practical 
training alone; rather, he believed that the study of law could be undertaken through 
intense periods of private readings in broad range of subjects.111 That is, Jefferson 
believed that the university was not created to teach students the law but to expand 
their minds beyond what they could otherwise accomplish in their own time.112 It 
should be noted here that the notion of a liberal arts education has changed over time, 
and that Jefferson’s views should not necessarily be transplanted into modern 
universities. These historical examples are merely a ‘launching pad’ from which to 
engage with more modern understandings and practices of teaching law today. 
The law school at William and Mary was also intended to serve society. According to 
Jefferson, a proper university education would create a generation of lawyers who 
were dedicated to ‘public virtue’ or to ‘the preference for the greater good over one’s 
individual interest’.113 Jefferson argued that the ‘spirit of commerce … knows no 
country, and feels no passion or principle but that of gain’.114 The idea that lawyers 
should serve themselves or their clients above the public fundamentally opposed 
Jefferson’s conception of the law. With Jefferson’s foundational view of the Republic, 
America was to be a place that would practice Montesquieu’s ideals of self-sacrifice 
and public service, over and above the ideas of greed and personal, monetary 
pursuits.115 
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c) Other Early Innovators 
The history of legal education in Australia reveals a similar vocational trajectory as 
that of Canada, the UK and US. At the start of the colonial period in the 1800s, 
Australia had neither law students nor an established legal profession. Instead, 
students who wanted to become solicitors would have to be trained by means of 
apprenticeship in legal offices either in England or Ireland before returning home at 
great personal expense.116 This was inhibitive in practical terms. The training they did 
receive was often practical, in the sense that students lacked a theoretical 
understanding of the law.117 The type of education that a student received depended 
entirely on the supervising lawyer (as discussed above), and this, in turn, depended on 
the education that that supervising lawyer had received in his own apprenticeship.118 
Consequently, the quality and scope of apprenticeships for Australian lawyers who 
were trained overseas varied extensively.119 
This section will consider early examples of legal education that emerged in 
Australia. It includes a discussion of early legal educators in Australia, some of whom 
advocated for a liberal arts style of education, along with the gradual formalisation of 
legal teaching in various written rules and regulations. Although this section does not 
definitively account for the entire early history of Australian law schools (other 
studies have done so at great length), it will document key turning points in various 
law schools as they responded to the widespread, gradual introduction of legal 
educational standards. These standards sometimes resulted in a more professionalised 
curriculum that aimed to train students for the profession of law rather than aiming to 
teach an academic or liberal arts study of law. Some examples of this professional 
approach will be documented towards the end of this section; however, they do not 
represent the only approach to teaching law in modern Australian law schools. 
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The first Australian universities opened in the late 1850s, during which some of the 
early law schools pursued, briefly, a liberal arts education in law.120 Beginning in 
1857, Melbourne Law School offered lectures in law which drew influence from 
Oxford.121 These early lectures relied heavily on Blackstone’s Commentaries and 
other English jurisprudential texts.122 Blackstone’s approach of combining substantial 
law with jurisprudence might have influenced these early university lectures and 
prompted them to extend beyond a strictly doctrinal approach to law.123 Richard 
Sewell, the first law lecturer at Melbourne Law School, aimed to produce 
‘gentlemen’—but, as a working criminal lawyer, he embodied the more vocational 
model of a professional as a teacher.124 Henry Chapman, the second lecturer at 
Melbourne Law School, stated that his classes were meant to ‘elevate [students’] 
views above the mere practice of law as a trade’.125 His lectures covered extensive 
branches of the common law and extended beyond case law.126 Chapman also aimed 
to teach students to become gentlemen rather than tradesmen, but he recognised that 
most of his students intended to become lawyers.127 At first glance, the aim of these 
early lecturers seems to be non-vocational, until the context of the time reveals 
otherwise. 
Melbourne Law School was created partly because the University of Melbourne had 
low student numbers in its opening two years.128 To attract more students, the 
university sought to establish a law school that counted towards legal admission in the 
state.129 The admission rules in Victoria were decided by the Supreme Court, and the 
Chancellor of the University of Melbourne, Redmond Barry, happened to be a 
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Supreme Court Justice.130 Justice Barry managed to influence the admission rules so 
that by the time that Melbourne Law School opened in 1857, law students would be 
exempted from the Supreme Court law exams.131 This was a significant change in 
how law was taught compared to other state universities, such as Sydney Law School 
(which had a similar exemption only in the 1890s).132 Melbourne’s law degree thus 
originally aimed to satisfy ‘the court’s requirements’ for admission, rather than to 
become a ‘longer degree course’ with non-vocational aims.133 This vocational focus 
was also evident in 1880, when classes were moved from the university to the city 
centre, mainly to facilitate the demand of part-time students and lecturers who worked 
in the legal sector.134 Melbourne Law School was here, again, catering to the needs of 
the profession. 
Sydney University was the second university to start teaching law in Australia, 
offering law lectures from 1859.135 The experiences at Sydney would differ markedly 
from those at Melbourne Law School. From its inception, Sydney ‘provided for the 
granting of degrees in law’ from a non-technical focus, in a ‘general or classical sense 
in which it had been customarily included in Literature or Arts’.136 However, it took 
until 1859 for John Fletcher Hargrave, then solicitor-general, to begin a set of 
experimental lectures at the university in law itself.137 These early lectures were non-
vocational,138 and they were regarded ‘as part of a general education, not training for 
legal practice’.139 Hargrave himself ‘doubted the value of academic legal education’ 
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to be the purview of the legal profession itself.140 By contrast, his law lectures at 
Sydney primarily focused on the conceptual side of law.141 Hargrave aimed to teach 
law as a humanities subject, and he therefore trained his students in jurisprudence.142 
Since the admission bodies did not recognise his course as a pathway to practice, 
Hargrave was not pressured to teach law as a vocational degree.143 Instead, he taught 
a non-vocational study of law as part of a humanities education.144 He aimed to make 
the law ‘popular, accessible, intelligible and interesting’, and his lectures ‘spanned a 
wide range of subjects’ including jurisprudential approaches to law from ‘Burke, 
Blackstone, Bacon and others’.145 One of his lectures ‘was prefaced by a quote from 
Bolingbroke’ regarding the necessity of a liberal education in law; it extolled that 
lawyers should be ‘Orators, Philosophers, Historians’.146 At the time, this was as 
liberal an education as one could find. At the same time, Hargrave struggled to ensure 
high student attendance without the ‘recognition of the profession’ and with students 
finding legal work more lucrative than studying.147 He resigned in 1865, but his 
successor, Judge Alfred MacFarlance, also experienced similar attendance problems 
until the lectures were discontinued in 1869.148 
In the 1880s, Sydney University began offering professional degrees in law that 
aimed to prepare students for private practice (although these degrees did not 
guarantee admission).149 These degrees were preceded by similar ones at Melbourne 
University in 1857 and followed by Adelaide Law School in 1883.150 This mirrored 
the broader movements towards vocationalism evidenced in the universities more 
broadly. In the 1860s and 1870s, various changes were suggested for admission to 
practice requirements, including ‘exemptions from preliminary examinations’ for 
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university law graduates.151 In 1877, a committee on the admission to practice (led by 
Hargrave, William Manning and others) reduced the time of articles for university law 
graduates.152 However, these and other changes were made mainly on the terms of the 
profession rather than the terms of the universities.153 Due to these changes, Sydney 
Law School’s focus began to drift towards vocationalism. In 1878, the newly elected 
Chancellor of the University of Sydney, William Manning, proclaimed that ‘[Sydney] 
university should provide not only a liberal education [in law but also] direct legal 
training’.154 He claimed that the earlier notion of a gentleman’s education was ‘better 
suited to a leisure class than to such a busy working world as ours’, further adding 
that Sydney should start teaching ‘technical instruction’ instead.155 Manning had 
completely reverted from his original views on the topic. This was partly due to the 
public pressure being placed on the University of Sydney at the time for being too 
elite, as well as the promises of reciprocal admission arrangements in the other 
colonies.156 
A professional Faculty of Law was established at the University of Sydney in 1890, 
but there was still ‘no guarantee that the degree would entitle [students] to 
practice’.157 Nevertheless, as Martin elucidated, the vocational nature of Sydney Law 
School was enshrined in three distinct ways.158 First, the school was located in the 
heart of the city’s legal district rather than on campus.159 Second, the ‘lectures were 
free’ (and university funded), and students paid professional associations directly ‘in 
lieu of the final examinations’.160 Third, the faculty would ‘comprise a Supreme Court 
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Judge and practicing barristers’, which ensured that the quality of teaching would 
have ‘a sufficiently practical bias’.161 
Among the other early law schools, Adelaide Law School (founded in 1883) stands 
out in its pursuit of blending professional and liberal arts goals.162 Adelaide Law 
School was founded after the 1877 changes discussed above, which allowed 
university law graduates to have shorter articles in a law firm compared to non-
graduates. Consequently, the school was less affected by the issue of ‘purpose’ that 
other early law schools faced, as it already possessed an in-built incentive for students 
to attend. The school’s law degree was designed as a three-year course that taught 
eight legal subjects, including Roman law, property, jurisprudence, constitutional law, 
the law of obligations, the law of wrongs and the law of procedure.163 The subjects 
aligned with the admissions requirements of the time (barring the three ‘cultural 
subjects’ of jurisprudence, Roman law and optional Latin).164 Two local lawyers, 
Aretas Young and Robert G Moore, obtained part-time lectureships, while Walter 
Ross Philips later began his profession as a full-time lecturer.165 
The style, if not the content, of Adelaide Law School shifted its focus in 1888 due to 
the replacement of Philips with FW Penefather.166 Penefather believed in a model of 
legal education that was based on the ‘Oxbridge tutorial’, in which students would 
write essays that were then read aloud in class and critiqued by other students and 
professors.167 He believed that ‘the study of law should include the study of ethics, 
history, politics and economics, all of which [are] involved in the full understanding 
and scientific development of legal systems’.168 The original law course at Adelaide 
Law School in 1883 thus included jurisprudence and Roman law, with a heavy 
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historical focus.169 The aim was to teach law in its historical context, to demonstrate 
the origin of modern English case law in earlier Roman thoughts and practices.170 
However, this liberal arts education did not last. In 1896, Penefather was forced to 
resign due to illness, and the law school thereafter became more vocationally focused 
—it adopted a ‘thoroughly practical character’ that aligned with the desires of the 
profession.171 The profession’s influence on the law school was greater than the 
legacy of one professor—a theme that has remained consistent throughout the history 
of law schools.172 
By 1894, law graduates from every major Australian law school were exempted from 
solicitor exams for admission.173 This meant that there was a direct pathway that led 
from a university degree into the legal profession.174 This pressured law schools into 
providing a more vocational style of education so that students would be sufficiently 
prepared for the profession at graduation.175 A law degree was now the main, 
vocational pathway. Consequently, the admission authorities began demanding that 
specific topics be taught in law schools, which drove the universities away from 
conceptual teaching.176 
In subsequent years, Australian law schools began considering the US model of legal 
education for crafting more practical and technical degrees.177 A combination of 
‘limited funding, small libraries [and] scant research funds’ prompted the law schools 
to focus more on producing professionally trained lawyers instead of gentlemen or 
thinkers.178 As teaching began with this revised focus, the older theoretical 
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jurisprudential and sociological aspects of law.180 Law schools became more 
professional over time.181 This practical focus rendered Australia especially 
susceptible to the teaching methods of Christopher Columbus Langdell and his case 
method, which was developed at Harvard.182 By the late 1880s, some Australian law 
schools had begun introducing casebooks in their courses and thereby introducing the 
prerequisite texts for teaching the case method (even though some resistance to the 
case method yet remained).183 
Section 2 below chronicles the rise of the case method in its various forms at Harvard 
Law School, as well as how the method was initially taught in some US, UK, 
Canadian and Australian law schools. The section also discusses how this method 
fundamentally changed legal education from its prior textbook and lecturing mode of 
study. 
2) Moving towards Vocation 
a) Law as a Science and the Rise of the Case Method 
The modern US law school is considered to have begun with the teaching of 
Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard Law School (from 1869–1870).184 With 
the reforms that began in 1869, Langdell subsequently taught students at Harvard Law 
School for the first time using the case method and the (now less used) Socratic 
method.185 The case method involves students finding legal principles in a case and 
applying those principles to a new set of factual circumstances.186 This method is said 
to mirror the professional or technical work of a lawyer. The Socratic method 
involved quizzing students about those facts and principles in a classroom as part of 
an interrogation so that flaws in logic could be highlighted, the logic of judicial 
decisions could be unpacked, and students could be guided to think ‘critically … like 
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a lawyer’.187 The case method and, to a lesser extent, the Socratic method still 
dominate legal education in the Western world—from England to the US to 
Australia.188 
In contrast to earlier lectures at law schools and apprenticeships, students of 
Langdell’s Harvard classes in the late 1800s were taught exclusively through cases. In 
an earlier law school, one might learn broad legal principles from books like 
Blackstone’s Commentaries. In Langdell’s classes, students were told to examine 
cases alone, in which they were to find no ‘right’ answers, only competing judicial 
opinions.189 Almost instantaneously, legal education became more adversarial in 
nature. Instead of laws arising from the government, to be documented in essay-like 
prose, laws were to be regarded as arising from competing perspectives that were 
posited before a judge. Although this had always been the case, prior forms of 
university instruction had never so explicitly framed the law as solely about 
competing claims. Langdell’s law school was thus more personal and transactional; it 
tended to focus more on the individual than on the government or wider social 
context. 
Langdell wanted a purely scientific study of law at Harvard. He frequently referred to 
law as a science—that is, as a set of objective principles rather than as a set of 
subjective opinions.190 Law was to be taught as a method for discovering and 
applying legal principles alone, which were themselves established rather than part of 
a broader conceptual knowledge of politics.191 He focused on professional and 
analytical training, as well as on the belief that law students would become lawyers 
who would argue their cases in court. His style of solely using case law to teach 
students everything about law linked to a rising, popular legal philosophy of his age: 
the philosophy of legal positivism. 
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In 1934, the legal philosopher Hans Kelsen described legal positivism as ‘pure law’ or 
the teaching of law without the ‘baggage’ of the social sciences of politics, 
philosophy, morality, religion and history.192 Kelsen believed that law should be 
studied as an objective body of rules that were divorced from any other field of study 
or discipline.193 This mirrored Langdell’s approach at Harvard in 1869. By teaching 
law exclusively through cases, Langdell could instil in his students the belief that law 
was a scientific study and that it did not require background knowledge—much like 
how one would study mathematics without needing to know why or how a maths 
textbook was written. Although this appeared to be a banal philosophy in the law 
school, legal positivism, when properly considered, was controversial and radical in 
its application. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, a contemporary of Langdell, frames this 
notion in a rather dark context by stating: 
Even if every decision required the sanction of an emperor with despotic 
power and a whimsical turn of mind, we should be interested none the less, 
still with a view to prediction, in discovering some order, some rational 
explanation, and some principle of growth for the rules which he laid 
down.194 
This obsession with framing rules and procedures as a science characterised law 
school as a place in which students were systematically obliged to document a body 
of rules without reason. In this sense, a student at Harvard Law School was 
reminiscent of a protagonist in a Kafka novel, in which systems and rules existed, 
which were not to be questioned, explained, justified or reasoned with.195 
To the present day, some scholars still contend that Langdell’s case method reveals to 
students ‘how open is the future of the law’.196 In contrast, Langdell himself perceived 
law as being mostly static. His aim was not to teach legal history, comparative law or 
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how law could change over time. These subjects barely interested him, beyond the 
basic call for students to study ‘the principles of law’ in cases.197 
By 1914, Langdell’s case method had come to dominate US professional law schools, 
as well as the greater common-law schools in England and Australia.198 The method 
was also adopted in Canada at the University of Manitoba, in which several 
casebooks were created for students between 1914 and 1915.199 At the University of 
Manitoba, the case method was considered a means of making students ‘conversant 
with the law’—in a way that had been impossible with the previous ‘dry lecture’ 
method.200 In addition to the case method, prominent law schools often taught legal 
writing, legal research and, occasionally, clinical legal education. In all these areas, 
technical skills were considered far more important than soft or transferable skills, 
and law was framed as a science that should be studied in its own right, without 
reference to other areas of thought. 
The next section will consider the ‘molten state’ of law schools (from the 1920s to 
1930s). At this time, Langdell’s reforms had not yet solidified; as such, a wave of 
alternative law schools was observed, as they sought to move in a different direction. 
3) The Resistance 
a) The Great Debate over the Future of Law Schools: 1920s–1930s and Legal 
Education in a ‘Molten State’ 
Langdell’s reforms did not occur in a vacuum, nor did they escape criticisms both at 
the time and in the following decades. However, the innovative experiments at the 
Inns of Court—as well as those in the apprenticeships in London and Virginia (at 
William and Mary)—became rarer following Langdell’s reforms; this was because 
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various rules, procedures and processes had developed to limit the flexibility of newer 
law schools. Admission requirements and examinations began to cement a kind of 
educational formula that centred Langdell’s case method at the heart of instruction. 
This occurred in the wider educational developments of the period in both England 
and the US: 
By the latter part of the 19th Century the organization, scope and role of 
schooling had been fundamentally transformed. In place of a few casual 
schools dotted across towns and country there existed in most cities true 
educational systems: fatefully articulated, age graded, hierarchically 
structured … administered by full time experts and … taught by specially 
trained staff.201 
However, there were still those who sought to change legal education at the time, as 
well as restore the earlier vision of law as a liberal art. Legal education had not yet 
become completely established in Langdell’s formulation, and between 1890 and 
1920, it was still in a ‘molten state’—that is, it could still be swayed one way or 
another. 
One attempt to sway it occurred at Yale and Harvard Law Schools, between 1910 and 
1919, under the leadership of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld and his mentor, Roscoe 
Pound, respectively.202 Pound would later become a leading voice of American 
sociological jurisprudence, and he would refute Langdell’s understanding of law as a 
static set of objective rules.203 Although Pound later adopted the case method as the 
dean of Harvard Law School in the 1930s, in his younger days, he vocally opposed 
strict and rigid understandings of the law.204 In this period, the two men worked on an 
ambitious agenda to transform legal education and engender a greater emphasis on 
‘social realities’, philosophy and jurisprudence.205 
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Beginning in 1903, Pound launched a blistering attack on the dominant method of 
legal education, which was formulated under Langdell.206 Instead of merely teaching 
legal principles that were found in cases, Pound asserted that law schools ‘can and 
should do more’.207 For example, he argued that comparative law, legal philosophy 
and legal history should be taught in their own right.208 More fundamentally, he 
wanted law schools to be centres of law reform, and he thought they should teach 
students the ‘social realities’ of law in practice to serve the currents of ‘public 
opinion’ in a democratic society.209 Without this link to the public, Pound feared that 
law students and law professors would remain ‘legal monks’ who were disconnected 
from the society they were meant to serve.210 In 1912, Pound insisted that law 
professors needed to ‘reconsider the attitudes’ of their teaching and begin teaching 
law in a manner that served ‘the purposes and policies of modern lawmaking’.211 He 
believed that law schools should start teaching ‘sociology, economics and politics to 
“fit new generations of lawyers to lead the people,” rather than merely giving students 
vocational training’.212 In many ways, his writings are reminiscent of those by 
Jefferson and Wythe at William and Mary, who advocated for a law school that 
primarily focused on government, advocacy and politics. 
Professor Hohfeld of Yale Law School joined Pound in his pursuit. In 1914, Hohfeld 
began demanding a suite of liberal arts–focused reforms at Yale Law School.213 His 
vision was for a law school that taught ‘analytic, historical, critical, legislative, 
functional and empirical’ understandings of the law.214 Hohfeld believed that only out 
of the chaos of these competing perspectives could the order of understanding the law 
correctly arise in a student.215 Students should be taught to question the ‘intrinsic 
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[and] extrinsic’ logic of law, including the ‘psychological, ethical, political, social and 
economic bases of the various competing doctrines’.216 Extending beyond mere case 
law, students could question from where the cases originated, how they emerged and 
why. In this, both Hohfeld and Pound were inspired by the French legal sociologist, 
Eugene Ehrlich, who suggested that ‘it is not enough to be conscious that the law is 
living … we must rather be conscious that it is part of human life … in a sense, 
everything human is a part of it’.217 
Hohfeld’s pursuit to sway the trajectory of US legal education was largely 
unsuccessful. Some have argued that this was due to personal failures: a tendency to 
make laundry lists of demands rather than focusing on simple principles.218 After all, 
the case method was simplistic, and simplicity often dominates a field when teachers 
consider complex ideas too difficult to implement. Nonetheless, Hohfeld did 
influence Yale Law School by prompting several faculty members to accept his 
reform proposals. In Hohfeld’s time, Yale Law School staff envisioned a new law 
school that offered ‘civic and cultural education’ for ‘non-professional college men’ 
and ‘scientific and constructive’ instruction for ‘jurists broadly trained for service in 
many fields of useful and far reaching activity’ who would study ‘law and its 
evolution, historically, comparatively, analytically and critically, with the purpose of 
directing its development in the future, improving its administration and perfecting its 
methods of legislation’.219 
One of the reform writers at Yale Law School was Arthur Corbin, who pushed for 
legal education reform at Yale between 1909 and 1943. According to Corbin, law was 
not to be found definitively in cases in the form of simple legal principles.220 Instead, 
students should regard these principles as ‘tentative working rules … to be tested and 
re-examined in the light of the sources from which they were drawn’.221 The origin of 
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law was as important, if not more so, than the content of law.222 Consequently, the 
common law itself could not be regarded as perpetually self-justifying lists of 
precedents but rather as ‘living law’.223 Corbin felt that both judges and students at 
Yale Law School needed to constantly re-evaluate the ‘principles, maxims, purposes 
and policies’ of law.224 
Thomas S Swan, Dean of Yale Law School during this tumultuous period, adopted a 
slightly more conservative approach than many in his dissenting faculty.225 He argued 
that the case method was essential as a basis for understanding the law; however, he 
also recognised, along with Pound, Hohfeld and Corbin, that law schools should ‘aim 
… to aid in improving the law by scientific and analytical study’.226 Swan argued that 
students should be empowered to criticise the law as it currently stood, as well as 
suggest ‘improvements … by relating laws to other institutions of human society’.227 
This can be considered a more scientific way of adapting a liberal arts legal education. 
By studying laws as they currently stood, and then comparing those laws to other 
institutions, students at Yale could conclude whether current laws ‘fit’ the society for 
which they were intended. Swan adopted this wider view of legal education, and it 
extended Yale Law School beyond mere vocational training. 
Even at Yale, these reforms did not last.228 Legal education would eventually solidify 
according to the vocational view—which was partly due to advocates for the 
movement failing to properly advance the argument for a liberal arts education in law. 
As Myres McDougal of Yale Law School concluded in 1943, ‘Heroic, but random, 
efforts to integrate “law” and “the other social sciences” [have failed] through lack of 
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Conversely, the Langdell model and the case method were clear in terms of what was 
integrated (the case method), how it was integrated (via casebooks) and for what 
purpose it was integrated (to instil a scientific understanding of the law). It is this lack 
of detail, of concreteness, that made the movement for a liberal arts education in law 
fail in the 1930s and 1940s.230 
In addition to the battles at Yale Law School in the 1920s and 1930s, lessons can also 
be drawn from the University of Toronto’s liberal arts approach in Canada from the 
1920s to the 1940s. Both law schools opposed the dominant case method and aimed 
to teach a more liberal arts understanding of the law instead—which was 
accomplished to varying degrees of success. Perhaps the most notable author on the 
topic of ‘law as a social science’ in the period was the little-known dean and founder 
of the University of Toronto Law School, William Paul Maclure (‘WPM’) 
Kennedy.231 From 1926 (as a professor) and from 1944 to 1949 (as dean of the new 
law faculty), Kennedy pursued the most ambitious agenda of any dean of the period—
to radically change legal education.232 However, his contributions were intentionally 
erased from history by his successor, ‘Caesar’ H Wright, who largely favoured 
Langdell’s case method of instruction.233 This is a vital point to highlight, as it 
demonstrates how vocational approaches to law have come to dominate the 
curriculum—sometimes by subterfuge, but often by fierce intellectual rivalries.234 
However, Kennedy’s notions of a liberal arts–based law school are worth 
rehabilitating, not only because of their unique scope and depth but also because they 
emerged at a time when legal education was distinctly moving in the opposite 
direction—away from the liberal arts and towards vocationalism.235 If anything is to 
be learned about Kennedy’s liberal arts curriculum, then he must be written back into 
the history books and considered a forerunner to the more modern ideals of a broad-
 
230 Ibid. 
231 WPM Kennedy, ‘Law as a Social Science’ (1934) 3 South African Law Journal 100. 
232 Ibid. 





ranging liberal arts education in law.236 It is worth noting that the forms of liberal arts 
and social sciences that Kennedy advanced were different from their modern 
conceptions. The social sciences were in their infancy in the 1930s, having only 
started uniting the various sciences.237 This thesis does not intend to argue for wholly 
adopting Kennedy’s approach to these topics, but rather for using his ideas as a 
foundation for more modern discussions of incorporating social sciences and the 
liberal arts into law school. Finally, although Kennedy himself used the term ‘social 
sciences’, his proposals included both social science topics and philosophy and 
humanities topics that are typically considered liberal arts. Therefore, in discussing 
Kennedy, the broader term ‘liberal arts’ can be used to denote the superstructure 
under which social science falls. 
When WPM Kennedy became dean of the University of Toronto Law School in 1944, 
he was inspired by the traditions of Oxford and Cambridge.238 In 1934, he explicitly 
condemned Langdell’s prominent case method and quoted the Dean of Columbia, 
who called the method ‘intellectual inbreeding’.239 According to Kennedy, if law 
students are taught to learn rules from casebooks, then they will be totally unprepared 
for legal practice.240 They will learn ‘nothing of the history and meaning of the rules’, 
how the rules relate to everyday life or how those rules can be developed or reformed 
‘to serve society’.241 At Kennedy’s law school, the prerogative was to ‘relate law to 
life not life to law’.242 Students were tasked with considering how laws operated in 
the world rather than basing their lives on the recitation of legal principles.243 In 
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contrast, the professional schools had trained law students to be ‘tradesmen’ or ‘mere 
technician[s]’ rather than actual lawyers.244  
In somewhat radical contrast, Kennedy wished to establish the Toronto Law School as 
a school with ‘no professional ends to serve’.245 The school’s ‘impracticality’ 
permitted a great degree of experimentation in its curriculum content and method of 
instruction. In Kennedy’s school, professors were ‘absolutely free’ to run their own 
classes as they saw fit—specifically in terms of their teaching methods, as the school 
lacked a standardised teaching style or method of instruction.246 The case method was 
used in all subjects, but Kennedy preferred ‘to fit methods to a subject rather than to 
fit all subjects into a uniformity of [one] method’.247 This style was radically different 
from those of the professional schools in the period. 
Teaching law at Toronto was intended to extend beyond vocational training so that a 
deeper ‘educational purpose’ of teaching law as a social science could be pursued.248 
Law could only be understood ‘amid the intellectual clash of university activities … 
in relation to the other social sciences’.249 Students at Toronto Law School were thus 
taught courses in history, legal philosophy, ‘economics, psychology [and] political 
theory’.250 They were also taught the philosophical foundations of law251 and the skill 
of ‘critical thinking’.252 Students were encouraged to ‘criticise what is accepted’ and 
‘reflect critically on the “why,” not just the “what” and the “how,” of the law’.253 
Bora Laskin, a student who would later become Chief Justice of Canada, wrote that 
‘even more important than the law he learnt [in Kennedy’s law school], was what he 
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learned “about things that affected the law”’.254 Kennedy’s law school ‘gave [Laskin] 
a feeling that law was something more than a narrow discipline’.255 
Kennedy’s wider focus was on using law for social and political change. Students 
were asked to inquire ‘into the social worth of legal doctrines’ and deduce whether 
laws served ‘the ends of society’.256 Essentially, all law students were trained to be 
law reformers. However, seeking to serve the ends of society was a vague ambition. It 
could be asked of Kennedy’ students: Whose ends would be served? And by what 
judgement could a student understand society’s aims? Kennedy answered this by 
referencing democracy. Students required a ‘comprehensive survey of social values’, 
in which ‘survey’ signified a literal undertaking of understanding the public 
perception of social issues.257 Specifically, he highlighted broad-ranging principles of 
governance prevalent in his time, such as ‘the interest of a child in a good home, and 
the interest of the state in conserving resources’.258 Law was a means for resolving 
these ‘problems in political science’, in which it acted as a functioning arm of 
democratic government.259  
This fundamental conception shaped Kennedy’s belief that ‘law is one of the greatest 
of university subjects … the fundamental social science on which every aspect of our 
civilization must inevitably rest’.260 Law was not simply a means for governing 
transactions in property or injury in tort; it was a fundamental means of the 
government for ‘social engineering’ the kind of society that it wished to exist.261 
Kennedy’s students were an important part of this social engineering plan, and he 
intended to produce students who were trained as reformers of the law—‘the finest of 
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all instruments in the service of mankind’.262 In doing this, he was inspired by the 
belief of then Harvard Law Dean Roscoe Pound that the law: 
May well be thought of as a task or as a great series of tasks of social 
engineering; as an elimination of friction and precluding of waste, so far as 
possible, in the satisfaction of infinite human desires out of a relatively finite 
store of the material goods of existence.263 
Kennedy’s bold vision, much like that of Wythe and Jefferson before him, produced 
an impressive class of alumni. ‘Canada’s greatest criminal lawyer’, G Arthur Martin, 
was taught at Toronto, as were two chief justices of Ontario, a judge of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, a Stanford professor of law and a chief justice of Canada.264 These 
alumni were all taught in the five years that Kennedy oversaw the Toronto Law 
School as dean. 
His other contribution was creating the University of Toronto Law Journal in 1935. It 
was a first in Canada—the only ‘scholarly legal journal in Canada’ at the time.265 It 
quickly came to dominate legal research before it began facing competition from 
other journals.266 Kennedy intended the journal to be an outlet in which his ideas for a 
law school could come to fruition in the academy; it was to be an outlet in which law 
was considered part of ‘community life, of ordered progress, and of social justice’.267 
Kennedy was joined in this pursuit by various other Canadian thinkers,268 the 
foremost of whom was James Aikin. Aikin was the founder of the Canadian Bar 
Association in 1914, and he similarly pushed for a broader and more social role for 
lawyers in Canada.269 Aikin believed that lawyers should move beyond becoming 
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politicians in their advocacy for social movements and social goals.270 A lawyer 
defined as such would never have a purely private role in society but would rather 
always be engaged with the public and work on their behalf as a political actor.271 By 
extension, law schools would be involved in teaching students ‘moral fiber’ and the 
knowledge of ‘law in a big way’ or law in its proper political context to serve public 
ends.272 According to Aikin, the law played a role in upholding the values of 
civilization, including Christian and British values.273 Therefore, it was the law 
school’s role to teach its students values rather than merely teaching them technical 
knowledge.274 
However, the innovations that occurred in Canada under Atkin and Kennedy did not 
last. Replaced by Caesar H Wright as dean, Kennedy was sidelined, and Toronto Law 
School became dedicated to the same practical and vocational outlook as other 
common-law schools in America.275 As dean, Wright firmly committed to the case 
method and specified a focus on law being taught as a social science or liberal art.276 
He was joined in this view by various other Canadian lawyers, who criticised 
Kennedy’s law school as ‘being of limited practical importance, and indeed having 
very little to do with the law’.277 
The professional law school at Osgoode Hall also criticised Kennedy’s methods.278 At 
the time, Osgoode Hall considered using the case method in all subjects impractical, 
and it only adopted the method in half of its curriculum.279 However, this law school 
had also rejected jurisprudence completely; it was trialled temporarily ‘as a first year 
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course’ before being quickly removed from the curriculum.280 Writers at the time 
justified the discarding of jurisprudence by condescendingly suggesting that students 
could ‘hardly be expected to be competent to inquire why’ the courts acted how they 
did without being ‘conversant with a considerable body of law’.281 This prompted the 
now common refrain that students cannot question the law without knowing its 
content—which realistically resulted in students never being able to question the law. 
In the 1930s, Osgoode Hall adopted a list of compulsory black-letter subjects, which 
were similar to Australia’s Priestley Eleven: torts, contracts, criminal law, civil 
procedure, company law, equity, constitutional law, evidence and others.282 Under 
Wright, Toronto Law School quickly followed suit.283 Consequently, Kennedy’s 
vision of law as a social science did not eventuate in Canadian law schools. 
However, Kennedy’s movement had a final chance decades later. In 1983, Harry 
Arthurs, then Dean of Osgoode Hall Law School, wrote a report on legal education 
reform—which reawakened Kennedy’s social science vision.284 The report identified 
a distinct lack of critical Canadian legal research,285 for which it blamed the ‘narrow 
vocationalism’ in Canadian law schools and the teaching of black-letter law.286 
Arthurs noted a ‘tension between the humane intellectual goals of a law faculty and 
its professional training activities’.287 He worried that black-letter law was eroding the 
social and public roles of Canadian law schools.288 
Arthurs argued that to serve their ‘humane intellectual goals’, law schools would have 
to develop a curriculum that ‘identified with the humanities and social sciences’.289 
Arthurs’s report concluded with several recommendations to this end, including that 
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law schools should adopt new elective subjects with clear ‘social goals’ and 
‘encourage interdisciplinary study [of] legal theory’, and that ‘Undergraduate law 
school curriculum should include … comparative law, legal problems of 
disadvantaged groups [and the] legal implications … of social and political 
problems’.290 These recommendations aimed to revolutionise the way that law was 
taught, as well as open the subject to new disciplines, ideas and discussions. 
Unfortunately, the report had a minimal tangible effect in Canada.291 The law schools 
continued teaching a narrow, black-letter and vocational version of law.292 Although 
Arthur offered sound recommendations, he proposed few teaching methods by which 
to implement his reforms.293 This was a crucial flaw in the report. Without a practical 
‘how-to’ guide, it was difficult for lecturers to understand how they should implement 
what amounted to conceptual goals and visions.294 
In his recent reflective work, Arthurs stated that ‘Toronto’s Faculty of Law in the 
1950s [under Kennedy] could properly be described as Canada’s most progressive 
law school, even though it might not be regarded as such by today’s standards’.295 
This comment is useful on two levels: it highlights the uniqueness of Kennedy’s 
approach to legal education historically while simultaneously suggesting that a 
modern, progressive law school might act slightly differently. First, Kennedy’s 
approach (as documented above) uniquely contributed a non-vocational framework 
for teaching law that was embedded with humanities subjects—in a manner that 
contrasts a modern neoliberal educational framework (which will be discussed in the 
next section). Kennedy’s work offers lessons on the concept of a non-vocationally 
focused curriculum embedded with the humanities at its core. 
Although one can learn from Kennedy’s work, one can also strive for newer forms of 
teaching, content and methods that suit the context of the modern world (these 
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methods will be discussed at the end of this thesis). A more progressive and modern 
law school (as aligned with Arthurs’s point) might prioritise discussions of race, 
gender or class through a critical framework. However, Kennedy’s work as discussed 
in this thesis—as well as the works of other authors in this chapter—is intended to 
help differentiate unique and older methods of education from modern methods so 
that this uniqueness can be used as a springboard for new ideas. In tracking the 
development of certain law schools in certain places (and how they changed over 
time), it is evident that the lessons learned from teaching law as a non-vocational 
humanities discipline should not be lost. This idea will be discussed in greater detail 
in the next section. 
4) The Great Resistance: The Return of Law as a Liberal Art 
a) Legal Process School in the 1950s 
The latter half of the twentieth century observed several movements that challenged 
the traditionally vocational approach of US law schools. These movements help 
explain the beginning of the critical thinking approach to law (which will be discussed 
later in this thesis), and they help substantiate how legal education has developed in 
specific contexts over time. The first of these movements was the legal process 
movement. Beginning in the 1940s and 1950s, a group of legal scholars at Harvard 
began exploring a different method for comprehending the legal system. Instead of 
focusing on the outcomes of case decisions, this group focused on the processes of 
legal institutions.296 The legal process theorists believed that law was ‘purposive’ and 
that it derived from ‘human needs’ and social purposes rather than the sovereign alone 
(as in legal positivism) or God (as in natural law theory).297  
A core principle of the legal process movement was that institutions who interpreted 
the law had to ask ‘how [the original social] purpose might best be furthered’.298 With 
this principle, legal process theorists mirrored the legal realist movement by believing 
that multiple right answers existed for a court case, that ‘the law was not determinate’ 
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and that social and general values underlay the law.299 However, the legal process 
theories differed in their focus—which was on the different processes of law in the 
separate branches of government. For example, process theorists argued that decisions 
of ‘preference’ belonged to the legislature, that decisions of ‘expertise’ belonged to 
the executive and that decisions of ‘reason’ belonged to the judiciary.300 By focusing 
on these institutional differences, the legal process theorists could discern nuances of 
the law in action rather than perceive the law as a mere decree of the executive branch 
or judiciary. 
One of the most notable scholars of the legal process movement was Lon Fuller. 
During his time at Harvard, and specifically during his time as chairman of Harvard’s 
curriculum committee in 1947, Fuller was committed to broadening the law school 
curriculum’s scope to include the social sciences.301 He was ‘especially emphatic that 
the various interrelations between the legal and the nonlegal must become a central 
part of the curriculum’.302 He wrote that to ‘teach men to think freely’, law schools 
could not ‘rope off whole areas of reality’ such as metaphysics and ethics.303 Instead, 
the gates should be ‘swung open’ to these areas in the classroom.304 Responding to the 
vocational idea that such questions do not arise in legal practice, Fuller argued that the 
social sciences are considered irrelevant in practice partly because they are considered 
irrelevant in law school.305 Rather than conceding the point, he argued for integrating 
the social sciences into law school, and thereby making them relevant in practice.306 
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He maintained that law could not be taught as a ‘descriptive science’ alone, for it is 
impossible to separate what the law was with what the law ought to be:307 
For about twenty years now American professors of law have been agreeing 
with one another that we ought to do something about the integration of law 
with the other social sciences. In view of this general agreement, it is 
remarkable how little of real significance has actually been accomplished in 
this direction. The explanation lies, I believe, in a failure to work out a 
conception of legal education that will make the integration something 
real.308 
According to Fuller, a real integration of law and the social sciences would involve 
two significant steps: adopting non-legal materials in class and hiring non-legal 
educators.309 The first step involves students solving problems (i.e., assignments) that 
are a ‘synthesis’ of both legal and non-legal considerations.310 The second step 
involves drawing ‘on the resources of the university as a whole’ by inviting faculty 
from other departments (e.g., economics and psychology).311 Fuller tried this and 
observed it in other law schools, commenting that it worked effectively if the non-
legal problem could be attributed legal relevance.312  
One area in which Fuller could test his ideas was the design of a hypothetical course 
on jurisprudence.313 The course was described as a ‘critical examination [of] the basic 
premises that underlie reasoning about legal problems’.314 As a second year course, it 
would be taken after students had learned about the law but before the third year, 
when they no longer had time to question the law they had learned.315 According to 
Fuller, a course on jurisprudence could help students question the ‘unstated premises’ 
behind legal reasoning, ‘raise fundamental issues not mentioned by court, counsel, 
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casebook editor, or teacher, and generally point out when “the king doesn’t have any 
clothes on”’.316 This would help students become active in class, challenge their 
teachers and interrogate legal principles.317 The core of the course would focus on 
justice. According to Fuller, ‘Even the simplest problem of contract or tort law 
contains implicit within it issues concerning “the justification and ends of the state, 
about the ethics of human conduct”’.318 The course would be taught by ‘reading and 
discussing … representative authors [say ten to 15]’ about a topic, and the authors 
would be ‘selected because they represent divergent points of view’.319 
Despite ardently defending new teaching methods, Fuller never advocated for 
discarding the traditional case method.320 He loathed the ‘black letter mind’ that was 
preoccupied with the mechanical and narrow application of law, but he believed that 
the case method was distinctly separate to this mindset.321 In 1950, he wrote that 
‘some of us are inclined to be critical of the appellate case as the exclusive focus of 
legal education … but all would agree, I suppose, that the core of our instruction 
ought to be the close analysis of cases [however defined]’.322 He believed this because 
he regarded the case method as a tool rather than an end in itself.323 He argued that 
had the tool been created in a different time, it would have had a different contextual 
imprint upon it (e.g., not that of legal positivism but legal process or some other 
thought period).324 
The legal process movement ended partly due to its core focus on process over 
outcome. For example, by advocating for the judiciary to act on ‘reason’ rather than 
on the ‘immediate result’ of a case, the movement failed to grapple with the oncoming 
wave of the civil rights era.325 Wechsler, a famous process theorist, used this logic to 
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argue that the Brown v Board of Education decision (which ended segregation) was 
poorly decided.326 Many, but not all, legal process theorists agreed, which made it 
difficult for the movement in the 1960s.327 The new social movements ‘attacked’ legal 
process theory from both sides—including law and society theorists, critical legal 
studies (CLS) scholars and law and economics theorists, mostly for failing to properly 
situate legal decision-making in its social, hierarchical and economic contexts, 
respectively.328 It was one thing to ensure a proper process of law but quite another to 
separate this process from its political and social ramifications. 
b) Law and Society in the 1960s 
Another attempt to reconcile law with the social sciences occurred in the 1960s with 
the law and society movement. Beginning in 1964, a ‘group of sociologists, political 
scientists, psychologists, anthropologists’ and law professors formed the Law and 
Society Association, as well as the Law and Society Review in 1967 and various 
annual conferences thereafter.329 The first editor of the review observed that its 
publication came ‘from a growing need on the part of social scientists [economists, 
social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, anthropologists] and lawyers for a forum 
in which to carry on an interdisciplinary dialogue’.330 The aim was ‘simple but 
ambitious’: law and legal institutions would be examined with the empirical scientific 
tools of the social sciences, which would provide a unity of ‘theory and data’ to form 
a ‘critical judgment’ of how the law realistically worked in society.331 This critical 
approach substantiated the origins of a certain critical thinking of law (which will be 
discussed in more detail in Part 3 of this thesis). 
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An early contributor to the law and society movement, Philip Selznick, phrased the 
movement’s motto as ‘law in action’ and ‘law in context’.332 This motto was driven 
by two key realisations: that the law was human made and that law varied over time 
according to the context in which it was created.333 The research methods that were 
delivered varied greatly, but the projects in each centre aimed to ‘explain legal 
phenomena … in terms of their social setting’.334 Integrating the law and society 
movement into legal education aimed for the same outcome—to encourage students 
to situate legal institutions in their social context, and thereby understand the law as it 
works in society. 
A core weakness of the law and society movement was its dedication to inclusivity 
and plurality. By the 1980s, it had become a ‘big tent’ or ‘pluralistic association’, in 
which different academics brough different methods to pursue the central aims.335 The 
movement’s loose focus was considered a significant contributor to its gradual 
decline.336 As early as 1989, Lawrence Friedman observed that ‘law and society 
people are more common outside law school than inside. But their position is 
nowhere very strong.’337 He highlighted a ‘substantive weakness in the field’—that 
the work being produced was an ‘incoherent or inconclusive jumble of case studies 
[with] no foundation’.338 Robert Temper mirrored these thoughts at the time, writing 
that the movement was ‘wracked by anguish, self-doubt, role confusion, and 
occasional impotence’.339 The richness of the early years was considered increasingly 
eroded by a ‘breadth or inclusiveness’, which had begun being regarded as not 
necessarily ‘cost free’.340 One core problem was that the movement became divided 
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between those striving for normative ideas about the law or how it should be and 
those striving for a ‘detachment and neutrality’ about the law’s empirical reality (i.e., 
between natural lawyers and legal positivists, respectively).341 On the side of natural 
law, Selznick argued that ‘sociological theory and research would have little to gain 
from a rigid separation of fact and value’. He even argued that there was an 
‘interdependence’ between the two.342 Donald Black, a Yale scholar, termed this 
perspective ‘sociological jurisprudence’ (citing Roscoe Pound), and the more 
traditional, detached and positivist view ‘the sociology of law.343 This conventional 
division separated the law and society movement rather than united it in a common 
vision to challenge the status quo of law schools.  
In the 2000s, some academics began proclaiming that the law and society movement 
was dead due to a loss of focus.344 It had seemingly shifted from being a broad 
movement to a mere ‘mentality’.345 Schlage critiqued the movement for being unable 
to reproduce itself after its initial period of excitement.346 This perception of the 
movement might have been premature, given the survival of law and society journals 
that were dedicated to the topic throughout the 2000s, along with various other ‘law 
and __’ offshoots in the ensuing years.347 However, it is worth noting that law and 
society have not systemically changed legal education in the long term by radically 
transforming teaching methods or content; they have merely provided a different 
‘mindset’ by which to regard the law and legal institutions.348 To transform law 
schools, something more is needed than recognising, or even diagnosing, the 
relationship between law and society. 
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c) Critical Legal Studies in the 1970s 
Legal education was observed to become purely vocational after the attempts to resist 
vocationalism at Yale and Toronto in the 1930s and 1940s, as mentioned above (in 
addition to the legal process and law and society movements).349 The notion of a 
critical law education that connected students with a broader, contextual vision had 
been ignored in favour of casebooks and the case method.350 The fight appeared to be 
over until a new wave of resistance emerged in law faculties decades later. 
In the 1970s, a wave of dissent against vocational education emerged in various US 
and English law schools, ultimately formalising into a movement known as critical 
legal studies (CLS). CLS aimed to critique the political, moral and social influences 
of law on society rather than narrowly focus on teaching law as a set of rules.351 The 
CLS movement frequently referred to the law’s interaction with Marxist ideas about 
class, hierarchy, gender, race and sexuality.352 In this way, CLS was a new tool with 
which to attack the vocational curriculum—by stating that it ignored the biases of the 
law, entrenched hierarchy and promoted inequality and disadvantage.353 Rather than 
accepting the law as a system of rules to be applied, CLS criticised the law, law 
professors and legal institutions, even asserting that law itself should be put on trial.354  
One of the foremost writers in the CLS movement in the 1970s was Duncan Kennedy, 
a professor at Harvard Law School from 1976 to the present day. In 1983, Kennedy 
wrote a polemic against law schools in which he evaluated law schools from a CLS 
perspective, by reflecting on his days studying as a student in the 1960s.355 Kennedy’s 
polemic began by suggesting that law schools are intensely ‘political places’, despite 
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their claims that they neutrally train lawyers for practice.356 He argued that their 
political aim was to shape students into a corporate mould ‘for willing service in the 
hierarchies of the corporate welfare state’.357 By discouraging moral and political 
dissent, law schools aimed to drive all students—conservative, liberal or radical—
towards taking jobs in private and corporate firms and serving private and corporate 
interests.358 It is difficult to translate these findings into the Australian context; 
however, it is worth noting that this idea was echoed decades later in Australian 
National University’s Frozen Seas Report, in which Melanie Poole returned to law 
school in her final year to find: 
The students who had once marched for Indigenous land rights, who had 
spent their summers volunteering at clinics in Africa, had, somewhere 
during their legal education, decided that the only ‘viable’ career involved 
working 12 miserable hours a day to enhance the profits of wealthy clients. 
They referred to their work not as a conscious choice they had made, but as 
result of there being ‘no other options’, because everyone had to ‘do their 
time’ in corporate practice. 
The preference for private practice at law schools is thus revealed not as a real, 
intrinsic preference of students but as a covert political ideology that is driven by the 
law schools.359 According to Kennedy, law schools ‘channel their students into jobs in 
the hierarchy’ of private practice by making alternative careers (e.g., serving the poor 
or legal aid) seem ‘hopelessly dull and unchallenging’.360 Students are explicitly told 
that ‘alternatives are risky’, and they are persuaded to regard themselves as weaker, 
lazier and more incompetent than they actually are.361 The bargain is clear: if students 
offer themselves to a major law firm, then they will always be cared for; if students do 
not offer themselves, then they must suffer the consequences.362 Kennedy believes 
that this is an ideological agenda that requires dismantling.363 
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Dismantling the corporate agenda is when the liberal law professor emerges. 
According to Kennedy, liberal law professors can challenge the dominant corporate 
narrative in three distinct ways.364 First, they can be a ‘known liberal on the faculty’ 
and thereby protect progressive students ‘from being bulldozed out of their liberal 
values’ by conservatives.365 This includes supporting a student’s liberal arguments 
‘against conservative students and conservative professors’.366 Second, the liberal law 
teacher can push liberal students further towards the left, away from moderation and 
towards radicalism.367 Kennedy admits that this could lead to a form of 
‘indoctrination’, and he concedes that it would contradict his instinct that the liberal 
teacher is not intended to ‘impose his or her political beliefs’ onto his students.368 
However, Kennedy resolves this by stating that it is a law lecturer’s job to teach ‘his 
own truth of the subject’.369 Kennedy committed to creating his own teaching 
materials with his ‘version of the truth’, but at the same time, he aimed to arm 
students to help them ‘defend themselves against [him] with the very stuff [he’s] 
giving them’.370 
Here, Kennedy makes several unconventional decisions: he admits that law is 
subjective and his own bias, he teaches that bias, and then he arms students to ‘defend 
themselves’ against what he teaches. This is considered a critical education in law 
because the students can see behind the curtain at all times. They are not told that the 
law is objective, and that the lecturer is providing factual, decided principles. Instead, 
they learn that the law is both political and subjective. One might argue here that 
professors can, and should, teach a value-neutral version of the law rather than impose 
their own ideology. According to Kennedy, such a position is impossible to defend.371 
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Any ‘value-neutral teaching is implicitly to the right’, he stated.372 The doctrinal kind 
of education consists of students learning legal principles with a ‘one sentence’ policy 
justification for each rule, so each rule thus seems inevitable.373 The intellectual kind 
of teaching comprises the notion that there is no right answer to a case.374 This makes 
students passive because it bombards them with ‘a trillion possible interpretations’—
which signifies that a search for the truth or justice is futile.375 In either scenario, a 
value-neutral education simply serves to reinforce the status quo. 
The third and final goal of the liberal law teacher is to ‘undermine the confidence of 
conservative students’.376 Kennedy suggested that liberal lecturers should offer ‘dumb 
[conservative] ideas that pretty clearly will disintegrate in the light of day’.377 As his 
example, he cited the idea that ‘redistribution is always inefficient’.378 Here, he did 
not aim to exclude conservative students from the discussion, but rather to welcome 
them by challenging their views.379 The risk of this approach—as he himself has 
admitted (and as evident in the redistribution example)—is that he may ‘strawman’ 
the conservative argument or choose an easy target instead of challenging more 
nuanced conservative positions. 
By the 1990s, Kennedy’s perspective of legal educators imposing their own views on 
students so directly had shifted. In 1994, he wrote, ‘I’m not in favour of preaching … 
I think I can politicize my classroom without being guilty of indoctrination [or using] 
my authority as a teacher’.380 He created a novel teaching method to draw out the 
politics from the students. This indirect technique is especially novel because it relies 
on the traditional use of cases rather than on non-legal materials to make an 
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outlined below, contesting its usefulness is beyond the scope of the present 
discussion. 
In his method, Kennedy began by selecting a case or hypothetical scenario that posed 
‘a gap, conflict or ambiguity in the system of doctrine’ and that divided the class into 
two camps of liberal and conservative students.381 His goal was ‘to polarize the class’ 
so that students argued ‘hard among themselves’.382 Over time, students would form 
‘political alliances’ in the classroom, which could shift according to new and 
contested cases with political resonance.383 In this method, students began to learn 
that ‘legal argument is indistinguishable from political argument’.384 It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to unpack or critique this technique. However, for the purpose of 
the current topic, this technique is considered another example of a novel way to 
challenge the traditional objectivity of legal education. 
In his critique of law schools, Kennedy was joined by another CLS author and 
Harvard alumni, Karl E Klare.385 Together, they argued that the politically 
conservative ideology of law school was taught almost exclusively via the case 
method.386 According to Klare, the case method was used to separate ‘public’ and 
‘private’ thought, in which the core law subjects focused on private cases from a 
market-centric perspective.387 Kennedy believed that cases were used in law schools 
to position ‘legal reasoning’ above moral thought and social justice, often without any 
explicit justification.388 From their earliest lectures, students are taught that their 
initial reaction of ‘outrage’ to when a ‘bad guy wins’ in a case is ‘naïve, non-legal 
[and] irrelevant … and maybe even substantively wrong’.389 Consequently, most 
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students become disillusioned or detached from their own morality.390 Instead of 
critiquing the law, they begin to accept it for what it is—‘normalized’ and apolitical. 
As will be argued in Parts 2 and 3, vocational education thus does not teach the whole 
student; it treats their moral and ethical views as separate to their core function of 
being trained for a job. When it is learned that the law is ideological and serves 
‘particular groups’ above others, students do not have the required tools to argue this 
point or defend themselves from being ideologically indoctrinated into a corporate 
world view.391 Students are instead bullied into accepting ‘legal reasoning [as] 
different from policy analysis’, and they are expected to accept a case decision even 
when the logic of the case is ‘circular, question-begging, incoherent, or so vague as to 
be meaningless’.392 In a worst-case scenario, an unjust outcome of a case is to be 
accepted based on appeals to authority alone.393 Students are thus trained to separate 
themselves—on one side are their technical skills required for legal practice, and on 
the other are their ethical and moral integrity.394 
To challenge the ‘law’s ideological neutrality’, Kennedy, Karle and other CLS 
scholars argued against the status quo that all law was apolitical, entirely vocational 
or somehow separate from the public sphere.395 Realistically, the core subjects of law 
school obscured an ideological agenda of hierarchy, status and class—for example, 
‘Property rights are understood to confer power … contractual bargaining is never 
truly equal’.396 Karle stated that the curriculum itself ‘is emblematic of the notion that 
the core of … capitalism is rational, structured and central to the lawyering 
identity’.397 To be a lawyer is to think of ‘incremental reform through governmental 
regulation’ rather than through fundamental social change.398 
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One of the CLS movement’s central questions in the 1980s was: ‘How is it that those 
who are systematically disadvantaged by the existing order [of law, can come to 
accept] the legitimacy of the institutions … which perpetuate their subordination?’399 
Kennedy answered this question simply: the disadvantaged accept the existing order 
because they are taught to—through appeals to authority, circular logic and the 
prevailing notion that the law is not political at all and does not serve one group over 
another.400 In contrast, Kennedy argued for law schools to admit that this is not the 
case—that they are political and promulgate a hierarchy of social values through their 
teaching content and methods. Instead of merely teaching vocationally, law schools 
should admit to the political content of the law and teach it to students. 
This core ideal of the CLS movement took root at Macquarie Law School in 
Australia, in which the movement’s principles and ideals were practised in the mid-
1970s.401 In a new, mainly Marxist faculty, CLS was considered a way of critiquing 
the ‘traditional norms’ of law from a new and more radical perspective, which 
prompted dissenting views.402 The lecture hall was essentially abandoned in an 
attempt to encourage a critical style of learning.403 Although students were 
discouraged ‘from seeing themselves as passive recipients of information’, they were 
instead forced to ‘defend their views’ in small, tutorial-style classrooms.404 
The curriculum at Macquarie Law School had moved away from black-letter law, 
Langdell’s case method and the dominant ideology of legal positivism. Instead of 
teaching legal doctrine as ‘pure law’, core subjects were reframed as historical, 
contextual and philosophical subjects.405 For example, Macquarie had ‘no [specific] 
courses in torts or criminal law’ at the time; instead, ‘The law on those matters could 
be found in courses such as Standards of Legal Responsibility, Personal Injury and 
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Notions of Property’.406 These broader, philosophical subjects examined the historical 
context of legal doctrine, how it arose and whose aims it served.407 
Instead of sidelining legal history and jurisprudence as ‘irrelevant’ or ‘soft’ subjects, 
Macquarie Law School took the CLS approach of considering these subjects essential 
to a legal education.408 The intention of teaching jurisprudence in all subjects was to 
provide students ‘intellectual tools’ with which they could critically examine the law 
they were being taught.409 
Macquarie Law School’s experiment with CLS teaching did not last. In 1977, the 
dean of the law school, PE Nygh, began dismantling the faculty.410 In a letter to the 
staff, Nygh wrote that, as dean, he was ‘given a mandate … to create a course of 
professional training’ for students rather than one of ideological training.411 He feared 
that training students in a Marxist framework would lead to violence, as students 
became ‘defeatist [about their legal training, and that some could] come to the 
conclusion that the only answer to the problems of our society is to throw bombs 
around’.412 Nygh also referred to the Second World War and his belief that ideology, 
in all its forms, was a source of evil.413 
In 1987, the government-commissioned Pearce Report recommended that Macquarie 
Law School should be closed due to a lack of ‘solid legal substance’.414 Although the 
law school did not close, the CLS teaching style was abandoned.415 
Caution is advised when considering Macquarie Law School’s example of 
categorising critical thinking as left-wing or Marxist. Historically, critical thinking 
was advocated by thinkers on both sides of the political divide. The Christian 
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philosopher, Thomas Aquinas, was arguably the greatest critical thinker of the Middle 
Ages.416 Aquinas used dialectical reasoning to contrast different arguments and test 
their effectiveness, in much the same way that Socrates did.417 He also ‘answered all 
criticisms of his ideas as a necessary stage of developing them’.418 In more recent 
times, the Jesuits perform a kind of classical training in critical thought: they question 
what they are taught and by whom they are taught:419 
Education in the Jesuit tradition is a call to human excellence. It develops 
the whole person, from intellect and imagination to emotions and 
conscience, and approaches academic subjects holistically, exploring the 
connections among facts, questions, insights, conclusions, problems, and 
solutions … Jesuit education also examines the history of injustices, often 
subtly embedded within systems and cultures, while also generating hope so 
that students feel called to address significant world problems with courage, 
commitment, and good faith.420 
Framing progressives as ‘sceptics’ and ‘critical thinkers’ and conservatives as 
‘market-centric’ is a relatively recent phenomenon. This framing does not serve the 
purpose of an objective study into critical thinking in law schools. It is more effective 
to celebrate the history of critical thinkers on both sides of the political divide so that 
it can be ensured that critical thinking continues in universities. 
By the mid-1990s, the CLS movement was in decline, with key members of the initial 
movement declaring that it was dead.421 Notably, this included Duncan Kennedy and 
other scholars at Harvard Law School.422 Following the decline of the CLS 
movement, vocational education came to be cemented in various common-law 
countries. 
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The next section concludes with a description of how Australian law schools became 
vocational, which can be considered a precursor to the rest of this thesis; however, it 
is also worth mentioning the parallel descriptions of other jurisdictions. Following the 
decline of the CLS movement, the notion of a liberal arts curriculum never truly 
recovered. It was eventually replaced with the political philosophy of neoliberalism 
that entered law schools (as discussed in Part 2 below). 
5) Vocation Triumphant 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, Australian law schools grew exponentially—more 
students enrolled, and ‘full-time academic staff’ (replacing earlier part-time 
practitioners) were appointed, which formed a new full-time academic community.423 
Whether these new academics were vocationally focused or able to pursue a liberal 
arts teaching style remains debatable. On the one hand, Susan Bartie made a 
compelling case that 1950s law academics in Australia resisted the vocational pull 
and remained wedded to a liberal arts education.424 Indeed, many academics were 
followers of the growing realist movement in the US, which was inspired by the 
Harvard Law School academics (e.g., Roscoe Pound) who aimed to critique the law 
rather than just blindly follow it.425 Various 1950s law professors also ‘viewed law as 
an instrument for social change’ and believed in the flexibility and adaptability of 
legal doctrine rather than a strictly formalistic understanding of law.426 
Conversely, a Harvard Law School dean who visited Australia in the 1950s stated that 
the Australian ‘Law Faculties [were] dominated by practical rather than intellectual 
interests’.427 These practical interests seemed to prefer doctrinal knowledge over 
morality or social and contextual views of the law. Peter Brett, a University of 
Melbourne Law School professor in 1960, condemned that the ‘whole … profession 
in England and Australia has reduced itself to the status of a body of priests [who are 
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convinced] that law and morality [are] utterly distinct’.428 An Adelaide Law School 
professor at the time also commented that ‘for a variety of reasons, lecturers at 
Australian law schools have not made many significant contributions to legal 
literature. Most publications have been teaching tools—with “case books” becoming 
increasingly popular’.429 These accounts seemingly portray Australia’s law professors 
of the 1950s and 1960s as priests of the case method who lacked a commitment to the 
morality or social context of law and were more concerned with ‘practical interests’ 
than with offering students a liberal arts education. 
In 1971, a new law school was established at the University of New South Wales 
(UNSW).430 From its inception, UNSW Law School aimed to focus on social 
justice—or, in the words of the founding dean, the school possessed ‘a keen concern 
for those on whom the law may bear harshly’.431 However, despite this public aim, the 
law school did not begin with experimental teaching methods.432 At its inception, 
UNSW Law School had adopted the Socratic method and the case method instead of 
experimenting with critical teaching methods.433 The dominance of the case method 
once again is worth noting here, as is the knowledge that a new law school would start 
with the case method as the default method despite its potential moral ambiguity 
(which shall be discussed in further detail below).434 Nevertheless, the establishment 
of the case method evidences a doctrinal, black-letter and vocational outlook that 
continued even in the establishment of new institutions. 
In 1992, the Australian Law Admissions Consultative Committee (LACC) created a 
list of 11 compulsory subjects (‘The Priestley Eleven’), which embedded vocational 
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education into the curriculum.435 Due to their nature, admission requirements 
homogenised legal education in Australia.436 Compulsory subjects in students’ early 
years at law schools left little room for diversity in subject offerings, and there was 
very little flexibility for curriculum reform for law deans.437 Instead, compulsory 
subjects forced law schools to focus primarily on teaching vocational skills (in core 
subjects) above other types of knowledge.438 In Australia, the Priestley Eleven 
subjects contained only one liberal arts–focused subject: legal ethics.439 The rest were 
black-letter law or doctrinal in nature, including subjects such as torts, contracts, 
evidence, equity, property law, criminal law, company law, constitutional law and 
civil and criminal procedure.440 Black-letter law units like these tended to be taught 
via the case method, with a strict focus on learning and applying the law without 
contextual and theoretical knowledge.441 This aligned with a similar development in 
other jurisdictions. Starting in Ontario in 1957, the Law Society of Upper Canada 
‘prescribed eleven mandatory’ subjects for law students.442 This was reduced to seven 
in 1969, following a petition from several law deans.443 In 1999, the UK Law Society 
and the General Council of the Bar created a list of seven compulsory subjects.444 No 
compulsory subjects were created in the US, but law schools were required to teach 
‘substantive and procedural law’.445 It is significant to note that Australia has the 
highest number of compulsory subjects out of all these jurisdictions. 
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The rise in compulsory subjects in Australia and abroad was influenced by the 
increasing dominance of the political philosophy of neoliberalism. As mentioned 
earlier, the neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s (under the Hawke–Keating and 
Howard governments) aimed to privatise public services (including university 
education) and place them into a new private market.446 The withdrawal of public 
funding for universities in the 1990s led to a greater sense of competition among 
universities in the market and, consequently, prioritising numerical outcomes, 
graduate attributes and professional accreditations to ‘win’ a greater market share of 
prospective students.447 An increasingly instrumental view of education formed in 
legal education, in which law schools began focusing on skills acquisition and aligned 
their teaching with professional bodies and employer priorities.448 It is perhaps 
unsurprising that it was in this era that the professional bodies in Australia won by 
establishing the Priestley Eleven.449 Even if neoliberalism did not create the Priestley 
Eleven, due to its nature (its focus on vocational and market outcomes), it has 
certainly correlated with the rise of these core subjects.450 
By the 1990s, admission requirements forced all law schools to adopt a one-size-fits-
all approach. Any liberal arts or critical law subject was sidelined to the non-
compulsory, elective units that were to be taught in later years; they were considered 
optional and arguably subsidiary to the core black-letter law units.451 As Thornton 
suggested, the new neoliberal context of legal education attributed diminishing value 
in these liberal arts subjects, which were not considered relevant to students’ future 
job prospects.452 Instead, a renewed focus was placed on the practical teaching of law 
as pure law, without the baggage of the social sciences. Politics, moral philosophy, 
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anthropology and other subjects were regarded as irrelevant to this aim.453 More than 
ever before, the role of law schools was to prepare students to meet admission 
requirements rather than to broaden their minds.454 This devolved into the reduction 
of essays, critical thinking tasks and reflective tasks for the even more dominant role 
of the case method above all else.455 By 2010, Professor David Weisbrot suggested 
that if Christopher Langdell, the inventor of the case method, were to appear in 
Australian law schools at the time, he would ‘hit the ground running’.456 Therefore, 
Weisbrot believed that little had changed in legal education in the previous few 
decades.457 Whether this is a positive insight or not will be discussed in following 
sections of this thesis. 
The increasing prevalence of compulsory vocational subjects had a deleterious effect 
on student culture outside Australia in the UK and US. In 1994, Professor William 
Twining of University College London found that law students had come to 
internalise a preference for vocational, black-letter law units, even in the non-
compulsory elective subjects.458 When liberal arts subjects were offered as electives 
in the early 1990s, students would not pick them, instead preferring electives that 
‘look[ed] good on the CV’.459 In brief, as soon as liberal arts units were no longer 
compulsory, they were avoided by the student body. Subjects that ‘looked good’ in 
CV’s were those that extended admission units or that focused on black-letter law 
alone;460 they were vocational subjects, which became the main focus of both students 
and, consequently, faculty staff.461 
Various studies in the ensuing decades revealed a disturbing trend among law 
students; they prioritised career success over ethical integrity, marks over leadership, 
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networking over friendship and private practice over public advocacy.462 The shift 
towards a more corporate, technical focus in the curriculum was correspondingly 
followed by a corporate, technical approach to life among the student body.463 Law 
students began to learn that liberal arts and humane perspectives were irrelevant, in 
addition to morality, ethics, justice, fairness and other concepts that arose from those 
domains.464 
After witnessing these trends in 1993, future Yale Law Professor Anthony Kronman 
declared a ‘crisis in the legal profession’.465 He stated that law school graduates used 
to be devoted to an ideal of public service and charity, but that they had become 
increasingly devoted to being mere experts in the law.466 According to Kronman, the 
best lawyers of the past were ‘lawyer–statesmen’;467 that is, they were lawyers who 
could practise law while also serving the community.468 His ideal was based on early 
US lawyers, including Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton.469 His ideal 
emphasised the importance of subserving one’s private interests for those of the state. 
Kronman’s lawyer–statesmen were idealised and romanticised. To be a lawyer–
statesman was to be a ‘devoted citizen’.470 This signified a lawyer who ‘cares about 
the public good and is prepared to sacrifice his own well-being’—including, if 
necessary, his private interests.471 It also signified a ‘leader in the realm of public life’ 
who could practise ‘prudence and practical wisdom’.472 That is, it signified someone 
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who was not cold or hard but who practised a form of ‘compassion’ when making 
‘judgments about the public good’ or when choosing between two alternatives.473 
Compassion was defined narrowly by Kronman as the ability to ‘sympathize with the 
values represented by a particular choice’ so that an informed decision could be 
made.474 Lawyer–statesmen are intended to make all choices in this ‘sympathetic’ 
light so that they can reach a rational, if ‘intuitive’, decision regarding the right 
outcome of a legal problem.475 
Admission requirements made it difficult for lawyer–statesmen to emerge, as they 
were sidelined in a curriculum that produced employees rather than leaders. Voices 
like Kronman’s were increasingly silenced in the decades after the 1990s. Reform in 
curriculum design and teaching methods was once common in the ‘molten’ years of 
legal education (1910s–1930s), but by the 1990s, legal education had formalised, 
solidified and focused on the compulsory black-letter subjects. For example, minimal 
flexibility remained for testing whether law students could be taught public service or 
‘compassion’ as defined by Kronman. Law schools could not demonstrate the same 
innovation, ingenuity and creativity they had in their earlier years, as they were 
increasingly pressured into a firmly vocational mindset. 
 
Conclusion 
The history of legal education in the selected common-law countries reveals a slow 
but deliberate shift from innovation and experimentation in a liberal arts education 
towards a narrow and vocational teaching of law. Commencing at Oxford in England 
(as well as in some specific early examples of law schools in the US, Canada and 
Australia), some early law professors have clearly attempted to teach law as a liberal 
art. From the 1850s to the 1920s, some of these professors attempted to base the law 
curriculum on the social, political, economic and philosophical contexts of law. The 
ensuing ideas ranged from linking the study of law to politics (via legislative 
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assemblies) to linking law to social problems (via the notion of law students as law 
reformers). In each case, these select few professors believed that law was a wider 
field of study—that it was a broad humanities discipline related to the wider world 
beyond the courtroom. The role of the law student was more expansive under this 
paradigm, with students seen by some of these professors as possessing, at times, a 
civic duty to promote law reform and the law’s social progress. 
The shift towards a vocational legal education in the selected common-law countries 
was slow but persistent. It began with the creation of the case method and Socratic 
method at Harvard in the late 1800s. Langdell’s methods separated law from its 
natural partners of politics, philosophy and history, and created a science of law unto 
itself. Law was to be taught via cases. Students would uncover legal principles in 
those cases to be applied to new factual circumstances.476 Adopted by various law 
schools worldwide (including the first law schools in Australia), Langdell’s case 
method (and specifically the use of casebooks and case problems), ultimately came to 
dominate all others; it became the primary method for teaching law in common-law 
countries by the 1920s.477 
Despite this, small groups of resistance remained, in which certain law professors 
maintained the ideal of teaching law as a liberal art. At Yale in the 1920s and 1930s, 
Pound and Newcomb fought for a different style of legal education—one that was 
centred on the social cost of law and the legal realist notion that the law was living 
and changeable.478 In Canada, WPM Kennedy had similar notions at the University of 
Toronto; he attempted to teach students how law affected society, and how law was 
the ultimate social science.479 Innovations and experimental teaching methods and 
assessments were evident in these early permutations of legal education (some of 
which will be discussed in further detail below). 
The latter half of the twentieth century observed several movements that challenged 
the idea of a vocational education in US law schools. These movements began what 
evolved into a more critical understanding of the law’s role in society. In the 1940s 
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and 50s, members of the legal process movement argued that the law was ‘purposive,’ 
derived from ‘human needs’ and was made to serve social aims.480 Legal education 
was to go beyond a mere learning of the rules and towards a questioning of the 
process that brought those rules into existence. Fuller wrote of the need to bring non-
legal subjects and non-legal instructors into the legal classroom in order to get 
students to interrogate the ‘unstated premises’ of legal reasoning.481 Legal process 
academics were, however, critiqued for a focus on process over outcome, especially 
in light of the social movements that arose in the 1960s and 70s.482 
The law and society movement and the CLS movement of the 1960s and 70s, 
respectively, aimed, in different ways, to shift the conversation away from legal 
process and towards legal outcomes. Law and society scholars used the tools of 
empirical researchers (traditionally found in the social sciences) for this purpose.483 
They aimed to unite ‘theory and data,’ in order to discover the true impact of the law 
on society, revealing the social context of law in action.484 CLS scholars, on the other 
hand, aimed to unpack the ways in which the law advantaged or disadvantaged 
particular segments of society, by revealing hidden biases in what was otherwise 
presented as an objective law school curriculum.485 This culminated in a struggle for 
the hearts and minds of students. Duncan Kennedy went so far as to suggest that law 
lecturers should radicalize the students in their classes by both undermining 
conservative student arguments and supporting liberal student arguments and sowing 
disagreement.486 CLS scholars like Kennedy wanted to unveil the hidden, political 
nature of legal education, revealing an implicit status quo bias hidden behind the 
typically vocational style of teaching.487 Law students were not to just learn the law, 
they were to learn its effects and impact on different parts of society. 
For a myriad of reasons, the aforementioned movements went into various states of 
decline in their respective decades of prominence, with a few notable exceptions. As 
the course of the twentieth century progressed, legal education in certain cases 
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became increasingly vocational under the pressures of neoliberalism, formalised 
professional credentials, examinations, assessments, the case method and compulsory 
subjects. The history discussed above reveals that it was not one but all these forces 
that led to the embedding of vocational education into the curriculum’s core. In 
Australia, the LACC created 11 compulsory subjects for admission in 1992, giving 
law schools very little flexibility for curriculum reform.488 The core subjects were 
black-letter law or doctrinal in nature, with the exception of legal ethics. In the 
ensuing decades, funding cuts to public universities by various federal governments 
led to a greater sense of competition between universities and a greater focus on 
skills, graduate attributes and employment outcomes.489  
1) Lessons Learned from History 
The history presented in Part 1 is relevant to the rest of this thesis for several reasons. 
First, it provides context for a liberal arts education in law, and where it has existed in 
a few diffuse examples in common-law countries. The limitation to common-law 
countries allows for a closer study of the development of the case method as it came 
to prominence. Second, the history sets out examples of the conflict between a liberal 
arts and vocational view of law. It reveals rival schools of thought, sometimes within 
the same faculty building, at times, aiming to convert the student body to one or 
another perspective. Third, the history provides context for the early development of 
legal education in Australia. This latter history will be developed further in Part 2 
below.  
Finally, for the purposes of this thesis, the above history provides a source inspiration 
for what a modern liberal arts law school might look like. Looking to history reveals 
examples of various teaching methods, assessments and subjects that adhere to the 
liberal arts tradition. These methods may need to be adapted to modern educational 
standards. This may include removing exclusionary educational philosophies, such as 
the idea of a ‘gentleman’s’ education. However, at the same time, it is important that 
successful teaching techniques are not lost to history altogether. A fresh look at 
historical teaching methods may provide insight into how these methods can be used 
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in today’s classrooms, when paired with contemporary pedagogical theory and 
adapted to modern standards of diversity and inclusion. These teaching methods 
include the teaching of law in relation to interdisciplinarity, politics, society, social 
critique, law reform and process, along with the ideas of small class sizes, class 
discussions, reflective tasks, roleplays and critical essay tasks.  
Beginning with the early law professors cited above - Blackstone at Oxford, Wythe at 
Virginia, Kennedy at Toronto, and Hargrave at Sydney – some early law professors 
aimed to, to varying degrees, relate the study of law to a broader interdisciplinary 
study of other, related humanities or social science fields.490  This broad approach 
empowered students to ask the ‘big questions’ about the law’s origin and purpose, by 
contextualizing the study of law in history, philosophy, anthropology and politics. 
This combination of law with other topics created the conditions for novel teaching 
methods, such as Wythe’s legislative assembly, where students roleplayed as 
legislators, gaining an understanding of the way law relates to political forces.491 
Interdisciplinarity is here revealed as both a teaching method in itself, and a means by 
which to reach other, innovative teaching methods and assessments. 
In the case of WPM Kennedy, Toronto Law School showed one way law could be 
taught with a view to its social function, and how students could be trained to be 
social reformers of the law, rather than just practitioners.492 In class, via assessments 
and class discussions, students were asked to consider ‘the social worth of legal 
doctrines’.493 They were to do so via their interdisciplinary training on the public 
perception of social issues, embodying the role of democratic representatives of a 
kind.494 In this way, the theoretical aspects of their interdisciplinary training merged 
with the practical outcome of law reform tasks. Other innovations by Kennedy, 
including smaller class sizes and diverging away from case-based teaching, allowed 
for more wide-ranging lecturing and teacher autonomy.495 The law school that 
Kennedy established, in part because of its novelty, will be considered in greater 
detail in Part 3 of this thesis. This will include an in-depth discussion of Kennedy’s 
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curriculum, teaching methods and assessments, and how some of them may be 
adapted to fit into a broader modern curriculum. 
In 1947, Lon Fuller, while on Harvard’s curriculum committee, planned a different 
kind of interdisciplinary legal education.496 In Fuller’s case, this was to be achieved 
by inviting non-legal educators into the classroom, including faculty members from 
other university departments, such as economics and psychology.497 He enacted this 
method in his own classes and found that it was successful when the non-legal topics 
were given legal relevance.498 The presence of non-legal instructors may encourage 
divergent thinking, where law and other topics are juxtaposed against one another, to 
find implicit connections, such as between law and ethics.499 
In the 1960s and 70s, some professors expanded on the idea of interdisciplinary 
education by combining it with critical assessments and critical, interrogative student 
discussions. Law and society scholars, for instance, tried to motivate a ‘critical 
judgment’ of how the law actually worked in society, through the evaluation of 
empirical data.500 CLS scholars went further by encouraging students to debate the 
political aspects of law in class, uncovering hidden biases and inequality, along with 
unclear, divisive, legal outcomes.501 The aim of these teaching techniques was to 
move students beyond a mere understanding of legal principles and black-letter law, 
and towards an understanding of who benefited from the law, and who lost out.502 
Critically engaged discussions and assessments were introduced to teach the whole 
student; treating their moral, political and ethical reactions to cases and legislation as 
inseparable from their learning experience. 
The lessons learned from this history will be expanded upon in greater detail in Part 3 
of this thesis. In particular, Part 3 discusses how some of these techniques can be 
adopted, expanded or refined in a modern curriculum, in combination with new 
pedagogical techniques. Building a modern liberal arts law school curriculum can 
therefore begin by drawing on methods that have worked in the past, and discarding 
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or refining those that are not suited to present circumstances. These methods can also 
be tested against the literature on educational theory, which provides various 
benchmarks for measuring success, not the least of which including student 
satisfaction. 
The next part of this thesis will investigate modern legal education in Australia. 
Specifically, it will explore the influence of neoliberalism in shaping the curriculum’s 
current content, structure, assessments and teaching style. The ideas that will be 
explored include the dominance of numerical styles of evaluation, graduate attributes, 
vocational assessments and the conversion of students’ mindsets in their studies and 
lives to a vocational outlook (as well as the circular effect that this has on the 
curriculum). The next part of this thesis will specifically function as a deeper delving 
into the recent history of law education in the early 2000s and onwards, in which 
vocationalism has been firmly entrenched in law schools, and there is little room for 














Section 1: Neoliberal and Instrumental Legal Education 
With the previous section having examined the general history of legal education in 
common-law countries, this section will specifically focus on analysing the recent 
neoliberal turn in modern Australian law schools. It will examine the narrow and 
prescriptive conception of legal education as a path to a vocation rather than as an 
academic pursuit in the model of the previously mentioned early law schools, as well 
as the liberal arts approach, the CLS movement and other critical approaches to 
teaching law. In doing so, this section will take an evaluative stance and critique the 
content, style and delivery of the current Australian law school curriculum. 
Understanding the neoliberal turn requires a definition of ‘neoliberalism’, both as a 
matter of political philosophy and as it applies to higher education. The following 
background definitions and contextual paragraphs can be considered a starting point 
for discussing the rise of neoliberalism in higher education and its correlation to law 
schools transitioning towards a greater focus on vocational education. This thesis does 
not contend that neoliberalism is the only force influencing modern law schools. In 
contrast, it contends that it is merely one way of explaining how certain Australian 
law schools have changed to prioritise (or resisted attempts to de-prioritise) vocational 
education. The neoliberal framing is evident in the assessment structure, student 
culture and influence of the employer’s voice in curriculum design—which all 
combine to form a curriculum that tends to prioritise market imperatives (e.g., the 
voice of key stakeholders) over intrinsic educational aims (e.g., learning for the sake 
of learning). 
1) Neoliberalism 
Australian law schools have not become vocational by accident; rather, they have 
become so due to a designed feature of the emerging political philosophy of 
neoliberalism.1 For the purpose of this thesis, neoliberalism, as a political philosophy, 
refers to the deregulation, privatisation and use of ‘monetarism and market-based 
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reform’ mechanisms in public policy.2 This neoliberalism is typified by the notion of 
turning every aspect of life into a market—and it is readily identified with the market-
centric policies of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, along with the 
push towards laissez-faire economic policies.3 In practice, neoliberal policies refer to 
leaving markets to their own devices without government interference.4 Neoliberalism 
trusts the market to reach the correct policy outcome on its own accord through 
competition between private firms, even at the risk of producing market failures.5 
This description does not exclude some limited role for the government in national 
defence and defending basic private property rights. However, it is contended that 
even these defences should be decided through market mechanisms.6 
The concept of neoliberalism first emerged in academic circles in 1947 when, inspired 
by the leadership of Austrian philosopher Frederick von Hayek, a small group of 
‘academic economists, historians and philosophers’ formed the Mont Pelerin Society 
at a Swiss spa.7 The group consisted of Hayek, Ludvig von Mises, the economist 
Milton Friedman and ‘for a time, the noted philosopher, Karl Popper’.8 For its 
founding document, the group outlined its concerns with the global world order in the 
period following World War II.9 Principally, the members of this group were 
concerned about the individual’s diminishing power in the West due to the 
increasingly arbitrary power of the state.10 They argued that this development had 
occurred due to ‘a decline of belief in private property and the competitive market’.11 
Without these two bedrock institutions, it was difficult ‘to imagine a society in which 
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freedom may be effectively preserved’.12 Hayek summarised the group’s view 
regarding individual liberty in the competitive market as follows: 
Our freedom of choice in a competitive society rests on the fact that, if one 
person refuses to satisfy our wishes, we can turn to another. But if we face a 
monopolist we are at his absolute mercy. And an authority directing the 
whole economic system of the country would be the most powerful 
monopolist conceivable … it would have complete power to decide what we 
are to be given and on what terms. It would not only decide what 
commodities and services were to be available and in what quantities; it 
would be able to direct their distributions between persons to any degree it 
liked.13 
The solution to this threat was to mandate the introduction of the free market into all 
aspects of public life so that state monopolies of public services can be prevented.14 
The term ‘neoliberal’ was derived from two core ideas. The designation ‘neo’ 
originated from the group’s ‘adherence to those free market principles of neo-classical 
economics’.15 The designation ‘liberal’ originated from the group’s ‘fundamental 
commitment to ideals of personal freedom’.16 The free market and personal liberty 
were essentially combined with Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand as ‘the 
best device for mobilising even the basest of human instincts, such as gluttony, greed, 
and the desire for wealth and power’.17 Neoliberal thinkers have argued that this is 
why so much of society had to be turned into a market—it had to liberate the 
individual and mobilise market forces towards optimal outcomes for individual 
happiness.18 This thought process is outlined in Hayek’s quotation above, in which 
the market, through competition, is observed as providing variation to satisfy any 
individual’s needs through competition among suppliers.19 It was argued that the 
natural result of this was the belief that markets should be instilled in various aspects 
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of people’s personal and public lives.20 Anything that is not a market should be 
transformed into a market, including assets typically held by the state for public 
benefit under a monopoly of state control (e.g., education or health care).21 
Neoliberal thinkers such as Hayek were critical of the state’s role in providing public 
services to society; it was argued that the state could never work as efficiently as 
market forces.22 The information to which the state had access was said not to be 
capable of matching the efficiency of a market economy’s price signals.23 Therefore, 
it was argued that state-run services should be dismantled and privatised into a market 
alternative.24 State institutions were also regarded with scepticism because they were 
tainted by political bias, as compared to the non-biased logic of the market.25 Michel 
Foucault highlighted that neoliberal thinkers believe that the ‘government must not 
form a counterpoint or a screen, as it were, between society and economic 
processes’.26 Instead, economic processes should be left to play out on their own. 
Despite critiquing the state, the Mont Pelerin Society did believe that the state played 
a limited role in society. Under a neoliberal framework, the state acts as an enforcer of 
market principles, including ‘private property rights, the rule of law, and [other] 
institutions of freely functioning markets’, such as deregulation and low corporate tax 
rates.27 The policy proscriptions are varied. First, a neoliberal state would have to 
create strong legal frameworks to allow ‘freely negotiated contractual obligations’ in 
the market.28 Second, laws would have to be passed (or repealed through 
deregulation) to allow businesses to trade freely—both domestically through private 
property and intellectual property laws and internationally through free trade 
agreements.29 
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The protection of intellectual property, specifically, would ensure that ‘technological 
changes’ could proliferate throughout society, which would lead to a sustained period 
of innovation.30 It was argued that this innovation would lead to increased 
productivity, which would, in turn, deliver ‘higher living standards to everyone’.31 In 
simple terms, this is known as trickle-down economics or it can be expressed by the 
phrase ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’.32 Through deregulation, tax cuts and laissez-faire 
economics, a neoliberal state would deliver economic gains to the poor through 
money ‘trickling down’ from the winners of the market competition down to their 
employees. However, in practice, neoliberal policies tend to give more power to 
companies and ‘global corporations’ through a transfer of power upwards.33 Aside 
from a few notable exceptions (e.g., several South-East Asian countries and France), 
neoliberalism as a political philosophy has led to increased income inequality in 
various countries, in which it has delivered more power to so-called ‘economic elites’ 
at the expense of the poor.34 
In their aversion to government-led services, neoliberal thinkers also dimly regarded 
democracy and democratic institutions.35 Under a neoliberal framework, the notion of 
democracy was ‘viewed as a luxury, only possible under conditions of relative 
affluence coupled with a strong middle-class presence to guarantee political 
stability’.36 Instead of democracy, the preference was for a market-led alternative, in 
which power was attributed to consumers so that they could make decisions for 
themselves.37 Democratic institutions could be replaced by non-democratic market 
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International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization).38 These institutions 
could be run by experts who knew the relevant topics. 
Neoliberal thinkers tend to prefer this form of technocracy or the leadership of society 
by ‘experts and elites’.39 Expert leaders have triumphed in the meritocracy of the 
market and are thus deemed worthy of leadership. Critics of neoliberalism highlight 
the growth of income and wealth inequality as a sign that ‘experts and elites’, when 
placed in positions of power, take too much away and offer too little in return in 
wealth redistribution. A market economy might lead to a trickle-down effect, but it 
might also lead to a ‘winner takes all’ outcome, in which the best competitor takes the 
greatest amount, and the disadvantaged are left with little.40 However, it must be 
noted that neoliberalism in itself does not necessarily prevent the redistribution of 
wealth, especially if private actors choose to give their wealth away or the 
government intervenes to do so.41 
Neoliberalism rose to prominence in the political realm (as opposed to the academic 
realm) in the 1970s and 1980s. After its initial founding, the Mont Pelerin Society 
made a concerted effort to garner ‘financial and political support’ in the US from ‘a 
powerful group of wealthy individuals and corporate leaders’ who were invested in 
the success of neoliberal philosophy.42 The movement gained significant traction in 
the 1970s due to several notable events. First, two leaders of neoliberal theory, 
Frederick Hayek and Milton Friedman, won the Nobel prize in economics in 1974 
and 1975, respectively.43 Second, the theory gained a foothold in politics when 
Margaret Thatcher was elected as prime minister in England in 1979 and Ronald 
Raegan as president in the US in 1980.44 Thatcher was elected ‘with a strong mandate 
to reform the economy’ under neoliberal principles.45 Under the influence of ‘Keith 
Joseph, a very active … neoliberal [from] the Institute of Economic Affairs’, she 
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began to confront trade unions, attack ‘social solidarity’ and privatise public assets.46 
Ronald Reagan’s victory in the US was equally decisive in 1980. The Reagan 
government devoted itself to ‘deregulation, tax cuts, budget cuts and attacks on trade 
union and professional power’, which mirrored the neoliberal developments in 
England.47 On both sides of the Atlantic, ‘Reagenomics’ and ‘Thatcherism’ pushed 
for the core ideals of neoliberal philosophy: deregulation, a withdrawal of the state 
from public service and a fight against collective (as opposed to individual) 
bargaining power.48 Margaret Thatcher summarised the transition with her famous 
statement that ‘there is no such thing as society’; there are only individuals.49 
Many critiques can be made about neoliberalism as a political philosophy. In this 
thesis, four related problems will be mentioned—which are considered separate from 
the problems in education that will be covered in a following section. These related 
problems include contradictions in neoliberalism’s stated objectives, monopolies, 
market failures and economic inequality. First, the core of neoliberalism has two 
central contradictions: a distrust of the state and yet the need for a strong state to 
enforce individual liberties, as well as the science of neoclassical economics that is 
contrasted against the ideology of political individualism.50 In brief, neoliberal 
philosophy calls for both a weak and strong state, as well as both a scientific and 
ideological approach.51 However, these contradictions can be resolved simply by 
diminishing the ideological purity of devotion to one side of the scale. For example, a 
weak state could still provide basic levels of regulation while remaining relatively 
weak. A second problem of neoliberal philosophy is that its devotion to markets can 
lead to monopolies, in which a single company wins in the competition of the 
market.52 This can also be resolved; according to neoliberal philosophy, monopolies 
are not necessarily a problem if no barriers are blocking the entry of new 
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competitors.53 The state needs only deregulate and remove any barriers. Third, 
neoliberal philosophy might inadvertently cause market failures—such as pollution, 
in which companies avoid paying the full costs of a process by ‘shedding their 
liabilities outside the market’ (i.e., dumping in public land).54 Neoliberals contend to 
solve this through even more market mechanisms, such as environmental tax 
incentives.55 Finally, neoliberal philosophy can lead to the concentration of power and 
wealth in the hands of the elite (the ‘winners’ of the market competition), and it can 
widen the gap between the rich and poor.56 As a solution to this problem, the 
redistribution of wealth seems to contradict both the neoliberal principle of individual 
liberty (control of one’s own resources) and the devotion to market mechanisms 
(whereby a winner has rightfully been chosen).57 
Both the definition and analysis of neoliberalism above—which describe it as a force 
of diminishing state power, privatisation and market competition—are not immune to 
counterarguments from neoliberal apologists. These arguments can generally be 
categorised into three camps. First is the belief that neoliberalism is too difficult to 
define (or that any definition is too vague); in this sense, the term itself might be 
useless, and any criticism is thus unworkable.58 Second, the term ‘neoliberalism’ has 
also been described as an encompassing term that left-wing academics who pursue a 
political agenda use to attack the ills of society.59 Third is the belief that neoliberalism 
can be defined clearly and that it is ultimately a positive factor for society—in which 
case, it should be supported or improved rather than criticised or dismantled.60 
The term ‘neoliberalism’ has been described as ‘slippery’ and ‘vague’, with the 
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disparate positions’ under one heading.61 Great scepticism is expressed towards the 
term ‘neoliberalism’.62 Authors have even admitted their own difficulty in defining 
the term for their works.63 For example, Casey suggested that the term is conveniently 
vague, in that it is used ‘to explain just about any and all social ills’.64 Glendinning 
proposed a definition so wide-reaching that it could apply to various processes that 
were unrelated to economics altogether: ‘I define neoliberalism … as the outlook of a 
community of ideas that seeks the limitless extension of the norms of conduct of one 
domain of life to the whole’.65 He then proposed that a variety of neoliberalisms 
existed, such as religious neoliberalism (‘the limitless extension of religious reason to 
every sphere of life’), political neoliberalism (‘the limitless extension of political 
reason to every sphere of life’) or economic neoliberalism (‘the limitless extension of 
economic reason to every sphere of life’).66 However, this definition might be too 
broad to be workable. Further, even if this definition was accepted, this thesis will 
only consider economic neoliberalism. It can be stated that the definition provided in 
this thesis will be used for present purposes, and that these wider discussions of other 
vaguer definitions will not be overviewed. 
It is also alleged that neoliberalism is an all-encompassing phrase for left-wing 
academics and their political agendas.67 On this claim, Clive Barnett contended that 
neoliberalism might be a ‘banal’ and ‘predictable’ term that facilitates ‘the ritual 
enactment of a rote critical identity’.68 This crucial identity is that of a left-wing 
academic who aims to create a dichotomy between market and progress, with 
‘romantic antagonism’ between the two.69 The word ‘neoliberalism’ also tends to be 
used by critics instead of the theory’s proponents.70 As a label denoting the critics’ 
dislike, there is a risk that neoliberalism might be considered a ‘strawman’ philosophy 
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without any inherent substance. Here, it is worth mentioning that there are those on 
the right side who embrace and defend the term.71 In this thesis, the various 
discussions (e.g., comparing a ‘liberal arts v vocational’ approach to education) also 
predate the term ‘neoliberalism’ and the suggested left–right dichotomy. Instead, 
neoliberalism is considered a useful shorthand for the privatisation of public assets, as 
well as a set of policy proscriptions that prioritise market mechanisms in all areas of 
life. This definition in itself is neither political nor vague—rather, it is targetable at 
certain processes within society. 
Finally, it can be argued that neoliberalism is exactly what this thesis has defined: a 
positive factor.72 Apologists of the theory have highlighted that neoliberal political 
parties have created ‘positive economic outcomes’ that outweigh any detriments of 
the boom/bust market cycle.73 Bowman noted that under neoliberal regimes 
worldwide since the 1980s, ‘Extreme poverty has fallen from 44% [in 1981] to 9.6% 
[in 2017]’.74 He specifically referenced the drastic reduction in extreme poverty in 
China, which shifted from its traditional communist roots to a more market-based 
economy.75 In embracing the free market and global trade, neoliberal thinkers might 
also present themselves as more centrist and moderate than the populist insurgencies 
of the left or right—whether in the form of the protectionism of either Bernie Sanders 
or Donald Trump.76 Instead, neoliberal thinkers venerate the opinions of experts to 
lead people through struggles and ignore populist mandates, which leads to a 
potentially more stable global order with less-extreme swings in politics.77 These 
arguments might be true, but they do not inhibit this thesis using the term in a 
negative light. An educational experience might be profitable and stable, but it might 
also be inadequate for students and society. There is no inherent contradiction in this 
argument, which signifies that the discussion of education below still stands. 
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2) How Did the Neoliberal University Arise? 
The neoliberal shift in legal education can only be understood by more generally 
contextualising it in the broader neoliberal shift of Australian universities. 
Neoliberal philosophy enters the education space through the privatisation of 
educational institutions, the creation of educational markets and the introduction of 
‘performance goals’ that track the competitive advantages and disadvantages of one 
institution against another.78 These changes begin with the privatisation of public 
assets or the transformation of public goods into a competitive private ‘market’.79 In 
the context of universities, ‘privatisation’ refers to the transformation of universities 
from publicly funded institutions that aim for the common good (or learning for the 
sake of learning) to privately funded institutions in a market that aim for profit 
maximisation (or securing greater funding through numerical outcome competition).80 
In Australia, neoliberal education emerged from a series of government funding cuts 
to the university sector, which began in 1975 and extended throughout the following 
three decades.81 Australia’s investment in higher education is now ‘low compared to 
other industrialized countries’.82 However, to truly understand this context, it is 
important to consider the period preceding these events—in the early 1970s, when 
universities were considered a public good and were generally free for students. 
In 1972, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam was elected, along with the policy of making 
tertiary education free for all Australian citizens.83 With the new Tertiary Education 
Assistance Scheme, full-time university places became means tested, which granted 
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greater access to lower socio-economic students.84 It was stated that ‘hundreds of 
thousands of students studied without incurring debt, two-thirds also receiving income 
support’.85 Free tertiary education was marketed as a method for increasing access 
and diversity, as well as one for training a new generation of professional services 
workers for the growing services economy.86 In principle, free education made 
university a public good and removed it from the private market and competition.87 
Universities could rely almost exclusively on the government for their income rather 
than private investors or private student loans.88 
However, the experiment of free education was almost immediately placed in 
jeopardy. Gough Whitlam was dismissed in 1975 by the governor-general, and he was 
succeeded by a conservative Liberal government under Malcolm Fraser.89 Facing the 
prospect of a continued economic recession (which began in 1973–19974), the new 
Fraser government began implementing a series of aggressive neoliberal policies.90 
These included funding cuts to public services, but they fell short of a full-scale 
deregulation of private industry.91 According to most accounts, Fraser was a relatively 
light-handed neoliberal prime minister compared to his successors.92 For example, 
despite its economic difficulties, the government did not reintroduce student fees for 
universities.93 Instead, it commissioned the Williams Report, chaired by a former 
University of Sydney vice-chancellor, to examine university-sector reforms.94 The 
Williams Report focused less on the notion of education as an individual’s right and 
more on the matching of education with economic goals and numerical outcomes.95 
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98 
This included the neoliberal priorities of the market and the numerical measurements 
of outcomes in educational institutions.96 Based on the report’s findings, the 
government radically cut back on existing university grants and loan schemes, 
including income support for students.97 Consequently, ‘The proportion of students 
receiving some form of government assistance fell sharply, from 70 percent in 1976 
to 40 percent in 1982’.98 This marked the start of the federal government’s withdrawal 
from the university sector, and it foreshadowed other neoliberal policies in the 
decades to come. 
The subsequent Labor government under Hawke–Keating drove the neoliberal agenda 
to its natural conclusion: a semi-privatised university system.99 In 1983, the new 
Labor Party came to power during ‘the worst economic crisis since the Great 
Depression’.100 The party immediately implemented an ‘Accord’ that was signed with 
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU).101 In exchange for guaranteed 
political support, the ACTU would agree to halt the ‘wage growth by indexing it to 
inflation’—and the government promised to offset this with increased spending, 
progressive taxes and social benefits.102 Realistically, the government reneged on its 
side of the bargain. By 1984, the Hawke–Keating government had adopted a series of 
neoliberal economic policies, including a commitment ‘not to increase taxation, 
government expenditure, or the size of the budget deficit’.103 Other neoliberal policies 
followed, including ‘industry deregulation, privatization of public assets, 
corporatisation of government departments’ and ‘free trade’ deals.104 
In 1987, John Dawkins became the Labor government’s Minister for Employment, 
Education and Training, in which he instigated significant reforms to tertiary 
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education.105 The Dawkins reforms, as they came to be known, solidified much of the 
neoliberal agenda.106 The reforms made three main changes to the tertiary education 
system: they linked public funding of universities to ‘national objectives’, merged 
Australian colleges and universities and abolished free tertiary education.107 Of the 
three, the funding changes were not purely neoliberal, as the ‘national objectives’ 
included ‘economics, society and culture’ (as opposed to market-based economics 
alone).108 However, the merging of colleges and universities had a more profound 
effect. Student numbers at universities steeply increased from ‘393,000 in 1987 to 
650,000 in 1997’.109 Despite the recommendations of the 1987 Pearce Report, law 
schools also increased in number by 16 from 1989 to 1997, with 10 more opening in 
the following two decades.110 The final change of the neoliberal reforms was the 
abolition of free tertiary education.111 In 1989, the Labor government reintroduced 
university fees under the HECS model, effectively abolishing the Whitlam ‘free 
education’ reforms of the 1970s and turning universities into a semi-privatised 
market.112 
The points listed above do not intend to argue that neoliberalism was the only factor 
that higher education institutions faced in the 1980s. Forsyth suggested that elements 
of ‘esteem’ were also involved and that universities were increasingly pressured by 
both the newly dominant global university ranking systems and the general public to 
perform well.113 MacIntyre highlighted that Australian policy was merely following 
global trends in higher education and that the push to link research to commercial 
goals originated from a concern with the country’s economic circumstances at the 
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time.114 Exploring these lines of thought are currently beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but it is worth mentioning that other factors besides privatisation might have been 
present. 
The further privatisation of Australia’s public universities has been gradual but 
persistent since the 1980s. After the Hawke–Keating government, successive 
governments further cut university funding on both sides of politics.115 In the Howard 
government, universities received significant funding cuts, including the single largest 
cut in Howard’s 1996 budget.116 The Abbott government tried a further round of cuts 
in the 2014 budget, but it buckled due to backlash from the Australian public.117 
However, the latest proposals to deregulate the sector occurred with a sense of 
inevitability, given the history of prior government proposals turning in that 
direction.118 
The trend of all federal governments since Whitlam has been to shift towards 
decreasing public funding for universities, within the philosophical framework of 
neoliberalism. As a political philosophy, neoliberalism emerged in the 1980s and 
1990s as an ideology that promoted the ‘deregulation, privatization and the 
withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision’.119 At the heart of 
neoliberalism was the belief that the free market should determine the course of 
human society. If a service or institution is not a market, then it should become one.120 
Under this model, universities are increasingly expected to compete and gain a market 
share of prospective students.121 Funding cuts are intended to ensure the efficiency of 
university services. Due to the pressure of increased competition, universities are 
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expected to produce more research and create more market-oriented student 
graduates. 
According to Thornton, the shift towards neoliberalism harkened a new age of 
university policies—ones that were driven by market forces rather than other potential 
goals (e.g., social justice or a liberal arts education).122 Forced to ‘compete’ in the 
open market for a share of prospective students with less government funding, the 
universities had little option but to raise the cost of tuition.123 Students were forced to 
acquire larger student debts.124 This increasing student debt compelled students to 
regard their education as a product and themselves as consumers.125 Students could no 
longer learn for the sake of learning; learning had been ‘replaced with a “consumer” 
mindset where students focused on “getting what you pay for”’.126 Universities, in 
turn, had to sell their services to students. They did so by prioritising certain 
numerical outcomes that student ‘customers’ value, including employability 
outcomes, graduate attributes, global university rankings and lists of famous 
alumni.127 
In addition to funding cuts was an increasing number of universities worldwide, 
which significantly increased competition for what little public funding remained. As 
more ‘research’ universities were created (some with ‘20,000 or more’ students), it 
has been argued that the ‘gulf between academic staff and students’ increased even 
further.128 However, the expansion of universities did allow students from lower 
socio-economic backgrounds to access institutions that were once reserved for the 
elite (or the gentlemanly), as described in the previous history section.129 
Nevertheless, the neoliberal shift might have prompted professors to prioritise 
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research over the needs of students—and students similarly felt that they should 
prioritise their careers over their education.130 As more professors were hired, they 
increasingly ‘closed their doors’ to students and became isolated and detached from 
the teaching experience.131 The focus of universities turned towards yearly audits and 
research numbers that differentiated one institution from the next.132 Institutions 
aimed to raise themselves higher in the global university rankings.133 
It is possible that Thornton, James and the other critics of neoliberalism argued too far 
by implying that neoliberalism was the sole driver of the changes to education. Some 
observations can be made as a counterargument: the changes to education were less 
neoliberal than they might have first appeared. First, the merging of universities and 
colleges in the 1980s during the Dawkins reforms (which were often framed as 
neoliberal in nature) contradicted the neoliberal notion of increasing competition in 
the market.134 Concurrently, deregulation, a central pillar of neoliberalism, never 
occurred in the Australian university sector.135 Finally, the government did not 
withdraw completely from the university sector in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, the 
Dawkins reforms linked the government funding of universities to ‘national 
objectives’ that pertained to economics, society and culture.136 A truly neoliberal 
agenda would place fewer government imperatives on universities rather than more. It 
is possible that other forces contributed to the vocational shift of universities beyond a 
strictly neoliberal agenda. 
Further, Thornton, James and the other critics might have overplayed the negative 
aspects of neoliberal policies while ignoring the potential advantages. As discussed in 
the previous definition section, neoliberal policies have been responsible for 
numerous positive effects on society—such as reducing global poverty, continuing 
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more moderate (and less politically extreme) policymaking and offering the freedom 
of choice to students who study under a neoliberal education model. Bowman 
highlighted that under neoliberal policy regimes since the 1980s, ‘Extreme poverty 
has fallen from 44% [in 1981] to 9.6% [in 2017]’.137 
In an educational context, a similar argument is often made about the democratisation 
of education for the poor. The proliferation of Australian universities in the 1970s and 
1980s led to an increased number of students attending university generally, including 
an increased number of lower socio-economic students.138 The participation of this 
student cohort increased from 15.69 per cent in 2006 to 17.01 per cent in 2011 and 
continued to increase in 2013.139 
Even if the quality or content of education had somehow been altered, it could be 
argued that the benefits of neoliberalism outweighed the costs—at least to women in 
the law school context and the disadvantaged in the university context.140 Further, if 
students from a lower socio-economic background could access higher education 
more generally, then their needs would be different from those of traditional upper-
class university students (e.g., requiring a more vocational approach); this signifies 
that a change of focus in education is less about neoliberalism itself and more about 
class needs. Nevertheless, as the civil rights activist WEB du Bois argued, just 
because someone comes from a disadvantaged background does not mean that he or 
she should be deprived of a broader liberal arts education.141 Du Bois suggested that 
‘future leaders in the African-American community deserved a college level liberal 
education—that is, the best kind of higher education, not just narrow occupational 
training’.142 It might be that lower socio-economic students deserve this same 
opportunity and that the neoliberal turn is detrimental to their interests. 
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Students were said to benefit from the neoliberal shift in universities because they had 
more ‘choice’.143 Students had more choices after the expanding number of 
universities and, for relevant purposes, the number of law schools (an additional 26 
between 1987 and 2015).144 Additionally, greater competition between universities 
was said to provide more choices to the student ‘consumers’ regarding which 
university they should attend according to the best value for money. Students were 
said to be free from the ‘bureaucratic restraint’ of governments that interfered in their 
daily lives, and they were thus free to pursue ‘whatever work [or course, they wanted 
to pursue], and to sell [their] labour … for a wage that reflects’ the value of that 
work.145 However, this freedom tended to result in students becoming more driven by 
financial incentives than an urge to learn.146 
However, neoliberal policies have also had unintended side effects on student culture, 
such as increased competition between students and choice paralysis. Forced with 
new public or private debt, students began to devalue education as an end in itself 
because they could not afford it.147 Instead, they increasingly wanted a return on their 
investment—job skills and a graduate job linked to their degree—so that they could 
ensure they profited from their degree.148 Of course, these vocational conceptions of 
education have always existed, but neoliberal policies (privatisation and the 
consequent competition between universities) have made them the dominant 
conceptions of higher education in the minds of students.149 As degrees have 
increased in cost, students have correspondingly increased their focus on vocation. 
Modern students are considered ‘consumers’ of education, and they are 
‘individualised’ into becoming ‘entrepreneurs of the self’ who aim to obtain their 
money’s worth.150 Students perceive the core ideal of neoliberalism (individual 
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freedom) as universities competing through differentiation for their money. However, 
the result of these freedoms is just as often ‘ambivalence, confusion, doubt, failure 
and anxiety’, as the choices seem overwhelming and the push to ‘maximize individual 
potential’ draining.151 The ultimate effect of neoliberalism was this realignment of 
student culture, in which students became more motivated about attaining lifelong 
employment in an upward trajectory towards the richest positions in society.152 
In addition to a shift in student culture was a shift in academic culture. Neoliberalism 
pushed academics beyond the ‘publish or perish’ mantra and, since at least 2016, 
towards a model that focused on collaboration with industry.153 Teaching began to 
reflect the desires of the market, the employer and the newly commercialised student. 
Under a numeric and outcomes-focused approach, staff began to prioritise their 
research so that they could boost global university rankings.154 University global 
rankings rely on consistently cited publications, which pressures academics to 
prioritise their research over their teaching and their research papers over their 
students.155 Academics are ranked according to ‘both the productivity and citation 
impact’ of all published work.156 In this way, professors have been pushed into a 
neoliberal imperative to quantify everything by numbers.157 
A focus on numerical outcomes changes the nature of university education—in that 
every class, subject and teacher is forced to focus on outcomes rather than processes, 
on employability rather than knowledge and résumé points rather than a student’s 
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intrinsic worth as a well-rounded human being.158 Staff and students can easily 
misconstrue anything that does not contribute to a university’s outcomes or rankings 
as superfluous, and it can consequently be cut from the curriculum.159 The effect of 
performance-based outcomes is thus profound: 
Academics deliver products to consumers and those products can be 
assessed in the same way we assess any product or commodity: in terms of 
satisfying consumer preferences. Moreover, the university as a part of wider 
society should also be judged in terms of its service to national (or more 
generally commercial) economic goals and interests.160 
It should be noted here that the critiques of US authors should be interpreted within 
their proper context. The works of universities, and specifically law schools, differ 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as do the perceived influences of neoliberalism.161 
Concurrently, parallels can be drawn between the kinds of critiques that were made 
and the kinds of effects that neoliberal educational policy had on students, even if 
these effects occurred in different educational contexts. This thesis does not aim to 
definitively claim that neoliberalism has affected all universities (or law schools) in 
the same way; it merely intends to highlight examples in different countries of a 
possible neoliberal shift in focus. 
3) The Neoliberal Shift in Australian Universities: A Feature Not a Bug 
Since the early 2000s, warning signs have been noted regarding the health of our 
democracies; it has been threatened by universities being abandoned as communities 
of intellectuals in favour of a new model that is driven by a ‘market forces’ and a 
‘user pays’ mentality.162 Prolonged funding cuts in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as 
the dominance of neoliberal policies at the time, changed the old university system 
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and replaced it with a newly commercialised university ‘industry’.163 Forced to 
compete in the open market, universities shifted their internal practices away from 
knowledge accumulation and towards profit. Students were no longer regarded as 
students but as customers; tutors were no longer regarded as tutors but as employees; 
research was no longer regarded as an end in itself but as a means to an end (the 
increase of global university rankings).164 This had correspondingly influenced 
internal decisions regarding the content of the internal curriculum.165 The curriculum 
in several major universities began to reflect the desires of employers rather than 
those of students. Consequently, students began to learn that the market was the key 
determinant of their future success, and that their entire lives were a function of their 
employability. 
Law schools were not immune to these changes. In Australia, the 1987 Pearce Report 
found that ‘all law school[s] surveyed’ were following the broader ‘increased focus 
on skills acquisition across universities [generally]’.166 Law schools were increasingly 
pressured into providing practical and international courses and legal clinics to help 
students compete in the ‘global marketplace’.167 Student ‘customers’ began 
demanding more corporate law electives over time, in the hope that these electives 
would boost their chances of employment at graduation.168 Throughout the 2000s, law 
students were especially regarded as having become focused on corporate interests 
rather than public interests under a privatised university system.169 Students 
prioritised high-paying jobs and feared ‘that a public interest career’ would ‘not 
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generate sufficient income to repay a substantial higher education debt’.170 Although 
law schools had historically been predisposed to vocational education (as evidenced 
in Part 1 of this thesis), neoliberalism had offered a new edge and strictness to the 
curriculum; it made alternative education models increasingly difficult to implement. 
Divided into two parts, this section will consider the challenges that the increasing 
vocational focus of law schools poses to students, the curriculum and society. First, it 
will conduct a broad overview of how neoliberalism has influenced the curriculum 
over time. This includes examining the evidence of vocationalism in Australia’s 
major law schools and how it affected the curriculum. Second, this section will track 
the effects of neoliberal education policies on students and society. Specifically, it 
will discuss how law students have missed the opportunity for an education that 
includes moral critiques, creative thinking and critical insight. Law schools had once 
produced lawyers who were trained in public service, but today’s law schools produce 
students who might consider law as morally or politically neutral, who cannot critique 
the law’s faults and virtues and who accept the law’s authority at face value. 
However, this style of education is not apolitical; it only masks the true political 
objective of implementing and protecting neoliberal market forces.171 
4) Neoliberalism in Australian Law Schools 
The neoliberal shift in Australian higher education, marked by decreased public 
funding for universities, has strongly affected law schools. After the federal 
government cut public funding for universities from the 1970s to 1990s, universities 
were forced to create new faculties to secure more lucrative student loans.172 Law 
schools were considered a great return on investment, as they cost little to establish 
but could attract large numbers of fee-paying students.173 New and old universities, as 
well as those that lacked the faculty, established law schools. This significantly 
increased the numbers of law schools across Australia and, consequently, the number 
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of law graduates nationwide.174 The new faculties encountered ‘a virtually 
unstoppable demand for law places’ due to the social prestige of law, which meant 
that the universities could charge high prices for the degree and thus increase their 
income to offset reduced state funding.175 Law, with its history in vocational 
education, could also be sold as a vocational degree with more job prospects. This 
vocational focus (again, caused by a neoliberal withdrawal of state funding) was 
embodied in the content, teaching style and assessment structure of the legal 
education curriculum; it highlighted a focus on corporate values, employability 
outcomes and jobs skills above other perspectives on education.176 
Within a neoliberal framework (in which universities competed with each other for 
prospective students), the core purpose of a law school became to prepare students for 
their future jobs in the employment market.177 Consequently, job-related skills were 
considered more important than other educational experiences, and students were 
regarded as customers and tutors as freelance employees.178 Law schools were treated 
as trade schools rather than a critical institution, and they aimed to teach law students 
to ‘think like a lawyer’ rather than for themselves.179 The increased number of law 
students and law schools also posed the risk of isolating students from their professors 
and creating a detached educational experience.180 This correlates with a finding in 
the Breaking the Frozen Sea report, which was written by ANU Law students.181 
Interviewed law students stated: 
I felt like most of the lecturers I’ve had were too busy to meet up with 
students. 
I guess I hoped for encouragement, inspiration, mentorship, confidence-
building … I’ve definitely not received those things. 
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The lecturers can be a little impersonal, aloof and in some cases harsh. 
[There is] no room for friendly interaction with lecturers. 
Vocational education predates the rise of neoliberalism, and students were indeed 
taught common law with a vocational focus since the 1200s at the Inns of Court in 
London.182 However, the philosophy of neoliberalism has come to influence and 
correlate with the rise of a vocational focus as one of the core focuses of legal 
education in Australia. In addition to some other factors, it has led to a curriculum that 
can sometimes exclude other areas of knowledge that were historically valued,183 such 
as legal history, legal philosophy, political philosophy, civics and ethical, moral and 
religious views of the law.184 
Vocational education is generally framed in the language of ‘skills’, ‘outcomes’ or 
quantitative outcomes—which signifies that learning is guided towards attaining 
specific and measurable goals (as opposed to attaining intangible self-realisation).185 
The shift towards a neoliberal education framework in Australian law schools is 
evident in the prioritisation of these outcomes and job-related skills in the law school 
curriculum and in its core subjects, assessments and graduate attribute listings.186 
In 2011, Margaret Thornton conducted the largest study of Australian law schools.187 
The assessment structure of law schools was revealed to enshrine vocational 
education above all other forms of learning, including learning for the sake of 
learning, the humanities and critical introspection.188 Thornton found that law 
professors prioritised non-critical assessment tasks (e.g., case problem questions) over 
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critical or reflective tasks (e.g., essays).189 She found that essays were ‘no longer 
regarded as an essential element of law school culture’.190 In contrast, teaching 
‘known knowledge’ and ‘right answers’ were considered essential.191 
At least one critic has described Thornton’s work as ‘exaggerated’, further suggesting 
that many of the problems linked to neoliberalism predate modern neoliberal 
philosophy.192 Thornton also risks generalising her findings of neoliberal education 
too broadly—she could be portraying an overly dark image of law schools, as well as 
misrepresenting the actual changes that occur in education in Australia and the many 
(not singular) causes of these changes.193 At the core of her book, Privatizing the 
Public University, Thornton suggested that a process of ‘marketization’ has occurred 
in law schools, which was caused by universities shifting from public to semi-private 
institutions.194 This has led to an increased focus on work skills and the rise of 
casualised staff and performance metrics.195 Consequently, there have been changes 
to the Australian law school curriculum that have made it more vocational, with 
students focussing on personal career goals.196 Critics of Thornton suggested that her 
image is too bleak.197 Goldsworthy argued that ‘law schools have long been 
deferential to the legal profession, wanting to be noticed and appreciated, especially 
by the judiciary’, and so this perspective is not new.198 This critique is well placed, 
but it does not necessarily prove that neoliberalism has not enhanced or extended 
negative trends linked to vocational education in law schools (which will be argued in 
greater detail below). 
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A second critique of Thornton’s work relates to the notion of regarding neoliberalism, 
and the massification of education, as a net positive.199 More students studying law 
might be a positive outcome if the potential democratising effects of increased student 
enrolments were considered.200 If more students are attending law school from more 
diverse backgrounds, then the increased number of law students can be framed as a 
net positive.201 However, the reality of the situation is more nuanced than this. As the 
number of law schools increased in the 1970s and 1980s and overtook most other 
routes into the legal profession (e.g., apprenticeships), they increasingly sidelined low 
socio-economic students who had previously taken such alternative routes.202 As 
Weisbrot observed, ‘University law students typically come from homes which are 
significantly more affluent than the norm; most attended selective or elite, private 
secondary schools; their parents mainly have professional or management 
backgrounds’, which contrasted the students from low socio-economic families.203 
What has changed is the number of women who are entering law school. Over the 
same period, women comprised ‘11.4 per cent of Australian university law students in 
1960, 12.4 per cent in 1968, 22.1 per cent in 1974, 29.1 per cent in 1977, 33.3 per 
cent in 1980, and 41 per cent in 1984’.204 The issue is that these women often arrived 
from the same upper–middle class background as the men, which signified that law 
schools have not opened to the poor despite increased student numbers.205 
To offer a more nuanced perspective on Thornton’s work, it might be more accurate 
to describe Australian law schools as a ‘hybrid’ system rather than a purely neoliberal 
system (although they retain a neoliberal push towards vocation).206 Evidence of this 
can be observed when the government’s involvement in the university sector is 
considered. Under a truly neoliberal system, the government would completely 
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deregulate universities and turn them into a fully private market.207 Instead, the 
Australian Government has remained involved in funding universities and, through 
them, law schools—which signifies that the established system is, to some degree, a 
hybrid of neoliberal (privatisation) and traditional state-funded education.208 
However, even the absence of a purely neoliberal approach does not signify that 
neoliberal philosophy has had no effect or has not somehow correlated with the rise of 
a vocational educational approach. Even if Thornton did not completely substantiate 
this view, other evidence at play can be observed. 
In the same survey of 29 law schools mentioned earlier, every law school in Australia 
stated that, ‘to varying degrees’, they considered the ‘views of the profession’ when 
they designed their internal curriculum.209 At least one law school dean met with 
major corporate law firms every two years to craft a curriculum that best suited the 
needs of the employer.210 This notion of the ‘employers’ voice’ has become an 
essential influence on legal education in Australia; it has shaped curriculum design, 
assessments and graduate attributes.211 For example, Bentley and Squelch in 2014 
examined the kinds of skills that employers desired from law graduates ‘to work in a 
global context’.212 Typically, employers preferred students to learn skills and 
assessments, as well as focus on ‘reading and analyzing case law, applying and 
distinguishing cases [and gaining a] familiarity with legal principles’.213 
Uncoincidentally, these are the types of skills that are taught in law schools today. 
The vocational outlook has also been enshrined in the core curriculum’s subjects. As 
mentioned earlier, the Priestley Eleven are 11 compulsory subjects that all law 
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Hawke–Keating governments’ introduction of neoliberal philosophy in Australia.215 
The Hawke–Keating government instigated several reforms to privatise state assets, 
deregulate industry and encourage services to become markets.216 The timing might 
be coincidental, but neoliberalism as a philosophy certainly helped entrench the 
vocational nature of the subjects over time.217 The Priestley Eleven were narrowly 
focused on ‘substantive’ and doctrinal law rather than on extrinsic lessons in ethics, 
morality or politics (aside from a legal ethics subject itself).218 
At their core, the Priestley Eleven represent a vocational and black-letter law—they 
focus on teaching students technical legal skills in case analysis, as well as knowledge 
about legal doctrine and legal principles.219 They include core, black-letter law units 
such as torts, equity, contracts, administrative law, evidence, corporations law, 
property, constitutional law and civil and criminal procedure. Black-letter law 
subjects tend to focus on what the law is rather than on what it should be, and it tends 
to normalise the conception of law as an objective, neutral and passive force in 
society.220 These subjects tend to be ‘saturated with scenario-based learning through 
problem solving’ questions instead of learning through essays or other critical 
engagement tools.221 
The Priestley Eleven, having been written by the law admission authorities of each 
state, aim to prepare law students for graduate employment in the legal profession.222 
It is worth considering that there are 11 compulsory subjects—almost all vocational—
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that all law students must complete. This is far more than the compulsory admission 
requirements for students at universities in Canada (seven subjects), the UK (five 
subjects) and US (no subjects).223 The status quo in Canada, the UK and US is that 
law schools should be free to set their own curriculum, with less direct control from 
the profession or industry bodies. This offers law schools in these jurisdictions the 
opportunity to prioritise subjects that are non-vocational in nature.224 No such 
opportunity exists in Australia. 
The narrow focus of the Priestley Eleven subjects has received sustained criticism in 
recent years. The subjects have been described as not being vocational enough. Nick 
James, dean of Bond Law School, has described the Priestley Eleven as outdated and 
incapable of meeting the demands of new subjects (e.g., in technology, block 
chain).225 According to James, the Priestly Eleven are ‘not keeping up with reality’.226 
Kate Galloway has argued that, even in practical terms, the Priestley Eleven do not 
meet the needs of modern lawyers, ‘as the profession transforms’.227 Neil Rees has 
similarly suggested that the Priestley Eleven aim ‘to provide law students with the 
essential content for something which really no longer exists—a career as a solicitor 
in general practice’.228 
As far back as 1999, Chief Justice French described the Priestley Eleven as being a 
‘dead hand’ on curriculum reform—one that prevents innovation in what law schools 
could offer their students.229 It has also been critiqued that so few Priestley Eleven 
subjects (only three, in one case) focus on how law affects marginal groups or even 
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how law affects society.230 There is a consensus among the authors mentioned above 
that a broader curriculum (in the liberal arts, technology or social justice) is not 
possible if the Priestley Eleven remain established.231 
Despite sustained pressure to abolish or change the Priestley Eleven, the LACC’s 
recent reviews have cemented the committee’s role and made the subjects even more 
vocational. From 2015 to 2016, the LACC reviewed the Priestley Eleven 
requirements.232 Somewhat ironically, the review began by immediately limiting its 
scope, rejecting various proposals for changes and reinforcing existing arguments.233 
Key to this was rejecting the Productivity Commission’s recommendation to abolish 
the compulsory subjects, which the LACC stated ‘lacked accuracy and rigour’.234 The 
LACC proceeded to defend compulsory subjects in general, repeatedly referring to 
the need for ‘threshold competence’, ‘threshold academic knowledge’ and ‘threshold 
knowledge [and] skills’.235 It concluded with only minor changes to the descriptions 
of two core subjects.236 
In 2019, the LACC again reviewed the Priestley Eleven subject requirements.237 
However, this time, the committee sought to revise the description of every subject, to 
support ‘a more general move to express academic requirements in terms of 
‘outcomes,’ as well as support the threshold learning outcomes for law courses.238 
This outcome-oriented approach is an acknowledgement of the neoliberal framework 
of modern law schools. The latest report repeatedly emphasised the importance of 
skills and vocational knowledge as being the core knowledge necessary in law 
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schools.239 Nick James has noted that this latest review did not reach far enough and 
that it focused on simply ‘rewording the Priestley 11, not changing the Priestley 
11’.240 The report itself acknowledged that ‘the present 11 prescribed areas have 
proved to be extremely difficult to change’.241 Given that the LACC is the only body 
that can change the Priestley Eleven, this makes any future change to the subject list 
unlikely. Instead, the vocational outlook is firmly established for the foreseeable 
future. 
The neoliberal framework of Australian law schools is not only evident in the core 
subjects but also in the proscribed graduate attributes. As early as 1994, Australian 
law schools were already following a broader ‘increased focus on skills acquisition 
across universities’.242 This was established in the mid-2000s with the introduction of 
graduate attributes.243 Graduate attributes helped shape the focus of education by 
guiding professors into teaching to numeric or qualitative ‘employability’ metrics.244 
Today, all teaching at a law school, to one degree or another, must meet a graduate 
attribute—that is, all teaching must contribute to the student’s employability.245 This 
is reinforced by Australia’s QS Graduate Employability Ranking,246 a yearly ranking 
system that aims to level each university according to the employability of its 
students.247 These metrics guide teaching and content, and they pressure law schools 
to focus on employability above other areas.248 They are an essential part of neoliberal 
doctrine, in which everything must be measured (including students). 
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The influence of the employers’ voice in law schools extends beyond the curriculum 
and into student services, events and functions. Recently, law schools have allowed 
law firms to sponsor student events, networking functions, clerkship presentations, 
career fairs, libraries, drink occasions, boat trips and other activities.249 The 
dominance of corporate law firms in students’ social lives has prompted at least one 
dean to question whether this dominance unduly influences students’ decision-
making.250 Attracted by the message and glossy brochures, students come to crave 
‘the office with a spectacular view, original artworks, lavish entertainment and high 
salaries’, and this image ‘overshadows alternative careers’.251 It is notable to consider 
how vocational education extends into students’ private lives, and how it pressures 
them to join law-related societies, events and networking events so that the students’ 
lives can be aligned with a corporate, market agenda.252 
a) Students and Neoliberal Values 
There is much to criticise about neoliberalism as an ideology, but in the context of 
this subsection, the notion that neoliberalism leads to ‘freedom of choice’ is especially 
contentious. With regard to Australian law schools, this subsection will demonstrate 
that a focus on financial incentives drives students to become narrow-minded, insular 
and risk-averse over time, rather than ‘freethinking’ or ‘free to do what they want’ 
with their lives, as proponents of neoliberalism would claim. 
The culture of neoliberalism regards the workplace as the heart of all authentic 
knowledge, so anything that cannot be turned into a job-related skill or job-related 
knowledge is deemed suspect.253 The humanities in particular are described as 
functionally useless, and students who study law consider irrelevant and impractical 
subjects boring.254 Law students are quoted as asking ‘what’s the relevance of this?’ 
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when studying morality and legal ethics, as if this kind of holistic knowledge about 
morality, philosophy and ethics is simply irrelevant to their future working lives.255 
This reflects a disconnection between how law is represented in popular media 
(revolving around justice, fairness and equality) and how law students have come to 
internalise the opposing culture of neoliberal education—in which they consider law 
school a matter of practicality and wealth accumulation, are bored by the ‘irrelevant’ 
topics of morality and justice, and are unaware of how fairness ‘fits in’ with coldly 
applying law to a set of facts. 
In a more meaningful sense, students are no longer connected to the larger purpose 
that universities were intended for.256 Ivy League educator William Deresiwicz 
suggested that ‘specialization is the only part of the curriculum that makes sense to 
students anymore’.257 Students have lost the belief that universities can offer them 
something other than a certification or degree in law; that is, they have forgotten that 
universities can offer something else—an opportunity before work and other 
commitments to develop a fuller understanding of themselves, to develop a ‘soul’ or, 
crucially absent of parental oversight, to develop independence.258 Raewyn Connell 
wrote that ‘a good university will be a place rich in coffee shops, with the coffee 
shops rich in passionate argument, intense thought and exotic projects’.259 It is not 
numerical marks or research that define a university, but what occurs in the free time 
and space in which people are not ticking boxes.260 Without this broader goal, the 
average law student will invariably start demanding as many specialised, vocational 
courses as possible. Students are grasping at whatever they have been taught to grasp, 
and they are reaching for what they know how to reach: another box to tick. They 
come to regard the study of law as a practical matter, and themselves as more of ‘an 
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auto mechanic [than] an intellectual’.261 Law is considered a technical skills training 
course, and, therefore, acquiring as many technical skills in as many technical 
subjects as possible is a sensible approach. 
The more esoteric and intellectual subjects do not interest most students, and the 
average law student avoids ethics, morality and social justice. Instead, students focus 
on the external, functional and practical aspects of life: work, careers and the potential 
for future success.262 Core internal processes of self-reflection, growth and dynamism 
(the ability to move beyond the strict confines of a single subject area) are sacrificed 
in favour of practicality. Students become narrowly focused on career:263 
Mainstream students … are preoccupied with their careers, with getting a 
job, making money, getting married, deciding where to live—getting 
through law school as trade school, with no intellectual, political, cultural 
agenda of any kind … on the way to life in the mainstream.264 
In some cases, students feel the change occurring within themselves and sense that 
something is wrong with their education.265 Over time, they become convinced that 
vocation is the only valuable factor, but they also retain other, intrinsic motivations 
from when they first started university.266 Richard Hil interviewed several such 
students at Macquarie University, with one example below: 
Student: I came to do a degree but I wanted more—I really wanted to get to 
know other students. But as time wore on I felt increasingly isolated from 
uni and the students in it. I felt something was missing. It was all so, well, 
bland. 
Hil: So if it isn’t about connecting with others, what does the uni experience 
mean to you? Is it just about the formal learning? 
Student: It's really just preparation for a career, I suppose, it’s all designed 
to get you into the workforce. It’s a case of do the course work, get the 
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necessary qualification, then go out and find a job—hardly what I’d call a 
great experience.267 
Today, students are much more efficient proponents of market and neoliberal values 
than those described by Duncan Kennedy in the 1980s.268 In that period, he argued 
that students ‘believed what they [were] told’ about corporate values and that they 
acted ‘affirmatively within the channels cut for them’ by the law school.269 However, 
there were still those who resisted—both faculty and students—by providing a liberal 
arts lens to studying law.270 In contrast, the ‘debt-burdened’ students of today’s 
neoliberal order have a strong imperative to ignore critical perspectives of their 
education and, instead, adopt the ideology they are being taught.271 There is less of a 
need for a cultural education in the liberal arts than there was in the past, even among 
the elite classes of society.272 Consequently, students themselves will begin to voice 
neoliberal values and call for neoliberal subjects—all while suppressing any unease 
for doing so due to market imperatives.273 
The changes to the student body have been prompted by changes to the law schools 
themselves. Law schools have increasingly come to serve external market interests 
over the interests of the student body. Students are indoctrinated from the beginning 
of their studies into believing that law is a passive, neutral force in society. At worst, 
this produces a neutral effect, and at best, a singularly positive one. This 
indoctrination of students into acquiring an unquestioning attitude is best evidenced in 
the internal assessment structure, in which problem questions intrinsically reject 
critical and ethical thinking in favour of the predominance of legal positivism. 
Although this attitude has existed since the inception of modern law schools, it has 
been further solidified by neoliberal values in recent times. 
 
267 Ibid. 
268 Kennedy (n 171) 5. 
269 Ibid 54–5. 
270 Ibid 56. 
271 Brown (n 149) 180. 
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid 180–1. 
 
122 
5) Commercial Values 
Law schools have propagated neoliberal values in three distinct ways in their internal 
curriculum. First, they have adopted an assessment structure that intrinsically 
celebrates corporate values by framing law as being passive, neutral and objective 
rather than active, ideological and subjective.274 Second, law schools have succumbed 
to the influence of the ‘employers’ voice’ in curriculum reform, which allows 
employers complete access to influence both the internal graduate attributes and the 
direction of law schools.275 Third, law schools have offered major corporate 
employers the opportunity to dominate career fairs; these corporate employers would 
directly advertise and market towards students at a time when the legal profession is 
experiencing a decline in the number of graduate jobs.276 
Law schools justify this shift towards commercialisation by using the clichés of being 
situated in a ‘technological age’ that has greater ‘globalisation’ and more ‘global’ 
challenges than ever before.277 It is unclear why this justification is being used when 
the real justification appears to be a shift towards corporate values.278 
a) Law as ‘Passive’: Assessing Structure 
An essential part of the legal education process involves converting students from 
actively engaged citizens into passively observant judges who accept the authority of 
law at face value. 
Another essential part of this process involves students adopting the philosophy of 
legal positivism. As mentioned previously, Austrian philosopher Hans Kelsen 
described legal positivism as the belief that law should discard the ‘baggage’ of the 
social sciences, morality and other considerations and instead pursue the study of law 
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as ‘pure law’.279 By ‘pure law’, Kelsen references the study of law alone, based only 
on its own authority. Kelsen has suggested that law derives its authority from prior 
law alone (and no other force), and that the prior law itself derives its authority from a 
further prior law before it—and this linear basis continues as far back as it can.280 
When no previous authority can be found, the final piece of law can ‘presuppose its 
own validity’ (e.g., in the case of constitutions).281 
In general society, legal positivism is commonly understood by the phrase ‘the law is 
the law’. This phrase reinforces what the law ‘is’ without questioning what the law 
‘ought’ to be.282 Continually used by politicians to justify controversial (often 
immoral or morally questionable) judicial decisions, this banal phrase summarises the 
non-critical conception of law being a final or ultimate conclusion to a problem, as 
opposed to the start of a continued debate on possible solutions.283 Instead of 
questioning whether an outcome is just or fair, it is considered ‘just’ simply ‘because 
it derives from a legal authority’.284 The law is considered just simply because it ‘is’ 
law—because law is law. In this way, an ‘ought’ (justice) is derived from an ‘is’ (the 
law). Deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ is a logical fallacy. David Hume originally 
elucidated as much in his. Treatise on Human Nature, in which he stated, ‘A reason 
should be given … how this new relation [the ought] can be a deduction from the 
[is]’. The laws of slavery in the US, of the apartheid in South Africa, of 
discriminatory voting rights in the Western states prior to the 1980s and other cases 
were all principally unjust; they are widely still regarded as such today, but they were 
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nevertheless ‘law’ at the time. If ‘the law is the law’ is an ethical justification for just 
laws, then the laws of slavery in the US were just. This is clearly an untrue statement, 
which highlights how ‘the law is the law’ as an ethical justification for law itself is an 
untrue statement and, further, a logical fallacy. 
It is thus problematic to observe a potential over-reliance on past precedent over other 
forms of knowledge in some Australian law schools. If students rely on cases as the 
main source of legal information in class, then some students might ultimately derive 
their conception of justice by referencing past legal authority rather than wider 
discussions of political science and political philosophy. The most common 
assessment task is the problem question, which involves students applying legal 
precedent to a new set of facts.285 Students are given new facts and are expected to act 
like appellate court judges in applying previously found legal principles to those facts, 
without any regard to extrinsic justificatory materials.286 This analysis is circular, in 
that the students’ conclusions are justified by past legal precedents alone, which are 
themselves, as case laws, justified by further past legal precedents. The ‘end point’ or 
the original conception of law is never questioned in terms of its derivation from 
certain areas such as politics, society, morality, moral philosophy, sociology and 
anthropology.287 In this sense, law is justified in law schools simply by reference to it 
being the law. This mirrors the broader societal belief that ‘the law is the law’, and 
that any ethical justification of law is self-evident by its own authority. Again, 
according to Hume, this is a logical fallacy—and, again, no external justification is 
provided, even though one is needed. 
With the appearance of being morally neutral, but intrinsically just, the case law 
method equips students with the tools to ‘draw boundaries between the spheres of 
legal, moral and political consideration’.288 This allows them to normalise law as 
being objective, neutral and passive while ignoring contrary evidence. Morality, 
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politics and justice are considered subjective irrelevancies outside the curriculum’s 
scope.289 To be a law student is to have an ‘encyclopedic grasp of law’s terms, 
precepts, rules and decisions’.290 In this sense, law students become walking 
encyclopedias, though law schools pretend that law is not a game of 
‘memorisation’.291 Students who enter law school are transformed from laypersons 
and interested citizens into apolitical social constructs. Reflecting on the US 
experience, Kennedy highlighted that students with fast-reasoning intellects will 
likely have to ‘deconstruct law starting from scratch’ after they complete their law 
courses, or otherwise be entrenched in a hegemonic culture in which law is self-
justifying, self-verifying and self-perpetuating under the ‘law is law’ mindset.292 
Neuhaus even suggested that lawyers who follow ‘mechanical precedent’ alone lose 
their sense of morality, in that they are artificially ignoring the ‘moral meaning’ 
behind each case decision.293 By following precedent rulings blindly, students are 
implicitly rejecting the moral basis on which the law was made; they are turning away 
from the law’s original public conception (that it is a derivation from society, morality 
or God). This would not be a concern if some other justification for law were offered 
in the internal curriculum; however, it is concerning because no such justification is 
offered. 
At various points throughout history, legal educators have attempted to either justify 
or question the morally neutral teaching of the law. The CLS school of thought (as 
discussed in Part 1) sought to critique the current form of law and consider hidden 
biases, hierarchies and discrimination behind the façade of ‘pure law’ teaching.294 By 
extension, the prominent school of legal realism in the 1930s–1940s refuted the belief 
that law was somehow ‘static’ or immovable and contrasted it with the opposing 
belief that law was the ‘living law’—that it was ever changing with the social context 
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of the times.295 Law was not to be judged by its own internal ‘logic’ but through 
‘experience’ as it changed over time.296 However, despite the small but lingering 
movements in academia, they have had little tangible effect on the law school 
curriculum of today. 
In fact, a large-scale study of 29 Australian law schools in 2003 found that the most 
common mode of assessment at the time remained in the black-letter forms of 
‘examinations, written reports and problem-based’ questions.297 It is difficult to 
ascertain whether this is still the case without a new empirical study of the same 
magnitude. Although such a study is beyond the scope of this thesis, some 
circumstantial evidence indicates that at least casebooks and problem questions 
remain prominent in law schools (according to certain critiques on modern legal 
education that this section references). More recent statements from professors, 
faculty members or students at numerous law schools throughout Australia also 
indicate the continued use of the case method, cases and problem questions. 
For example, in 2011, Molly O’Brien at ANU Law School described appellate court 
judgements as ‘the meat and potatoes of [Australian] legal education’, further 
suggesting that ‘the predominant mode of teaching law—especially in introductory 
classes—is still case analysis’.298 In the same year, Patrick Keyser at La Trobe Law 
School argued for a ‘deepening’ of the case method, so that other theoretical factors 
could be considered.299 In 2015, Cameron Royse, a tutor at Monash Law School, 
suggested that ‘most [law] exams follow the formula of two “problem” questions’—in 
which one is an essay or policy question, and the other a case problem.300 A year later, 
Kelley Burton at the University of the Sunshine Coast Law School outlined the use of 
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the IRAC method and other acronym-based tools of case analysis.301 In 2017, Sydney 
Law School and the Sydney University Law Society both released guides that detailed 
case problem analysis and independently explained why cases are considered an 
important aspect of a law school curriculum.302 A year later, two academics from 
Curtin University and the University of Western Australia proclaimed that 
‘undisputedly, the teaching of black letter law forms a substantial basis of most 
undergraduate Bachelor of Laws curricula’ in Australia.303 According to these 
firsthand accounts, it is evident that black-letter law and case-based teaching 
continues in many law schools throughout Australia. 
Similar statements from students further confirm the use of case-based teaching at 
various Australian law schools. As mentioned previously, Sydney University Law 
Society published a guide in 2017 for law students, which addressed case problems, 
case notes and essays.304 Many statements regarding the use of cases can be found in 
law society guides for first year students. In 2016, Curtin Student Law Society 
published a first year guide that included a section titled ‘Day in the Life’, in which a 
fourth-year law student explained how they liked to ‘brainstorm the relevant points of 
law, cases and other useful material’ before a tutorial.305 In 2019, Adelaide University 
Law Student’s Society also released a first year guide, and it included study tips for 
only one kind of assessment task: case problems.306 In 2020, Deakin Law Student’s 
Society released their first year guide; it included a section titled ‘How to Do a Law 
Assignment’ that focused on only one type of assessment task: case problems.307 In 
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the same year, a first year juris doctor student at Melbourne Law School offered tips 
for students to ‘think like your examiner’, in which the student discussed only case 
problems as a type of assessment task.308 
The ubiquity of cases is also evident in online, anonymised forums, in which current 
law students summarise what studying law is like for aspiring high school applicants. 
These quotations are relevant enough to reproduce below. It should be noted how 
each student ultimately presents casebook readings and/or problem questions as the 
norm. Although online forums are typically considered unreliable, the nature of 
anonymity, in contrast, allows law students to be blunter and more honest with how 
they assess their legal education: 
[To get good marks in law school,] read summaries/principles of the cases 
and law, and work from there. Ideally, do that first, then walk into class and 
note down what your lecturer mentions on top of that. (4th year student, 
UNSW Law School)309 
I usually did the required readings (most subjects don’t set whole cases—
just extracts), create ‘reading notes’ (from the cases), lecture notes and then 
I combined them to form a summary. Depending on the subject, some very 
case based ones, I would end up having a summary of cases at the end of my 
notes—key facts, issue and decision (usually only 1–2 lines for each 
element). (Alumni, ANU Law School)310 
Students also differentiated legal education (and problem questions, specifically) from 
traditional liberal arts–style examinations in the humanities: 
Law exams are not anything like high school English essays. They are hectic 
and intense problem questions, with a dense hypothetical that you must 
resolve in 40 mins–1 hr, by identifying the legal issues and resolving them 
in a concise, legal argument. (2nd year student, Sydney Law School)311 
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The writing expected of law students is very different to what students in 
liberal arts degrees do ... The words that you choose to describe a principle 
of law will be subject to great scrutiny. On the other hand, the more 
important aspect of studying law is problem solving. (5th year student, 
University of Canberra Law School)312 
Unsurprisingly, a focus on black-letter assessments through case analysis reflects the 
kind of assessment tasks that best serve the market, as well as the kind of skills that 
employers desire the most. In a small-scale pilot survey of 16 employer organisations, 
the traditional skills of ‘reading and analyzing case law, applying and distinguishing 
cases [and] familiarity with legal principles—scored most highly’.313 Employers are 
not invested in law students solely gaining a moral or justice-oriented education. They 
are invested in students becoming highly capable in their jobs. Problem questions are 
routinely defended as reflecting ‘real world’ knowledge or ‘so called “authentic” 
situations’ in legal jobs.314 Law firms are typically pressed for time and need law 
graduates who can quickly apply legal principles to a new set of facts. Universities 
create a ‘value proposition’ by selling this kind of skill and assessing students’ 
abilities to successfully learn this skill ‘that individuals, employers and ultimately 
society pay for’.315 Bentley and Squelch cited that law students required the graduate 
skill of ‘thinking’ for work; however, the scholars only cited ‘problem solving’ as an 
example of a thinking skill.316 In brief, problem-solving is the only necessary kind of 
thought. Although this reflects the expediencies of the market, it does not represent 
the growth of the individual student. 
Although the analysis above offers a robust market defence of case analysis, it does 
not justify the lack of consideration regarding morality, policy or extrinsic materials 
in the current curriculum. Instead of justifying how case law derives an ‘ought’ from 
an ‘is’ (and thereby creates a self-perpetuating logical fallacy), the market 
‘justification’ simply considers case law a convenient skill for law students to possess. 
As Margaret Thornton stated, any other assessments like ‘research essays, with their 
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creative and critical edginess do not comport with market orthodoxy’.317 Other types 
of assessments are simply too difficult to mark, write or structure,318 and they tend to 
challenge the status quo. Even worse, creative or intellectual thinking is considered 
less beneficial to employers, as it is believed that this thinking does not offer students 
enough marketable or transferable skills. In this point, the convenience of the market, 
major firms and law schools supersedes the morality, critical engagement or 
intellectual insight of the student body. 
In the US context, Duncan Kennedy suggested that ‘the actual intellectual content of 
the law seems to consist of learning the rules, what they are and why they have to be 
the way they are, while rooting for the occasional judge who seems willing to make 
them marginally more humane’.319 This is especially true in Australia, considering the 
almost celebrity-like status of former High Court Justice Michael Kirby, who is 
celebrated by law students as a great dissenter on issues of human rights, justice and 
morality.320 Justice Kirby’s popularity extends to an appreciation group on Facebook, 
in which Australian law students make comments such as ‘Kirby for PM’ or ‘Kirby 
for Governor-General’ (in which they are presumably serious in such hopes). 
However, celebrating human rights should not be limited by (or construed through the 
lens of) a judge’s dissenting opinions or by any ‘authority’ figure in case law; rather, 
conceiving human rights should be based on students’ own sense of morality and their 
independent moral judgment or ‘dissent’ against the norm.321 Support for human 
rights often requires rejecting the dominant stream of public thought at a specific 
point in time, along with students’ own acclimatised culture (in this case, the 
business-like culture of law school) in favour of pursuing a moral objective to its 
rightful end. 
Justice Kirby himself fought against the dominant culture of homophobia in the 
1980s, and his dissenting approach in legal cases often valorised human rights and 
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morality at a time when such principles were unpopular. It is difficult to reconcile 
how law students celebrate this ‘great dissenter’ with the assessment structure of law 
schools’ mainstream corporate law culture. Students celebrate a rebel while they 
themselves might be trained to become conformists. The application of judicial 
rulings by rote, problem-based questions and other similar methods does not allow for 
a ‘dissenting’ voice to arise in the legal classroom. Instead, law students become 
intellectuals by proxy—through their hero, Michael Kirby—while they hide behind 
their doctrines, rules and black-letter law. 
The fictional lawyer Alan Shore expresses this succinctly when he stated, ‘Every first 
year law student is taught don’t ever, ever equate legal ethic with morality. They’re 
almost always mutually exclusive!’322 William Sullivan et al mimicked the statement 
by expressing that ‘in their all-consuming first year, students are told to set aside their 
desire for justice. They are warned not to let their moral concerns or compassion for 
the people in the cases they discuss cloud their legal analysis.’323 
The case method teaches students to become post-emotional and disregard their 
reactions. Essentially, the case method teaches students to become automatons: they 
apply legal principles that they never morally justify or rationally criticise beyond the 
limited criticisms available within case law itself (specifically by reference to the past 
‘dissenting judgments’ of the aforementioned Justices).324 Students often begin their 
first year with a strong sense of morality and justice, which slowly diminishes by the 
time they graduate three years later.325 This is reflected in certain US studies on 
student opinions and perspectives over time.326 It was found that students changed 
their perceptions of law simply because they were told that this was how the law 
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school functioned.327 They were taught that this was how the world worked. Or, more 
bluntly, they were taught that ‘the law is the law’: 
Law students come to law school with a sense of moral right and wrong, a 
well-tuned ethical compass, and even a rough feel for justice … Three years 
later, those same students leave law schools as graduates ready to sell their 
services as a hired gun to the highest bidder, skeptical of either the existence 
or the objectivity of right and wrong or good and bad.328 
Defenders of the case method highlight its original conception under Christopher 
Langdell at Harvard. Under the reforms that commenced in 1896, Langdell taught 
students at Harvard for the first time using the Socratic method.329 By 1914, the 
Socratic method and the accompanying format for case law problem questions came 
to dominate law schools worldwide.330 The case method ‘was copied in Australia as 
the new law schools were established, first at Melbourne and then at Sydney in the 
last years of the nineteenth century’.331 Problem questions were considered an escape 
from the dry, rote memorisation of legal principles.332 Instead of being lectured to, 
students received judicial opinions on related cases and were asked to ‘replicate or 
improve on the judge’s reasoning and the arguments of the lawyers on each side’.333 
This contrasted the older model, in which students read and listened to textbooks and 
were expected to explicitly memorise case principles. Students in this prior period 
were given the ‘right’ answers. However, under Langdell, they were told that there 
were no ‘right’ answers, only competing opinions.334 To this day, some scholars and 
academics yet believe that Langdell’s case method is the best method for allowing 
students to observe ‘how open is the future of the law’.335 By considering the different 
perspectives of appellate court judges, the law is supposedly unearthed as fluid and 
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dynamic, as well as open to change or reform at the whim of a new judge. However, 
critics of Langdell, both in his time and presently, suggested that a focus on case law 
actually narrows the scope of a student’s thoughts, as it ignores how law relates to 
everyday life.336 A true consideration of ‘how open is the future of the law’ would 
consider substantive issues that actually reveal the true scope of law, such as politics, 
sociology and anthropology.337 Politics and activism should at least become a central 
part of the curriculum since appellate court judges rarely change the law in their own 
right.338 Instead, changes in the law tended to originate from persistent debate, 
activism and the work of politicians drafting new statutes. 
Even more fundamentally, a true consideration of ‘how open is the future of the law’ 
would more greatly emphasise statute law itself. Critics often highlighted that 
Langdell’s method prioritised case law over statute law in an age when statute law 
had come to dominant law reform.339 Ironically, since 2006, Harvard Law School 
itself had shifted its focus towards statute law, after a century of Langdell’s 
method.340 First year Harvard students now consider statute law analysis, international 
law and a broader understanding of law as general proponents of a field ‘rather than 
… focusing entirely on interpreting legal doctrines’.341 New Harvard tutors who teach 
a newly formed elective, Systematic Justice, stated that the case method simply ‘puts 
too much emphasis on what the law already is, rather than [on] what it should be’.342 
Tutor Jacob Lipton claimed that it ‘tends to assume that decisions of the past are fair 
and appropriate’, whereas legal education should begin by considering ‘what the 
problems are in the world’ and how they should be effectively addressed.343 Justice 
Kirby highlighted an obvious discrepancy when he stated that it was ‘astonishing that, 
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in Australia (with a few notable exceptions) law courses continue to persist with the 
illusion that the common law is the centerpiece of our legal system’.344 People might 
thus wonder why Australian law schools have been so slow to shift their focus when 
they had once been quick to follow the dictates of Harvard. 
A rare exception is the University of Wollongong Law School, which posits in its first 
year law student manual that: 
We do not spoon-feed students at the Faculty of Law. We discourage 
passive listening. We do not simply pass on an acceptance of the way the 
Law has always been. If we were to teach Law in that way you would be 
most unlikely to gain the independence, judgment and flexibility you expect 
from a University education.345 
In addition to this guideline, the university mandates a legal drafting course and four 
theoretical courses as part of its core curriculum.346 Other universities, including 
UNSW, have responded to the rising prominence of statute law by introducing a new 
elective course in statutory interpretation.347 However, this decision is not as proactive 
as those of Harvard.348 Indeed, Australian law schools have remained slow to adapt to 
the new realities of law, as they continue focusing on the old and narrow case–law 
method. Eugene Clark’s criticism of Australian law schools that was made a decade 
ago still applies: ‘Few law schools, if any have had the time or resources to be 
proactive, to plan for change in an orderly, coherent and strategic way’.349 This trend 
among modern law schools can be compared unfavourably to the early and more 
innovative law schools of the 1800s, as discussed in the previous section. 
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i) The Priestley Eleven 
The national legal admission requirements, known colloquially as the Priestley 
Eleven, are fundamental to the dominance of the case law method and the ‘law is the 
law’ mindset in Australia. 
The Priestley Eleven is a set of compulsory subjects that all law students must 
complete to be admitted to practice law in Australia.350 These subjects emerged due to 
the LACC in 1992, who aimed to establish a uniform list of subjects for all admitted 
lawyers in Australia.351 Named after the head of that committee, Lancelot John 
Priestley, the selected subjects portrayed a narrow focus on ‘substantive law’ rather 
than on extrinsic lessons in ethics, morality or politics (excluding the ‘Legal Ethics’ 
subject).352 Priestley Eleven subjects include core, black-letter law units such as torts, 
equity, contracts, administrative law, evidence, corporations law, property, 
constitutional law and civil and criminal procedure. Black-letter law subjects tend to 
focus on what the law is rather than on what it should be, and they tend to normalise 
the notion of law being an objective, neutral and passive force. They also tend to be 
‘saturated with scenario-based learning through problem solving’ questions rather 
than learning through essays or other critical engagement tools.353 In this sense, they 
tend to justify the ‘law is the law’ mindset by never offering students the chance to 
criticise what the law is, which thus implicitly endorses its current form. 
Most Australian law schools adopt the approach of teaching every Priestley Eleven 
subject in its own unit, which signifies the predominance of black-letter law 
throughout the core curriculum.354 The Australian Law Reform Commission has 
criticised the Priestley Eleven content as being ‘outmoded’, as it tends to prioritise 
‘what lawyers need to know’ over what lawyers ‘ought to do’.355 In contrast, law 
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students in the US are expected to study how they can ‘improve the profession’, gain 
‘professional self-development’ and learn lessons in ‘morality’ in all core law 
subjects.356 In Australia, the focus is narrowly on legal principles. Indeed, the 
Priestley Eleven tend to focus on teaching law through cases rather than through 
critical or ethical thinking. Students are commonly told to ‘set aside their desire for 
justice’ and not let their ‘moral compassion’ cloud their judgement in black-letter law 
subjects.357 However, it becomes artificial to separate all moral considerations from a 
student’s problem-solving analysis when Priestley Eleven subjects include topics on 
sexual assault, politics and business transactions. Students come to believe that 
advising a client involves a robotic function of applying law to the circumstances, 
drawing lines between precedents and facts, and distinguishing competing cases.358 
Even worse, students gain the false impression that law is neutral, passive or 
impartial, when, realistically, it greatly affects people’s everyday lives. 
When students are eventually allowed to consider ethics at the end of their degree (or 
briefly at the start), they might find it confusing, or they might gain a cynical 
impression of the dismissive treatment of ethical teaching in the curriculum.359 Some 
authors have suggested that it is too late by the time that students are allowed to 
expand into other electives and subjects such as ethics; by the time they reach the one 
or two ethics courses in law school, they might have already acclimatised to ‘thinking 
like a lawyer’.360 If so, they might come to regard ethics as a game to be played.361 
Many academics have suggested integrating ethics ‘throughout the curriculum’ to 
prevent this mindset.362 Others have suggested that a greater focus should be placed 
on teaching ethics and morality at the start of the degree so that it can act as a 
backdrop for law students throughout their entire course. 
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However, this suggestion misses the larger point of how legal ethics might act as just 
another vocational sphere of the law for law students to master. Truly broadening the 
minds of law students would require courses that teach the basics of moral 
philosophy, sociology and anthropology, as well as courses that permit students to 
question the cultural, theoretical and moral underpinnings of legal institutions and 
principles. The Council of Australian Law Deans (CALD) and the Australian 
Learning and Teaching Council (ALTC) recently stated that law graduates should 
‘understand the “broader context” [of law] including … the political, social, 
historical, philosophical and economic context’ from which it originates.363 However, 
implementing this course model seems impossible with regard to the current Priestley 
Eleven requirements. Chief Justice French recently panned the Priestley Eleven for 
this reason, pronouncing that the subjects are a ‘dead hand’ that constrains legal 
education reform.364 The Productivity Commission has similarly stated that the 
Priestley Eleven provide a ‘strong base knowledge of the law [but] limit the flexibility 
of universities to compete and innovate’.365 It would appear that universities must 
move beyond the Priestley Eleven requirements if they wish to sufficiently educate 
law students about the origins of the law and how to behave ethically. 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that a new review of the Priestley Eleven requirements is 
currently underway. In 2015, the LACC asked whether the subjects of civil procedure, 
company law, evidence, ethics and professional responsibility should remain a core 
part of the curriculum or whether they were no longer considered necessary for new 
lawyers.366 These specific subjects are considered unnecessary in the current 
curriculum because they might not be required for ‘all entry-level lawyers’, as well as 
because these subjects are already being taught in PLT courses.367 The LACC has 
quoted Chief Justices in its argument for a new focus on statutory interpretation 
instead. This mirrors this thesis’s previous argument regarding the changing focus of 
law towards statute law and the corresponding shift in the Harvard curriculum to 
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follow. However, despite this robust argument, CALD has clearly stated that it finds it 
‘unclear’ why ‘statutory interpretation … [has been] singled out’ in the review 
process.368 CALD opposes all changes to the curriculum, but it heavily qualifies that it 
would be more willing to consider change if it was part of a wider and more all-
encompassing review process.369 It is unclear how this process will unfold over time. 
b) ‘The Employer’s Voice’: Shaping Graduate Attributes 
In the early 1990s, Australian universities were increasingly pressured by ‘the state, 
industry and other agencies’ to produce graduates who possessed specific market-
relevant skills.370 By the mid-2000s, universities had embedded graduate attributes 
into the core of their teaching objectives.371 It is now common to observe graduate 
attributes presented as a dot-pointed list on course outlines, which are handed to 
students at the start of their degrees. These attributes are often used to justify the 
entire degree program, as if law would have no purpose without the graduate 
attributes of the degree. Of course, this is an absurd perspective, but it is nonetheless 
implicit in the documentation. Certain academics have argued that graduate attributes 
make university more ‘relevant’ to society by helping graduates contribute to the 
larger economic goals (and GDP) of their respective countries.372 This is partially 
true, and it will be discussed in greater detail below. However, the primary objection 
in this subsection is that a focus on graduate attributes diminishes the independence of 
a law school’s internal curriculum. Law schools now listen to the legal profession 
when they draft changes to the curriculum instead of deriving their own ideas. This 
greatly bolsters the vocational nature of law schools, in a time when the vocation 
itself is in a state of flux. 
Graduate attributes are key skills or criteria that a student should gain after 
completing a specific degree program. They are often broad or generic and encompass 
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areas such as ‘thinking skills … logical and analytical reasoning, problem solving 
[and] communication, [and] teamwork skills’.373 In vocational degrees, and 
increasingly in law, these attributes tend to focus more narrowly on the occupational 
skills required for gaining entry into the profession. In this way, they are often linked 
to a student’s ‘employability’.374 They are also linked to the belief that universities 
should produce the kind of graduates that employers desire.375 At their most intrusive, 
graduate attributes are used to guide the conceptual understanding and direction of 
law schools, along with their internal assessment structure and curriculum.376 
According to researchers who promote graduate attributes, the ‘best’ law schools are 
those that align their assessments with their graduate attributes to produce the kind of 
student that narrowly suits the needs of the market.377 Education, when examined 
within this framework, becomes outcome oriented rather than intrinsically 
rewarding.378 Instead of focusing on developing well-rounded students, universities 
focus on facilitating market-driven demand. 
Owen and Davis illustrated a pyramid that depicts how students should gain market-
relevant skills at every stage of their development (see Figure 1).379 This visual 
depiction, in which students become ‘narrower’ over time, is apt (although this was 
unintentional on the scholars’ part). It should be remembered that the more 
universities focus on vocational graduate attributes, the less their degrees can be 
considered general or holistic. The losses come in the form of well-rounded students 
who become narrow-minded over time because they are only taught the technical 
skills that are required for fulfilling a single role in a single occupation. In this way, 
universities become specialised knowledge trainers, and each university department is 
separated from others, which decreases the level of cross-institutional education. Even 
from a market-centric perspective, this signifies that the students that are produced 
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cannot adequately shift between different market roles or different occupations over 
time. 
 
Figure 1:380 Graduate Attributes Are Continually Linked to the Idea of 
‘Employability’, Offering Employers What They Want or Helping Students 
Achieve ‘work-based learning’.381 The figure above shows graduate attributes 
that are actualised in an assessment structure until a student’s graduation and 
afterwards. 
In general, universities have started emphasising employer–university relationships 
more by documenting the relationship with data. Several major Australian universities 
participate each year in the QS Graduate Employability Ranking.382 This yearly 
ranking system aims to level each university according to the employability of its 
students.383 The effect of numerical tools such as this cannot be underestimated. 
Numerical categorisation is a core of neoliberalism; it involves making all aspects of 
the university process a documented ‘science’ in which numbers matter more than 
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tangible outcomes.384 Questions have been asked regarding whether university 
ranking systems such as these are more ‘hype’ than ‘substance’, especially due to the 
variability of the data that was obtained from ‘competing’ universities.385 It is also 
worth questioning whether universities remain effectively independent—that is, 
whether they make decisions regarding their curriculum based on external ranking 
sites. 
Law schools have influenced as much as the broader university sector in terms of 
searching for employers to dictate their next decisions. In a broad 2003 Australian 
national ‘stocktake’ of legal education, the opinions of ‘employers of law graduates’ 
were considered important to survey, as was employers’ ability to ‘participate in the 
project’.386 It was found that all 29 law schools that were surveyed considered the 
‘views of the profession’ ‘to varying degrees’ when they designed their internal 
curriculum.387 Another study, which was co-authored by a current law dean, qualified 
that ‘law schools should [not] surrender control of the law school curriculum to the 
legal profession’.388 However, it then admitted that ‘it is important that law teachers 
are aware of the employers’ voice, particularly when contemplating the incorporation 
of “lawyering” skills into the law school curriculum’.389 The ‘employer’s voice’ is 
powerful and persistent, and it tends to shift educational outcomes. Law schools are 
praised when they use the employer’s voice to guide their formulation of new 
graduate attributes. Queensland University of Technology (QUT) was recently hailed 
as an ‘exemplar’ of best practice, partly because it used ‘feedback from employers 
and graduates’ to create its new list of graduate attributes.390 It should be noted that 
the ‘employers voice’ that these surveys referenced often emerged narrowly from the 
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major and minor law firms; it thus does not reflect the great diversity of graduate 
routes that law students select after graduation. 
On one end of this argument is a law school that admitted that: 
We are in constant and close contact with the profession to ask what they 
require of our students. As the Head of the School, I, along with the Dean of 
the Faculty, visit all the large commercial law firms, their HR people and 
some partners, at least every second year and ask them what they think of 
our graduates and whether they’ve got any suggestions. And we also meet 
with them at lunches.391 
In a political context, this would resemble lobbying. However, even in this context, it 
is concerning that the legal profession’s influence on legal education is so normalised 
that law schools can openly admit that such heavy-handed influence occurs. The loss 
of autonomy, in terms of how law schools no longer feel capable of defining their 
own internal curriculum without any external influences, is profoundly concerning. It 
is unclear how a university system—which itself lacks autonomy and merely serves 
as an extension of the agendas of large, corporate law firms—can expect to produce 
autonomous, critically aware and open-minded law students. 
The reality is that major law firms are currently dictating what occurs in Australian 
law schools, not only in terms of the curriculum and direction of graduate attributes 
but also in terms of general student life. 
The next subsection discusses how this corporate perspective proliferates into the 
social and extracurricular lives of law students. 
c) Broader Corporate Influence 
Most Australian law schools have observed a proliferation of corporate-sponsored 
career fairs, parties, social and networking events, sports activities, libraries and 
buildings, speaking events, mooting and other law school skills competitions, as well 
as clerkship presentations from major firms. One law dean recently admitted that their 
‘university is dominated by publicity from the big law firms’, and that their students 
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feel like they are failures if they do not obtain a job at one of the firms.392 Students are 
confronted with endless advertising from big firms, with some students consequently 
becoming ‘captivated by the glamour of corporate lawyering’.393 Law is no longer 
considered a job, profession or calling; it is considered the lifestyle choice of a 
gatekeeper to weekly office sports, drink events, parties and pork belly canapés. 
Attracted by the message, students come to crave ‘the office with a spectacular view, 
original artworks, lavish entertainment and high salaries’, which ‘overshadows [any 
possible] alternative career [pathways]’.394 Due to this oversaturation of marketing, 
corporate law is often considered the only option for law students. In the US, one 
educator recently discussed the four largest subjects: ‘Law, medicine, finance and 
consulting … dominate careers fairs, not by word of mouth or reputation, but by 
monetary donation’.395 Australian major law firms similarly out-pay everyone in 
terms of sponsorship towards law schools. The more these firms’ branding appears in 
front of students, the more those students will be convinced that corporate law is the 
only option for their future and for their vision of success. 
The current literature has not recognised that major law firms have become invested 
in capturing the attention of all students to the extent that they wish to acquire the best 
students after graduation. Given this vested interest and the reality of the economy not 
possessing enough jobs for all graduates, a clear discrepancy can be noted between 
the needs of employers and those of graduating students. The damage caused by 
encouraging all law students to pursue employment at the largest firms—when 
numerous students will never work at such firms—is profound. Although aspiration 
itself is not unethical, intentionally misleading most of a population to believe that its 
aspirations are attainable when it is statistically impossible is unethical. 
Many students (most students, according to some estimations) who feel misled by the 
culture of ‘prestige’ and inevitability in the practice of law (fostered by the major 
firms and their PR departments) are ignored. There are extensive online forum threads 
in Australia, such as ‘How to Improve Prospects for Law Grads’, in which students 
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and former students can complain: ‘The sooner the prestige wears off and the reality 
of law as compared to other professions sets in, the better’.396 Many students raise 
their concerns about the lack of available knowledge regarding alternative career 
paths in law schools, which themselves are dominated by advertising from the select 
few firms.397 Others raise concerns about the lack of demand for law graduates in the 
major firms, despite the excessive corporate advertising.398 Nick Abrahams, partner of 
a Sydney law firm, joked that ‘perhaps the answer is that rather than going to law 
school to become a lawyer, go to law school so you can open a law school’.399 
Venting this frustration, a popular genre of law student confessionals has appeared 
online, and Australian law students have begun writing online ‘ranting’ articles, 
similar to their money-strapped and debt-riddled US counterparts. Marie Iskander, a 
final year law student, wrote: ‘Despite being reluctant about pursuing a clerkship, 
because I didn’t feel drawn towards private law, I was convinced by peers, older 
lawyer friends and, of course, HR from the big law firms that “this is the right path” 
and “what do you have to lose?”’400 
The losses are real and significant. Many law students complain that they start law 
school with an interest in pursuing a social justice agenda but then feel that they must 
‘do their time’ at the major firms.401 This finding is evident in several empirical 
studies that compared the intentions of first year law students (who are initially more 
publicly motivated by social justice and morality) to their intentions at graduation (in 
which they are more focused on business and corporate values).402 Once they 
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graduate, social justice–oriented students are often ‘swallowed up [by the big firms] 
… drawn in by the tempting income’,403 and they feel like they are trapped between 
the proverbial rock and a hard place.404 The loss of social–justice oriented students to 
law firms is often dismissed as having a net-neutral effect on the economy. This 
demonstrates how all-encompassing the vocational outlook of universities has 
become. The corporate seduction and media messaging that are used to encourage 
students to act against their desires to help others, or contribute to charity and society 
more broadly, do not portray the supposedly ‘prestigious’ or ‘honourable’ profession. 
Indeed, encouraging students to forgo charitable or public-interested pursuits is 
dishonourable, and it should be called out for what it is. Once-a-week pro bono 
placements do not supplement becoming a public advocate. Law firms should not be 
rewarded for discouraging students from pursuing their own interests, pro bono 
service or social justice. 
The university curriculum’s loss of autonomy has shifted to an equivalent loss of the 
student body’s autonomy. Many students feel that ‘they are living out a script that 
they didn’t choose. They feel that their dreams are being shaped by incentives that are 
coming to them out of thin air.’405 The chief executive of the NSW Law Society 
starkly addressed the need to inform law students about ‘the state of the legal market’ 
before they begin a law degree, but it is unclear how this can occur while students are 
receiving the never-ending onslaught of glossy pamphlets from the major firms;406 
one man cannot stop a tsunami, however much he might shout at it to cease and 
desist. 
That major law firms have other vested interests (e.g., preventing graduates from 
being interested in other careers outside law) is similarly unrecognised in the 
literature. Several law firms have recently revealed open fears about the large 
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accounting firms ‘hiring [the] heavy hitters, [the law graduates] with real 
credibility’.407 These fears imply a greater fear: losing control over recent graduates. 
A common phrase among law firms is that Australian law schools are producing 
‘graduate[s] who are not committed to legal practice and who [will] leave after a few 
years’ (generally, to other industries).408 Paradoxically, law firms demand ‘well-
rounded’ applicants.409 Here, it must be asked whether a well-rounded candidate 
might develop interests outside the law, as aligned with the definition of being well 
rounded, and whether they might therefore seek to leave legal employment at some 
point in their lives. Being well rounded demands an intellectual expansion beyond the 
narrow confines of a single discipline; however, law firms demand a narrow 
specialisation of graduates into ‘legal professionals’ alone. 
This trend’s effect on legal education—a field in which the views of employers still 
predominate—results in universities becoming vassals for the major firms; 
universities cannot move beyond the narrow vocational confines, and their students 
are slaves to ‘graduate attributes’ that large firms dictate. It is difficult to perceive 
how well-rounded students can ever emerge from this system unless they fight against 
their educational institution—and fight for a decent education, one that contradicts 
what they are expected to receive.410 
Instead of encouraging law students to broaden their horizons while studying in law 
school, several Australian law deans have publicly suggested that law students should 
find diversity ‘from their other degree’.411 That is, they are passing the buck. One 
dean admitted the problem of diversity in graduating classes, but then immediately 
stated that students should ‘combine their law studies with a range of other degree 
programs [so that] at the outset they can craft the sort of career options that they have 
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in mind’.412 Another suggested that ‘a law degree … opens up many opportunities’.413 
Another again suggested that law students should ‘benefit from the intellectual 
diversity provided by a wide range of combined degrees which offer an 
interdisciplinary education to enhance their legal education’.414 Therefore, instead of 
making law a generalist degree that many students desire it to be, deans try to make 
law ‘generalist’ by association—to the idea of students being involved in other, 
external degrees. This is a subtle way of not addressing the problem. 
Despite how law deans are advising students to be involved in other degrees, most of 
the alternative advice to young law students regards narrowly gaining legal 
professional skills alone—to the detriment of gaining any well-roundedness. In their 
book for prospective law students, Carey and Adams suggested that new law students 
should become involved in as many law extracurriculars as possible.415 They should 
join law reviews, legal centres, law student groups and the local law societies.416 In 
brief, they suggested that law students should be ‘lawyering’ at all times, which 
denotes a lifestyle that is designed to destroy the ‘rhythmic and periodic textures of 
human life’.417 The focus on law-only extracurriculars explicitly discourages lateral 
thinking. However, this demand for constant lawyering has been routinely justified by 
the lack of new graduate positions at the major firms. Positioned with an absent 
demand in the economy yet in the heart of a vocationalised system, students are 
pressured into acquiring as many law-related extracurricular activities as possible. 
Since law firms can select any preferred graduate, the competition increases 
exponentially—to the extent that being good at law is no longer good enough. 
Graduates must be good at law and mooters or CLC volunteers; they must be 
involved in law student bodies or a review, or, even more crucially, they must work in 
part-time legal practices throughout their studies. In this sense, law dominates the 
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public and private lives of average law students, to the extent that they can no longer 
become well rounded, even if they wanted to. 
Little is explained to law students regarding alternative career paths while they are in 
law school. Lee-May Saw, President of the Women Lawyer’s Association of NSW, 
recently stated that ‘many [law students] are choosing not to pursue a career in law 
but what’s concerning is graduates feel there is a lack of information about work 
opportunities’.418 In a cynical reading, some have also suggested that universities in 
the neoliberal age have ‘strong incentives not to produce too many seekers and 
thinkers, too many poets, teachers, ministers, [or] public-interested lawyers’.419 These 
graduates would decrease the amount of alumni funding available from students after 
they graduate.420 There is a clear incentive to funnel law students into the most highly 
paid professions available (i.e., the major firms), so that alumni contributions can be 
maximised.421 At the least, there is a conflict of interest here; at most, this ensures 
profit seeking on the part of all parties (the student, law firm and university). Profit 
becomes the metric by which all actions should or can be judged, and all parties turn 
their minds towards a vocational, market-centric ideology and outlook—one that 
lacks any meaning other than money as the prime motivator in life. 
One suggested solution is to introduce legal clinics or clinical legal education. The 
following section explores whether legal clinics are a real solution to the current 
dilemma in social justice careers, or whether they might, counterintuitively, reinforce 
the neoliberal perceptions of students. 
d) Clinical Legal Education as a Silver Bullet 
Legal clinics are institutions attached to law schools, or in the community, that place 
students in real-world settings with clients, which thereby allows them to confront the 
‘reality’ of the law.422 Students are paired with faculty or volunteer lawyers to fulfil 
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basic duties, including client interviews, drafting and research.423 The clinics are often 
established as (or linked to) community legal centres, and they provide services to the 
‘poor and disadvantaged’.424 In this way, legal clinics frequently begin with an 
implicit social justice agenda.425 This agenda would include expanding access to 
justice by providing services to the poor and helping the vulnerable with legal 
disputes or others who otherwise could not afford such services.426 For example, 
UNSW’s Kingsford Legal Centre aims to deliver ‘access to justice to the most 
disadvantaged members of our community’.427 Clinical legal education can be 
presented as a solution to a law school curriculum that is considered detached from 
lawyers’ real experiences of working in society.428 Working with real clients, 
confronting the reality of the law in practice (e.g., the psychological toll of legal 
procedures on real people) and possibly assisting those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds provides students with a broader educational and professional 
experience of the role of lawyers than they would otherwise receive.429 Duncan 
Kennedy’s historical complaint that law schools entrench inequality in society can be 
somewhat addressed by allowing students to work in pro bono legal clinics that target 
access to justice—an issue that typically entrenches such societal inequalities.430 
Concurrently, the increasing focus on clinical legal education (as a ‘new’ movement) 
can be regarded as correlating with the rise of neoliberal philosophy. Clinical legal 
education might sometimes inadvertently assist the neoliberal turn in legal education 
by reinforcing a focus on job skills, graduate attributes and numerical, outcome-based 
education. In clinics, students ‘learn about law and lawyering by performing 
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lawyering tasks’.431 These tasks endow them with specific skills that are valuable in 
the job market.432 However, at other times, clinical legal education might also work 
against the neoliberal turn by allowing students to critique the law in practice, reflect 
on a client’s lived experience of the law and gain tangible new traits such as empathy 
and compassion, which are not necessarily part of a neoliberal or vocational 
curriculum.433 Regardless of whether students’ experience in a legal clinic is broad or 
not, perceiving the law in society critically or being narrowly focused on job skills 
alone is decided by the individual clinic, which varies according to each case. It is 
equally plausible for clinics to be a hybrid of social justice and neoliberal (or at least 
vocational) educational paradigms; this would provide students job skills while 
simultaneously allowing them time outside class to consider social justice and reflect 
on how the law works in society. 
Examining the arguments that have been advanced to establish legal clinics offers a 
better understanding of the veracity of the claims of a vocational or social justice 
purpose to clinical education. This section does not aim to offer a comprehensive 
history of these clinics, but rather some select examples that demonstrate how 
different arguments have been made for legal clinics to become part of a law school 
curriculum in the US and Australia over time. These historical arguments have 
sometimes matched a neoliberal paradigm by focusing on numerical outcomes, job 
skills and market-based competition with other law schools; however, legal clinics 
have also been advanced as a social justice salve to legal positivism or as a method 
for students to gain exposure to the real world of law in society. Further, sometimes 
both directions have been advanced.434 
Some of the earliest of these examples from a common-law jurisdiction are from the 
US, where legal clinics were initially, though not exclusively, established to replace 
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apprenticeships as a method for teaching vocational skills to law students.435 By the 
late 1800s, law students were still mandated to complete apprenticeships ‘in private 
law offices’, even if they had attended a US law school.436 An informal agreement 
existed ‘between the legal bar and law schools’, in which the theoretical component 
of legal education would be left to law schools and the practical component to the 
legal bar.437 Law students were required to undergo apprenticeships even if they had 
attended a law school; this signifies that US law schools lacked a requisite incentive 
to provide their own practical legal training.438 However, as ‘the apprenticeship model 
dissipated’ and law schools arose as the primary avenue through which to enter the 
legal profession, a question was asked regarding ‘who would train law students’ in the 
more practical aspects of legal practice.439 One answer was law schools themselves, in 
which students would spend time in legal clinics that were run by, or associated with, 
the faculty or student body.440 
Early legal clinics began as legal ‘dispensaries’ that were modelled from the concept 
of medical dispensaries providing free services to the poor.441 To varying degrees, 
these early legal clinics linked either to a university or student group, and they were 
often informal compared to modern legal clinics.442 That they provided services to the 
poor implicitly signifies that these dispensaries had a practical vocational and social 
justice aspect from the beginning. The first dispensary in the US was established in 
1893 by a ‘law club at the University of Pennsylvania’.443 The Pennsylvania 
dispensary was established by a voluntary student organisation that had no affiliation 
with the university.444 It aimed to provide ‘free legal services to the poor, much like 
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medical dispensaries of the time’. As such, it initially possessed a clear social justice 
agenda.445 However, according to contemporary documents, this agenda was 
secondary to a professional agenda; students would work as lawyers until they could 
represent clients in court, which indicates a significant practical-skills component of 
helping students hone ‘the tools of [the] profession’.446 
Other universities followed suit. In 1904, the University of Denver established a 
dispensary, while in 1913, Harvard ‘established the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau and [in 
the same year] the University of Minnesota required obligatory service by all students 
in the office of the Legal Aid Society’.447 In the case of Harvard, social justice was 
the core mission statement of the student-run clinic; it focused on ‘rendering legal aid 
and assistance, gratuitously, to all persons or associations who by reason of financial 
embarrassment or social position, or for any other reason, appear worthy thereof’.448 
In the case of the University of Minnesota, the university advertised the clinic as a 
‘service to poor clients’, but the faculty’s main internal motivation was to prepare 
students for legal practice.449 These early clinics each had an implicit (and often 
advertised) social justice focus in addition to an often more explicit, internal and 
vocational focus. 
Two interesting statements were made by US advocates of legal clinics in the ensuing 
decade, which reflected the dual social–vocational purpose of legal clinics at the time. 
In 1917, William Rowe wrote a law review article that advocated for every law school 
to have a clinical program.450 He argued in favour of legal clinics for three key 
reasons: vocational training, professional responsibility and social justice.451 He 
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‘nothing else’ would ‘arouse an abiding interest in the law, as a vital thing’ for 
students.452 According to Rowe, common-law countries had failed to provide 
adequate vocational training in the wake of the apprenticeship model; he argued that 
this could now be accomplished via law schools.453 Further, not only could law 
schools train students in practical matters, but they could also teach students about the 
‘professional spirit’ of ‘good citizenship’ and a lawyer’s duty to society.454 Finally, 
students could learn from clinics about duty ‘to the poor’, to ‘charity and [to] social 
service’.455 
In 1921, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching funded a report 
on legal education.456 Written by Alfred Reed, the report advocated for a ‘practical 
skills’ course in all law schools that would advance both ‘social service’ and 
‘practical skills’.457 The purpose of legal education was similarly identified by Reed 
as being three-fold: ‘general education, theoretical knowledge … and practical skills 
training’.458 Reed suggested that lawyers were political actors of the ‘governing 
mechanism of the state’ and that they acted as a check and balance on injustices 
against individuals.459 Expectedly, Reed’s proposals were met with controversy; for 
example, Albert M Kales of the Chicago Bar vigorously critiqued that the 
recommendations of Reed’s report were impractical—a criticism against which Reed 
felt compelled to defend himself.460 Nevertheless, his recommendations imparted the 
same wider perspective of what legal clinics could do in a law school. 
In 1928, the University of Southern California established the first experimental six-
week in-house program for clinical legal education,461 which was created by John 
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Bradway.462 Bradway would later establish a legal aid clinic at Duke University, one 
that would be considered ‘the first full-fledged in-house clinical program’ in a US law 
school.463 In his 28 years of running the clinic, Bradway contended that it possessed 
multiple objectives.464 It would help train ‘new lawyers’ with ‘flesh and blood clients’ 
in preparation for the bar, it would help Duke ‘build relationships in the community’, 
and it would finally demonstrate the legal profession’s ‘humane side’ by representing 
clients who could not pay.465 This trifecta of vocational training, outreach and 
community service aligns with the focus of the earlier legal dispensaries. It was a new 
experience for Duke University, in that this trifecta occurred within the law school 
itself rather than at an external venue.466 Despite the success at Duke University, it 
would take another two decades before another law school (the University of 
Tennessee) opened an ‘on-going, in-house clinical program’.467 
In 1933, Jerome Frank, one of the major writers of the Legal Realist movement, 
argued that most law schools were too theoretical and had to become ‘lawyer-
schools’.468 His conception of lawyer schools contradicted that of ‘law[yer] teacher’ 
schools that tended to create more academics rather than practical lawyers.469 Frank 
argued that lawyer schools could be accomplished through legal clinics.470 However, 
even though he advocated for clinics from a strong vocational premise, Frank also 
acknowledged that legal clinics should have a larger role in the community through 
fostering legal aid work among students.471 Therefore, even when framed from a 
vocational standpoint, social justice concerns inevitably rose to the surface. 
However, the true rise of legal clinics as a source of social justice initiatives as the 
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specific social justice objectives.472 This diverged from the more implicit notion of 
social justice to a more explicit motivating factor.473 Grants were offered to law 
schools from ‘the Department of Education and the Legal Services Corporation, [and] 
the Ford Foundation’ to significantly expand clinical programs.474 This funding was 
linked to explicit ‘social justice’ missions of ‘providing legal assistance to the poor’, 
which diverged from the explicitly vocational focus of earlier clinics.475 By 1972, 
several law schools (including Stanford, Michigan, Yale, Pennsylvania, UC Hastings 
and Georgetown) began operating under this more explicit social justice agenda.476 
There is a correlation that can be made here regarding the rise of the CLS movement 
in the same period, in which various CLS scholars had equally argued for legal clinics 
to be used to teach students about ‘privilege’, oppression and the reality of the legal 
system as a non-neutral entity.477 These objectives were broader than a strictly 
vocational approach would allow. The increasing number of legal clinics in other 
countries worldwide (e.g., Canada, Australia and the UK) can also be traced back to 
the 1970s.478 The specific context of Australia’s history of legal clinics will now be 
discussed in greater detail. 
The origin of clinical legal education in Australia began in the 1970s with various 
legal referral services. These services involved students participating in external 
placements outside law schools without any course credit or university supervision.479 
Examples include informal referral services that were associated with Melbourne 
University, Monash University and ANU.480 The first of these referral services was 
created in 1971 by Melbourne University law students who operated a ‘free legal 
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referral service’ in Carlton at the Church of All Nations.481 In 1971, a group of law 
student volunteers from Monash University (supported by members of the law 
faculty) began a referral service that was hosted at the Melbourne Citizens Advice 
Bureau.482 Finally, in 1972, the ANU Law Society established a referral service in 
lieu of ‘official’ legal aid offices, which opened the following year.483 As voluntary 
organisations, these early services possessed an implicit social justice agenda, which 
involved providing free referrals and an initial point of contact for disadvantaged 
clients.484 However, they were not hosted in-house at law schools. 
The first Australian in-house legal aid clinic was established in 1975 by Monash 
University Law School, and it was created as part of a dual focus on community 
service and student learning.485 By 1979, the Monash program was run as part of a 
law school elective called ‘Professional Practice’, in which it accepted 15 students at 
a time.486 The program allowed for one placement at the internal clinic and at three 
external clinics, but the core focus was less on education and more on legal aid 
itself.487 This sometimes involved helping those with a foreign language barrier (e.g., 
those who lacked proficiency in English) with their legal problems.488 The clinic had 
the dual role of serving the public through this outreach to immigrants and the poor, 
as well as the implicit role of serving students through course credit.489 
The Monash program was followed in 1974 by a legal clinical program at La Trobe 
University. It was created by staff in the Legal Studies Department who targeted the 
representation of students in legal disputes.490 Students were originally not involved 
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in this program, which signified that it was for their benefit (and a public benefit, as a 
subsidised service) rather than vocational training.491 By 1977, partly due to student 
demand, it was realised that the clinic could be used to train students in paralegal 
work to prepare for practice.492 Adrian Evans, a faculty member who was part of the 
clinic, established a clinical elective for students called ‘clinical legal education’.493 
Originally, 12 students were placed on the service, in which they participated ‘in 
seminars on interviewing skills and various substantive legal areas’.494 In 1978, La 
Trobe hired a legal aid lecturer, who established a secondary clinic at West 
Heidelberg Community Centre that functioned as a secondary placement venue for 
students on the elective unit.495 Another elective (‘law and social justice’) was 
developed from the same work, but with a more explicit social justice focus; it pushed 
for students to regard themselves as changemakers in society.496 Students were taught 
electives that would allow them to play a key role in ‘improving the workings of the 
legal system’ rather than to merely work within that system.497 
A final historical legal clinic worth mentioning is the one established at UNSW in 
1981, titled the Kingsford Legal Centre.498 The clinic had an evident social justice 
agenda and political mission from the start, as it accepted various anti-discrimination 
cases; however, it was also established to differentiate UNSW Law School from the 
existing Sydney University Law School.499 This market differentiation strategy is 
notable because it is unique according to the explicit reasons cited by the legal clinics 
discussed thus far. In terms of timing, a focus on the market competition correlates to 
the rise of neoliberal political philosophy at the time (though it was not necessarily 
caused by the philosophy). Kingsford Legal Centre nevertheless possessed a 
significant community service focus while it simultaneously allowed students to have 
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practical training in a ‘whole range’ of roles that were necessary for litigation.500 It 
could thus be said the centre was established for market, social justice and vocational 
reasons. 
The number of legal clinics and community legal centre placements for students in 
Australia has increased significantly from the 1990s.501 There were ‘13 CLE 
programs listed’ in the 1998 Kingsford Legal Centre Guide to Clinical Legal 
Education in Australian universities.502 By 2019, the same guide listed clinics that 
were linked to 26 of the 39 law schools in Australia, with some law schools running 
multiple different clinics or placing students at multiple community legal centres 
through different clinical law elective units.503 Part of this shift can be explained by 
CALD’s push for clinical legal education to be standardised.504 In its 2007 submission 
to the ‘Review of the Impact of the Higher Education Support Act 2003: Funding 
Cluster Mechanism’, CALD stated that: 
It is now widely accepted that legal education should have a clinical or 
industry placement component, with students having hands-on experience 
with real clients: yet clinical programs are so expensive that only a handful 
of law schools have been able to fund them adequately, usually with 
substantial support, to which many law schools do not have easy access.505 
One way to understand the modern focus of legal clinics in Australia is to consider 
their mission statements or to examine how they are described on law school 
websites. At face value, these statements evidence both a vocational and social justice 
focus (to varying degrees), and almost always simultaneously. The Kingsford Legal 
Centre stated that it is ‘committed to social justice and to promoting access to and 
reform of the legal system’.506 It also promised students ‘professional skills’, but only 
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those placed within a ‘critical analysis of the legal system’.507 Caxton Legal Centre 
(Griffith University) also promised students the chance to conduct real legal work, 
along with ‘pro bono law reform’ and ‘public interest research projects’.508 Redfern 
Legal Centre (Sydney University placement) similarly indicated the dual role of 
‘developing your skills’ through client interviews, along with learning the ‘constraints 
of the law’ as it applies to the disadvantaged.509 Other clinics linked to Macquarie 
University, Newcastle University, the University of South Australia, University of 
Adelaide, Murdoch University, ANU, Bond University and Curtin University all 
indicate a similar vocational–social dual purpose.510 In contrast, the University of 
Tasmania’s clinical placement program focuses solely on an explicitly vocational 
focus—namely, that students will gain ‘practical legal skills’ in a ‘practice-centric 
teaching’ curriculum.511 In these cases, social justice can only be evidenced implicitly 
in the clients that students take in their external placement organisations (e.g., in the 
Launceston Community Legal Centre and Tasmanian Aboriginal Community Legal 
Service).512 
Another way to comprehend the focus of legal clinics in Australia is to consider the 
experiences of students who undergo placements. Several surveys and statements of 
students reveal that they gain intangible perspectives about law, society and social 
justice, as well as tangible job skills from their time in these programs. In 2017, 14 
student volunteers and eight supervisors were surveyed at Macarthur Legal Centre in 
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South West Sydney.513 The survey aimed to ‘test whether students volunteering in a 
community legal centre made a significant difference to their learning of the law’.514 
The survey revealed that almost all students gained a greater understanding of their 
professional responsibility as lawyers and that 100 per cent of students cited a greater 
understanding of conflict of interest.515 All students similarly expressed a greater 
interest in pro bono work due to the placement.516 They remarked that it was 
‘rewarding to help those in need’, with one student even citing a new-found desire to 
pursue a wholly ‘not for profit legal career’.517 
Similar comments have been made by students from other placement programs. A 
student at the UQ Pro Bono Centre cited the ‘building [of] confidence in our legal 
skills’ and the ability to more ‘valuably’ understand the ‘significant socio-legal issues 
affecting indigenous Australians’.518 A student at Redfern Legal Centre stated that ‘it 
will make you realise that the law is not just fancy and glamorous, but that it affects 
real people with real problems’.519 This notion of confronting the reality of law was 
common. Students at ANU Canberra Community Law variously said that although 
the clinic helped them ‘learn from experienced lawyers’ and gain ‘client 
communication skills’, they also observed the consequence of the law on real 
people—specifically those from a lower socio-economic background.520 Heather, an 
ANU student, stated that the clinical experience had helped her think about ‘careers 
outside of corporate law’.521 Therefore, legal clinics not only offer students exposure 
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to the reality of the law in practice, but they also help students understand the role 
they can play in affecting that reality. 
It could be argued that regardless of effect, the rise of legal clinics in Australia might 
have been caused by neoliberal policy movements—such as the defunding of legal aid 
services more broadly and the outsourcing of legal aid responsibilities to clinics as 
semi-privatised institutions in the market (which relied on free student labour to 
subsidise the work of paid professionals).522 Campbell and Ray made this argument 
without naming it ‘neoliberal’.523 The start of the shift was observed in 1996 when the 
federal government ‘announced a program of reduction in legal aid funding’.524 In the 
ensuing years, the government pursued alternatives—such as clinical legal education 
with its ‘use of students as “free labour” and its connection with Universities, which 
might be expected to contribute to the costs of programs’.525 This reduction in public 
funding and reliance on universities (which themselves were becoming increasingly 
privatised) might indicate a neoliberal policy shift—one in which neoliberal 
philosophy involves privatising public services into a more competitive market. Due 
to these shifts, in 1998, clinical legal education became a part of government 
expenditure on legal aid services, as the government began working in ‘cooperation 
with universities’.526 The situation became somewhat more complicated after this 
point. Since 2000, the overall commonwealth funding that was bestowed to the states 
for legal aid has gradually increased (and this figure now includes clinical legal 
education).527 In Victoria, when isolating legal aid services, the share of federal 
government funding for state-run legal aid has been cut from almost 50 per cent in 
1999–2000 to almost 30 per cent in 2013–2014.528 
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It should be asked whether the rise in funding for clinical legal education over time 
(rather than for state-run legal aid services) is a neoliberal shift. There is a further 
question of whether this shift is partly taking advantage of free student labour as part 
of a broader neoliberal shift towards the casualisation and added precarity of the 
workforce.529 Free labour is often at the heart of neoliberal policy initiatives.530 
Although paid professionals also work in clinics, and some students are paid, paid 
workers are to some extent implicitly subsidised by the work of student volunteers. 
However, some doubt has been expressed regarding this claim, as some clinic 
supervisors believe that students might require so much training that they actually do 
not help the clinics operate at a higher capacity at all (and they even hinder clinic 
services).531 Further, working for free in this context (pro bono work) encourages 
students to commit to future pro bono work and charity, in a manner that does not 
necessarily reflect broader free labour in society (e.g., as part of a profit motive).532 
An increased amount of funding for community legal centres might also reflect the 
positive role that these centres play in their communities, instead of reflecting a 
negative turn in government policy. It is worth questioning whether a shift from state-
run legal aid services to community legal centres (and clinical legal education) might 
correlate with a broader neoliberal shift in government policy. 
The push for more ‘clinical legal education’ (which has occurred since the late 1800s) 
might also be considered a reinforcement of the vocational trend that is already 
occurring in law schools.533 Clinical legal education is often framed as being a more 
‘practical’ method for learning the law.534 In clinics, students ‘learn about law and 
lawyering by performing lawyering tasks’.535 These tasks endow them with specific 
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skills that are valuable in the job market.536 Legal clinics that are more job focused 
(and less focused on social justice) might be less critical in their approaches, and they 
might even accept and rely ‘on the established relations of law and power in 
society’.537 Tutors can instil their own neoliberal biases into the clinical environment, 
as they can be considered a product of the education that they themselves have 
received.538 This makes it difficult to ascertain how clinics can ‘avoid graduating 
instrumentalists’ who regard clients not as human beings but as targets for their own 
persuasion skills, achievement and performance.539 Even the concept of obtaining ‘job 
skills’ from clinical legal education seemingly undermines the belief that students 
exist to serve the public selflessly.540 This is most evident in discussions of clinical 
placement outcomes, in which it has been stated that ‘law students entering the 
competitive work environment can benefit significantly from practical work 
experience during the course of their law degree’.541 Although these placements are 
either completely pro bono or taken for credit, a potential underlying tension exists 
between students’ current charity focus in placements and their future-market 
orientation, in which they would use the experience for their résumé. The more 
vocational lens here centralises numbers and graduate attributes at the core of charity 
and public service rather than the traditional values of a person’s selflessness or self-
sacrifice.542 
Clinical legal education can also be framed as an attractive investment for law schools 
in terms of capturing a greater market share of students.543 This fits the neoliberal 
imperative to compete for income in the market and win by attracting more student 
‘customers’, with education considered a product. Appealing to student ‘customer’ 
demand is an important part of the concept so that law schools can be differentiated 
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from their competitors. The student demand for critical legal education programs is 
high, even at ‘conservative law schools’; this reflects that such programs must 
somehow be beneficial for businesses and reflect corporate values.544 
However, a market framing of clinical legal education is likely too cynical to be 
evidentiarily accurate. If clinical legal education programs have some aspect of a 
market imperative, then they are also steeped in a focus on social justice and the 
liberal notion of professional responsibility. Legal clinics are often sold as a silver-
bullet solution to positivist legal education.545 The central idea is that by working with 
the disadvantaged under close supervision, students will obtain an ethical 
understanding of the law that they could not have otherwise gained in their normal 
degree.546 This includes the ‘ability to think critically about the law, justice and the 
legal system, particularly from the perspective of disadvantaged clients’.547 Instead of 
leaving law school with the belief that laws are neutral and apolitical, students gain an 
understanding of ‘the maldistribution of wealth, power and rights in society’, as well 
as an understanding of their ethical obligation in addressing those inequalities by 
observing them firsthand.548 Legal clinics thereby subvert the traditional hierarchical 
structure of law school. For example, the survey of students at Macarthur Legal 
Centre in Sydney (as cited in an earlier section) found that ‘almost all respondent 
students gained a greater understanding of their ethical obligations’ from their time 
volunteering.549 Students had a similar experience at the Kingsford Legal Centre.550 
This type of ‘reflective’ practice (and reflective assessment) is covered in more detail 
in Part 3. 
Despite these benefits, legal clinics also have significant limitations. The chief 
limitation pertains to numbers. Only a small number of law students can work at a 
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any perceived benefits.551 It is costly to increase the number of slots available, as this 
involves hiring additional clinic staff and clients.552 For example, the Kingsford Legal 
Centre only has seven students who work there at any time (from a law school year 
group of 200).553 Law schools have subverted this issue in a few unique ways. At 
UNSW, all students can work in the Kingsford clinic—but only for a single night in 
their course, in which they interview one to two clients.554 However, a one-night 
attendance that focuses only on client interviews does not necessarily promote long-
term reflective thinking on the law as one might desire. In contrast, the University of 
Wollongong has a ‘compulsory undergraduate subject where the practical component 
involves 40 days of external placement for the student’.555 Seeking external placement 
broadens the range of pro bono and clinical options that are available to students, but 
it diminishes staff supervision of students in those placements. In a similar manner, 
the University of Notre Dame has ‘a regular community service requirement in its 
compulsory “Ethics for Lawyers” subject’.556 This workaround might ultimately help, 
but it remains the case that cost is a significant barrier for internal legal clinical 
education. 
One way to address the shortage in law student numbers at in-house clinics is to link 
students with external community legal centres outside university campuses. For 
example, Sydney University’s Social Justice Clinic and Public Interest Clinic program 
offers law students the opportunity to volunteer at Redfern Legal Centre.557 Students 
can act as ‘legal assistants’ by providing legal advice, assisting with client interviews 
and drafting. This offers them a chance to work their ‘legal knowledge’ in the ‘real 
world’ and help those who cannot afford traditional legal services.558 Similar 
volunteering opportunities for law students are available at Marrickville Legal Centre, 
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Community Legal Centres NSW and the NSW Public Defender’s Office.559 The 
number of these external placement programs is increasing in Australian law schools 
‘because they are much less resource intensive than in-house programs, do not require 
establishing infrastructure and clinical supervision is contracted out’.560 However, one 
disadvantage is that law schools have less control over the students’ learning 
experience, less supervisory presence and thus a potential for a diminished 
‘educational experience’.561 Further, the issue of student numbers persists, in which 
not all students will be able to find an external placement for their whole course. 
These community-based legal clinics with a social focus can help students ‘develop a 
commitment to the idea of pro bono work’ in their future careers.562 If the clinic can 
resist the trend of focusing only on job skills, then it can help law students ask 
important questions about ‘public policy, law reform, social and moral questions, law 
in a social context, and legal service of the public interest’.563 The ‘real-world’ aspect 
of the clinic can help students interpret the law in context.564 This includes the 
potential for critical reflection on issues regarding ‘gender, race, disability, [and] 
socio-economic, philosophical, cultural and indigenous’ perspectives on the law.565 
These perspectives on the law contradict the traditional positivist approach of law 
schools and have new forms of critique.566 
e) ‘Globalisation’ as a Justification for New Graduate Attributes 
One argument that has been advanced for the vocational turn in law schools is the 
concept of globalisation. It can be questioned here whether globalisation serves a 
neoliberal, vocational or liberal arts agenda. On the one hand, globalisation might be 
framed in neoliberal terms as a driving force behind a global competitive market of 
semi-privatised law schools, in which law schools compete for the scarce resources of 
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students and global university rankings. Conversely, globalisation might also be 
framed in liberal arts terms, in which it can broaden the perspectives of students 
beyond their own national contexts and help them understand the differentiating 
anthropological features of law in different contexts. In this way, the latter framing of 
globalisation might be used as a moderating force within a traditional and sovereign 
‘law is the law’ curriculum by exposing students to competing notions about the law 
from other cultures. 
Globalisation can be used to justify or reinforce the neoliberal turn in legal education, 
with a focus on global competition for students, global university rankings and 
graduate attributes that would allow international competition with other law schools. 
That the workplace is increasingly ‘globalised’ and ‘ever-changing’ due to new 
technologies has become a cliché in academic writing—one used to justify all kinds 
of arguments, specifically in this context (the focus on law graduate attributes).567 
Law students are said to constantly require more ‘legal skills’ within this newly 
internationalised context.568 They must ‘be prepared to practice in an increasingly 
globalized economy’ by developing the ‘knowledge and skills’ of that global 
economy.569 Law deans in Australia similarly asserted that ‘law graduates need to be 
prepared for work across multiple jurisdictions and in a wide range of employment 
contexts’.570 However, these statements do not necessarily have as much persuasive 
meaning as the law deans believe that they do. In some sense, they could even be 
considered a scare tactic. Historically, universities have highly emphasised 
intellectual development and ‘discovery, innovation and knowledge generation’.571 In 
the present day, the globalised marketplace has shifted the language of graduate 
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attributes towards one of ideological fear. Today, ‘the language used to justify 
graduate capabilities frequently evokes an apocalyptic view of a future characterised 
by rapid technological advancement, globalisation, climate change and resource 
constraints [along with] political instability’.572 The language is reactive (to the ‘new’ 
reality in which people find themselves) rather than proactive in terms of determining 
what kinds of people are desired from universities, regardless of the world in which 
they enter. On this topic, Lyn Yates has asked, ‘What are the qualities of the educated 
person[?]’, and answered, ‘I’ll give you a clue. I don’t think producing audit-style 
lists of graduate attributes is good enough’.573 
In 2014, 95 per cent of Australian universities listed ‘global citizenship’ as part of 
their graduate attributes listings.574 Global citizenship has a broad definition; it can 
mean anything from exposure to foreign cultures and practices to hard skills (e.g., 
languages or technical skills) that make students internationally competitive.575 That a 
globalised perspective must be quantified, turned into output and often converted into 
a skill demonstrates the influence of a more vocational or neoliberal educational 
outlook—in which education is a product with specific outcomes rather than a factor 
that is valued for its own sake. Further, in the context of law schools, the graduate 
legal market’s increasing mobility (both in terms of ‘importing’ students to study and 
‘exporting’ law programs overseas) places various countries in competition over the 
same resource—law students:576 
Globalization promotes, of course, increased global competition. Increased 
student and faculty mobility facilitate the search for excellence, which in 
turn promotes the creation of leading global education hubs in those 
countries and regions most able to generate them. These hubs are best placed 
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to attract the best and brightest students, faculty, and resources, generating, 
in turn, top graduates, research outputs, university spin-offs, and so on.577 
However, the concept of globalisation does not need to reinforce a neoliberal 
paradigm in law schools; it could instead be used to critique both neoliberal and 
traditional legal education ideas (e.g., legal positivism). Specifically, globalisation can 
challenge students to think about how the law relates between countries, as well as 
how the law in one country affects that of another.578 Instead of conceiving the law as 
a matter of national authority, the law is revealed in its global context as a function of 
global relationships and dynamics that change over time.579 Globalisation, in turn, 
moves societies away from a mono-dimensional order and towards pluralities, in 
which it creates a ‘premium on … flexibility’.580 Under a plurality of legal systems, 
the law is considered changeable and influenced from the outside. Through the 
language of globalisation, law students can thus be challenged to grapple with how 
the law interacts with foreign jurisdictions, changes over time and changes as a 
function of such relationships.581 This perspective contradicts a strictly vocational and 
positivist perception of the law (at least on one level), in which law students have 
typically been taught the law of their own state or country alone, and historically, as a 
static entity. 
Globalisation might be used as a justification not only for teaching the plurality of law 
but for shifting the law school curriculum towards a broader liberal arts curriculum. If 
students have to manage a newly globalised world with people from different 
backgrounds and cultures, then it might be argued that subjects in the humanities 
would help them do so.582 Not only must students understand ‘several legal systems’ 
in the new ‘global law’ world, but they must also understand the ‘other disciplines 
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that shape [that] global legal order’.583 This might include ‘politics, economics, and 
the humanities, particularly philosophy and anthropology’.584 For example, students 
could learn the philosophical basis for international law or, through anthropology, the 
different norms of different cultures that lead to different legal systems worldwide. 
These arguments could be expressed in comparative legal discussions. A more 
modern argument is that the globalised world is increasingly technological and that 
that law students must consequently grapple with new technology subjects.585 
Conclusion 
Australian legal education has observed a growing emphasis on vocational education 
that might have correlated with the rise of the political philosophy of neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalism has witnessed the withdrawal of public funding from universities over 
the last 30 years, as well as the positioning of universities into a competitive market. 
This has consequently influenced the shift towards graduate attributes, global 
university rankings and other metrics that play a more important role in universities 
(and law schools within them) differentiating themselves from their competitors. 
This thesis has chronicled the effects of these shifts in terms of the assessment 
structure and curriculum of Australian law schools. Principally, a more vocational, 
skills-based and graduate attribute–based curriculum can be observed in the types of 
assessments that are provided to students, which broadly aligns with the ‘employers 
voice’ in curriculum design. The case method or the use of casebooks and case 
problem questions persists in various law schools across Australia. Concurrently, 
other types of critical assessments (e.g., essays) are sometimes discouraged. The 
Priestley Eleven encourage the use of black-letter law rather than critical engagement 
with the law and the proposal of law reform. There has also been an increasing 
expansion of legal aid clinics over the last 30 years in Australia, which has led to a 
dual social–vocational aspect of legal education becoming a more common part of 
most law schools. Legal aid can be considered both a salve on positivist legal 







the vocational paradigm (giving students practical skills). That many of these changes 
have been driven by students themselves (who are regarded as the new ‘customers’ of 
legal education) and that legal education itself is more of a product might be a by-
product of the neoliberal market imperatives that have been outlined above. 
Despite offering justifications for globalisation and the argument that students live in 
a new age in which vocationalism is in high demand, the reality is that vocationalism 
has existed in law schools for over 200 years (as evidenced in Part 1). Future research 
could consider the link between funding and neoliberal policy, and whether wealthier 
law schools can resist the shift towards a vocational agenda. 
Having established that the modern assessments and curriculum in Australian law 
schools have correlated with a rise in neoliberal philosophy and vocational teaching 
(among other factors), the next section will consider an opposing idea—that of law 
students rising above vocational objectives and towards a higher calling. Specifically, 
the next section will consider the conceptualisation of the law graduate—as a 
democratic citizen, public advocate, person who is embedded with a certain moral 
value and role within society, and someone who has a voice in society, democratic 
processes and systems of law reform. 
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Section 2: Charting a Path: Towards Law School Graduates as 
Democratic Citizens 
This section aims to interrogate the notion of teaching law to produce democratic 
citizens. This encompasses several related points: first, that true civic participation in 
democracy requires a broad education; second, that law students require a certain 
training in moral inquisitiveness to interrogate injustices that are committed by 
institutional forces; third, that law students, in engaging in democratic processes, must 
not be silenced and restrained by free speech curtailments from corporate 
stakeholders; and, finally, that democratic citizenship naturally relates to jobs that 
extend beyond the confines of private practice alone. 
Regarding the criteria listed above, the current vocationally focused curriculum can 
be described as wanting. Under a vocational curriculum, students will, first, not be 
taught the tools for developing moral inquisitiveness; they will instead be taught to 
regard law as passive, objective and neutral rather than as an entity that directly 
affects people’s lives.1 Second, students will remain disenfranchised from non-legal 
careers, in which they will experience a decreasing number of law jobs yet an 
increasing focus on legal job skills in law schools.2 Finally, in a vocational 
curriculum, society does not perceive the law graduate’s role as an active participant 
in the democratic process who has unique insights into the law and legal processes 
they have gained from their degree. This section will consider a path towards 
perceiving the law graduate as a democratic citizen rather than a legal technician. 
1) Defining Democratic Citizenship 
To be a democratic citizen is to contribute to one’s society by having a voice in either 
praising or critiquing one’s laws and institutions and thereby facilitating the 
democratic process by which the people are placed into positions of power over their 
own government.3 An education in democratic citizenship can be defined as the active 
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engagement of students in the political processes by which society is governed, 
including the workings of legal institutions, laws, rules and community 
organisations.4 By extension, students learn how these processes and institutions work 
and how to contribute to the reform of these institutions in instances of injustice. 
The notion of democratic citizenship might prompt connotations of nationalism, 
elitism or racial prejudice (especially since the idea of ‘citizenship’ can be considered 
an exclusionary term for immigrants).5 However, this is not the type of citizenship 
that this section intends to explore. Instead, in this section, democratic citizenship is 
defined as a means of describing a participatory form of political engagement, in 
which people of all races, classes and groups within a country are empowered to 
speak truth to power and shape the institutions that govern their lives.6 This definition 
raises the notion of post-national citizenship (or global citizenship), whereby people 
have the right to contribute to the country in which they live regardless of the formal 
citizenship status they possess within that country.7 Citizenship here is thus 
considered shorthand for a larger conceptualisation of civic engagement. To be 
educated as a democratic citizen is to be educated in the means and processes of such 
engagement. 
A democratic citizen has several responsibilities and obligations that extend beyond 
their vocation. Someone trained as a professional need not engage in law reform and 
critique the government or hold public institutions accountable for their actions. 
Conversely, a student who is trained as a democratic citizen might engage in debates 
regarding the perceived justices or injustices of court and governmental decisions and 
institutions, volunteer for their community or participate in community organisations 
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that might or might not promote social, legal and institutional change.8 To be trained 
as a democratic citizen is not necessarily contrary to being trained as a professional—
indeed, the two can occur simultaneously. Rather, being trained as a democratic 
citizen involves reaching beyond one’s vocation to contribute to the community in a 
larger sense: to take one’s place not just as part of a workplace but as part of 
democratic society. 
The notion of democratic citizenship necessitates a broader, liberal arts education in 
law schools—one that encompasses the interrelation of law with other subjects that 
are necessary for democratic participation (e.g., an understanding of politics and 
history).9 Students who are trained as democratic citizens would reach beyond 
technical skills training to understand how to think for themselves about their own 
government, how to express their autonomy and how to fight for the rights of others 
within their community.10 How these ideas in a broader liberal arts education can be 
achieved with relation to teaching methods and content will be covered in later 
sections of this thesis. 
2) Building a Pathway towards Law Graduates as Democratic Citizens 
In 1998, the ‘Crick Report’ in the UK introduced the idea of ‘citizenship education’ 
into English secondary schools.11 The authors described citizenship education as 
convincing ‘people to think of themselves as active citizens, willing, able and 
equipped to have an influence in public life and with the critical capacities to weigh 
evidence before speaking and acting’.12 This style of education was deemed necessary 
for a well-functioning democracy, as public voices are essential to democratic 
institutions.13 A similar report in Australia that was conducted in 1994 highlighted 
that ‘our system of government relies for its efficacy and legitimacy on an informed 
citizenry [and that] without active, knowledgeable citizens the forms of democratic 
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representation remain empty’.14 It further suggested that without providing a form of 
citizenship education to the general public in Australia, the country risked slipping 
away from democracy altogether and into ‘tyranny’.15 The intensity of this language, 
as written by a group of experts, should indicate the relevant risks involved if citizens 
do not know how they can properly engage in democratic governance. 
In 2020, the Victorian Government presented citizenship education in a broad manner 
as teaching students about their ‘roles in the community’.16 This idea, and its 
application in secondary schooling, would seemingly imply that democratic 
citizenship education is considered relevant to all students, regardless of the careers 
they obtain. The government summary further noted the ‘rights and responsibilities of 
students’ in upholding the ‘values which underpin democratic communities’—such as 
‘freedom, equality, responsibility, accountability, respect, tolerance and inclusion’.17 
The government proposed that to uphold these values, the students had to be trained 
in ‘community and civic engagement and participation’ within their classes.18 It is 
implicit in the various accounts and definitions mentioned above that civic 
engagement is what upholds democracy and protects the various values that a 
democracy is said to represent. An informed citizenry, active in the political process, 
is thus considered an essential core function of a successful democratic society.19 
This role of the active citizen is worth considering, especially within the context of 
legal education. To be active in public life is to be involved in the processes, rules and 
laws that form part of the democratic process. Active citizens shape their democracy 
through their voices, civic participation and engagement with democratic 
institutions.20 An active citizen might engage in debates regarding the perceived 
justice or injustice of a judicial or governmental decision or the merits of certain 
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institutions; such a citizen might even volunteer for or participate in community 
organisations that might promote social, legal or institutional change.21 Active 
citizens might also participate in debates regarding the future of their society, 
institutions and the laws that govern their lives.22 In brief, an active citizen embodies 
the concept of democracy itself by helping shape institutions that should be directed 
by the voices of citizens such as themselves. Such a role extends far beyond the scope 
of a day job and into a lifetime’s obligation. 
Evidence from 28 countries suggested that simply teaching students about the formal 
political process can lead to greater active citizenship and engagement with the 
political process within their home countries, in their lives and after graduation.23 
Education that discusses the nature of political institutions—taught to students in a 
class—can influence their citizenry engagements in the long term, even after they 
graduate from that class.24 For example, citizenship education in children has been 
proven in multiple studies to have a long-term effect on their active citizenship 
participation throughout adulthood.25 By extension, the opposite, logical proposition 
can also be made: that a lack of instruction in the formal political process might 
hamper the active citizenship of students after they graduate from formal schooling. If 
graduates as democratic citizens is desired, then their education must teach them 
about the political process. In simple terms, only someone informed in the political 
process can contribute to that process. 
Law schools have a unique role in regard to democratic citizenship, as they teach 
students about the law—the exact topic by which democratic citizens are meant to 
exert their power and influence. Considering the evidence on learning outcomes that 
has been listed above, it can be logically asserted that teaching law students about the 
formal political process and the politics of law (among other features relating to the 
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processes of law in society, law’s origins and its effects in society) might help amplify 
the role of law students as active citizens after they graduate from law school.26 With 
unique knowledge of the law, a greater onus is seemingly placed on law schools to 
provide this kind of education (this argument will be discussed further below). The 
engagement that such education would provoke could range from volunteering, to law 
reform, to engagement with community organisations, to calling out justices or 
injustices as they occur, to holding the government accountable for wrongdoing and 
to participating in electoral campaigns.27 The evidence from multiple countries would 
suggest that avoiding discussions about the political process in schooling might 
generate the opposite result—more law graduates who do not engage as frequently 
with the functioning of their democracy.28 It logically follows that a vocational 
education, if it is disengaged from teaching students about citizenship, democracy and 
the political process, might have a tangibly negative effect on the active citizenry 
engagement of law students in their society after graduation. 
This notion of teaching law for democratic citizenship is evidenced in Lon Fuller’s 
research, which encompasses 12 articles and two books on the subject, as well as his 
authored report by the Harvard Law School Curriculum Committee.29 According to 
Fuller, the role of law students role should extend beyond merely applying the law to 
a hypothetical or real client in a case; it should extend towards upholding, critiquing 
and reforming the same system of law in which the students work as part of their role 
in a democratic society:30 
We must come … to see law as a quest for the principles that make possible 
the successful living together of men. We must come again to view 
democracy—not as a pat formula that can be applied thoughtlessly for the 
cure of any kind of social disorder, nor as a system of government that by 
reason of historical conditioning we happen to find congenial—but as a 
difficult achievement necessary for a realization of the full dignity and 
power of man.31 
 
26 See Whiteley (n 24). 
27 Weinberg and Flinders (n 4) 3–4. 
28 For a related discussion, see Torney‐Purta et al (n 23). 
29 Robert S Summers, ‘Fuller on Legal Education’ (1984) 34(1) Journal of Legal Education 8. 




In the manner described above, Fuller regarded law students as being an important 
part of maintaining democratic institutions through their role in maintaining the 
‘difficult achievement’ of democracy itself against the threat of government tyranny.32 
He suggested that law schools must train law students in preparation for considering 
the ‘law as a quest for the principles that make possible the successful living together 
of men’.33 He believed that rather than narrowing the mind of the law student to focus 
on technical skills, law schools could free the minds of students to focus on broader, 
systemic legal and democratic issues.34 Law graduates were not intended to simply 
‘apply the law that someone else created’ but to be involved in ‘establishing the 
framework’ for future laws.35 To contribute to law reform and maintain democracy, 
law students should know the purpose of law, its interrelation with other fields and the 
reason for its existence.36 Due to its nature, a legal education this broad would be an 
interdisciplinary education. It would teach students to become democratic citizens by 
relating law to the political process and other functioning parts of democracy (e.g., 
certain notions of justice and law reform). 
An objection might be raised here that not all law students need to be trained in the 
role of democratic citizens, as not all students will want to participate in democratic 
reform. Although this might well be true—indeed, a vocational education might serve 
the needs of some students without requiring a further foray into aspects of 
democracy—law schools are still uniquely placed as one of the few institutions in 
society that train students in law (a central feature of democracy); therefore, the 
argument is difficult to make without running into this counter-objection. 
It is worth considering this analysis in the Australian context. Describing the state of 
public debate in modern Australia, Alecia Simmonds wrote: 
For the most part, complex policy is discussed in vapid tweet-sized sound-
bites by columnists and politicians. Even those few academics who engage 
in public debate become celebrity heads for single-issues. There is simply 
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who could interrogate, inquire and offer an independent dissenting voice on 
a broad range of themes.37 
Law students, due to their critical training in the law (the factor at the heart of public 
policy), could be such intellectuals. An active, argumentative legal class could 
challenge the political establishment with rational and objective-based arguments, as 
well as publicly engage with the latest legal issues that the nation faces. Unlike 
ordinary citizens, law graduates can read through legalese and challenge politicians 
by directly referring to sections of law, fundamental legal principles and international 
and constitutional norms. In this way, law students can transition from being mere 
practitioners to being advocates for social and political change. This has already 
occurred in the US, where entire litigation firms now advocate on behalf of legal 
movements on issues such as consumer rights, environmental rights, gay rights, 
economic libertarianism and poverty.38 
The public role of people in the US who have trained in law is far wider and more 
public than the roles of strictly vocational lawyers in Australia. Judges have their own 
TV shows, and lawyers form parts of television panels in debates and engage more 
frequently in media interviews. This energises public debates about law and raises the 
legal consciousness of society in a consistent and beneficial manner for a liberal 
democracy. Open government requires intellectually engaged legal citizens who have 
the capability and integrity to challenge bad policy. Bad policy can be reformulated 
through open and honest debate with those who have been informed about the 
intricacies of law. Australia’s closest equivalent to the US televised ‘public lawyer’ is 
the lawyer-run TV show, Hypotheticals.39 However, this show last aired 30 years ago, 
so it cannot be considered a recent example of the genre.40 
Instead of hosting television programs, those trained in law in Australia are 
discouraged from engaging in public debate, as evidenced by the recent public 
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denouncement of Australian Human Rights Commissioner Gillian Triggs.41 An active 
legal citizenry should publicly question and challenge new laws, consider alternatives 
and make proposals for reform whenever fundamental legal principles are in danger 
of being breached or infringed upon by government overreach. 
Creating an active legal citizenry is likely impossible due to the current law school 
system, which narrowly trains law students to enforce rather than critically analyse 
the law. The problem question method, which dominates most Australian law schools, 
does not suitably allow students to debate or critique the law. A transformation is 
needed that will allow law students to become sceptics rather than enforcers of the 
law.42 Applying the law to a new set of facts is not enough: students should be asked 
what is wrong or right with the law, as well as how it can be improved.43 This kind of 
scepticism is at the heart of all authentic knowledge, as well as at the heart of the 
pursuit for truth.44 Scepticism was once considered a central tenant of university 
education before neoliberal graduate attributes came to dominate the field. 
Universities used to celebrate ‘a practice of skepticism that means a permanent 
questioning of those systems of thought and problematic forms of experience in 
which [they] find [themselves]’.45 Foucault once called this a ‘permanent critique of 
our historical era’.46 With scepticism, the idea is to ‘constantly interrogate’ the law, 
especially in terms of its effects on real people in real society, as well as to 
incorporate new insights that are gained in the process of interrogation. Criticising the 
law will result in better public policy, as devil’s advocacy tends to result in new 
insights and the discovery of overlooked problems. 
In the absence of an active, legal citizenry, Australians have predictably formed a 
‘black hole of ignorance and indifference’ with regard to their basic rights (including 
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their rights under the constitution).47 Many Australians cannot name their 
constitutional rights or freedoms, and many do not know that Australia has no written 
bill of rights.48 In the absence of such knowledge, the rights that do exist can be easily 
taken away by the government. An active legal citizenry—one aware of its own rights 
and duties, of the limits of the law, and of the ability to challenge the law—could help 
educate the public about their rights, as well as publicly engage in legal contests that 
are based on those rights. This would shift public policy towards favouring the 
individual’s freedoms instead of favouring other corporate or governmental interests. 
On this topic, William Deresiwicz argued that ‘the first thing that college is for is to 
teach you to think … it means developing the habit of skepticism and the capacity to 
put it into practice … it means learning not to take things for granted, so you can 
reach your own conclusions’.49 He added that ‘before you can learn’, ‘you have to 
unlearn’.50 Law students must unlearn the dogmatism suggesting that the law is 
always right (or the ‘law is law’ mindset) and begin critically analysing the flaws of 
judicial reasoning, legal reasoning and the legal system as a whole. Students must 
engage in public policy debate and critique the norms and systems in which they find 
themselves. This process is arduous, which is why it is best facilitated by universities 
rather than accomplished in a student’s own time or through their ‘other degree’, as is 
often recommended by law deans. 
One of the largest problems is that the authority of the law is inextricably tangled with 
the authority of judges, as well as with the notion that judges are ‘experts’ with which 
ordinary citizens (and even law graduates) cannot compete in terms of offering a 
different, meritocratic opinion on legal issues. This resembles the case of Petrarch, 
who, at the height of the Renaissance, dared to question the wisdom of Aristotle: 
Sometimes I would smile and ask how Aristotle could have known things 
that obey no reason and cannot be tested experimentally. They would be 
 
47 Michael Kirby, as quoted in Gregory Craven, Conversations with the Constitution: Not Just a Piece of Paper 
(UNSW Press, 2004). 
48 ‘Australians Struggle on Our Own Citizenship Test’, News.com.au (online at 21 January 2013) 
<http://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/australians-struggle-on-our-own-citizenship-test/news-
story/ddaa5b756a94eee76ff8e6530dbb734d>. 
49 William Deresiwicz, Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life 




amazed and silently angered, and would look at me as a blasphemer for 
requiring more than that man’s authority as proof of a fact.51 
Expert culture is reinforced in the legal profession through titles—‘Your Honour’ 
being one of the most famous epithets of deference in the Western world. Expert 
culture undermines the culture of competing ideas by excluding individuals who 
might oppose or contradict the dominant norm yet who lack sufficient credentials 
with which to state their opinions. In this way, the culture of expertise implicitly 
reinforces the status quo by allowing ‘experts’ to dominate the agenda. It is thus 
unsurprising that lawyers are increasingly being accused of ignoring the morality of 
unjust situations in favour of adopting a strictly legal perspective.52 John R Morss 
posited that ‘if a person can be persuaded to sign up to a contract which puts her at a 
severe disadvantage in terms of obligations … legal positivism cannot be blamed for 
that undesirable circumstance’.53 In this sense, the authority of the law is used to 
justify an unjust outcome. Lawyers should challenge this kind of legal positivism 
rather than following the dictates of legal rulings.54 The problems that must be solved 
are social, political and economic problems, which are inextricably linked to public 
policy and the law. 
In creating a vision of law students in which they are more than technical workers, it 
is important to consider other visions of legal graduates. One example is expressed on 
a plaque on the side of Berkeley Law School, and it emphasises some of the ideas that 
have been discussed above: 
You will study the wisdom of the past, for in a wilderness of conflicting counsels, a 
trial has there been blazed. You will study the life of mankind, for this is the life 
you must order, and, to order with wisdom, must know. You will study the precepts 
of justice, for these are the truths that through you shall come to their hour of 
triumph. Here is the high emprise. The fine endeavor. The splendid possibility of 
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achievement, to which I summon you and bid you welcome.—Benjamin N. 
Cardozo55 
It could be argued that students have free will and they should simply resist corporate 
messaging and enter the profession they desire. If they dislike corporate law and want 
to be committed to social justice or another profession instead, then they should 
simply ‘think’ their way out of the situation—through sheer willpower, imagination 
and determination—so that they can do what they actually prefer to do with their 
lives. 
However, this argument does not address a crucial issue. The social justice students 
who do opt for corporate law firms often rationalise their decisions with various 
reasons—such as by stating that they will only work at those firms for a short while, 
need the money to pay their debts or will actively avoid the worst aspects of the 
corporate world because they are somehow different.56 This subsection does not 
intend to imply that students lose their free will when they enter law school nor that 
they are completely indoctrinated into a corporate mindset. Rather, it intends to 
highlight that law students are guided to some extent, and then they use their free will 
to rationalise their loss of autonomy in a proactive manner.57 The resulting overall 
trend is oriented towards a kind of ‘surface cynicism’—towards a recognition of the 
problem that is inherent in many of the systems in which students are involved, 
followed by a resignation of powerlessness or an active justification of the system that 
is based on other irrelevant factors.58 
If the corporate world is unethical or antithetical to the students’ original intentions, 
then it is merely another part of adulthood, with adulthood defined as a long process 
of constantly assuming responsibilities that are often uncomfortable or unintuitive.59 
Responsibility here is not about virtue or morality but rather about resignation from 
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the negative aspects of life; it is a kind of stoic defeatism, of which Seneca would be 
proud when he uttered ‘be happy with what you have’.60 Freedom of thought—or 
constant questioning or scepticism—is antithetical to this conception of adulthood, 
and it is often associated instead with the mind of a young child who always asks the 
question ‘why?’ Students who stop asking ‘why?’ tend to start justifying why their 
life is how it is. Eventually, students come to perceive their previous goals of entering 
charity, social justice or any creative field as dreams of youth that were created by a 
younger and more impressionable pre-adulthood self.61 
3) Moral Inquisitiveness 
One element of democratic citizenship is the notion of moral citizenship through 
moral inquisitiveness: the moral intuition that is necessary for holding institutions 
accountable for moral failings. At a basic level, the structure and content of legal 
education do not provide tools for developing moral thinking or moral inquisitiveness; 
indeed, they encourage students to avoid moral reasoning altogether. Instead of 
learning to critique the law and propose law reform (on moral grounds), students learn 
from early on in their degree ‘that legal reasoning must be solely based on doctrinal 
neutrality’ without moral critique (as noted in the previous section).62 Notions such as 
‘emotions, imagination or moral considerations’ are not relevant to students’ 
interactions with the law.63 This process prompts students to dismiss their own moral 
code and become ‘less driven by their convictions’.64 
This process is frequently reinforced by the language of the law (both in textbooks 
and in the classroom), which tends to reflect the belief that law is somehow post-
morality or beyond the spheres of moral philosophy and critical reasoning.65 
Reflecting a broader neoliberal agenda, law faculty members often present themselves 
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case.66 In this way, law schools can ‘dull their students’ moral sense [and] weaken 
moral intuitions; they loosen the grip of conscience; and at best, they narrow the 
student’s felt obligation to serve justice into a narrow concern for fidelity to clients’.67 
Law tutors help students ‘adjust to the reality’ of law rather than resist or question this 
reality.68 Despite many tutors and professors exploring areas of legal critique and 
interdisciplinarity in their own research, this is not always reflected in their teaching 
methods.69 As Balkin expressed, ‘They say one thing in their law review articles, but 
do another in’ class, ‘they teach their students to parse cases and statutes (still mostly 
cases)’ and ‘in short, they prepare them rhetorically to be lawyers’.70 They also 
establish and reinforce competition among students by establishing the parameters of 
grades, skills and work as more important than anything else.71 This sense of 
competition can drive students away from critical introspection if they lack the time 
or faculty support to engage in such tasks. 
Many students have begun to perceive their relationship to their professors by the 
same neoliberal parameters—in that their professors are job mentors or sources for 
future references rather than learning guides or facilitators for career questioning or 
critique.72 Students who question the law, their degree or their jobs typically ‘do not 
come to office hours’ of professors to ask for help.73 They fear appearing 
unprepared—in terms of not completing the readings or being disengaged with black-
letter law materials—and they do not regard their professors as their ‘peers’ who can 
help guide them in major life decisions.74 Here, a separation occurs between public 
and private life, in which students must ‘act the part’ in public, even while they have 
private reservations about their studies. Students who go to professor office hours 
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‘often treat their interactions as opportunities to perform, to develop relationships 
with faculty in order to secure positive reference letters, or to prepare for the exam, 
rather than to learn’ in a critically engaged manner.75 
The artificial separation of law from morality and the social sciences is known as 
legal positivism. A major proponent of legal positivism, and a major influence on 
modern law schools, was HLA Hart. In 1959, Hart engaged in a famous debate with 
Patrick Devlin about whether law should reflect the moral values of society. Devlin 
argued that laws should reflect a general consensus of society—of society’s values 
and morals.76 Hart argued in favour of his harm principle—that law should only be 
created to mitigate harm (though he left room for the relevance of morality).77 As they 
argued about what the law should do, neither Hart nor Devlin considered what the law 
does in practice. Even if the law is only intended to mitigate harm, as Hart suggested, 
the law’s practical reality is that it reflects a society’s cultural values and social 
norms.78 A harm in one culture is not necessarily a harm in another. For example, 
what is considered public indecency in the West is different from what is considered 
public indecency in the Middle East.79 In short, Hart’s argument works in theory, but 
not in practice. In practice, ‘all law is political’ and ‘all law is social’.80 
Hart and Kelsen’s brand of legal positivism is most evident in the separation of law 
and morality in the law curriculum (as discussed above). As legal positivism 
specifically separates law from the social sciences, it poses a serious threat to the 
moral education of students; it propagates the myth that law has no roots in social life 
and hides the ‘play of power [inherent in law] below the surface’.81 Instead of 
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addressing power imbalances in the law outright, legal positivism tends to justify the 
status quo of those who wield power.82 
When law is presented as passive, neutral and objective, highly charged issues (e.g., 
sexual assault) can become sidelined in the curriculum. For example, Denbow 
explained how US legal educators have found it difficult to teach rape law in criminal 
law classes due to the passive neutrality that legal education requires.83 Law should be 
‘taught without directly addressing conflicts of … values’ or experiences.84 Certain 
legal educators, influenced by this thinking, refuse to teach rape law in the US due to 
their general discomfort with the topic.85 There is a fear that law students who learn 
about rape law might become less objective in their case analysis, as rape is a highly 
charged emotional issue, especially for female victims and ‘#notallmen’ men’s rights 
advocates.86 Yet the ‘“elephant” of sexual assault is in the class, whether or not 
lecturers or students acknowledge it’.87 Conversely, when rape is discussed in law 
school, it can provide a unique opportunity for discussing an otherwise marginalised 
topic in society. Mary Heath suggested that ‘teaching rape law offers a chance to 
constructively intervene in public discourse about sex and sexuality, coerced sex and 
coercive sexuality’.88 Importantly, when students are informed about the topic of the 
class ahead of time, they can be prepared for the difficult emotions involved.89 
However, such a teaching method is, unfortunately, rarely undertaken. According to 
Tamara Walsh, ‘When a choice has to be made [by most law schools], the social is 
deemed dispensable because its inclusion is not specified by the admitting 
authorities’.90 Instead of being taught about how to think in a critical manner—
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questioning how, why and if the law is correct—students are taught to substantiate 
their thinking by using prior legal authority alone.91 When students are asked to 
defend someone in a hypothetical case who has prima facie committed murder, 
students are encouraged to sideline the myriad ways in which the accused can be 
condemned (aside from proscribed punishments) and defences that can be raised 
(aside from proscribed defences).92 Facts are fitted to precedent so that the puzzle of 
conviction is never questioned, regardless of how puzzling a conviction becomes. It is 
almost never pertinent for a law student to ask for more facts to uncover contextual 
information; students might only ask for more information if it is directly relevant to a 
legal point. However, the general perspective is if you want to dissect the murderer’s 
psyche, then go and study psychology.93 
In 2013, a group of 64 students raised these and other concerns with the Sydney Law 
School, petitioning the faculty to change the law school’s examination policies in 
some of core Priestley Eleven subjects.94 The group felt that by advocating for essays, 
speeches, group work and other formative assessment tasks, they could help reorient 
the student mentality at Sydney Law School beyond a simplistic understanding of law 
as ‘pure law’.95 Rebuffing these suggestions, the law dean at the time suggested that a 
law degree is mainly a vocational degree and that examinations teach the appropriate 
‘graduate skills’ that are required of those who enter the legal profession.96 These 
skills include requiring ‘students to demonstrate a thorough understanding of 
principles and an ability to apply that understanding to solve problem questions’.97 
Essentially, the response was that law school is about teaching how law is applied to a 
set of facts and that the core of a law school’s purpose is vocational skills education 
not critically engaged assessment tasks. 
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In its official response, Sydney Law School ignored the fundamental questions that 
were raised about black-letter law courses.98 By advocating for a version of ‘pure law’ 
through ‘rigorous’ black-letter study, the school’s approach dehumanised the 
students’ response to a highly emotional set of circumstances (the emotional reality of 
case law); the school rendered emotion and human compassion irrelevant to 
instruction.99 In contrast, it can be argued that emotion and human compassion are 
crucially important for law students, even in the case of preparing them for 
professional practice.100 An understanding of emotion helps students build 
connections with clients and other professionals in the legal sector.101 A detached 
approach to teaching law might not only lead to a negative student experience but also 
to one as a graduate practising solicitor.102 
Some law schools have adopted several measures to rectify the influence of black-
letter law on students’ moral inquisitiveness. For example, UNSW adopted the 
clinical simulation approach, in which students accept real cases with real people in a 
legal office that is located on campus.103 Participants in the 2012 program described 
how interesting it was to observe clients firsthand and directly manage their issues in 
criminal and family law.104 The clinical approach offers a direct emotional connection 
with clients rather than a hypothetical client in examinations.105 Observing and 
speaking with real people renders them much harder to dehumanise. Concurrently, the 
clinical approach risks re-emphasising the vocational aspect of law (i.e., convincing 
students to ‘act’ as lawyers) rather than teaching students to regard law as a part of 
society. 
Other law schools have remained stoic in terms of adopting new teaching methods 
that relate to the topics of emotion, empathy and ethics. Many law schools still abide 
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by what Justice Kirby once called ‘a few [ethics] lectures thrown in at the end of a 
[law] degree’.106 Students at Sydney Law School became so frustrated with the status 
quo that they established the Critical Legal Students Network.107 This network 
extends beyond discussions of what the law is and asks ‘why is law the way it is?’ 
Although still new, the group has expanded over time and has received attention from 
students outside Sydney Law School.108 Its discussions of the oppressive nature of 
legal institutions, prisons, identity in the law and other unique issues arrive at a 
critical time when law schools do not teach such topics until fifth-year electives.109 
Teaching law without considering other aspects that shape its existence is the same as 
artificially presenting law as more objective, neutral and authority driven than it is.110 
It is to deny students the moral inquisitiveness with which they can analyse legal 
concepts, by stating that any such consideration is beyond the scope of the 
curriculum. In brief, it is the same as converting students who are critically engaged 
thinkers into highly functioning technicians who apply the law without appropriately 
considering how the consequences of doing so influence the people and society in 
which the students operate. Without such a consideration, law students cannot 
function as fully developed moral citizens. 
4) Fewer Law Jobs, yet Even More Vocational Education 
A vocational education in law risks directing law students towards law-related jobs 
while dismissing alternative non-legal careers that might better serve society. Indeed, 
the current focus on vocational education occurs at a strange time, given the 
underlying economic circumstances in which the legal sector finds itself. The legal 
industry has contracted over the last few years, which has led to fewer graduate law 
jobs.111 This has occurred in Australia and other jurisdictions, including the US, 
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where inflated graduate numbers have created a ‘crisis situation’ and law schools 
have been blamed for failing their students.112 Despite the shrinking demand, the 
number of law students in Australia has doubled in the same period.113 Universities 
have created new law courses as cheap alternatives to science and medicine. The 
number of law schools in Australia has increased from 12 to 32 in the last two 
decades alone.114 Due to these trends, a large oversupply of law students has emerged, 
which does not correspondingly match the lack of demand in the legal industry for 
graduate placements. 
One law dean has suggested that the shrinking number of graduate placements 
‘happens every cycle’, and that ‘these cycles are quite short’.115 At least one 
managing partner has contradicted this, admitting that ‘this is not just a temporary 
economic cycle thing, it’s permanent structural change … get used to it … [t]he 
market isn’t going to improve’.116 In 2017, former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull 
stated that ‘too many kids do law’ at university.117 To a great extent, law schools have 
become inflexible in terms of adapting to these kinds of changing market 
circumstances. Instead of becoming more generalist in nature, law schools are 
becoming more vocational, at a time when the legal profession itself might be facing a 
permanent structural decline. 
It is unusual for law schools to become more vocational at a time when vocation itself 
is declining. In one sense, it can be perceived as law schools retreating from their 
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social obligation to students. The Department of Education, Science and Training 
stated in 2002 that ‘[Universities should] maintain a focus on graduate capabilities in 
line with the needs of the economy and society’ [emphasis added].118 
In several law student surveys, approximately 66 per cent of students (61% or 50% on 
similar surveys) admitted that they wanted to enter legal practice after graduating.119 
However, only 36 per cent successfully did so.120 This figure is even lower than those 
in the US, in which only 55 per cent of law students entered a legal profession after 
graduating.121 In the Australian experience, this comes without a large student debt, 
but the crisis of purpose is analogous: 
Out-of-work or never-employed law graduates, many of them carrying 
between $100, 000 and $200, 00 worth of student debt, are now as 
ubiquitous in the bartending and cab-driving professions as the proverbial 
humanities majors.122 
A large gap is evidenced between the expectations of students who enter law schools 
and the reality they face when they graduate. According to the NSW Law Society, 
‘The majority of students study law with a view to practicing law but unrealistic 
expectations of the job market leave them disillusioned’.123 Unlike ‘in medical and 
dental schools’, which involves meeting ‘the supply with expectations’, law schools 
have failed to match the supply of students with the economic realities of the job 
market.124 Students remain uninformed about the realities of the graduate job market 
well into their studies. In the US, certain law schools have even been caught lying 
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about graduate job numbers so that they could entice more students to study law.125 
The inflated experience of ‘prestige’ and ‘status’ in Australia is analogous, if not just 
as unethical. 
Many law students in Australia graduate without adequate preparation for alternative 
career placements.126 In an economy that cannot ‘fit’ them in, law students are forced 
to consider obtaining non-law careers; it becomes their only option. Many law 
students currently enter non-law fields such as politics, public policy, academia and 
business.127 Small-scale studies reveal that approximately 48 per cent of law students 
consider entering ‘alternative law’ jobs,128 with other studies placing this figure closer 
to 50 per cent.129 Essentially, law students are adapting to economic demands, but 
they are provided little guidance regarding how to do so. 
A suggestion has been made that if law schools ‘do not shrink enrolments’ and a 
‘significant portion of law graduates’ continue to enter alternative careers, then ‘there 
will be pressure on legal education’ to become more generalist in nature.130 This 
pressure already exists to a great extent, and a shift in thought is already occurring in 
Australia. Many law students now recognise law as a generalist degree or as the ‘new 
arts degree’, as a joke.131 However, law schools lag behind by failing to implement 
substantial changes to their internal curriculum. Instead of becoming more generalist, 
law schools are becoming even more vocational. 
It is important to reiterate that a great number of law students (most, in some 
estimations) will never become lawyers.132 Instead, they will become ‘policy-makers 
… politicians and scholars’ and enter into business, media, journalism and myriad 
other professions.133 Treating all law students as future lawyers, as many law schools 
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currently do, misses the opportunity of guiding how these other professions interact 
with the law.134 
To adapt to these realities, the curriculum could be changed in many ways. Different 
professions require different kinds of knowledge in relation to law. Policymakers are 
required to know why a specific law should exist, as well as the pros and cons behind 
proposed law reform.135 Media and business leaders require a more holistic 
understanding of law that is entrenched in the wider social context of the economy, 
politics and social life. Even scholars require a more jurisprudential approach. 
Many other professionals (e.g., politicians, charity workers and social workers) 
require a greater focus on social justice or on the needs of society, which contrasts the 
current curriculum’s narrow focus on black-letter law. Essentially, by not focusing on 
the needs of these other fields, law schools cater to only half of their cohort. It is not 
sufficient to dismiss these concerns by referring to a student’s other degree, especially 
when vocationalism has occurred in other university degrees—and, therefore, these 
other degrees could also provide this form of broader, holistic education.136 
It should be remembered that law is used ‘to achieve economic regulation, social 
justice and national security’, and that the current curriculum does not thoroughly 
consider these areas.137 In the current Parliament, 25 per cent of MPs possess a law 
degree, and 13 per cent have had a job in the occupation of law, in which they acted 
as ‘barristers, solicitors, lawyers, [and] legal officers’.138 Approximately half of all 
Australian prime ministers have had law degrees.139 It is thus not only the health of 
the Australian economy at stake but also the health of its democracy. If law schools 
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continue producing vocational students who cannot criticise the law in their own field 
of influence (e.g.., politics, media, business), an active, participant legal citizenry will 
never be created. To successfully create an active legal citizenry, an active law school 
is required—one that teaches law students how to engage in the law in different ways 
not just in the narrow confines of legal skills training. 
To do so, students must be aware of the broader opportunities available in alternative 
law careers. UNSW Law School has recognised this disconnection between law 
students’ expectations when entering law school and the dismal graduate job market. 
Director of Senior Studies Michael Legg (in a recently created role) understood that 
students are ‘anxious about the fall in graduate places being offered by the major 
firms’ and about the ‘increasing numbers of graduates being churned out by 
universities nationwide’.140 His role includes outlining alternative career pathways 
outside corporate law to students.141 He wants students to ‘broaden their minds’ and 
ask ‘what kind of career might I be interested in?’142 
Michael Bradley, Managing Partner of Marque Lawyers, offers similar advice to 
readers of the popular law blog, Survive Law. He stated students should ‘stop listening 
to other people and think about your own career from the perspective of what might 
make you happy and fulfilled’.143 Similarly, Justin Whealing, editor of Lawyer’s 
Weekly, suggested that ‘a law degree is very well regarded in many other professions, 
such as journalism, so the fact that the majority of law graduates don’t take up a 
career in the law is not an undue cause for concern’.144 
According to the advice offered above, an argument can be made that the solution is a 
matter of telling these students that other options exist. UNSW law student, Amber 
Karanikolas, suggested that ‘there are lots of students who are passionate about social 
justice and may be interested in alternative paths … but just don’t know where to 
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look’.145 The focus on corporate careers ‘is still quite visible’ at most law schools, to 
the extent that it can blind out all other options.146 A final year juris doctor student 
responded to a survey on the subject with trepidation: 
Let’s be honest: from a distance, being a lawyer looks like a lot of fun. Only 
later on do [you] realize the crippling conditions that most young lawyers 
have to deal with at major firms. Corporate law firms have a lot to answer 
for, in relation to caring for the mental and physical health of their 
employers.147 
Those who responded suggested that many social justice–oriented students felt like 
they should ‘do their time’ at large firms, but that many get ‘swallowed up’ and 
‘drawn in by the tempting income’.148 
Other students were more forthcoming about their fears of never obtaining a job in 
law and having to resort to other careers out of resignation rather than choice. 
Responding to a student survey, one student said that: 
Getting a job [in law] is like getting into the popular clique in high school—
reserved for a small crowd of people. It seems as though the future of the 
legal profession will be saved exclusively for those outstanding, all-round 
HD recipients that tick all the additional requirements.149 
The University of Wollongong seems to manage the right balance successfully. In its 
public brochures, it argued that ‘legal education in a University must provide students 
with a critical and questioning attitude with broad perspectives and with the skills and 
knowledge needed for whatever career they may choose’ [emphasis added].150 
Focusing on legal skills training alone, to the detriment of a wider, holistic approach, 
involves missing the crucial opportunity to broaden students’ minds during their time 











they desire, but it prepares them for the many skills that are required in jobs today and 
for a more generalist employment market. 
5) The Wider Legal Culture: The Silencing and Restraint of Australian Lawyers 
A final point to be made regards how law graduates should be able to engage in the 
public square if they are to be part of an active legal citizenry. Since the late 1990s, 
lawyers and judges in Australia have been discouraged in their professional duties 
from engaging in public television (apart from carefully controlled news and current 
affairs programs).151 Part of this culture has developed due to the current neoliberal 
legal education agenda in universities. If law students are encouraged to perceive law 
as being passive, objective and neutral, it logically follows that graduating lawyers 
would not act as ‘public’ lawyers as required to intellectually engage with and critique 
the law.152 The culture of Australian law schools has filtered into a wider legal 
culture, one that is passive and unconstructive in regard to law reform. Today, at the 
top law firms, new lawyers sign media confidentiality contracts that bar them from 
appearing on television without written permission from their superiors.153 Similarly, 
new lawyers sign social media contracts that bar them from speaking freely online.154 
Finally, Australian courts maintain strict control over what lawyers can say regarding 
ongoing cases, while also limiting the use of film and audio recording equipment in 
court.155 
Most Australian law firms restrict what lawyers can say to the media without 
authorisation. In some cases, there is a strict policy ‘against media or public 
comment’,156 while in other cases, there is a ‘more strategic or liberal approach’.157 
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However, the trend orients towards standardised contracts that prevent junior lawyers 
from speaking freely and without permission from their supervisors. This includes the 
rule denoting that junior lawyers cannot talk about ongoing cases in which a lawyer is 
involved.158 However, this rule can also include further restrictions on talking in 
general about the law in the media altogether. In brief, lawyers must now ask their 
superiors before they talk about the law in public—a situation that at face value seems 
absurd. 
Rules that restrict lawyers from speaking freely to the press are often justified by 
referencing the right to a fair trial. Speaking to the press could ‘prejudice’ ongoing 
proceedings.159 This rule applies even when considering the ‘public interest in free 
discussion’ on the case.160 It can be admitted that this is an important rule; however, it 
does not justify media bans on lawyers talking to the press about the law in general, 
about their law firms or about areas of law reform. Indeed, as codified by the United 
Nations: 
Lawyers like other citizens are entitled to freedom of expression ... in 
particular, they shall have the right to take part in public discussion of 
matters concerning the law, the administration of justice and the promotion 
and protection of human rights … without suffering professional restrictions 
by reason of their lawful action.161 
It has been noted that ‘a lawyer has a moral, civic and professional duty to speak out 
when he sees an injustice’.162 To the extent that media bans issued by law firms 
prevent such a discussion, they are an undue restriction on free speech. It must also be 
stated that lawyers play an important role in the media and democracy, as they 
publicly speak about changing legal standards. They help ‘teach the public about the 
legal system’ and explain ‘the rule of law in our democratic society’.163 Restrictions 
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on the free speech of lawyers should thus only be enacted with extreme caution and 
trepidation, as the consequences are significant. 
In more recent years, law firms have reached beyond television media bans to social 
media bans. A study by Thomson Reuters found that 76 per cent of Australian law 
firms have established ‘social media strategy’.164 Corrs Chambers Westgarth, a 
leading Australian law firm, suggested that law firms ‘ban the use of social media’ for 
junior lawyers or ‘introduce contractual provisions governing the use of social media’ 
for all new employees.165 This kind of social media provision is already standard 
practice. For example, the Law Institute of Victoria recommended that ‘all individuals 
in [a law] firm should be instructed not to say anything on their personal social media 
channels which may … impact adversely on the firm’.166 It should be noted that this 
claim is directed at personal social media accounts. A law firm’s social media 
contract will apply to everything that lawyers say outside work, even during their own 
time in their private lives. The Law Society of New South Wales expressed it even 
more starkly by stating that ‘it would be foolish of employees to think they may say 
as they wish on their Facebook page with total immunity from any consequences’.167 
In this case, the law society is somewhat threatening lawyers to keep in line. 
In Australia, saying something untoward about a law firm online can result in 
immediate termination.168 This includes posting negative comments on Facebook or 
other social media sites.169 Even government department lawyers might be legally 
fired for criticising their departments online due to social media guidelines stating that 
lawyers cannot impugn the implied freedom of political communication; these 
guidelines are said to not apply to the cases of individuals but to political 
communication as a whole.170 Most lawyers are now heavily restricted in terms of 
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what they can say online about their law firm, the law and ongoing cases. It is 
difficult to comprehend how a ‘public lawyer’ such as Geoffrey Robertson can 
emerge in this new environment, filled as it is with social media potholes and perils. 
It should be conceded that many risks are associated with lawyers using social 
media—such as bringing the profession ‘into general disrepute’ by posting racist or 
sexist pictures or comments, engaging in cyber bullying, breaching confidentiality 
agreements or harassing a witness, juror or client.171 Some of these risks are a breach 
of Australian law, while others are merely unethical. However, all these risks are 
legitimate. There is an even greater risk in banning lawyers from engaging in social 
media altogether: the risk of limiting the public’s access to justice. The conceded fact 
is that ‘increased use of social media by the legal profession [improves] public access 
to legal information and access to justice’.172 Lawyers should be publicly available to 
serve the public. An outright ban on social media use is thus not in the public’s best 
interest. 
The experience of Australian lawyers differs markedly from the this of US lawyers. In 
the US, it is employers who have restricted access ‘to private social media sites used 
by employees’, and only with first gaining permission from those employees.173 The 
Stored Communications Act ‘prohibits employers from monitoring employees’ online 
without authorisation.174 Consequently, it is difficult in the US to fire a lawyer for 
comments made on a private Facebook page. Indeed, in a significant case, company 
restrictions on ‘employee blogging and social media communications’ were 
considered a violation of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (which covers 
the right to self-organisation and collective bargaining).175 The US thus has some 
better protections established for the free online speech of lawyers. 
In Australia, courts have frequently sided with the big law firms in terms of restricting 
the rights of lawyers to speak in the media about ongoing cases. Most judges fear that 
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the media will distort a trial and present a biased perspective.176 They are equally 
concerned about the risk of a ‘trial by the media’, whereby a jury is influenced by 
public opinion. Finally, judges prefer to maintain a professional distance from the 
media so that everyone can remain objective in a case. 
Historically, this has resulted in television cameras being banned in Australian 
courtrooms. Banning cameras from courts and issuing gag orders to prevent speaking 
about specific cases has negatively affected Australia’s legal culture in various ways. 
Geoffrey Robertson himself has argued that it is vitally important for courts to allow 
the filming of all trials to be shown on television so that the public can observe and 
understand the justice system.177 Quoting Freeborn John Lilburne, he suggested that 
‘justice must be seen to be done’.178 In a democracy, secret trials are not aligned with 
the general principle that the law is enforced by the will of the people. Of course, any 
recording of the proceedings should be carefully controlled. Robertson argued for a 
proviso that jury members should not be revealed on television, nor ‘vulnerable 
witnesses’, nor defendants—unless they were protesting or appearing as a witness.179 
In the UK, cameras have been allowed in the British Court of Appeal with these 
limitations since 2013.180 It is unclear why Australia cannot follow this example. 
Former High Court Justice Michael Kirby has extended one step further to suggest 
that there should be a ‘dedicated High Court television channel’ because ‘the public 
has a right to see the court in action’.181 In this case, the ABC’s On Trial (2015) series 
can be praised; it took the public inside the courtroom and featured ‘unprecedented 
access to major criminal trials in Australian courts’.182 Although positive, the show 
lasted for a single season, and it was filmed over a single year. There are arguments in 
favour of granting longer-term access. First is the argument that courts and lawyers 
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play an active role in educating the public about the law. It has been said that 
‘Australian images of their legal system and proceedings are distorted by the plethora 
of United States media portrayals’.183 In brief, there are too many US legal dramas 
that distort what people observe as Australian law. More than one-third of Australians 
do not know that Australia has a constitution, and even more cite the US constitution 
when trying to explain Australian law.184 In a democratic society, it is essential that 
people also have a chance to openly critique the courts with full knowledge of their 
legal system at work.185 
In a democratic society like Australia, open courtrooms are an essential part of the 
rule of law.186 The common saying that ‘no one is above the law’ entails public 
observation of the judicial process. As noted in Vancouver Sun (Re), judges must be 
observed to apply the law evenly in all cases to ensure ‘that justice is administered in 
a non-arbitrary manner’.187 Jeremy Bentham expressed this point differently by 
suggesting that open courts should keep ‘the judge himself, while trying, under 
trial’.188 Allowing cameras into the courtroom thereby allows the public to play a role 
in maintaining the rule of law in its society. Even when trials might embarrass the 
accused, Lord Atkinson similarly suggested that ‘the hearing of a case in public may 
be … humiliating’, but a public trial is the ‘best security for the pure, impartial, and 
efficient administration of justice’.189 
The rule of law also requires that the public knows what crimes attract which 
punishments in court.190 At a basic level, the public should know how the law is 
enforced so that people can avoid breaking it.191 On this point, Lord Hope argued that 
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the right to a fair trial also includes the right to know the ‘the reasons for the outcome’ 
of the trial, as well as how that trial compares to similar comparable cases.192 This 
includes the ability to observe, review and understand past cases through an open 
court system.193 Therefore, open justice or open-access courtrooms are critical for 
both a right to a fair trial and the rule of law. Open courtrooms inform the public of 
the punishments of a crime, while also holding judges accountable for evenly 
enforcing those punishments. Therefore, it can be stated that ‘the media and the courts 
[in concert] are vital to a free, questioning and just society’.194 
In contrast with the Australian media market, the US media market is brimming with 
lawyers and judges on television. The section below details the unique role of the US 
Attorney-General before covering the general trend of outspoken US lawyers in the 
media. 
6) Public Legal Culture in the US 
The public legal culture of the US is best exemplified by the role of the US Attorney-
General—the president’s legal advisor and public spokesperson. The post involves 
close relations with the media, so it is an extensively public role. 
The original Judiciary Act 1789 created the office of the Attorney-General, which 
‘evolved over the years into the head of the Department of Justice’.195 What began as 
a professional post is now much more political, with attorney-generals expected to 
maintain close relations with the press as a core part of their job.196 Today, attorney-
generals must head the department, advise the president on legal matters, occasionally 
represent the government in court and represent the public’s interest in the media by 
proposing new legislation.197 It is this last role—representing the public’s interest—
that makes modern attorney-generals public lawyers in the manner that has been 
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previously discussed. Representing the public’s interest also helps solidify the 
attorney-general’s role in promoting an active legal culture in which the law is 
discussed, criticised and reformed. 
US Attorney-Generals speak in the press on issues of law, justice and law reform, and 
they campaign on certain legal issues that are personal and in the public interest. The 
development of this role over time can be tracked since the 1940s, beginning with US 
Attorney-General Tom Clark (from 1945 to 1949). Clark was known for being 
‘familiar and engaging with the press. He understood what the media could do for him 
and his agenda and … he could be quite effective with them.’198 Clark used what the 
Americans call the ‘bully pulpit’ (i.e., the ability to use one’s basis of power to 
advocate for an agenda) to emphasise the ‘importance of rehabilitation and education’ 
for young criminal offenders.199 He hosted a golf tournament in Washington DC to 
raise awareness of this issue, to which he invited ‘top golf and movie stars of the 
day’.200 The media also attended.201 Clark gave speeches that promoted civil rights,202 
though this was not unique to Clark. Clark’s son, Ramsey Clark, was also a US 
Attorney-General (from 1967 to 1969). Ramsey Clark similarly used the bully pulpit 
to push for opposition to the death penalty, defend the United States Bill of Rights 
and promote civil rights laws.203 Ramsey also used his advisory role with the 
president to push his own agenda. At one point, he advised former president Johnson 
against laws that could have inflamed racial tensions due to his personal commitment 
to civil rights.204 
A US Attorney-Generals are not restricted in terms of what they can say to the 
media.205 This makes them capable as public lawyers who can represent the public 
interest. In addition to campaigning for certain causes, US Attorney-Generals can 
publicly attack what they consider errors in judicial decision-making. In a series of 
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speeches, US Attorney-General Edwin Meese (from 1985 to 1988) ‘attacked specific 
rulings of the Supreme Court’ that he viewed were errors in the law.206 He did so ‘by 
appealing to the public and the legal profession in speeches [and the] written word’.207 
Remarks by US Attorney-Generals on these kinds of controversial legal issues 
‘receive extensive media coverage’ and can thus start a public conversation about the 
law and potential law reform.208 This can lead to the US Attorney-General proposing 
legislation in the public interest, as in the case of US Attorney-General Herbert 
Brownell when he responded to business demands with anti-trust legislation.209 
US Attorney-Generals frequently defend existing legal norms for the sake of the 
public interest. For example, US Attorney-General Jeff Sessions (from 2017 to 2018) 
regularly appeared in the media to defend freedom of religion and the First 
Amendment.210 He also defended what he called ‘the primacy of law’, stating that 
‘courts and advocates and politicians’ had lost their respect for the legal system and 
ignored legal norms and traditions.211 In defending the ‘primacy of law’, US 
Attorney-Generals can extend one step further and appear alongside a plaintiff in 
court.212 This is called appearing as amicus curiae or as a friend of the court—as an 
advisor to the proceedings on behalf of the public.213 This occurred in various civil 
rights cases, in which US Attorney-Generals lent the government’s resources to 
particular plaintiffs to assist their cause.214 
Finally, there have been cases when US Attorney-Generals have stood up to 
presidents for the sake of the public’s interest and that of the Constitution of the 
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President Donald Trump and refused to implement his travel ban on people who 
travelled to the US from Muslim-majority nations.215 She did so because she believed 
that the so-called Muslim travel ban violated the constitution216 (namely, that it 
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment for the freedom of 
religion). She decided that the Department of Justice would not enforce the order, as it 
was both unconstitutional and not in the public’s interest to do so. 
US Attorney-Generals are part of the broader US legal culture, whereby lawyers and 
judges frequently appear on television. Many have had their own television shows, 
while others have negotiated ‘a personal media deal’ to talk about their clients with 
the press.217 An old US saying states: ‘Let’s try this lawsuit the old-fashioned way: in 
the newspapers’.218 This perception of law can be criticised for becoming a spectacle 
or theatre; however, it should also be remembered that the public loves spectacles and 
theatre. 
To engage the public, the law must be open and available, easily accessible and, in 
some cases, entertaining. An active legal culture requires lawyers to engage in this 
process rather than retreat from it. Australia has much that it can learn from the US’s 
media culture, the free speech rights that it provides its lawyers and the freedom that 
the public has to critically engage with the law. Rather than restricting the rights of 
lawyers to speak freely, Australia should empower lawyers to inform the public, 
educate and entertain. Geoffrey Robertson’s Hypotheticals series offers a helpful 
model from which to base the Australian public legal culture. Not only should 
lawyers form part of our media culture, but lawyers should be at the heart of 
critiquing and questioning the law. 
To conclude, a possibility exists for a different kind of law graduate to emerge in the 
future—one who is empowered to think about moral challenges and speak freely 
about the injustice of the law. The current neoliberal agenda does not provide students 
a moral education in law; rather, it prioritises a focus on profitability and personal 
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enrichment.219 Students are also currently not encouraged to consider alternative 
career paths that can be distinguished from private practice or corporate law jobs, 
despite the severe lack of private jobs available.220 In contrast, society does not gain 
the role of a lawyer as an active participant in the democratic process, with students 
who can take are trained as democratic citizens. 
Part 3 of this thesis will consider the notion of a new law school that champions the 
lawyer’s role as a democratic citizen. A new kind of law school could move beyond 
the neoliberal agenda to experiment with alternative forms of legal education that 
allow students to think for themselves and prepare them for numerous jobs beyond 
private legal practice. A broad, liberal arts education in law school would allow 
students to understand the law in its proper context, the purpose behind law and the 
relationship between law, history, politics and society; consequently, students would 
gain several different perspectives through which they can critique legal institutions 
and traditions. This thesis will conclude with a curriculum that embraces new and 
alternative methods of understanding, critiquing and reflecting on the law that 
students learn in class. Some of the methods will be generally relevant to modern 
educational theory (e.g., small class sizes); however, even these methods have been 
observed in Part 1 of this thesis, in which they have allowed for more sustained 
discussions about the law in society, the law in context and the relationship between 
law and other fields of study. 
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Section 1: Current Teaching Methods and Assessments 
One of the greatest problems in legal education today is the reluctance of law schools 
to experiment with new and innovative teaching methods that already exist in other 
university departments.1 Traditional methods of teaching law (e.g., casebooks and, in 
some examples, the case method) remain ‘antiquated and ineffective’, as they were 
created in the late 1800s and have only been marginally adjusted since.2 This is 
despite the widespread and broad changes to education in universities, including 
entire education departments that were established for this explicit purpose. Properly 
evaluating law schools necessarily involves considering new methods for teaching 
law and new experimental teaching techniques. 
This thesis explores the relevant alternative teaching methods in the field, and it 
provides a critique of current methods. First, it argues that the Socratic method and 
case method require significant revision or adaptation to remain relevant in the 
present day. Although the Socratic method is not commonly used in Australian law 
schools, discussing it reveals how it could be used for a humanities-based education in 
law. For example, the method might not be directed towards students, but it could be 
directed from students towards law professors, judges and the law itself. Second, this 
thesis argues that the case method currently promotes an unjust and passive 
understanding of the law. A more effective case method might involve students 
considering the effect of applying the law to a set of facts (e.g., a client potentially 
being sent to prison, someone losing their home, someone losing their livelihood) 
rather than having no regard for the consequences. In both cases, this thesis contends 
that the Socratic method and the case method require a more thorough connection 
between legal principles and the reality of the law as it affects society. 
Section 2 of this part considers new and alternative teaching methods. These include 
teaching critical thinking and the effects of law enforcement and philosophy, as well 
as providing new technological tools that can enhance the empathy of students (e.g., 
virtual reality, simulations and games). Principally, this thesis suggests that new 
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technology can be combined with a traditional liberal arts education to create a new 
kind of law degree—one that not only teaches students what the law is but also allows 
them to question what the law ought to be. Many of the alternative techniques that 
will be discussed in this section have beneficial effects for a humanities-based 
education in law. These include reading groups, essays, small class sizes and critical 
questions in class—all of which contradict the more traditional styles of large lecture 
halls and case-based questions. However, it is true that changing teaching methods 
alone does not guarantee a humanities-based curriculum. Teaching methods are only 
one-half of the proposed curriculum, and the proposed substantive changes to content 
and subject listings are outlined later in this thesis. 
1) Moving towards the ‘Real’ Socratic Method 
Professor Kingsfield stands at the front of a law class and picks on a student at 
random. 
‘Mr Hart,’ the lecturer says, ‘What are the facts of the case?’3 
The student stands. 
‘I haven’t read the case,’ the student says quietly.4 
The professor grumbles in frustration, mentioning that the assignment has been 
stuck on a wall in Langdell Hall for over a week. 
‘I will give you the facts of the case myself, Mr Hart,’ the professor 
says, to the student’s visible worry.5 
The above scene from the film The Paper Chase (1973) is a classic example of the 
Socratic method—a system in which students are asked questions about a specific 
case of law. Invented by the law professor Christopher Langdell in 1870, the Socratic 
method minimally resembles the actual ideas of Socratic wisdom in Meaieutics and 
the Apology. This section intends to challenge Langdell’s interpretation of Socrates 
 





and asks whether his method reinforces authoritative structures of law rather than 
granting students the ability to test their own critical thinking skills. 
This thesis suggests that in a true Socratic law school, students would be instructed to 
ask questions of those in authority instead of answering questions from authority. 
Nothing would be beyond a student’s questioning, especially regarding claims to 
authority or expertise alone. Students would be empowered to question the wisdom of 
law professors, judges, politicians and the law itself; they could unpack the hidden 
values, ideological motivations and philosophical foundations of legal principles. By 
questioning the origins of the law, students would learn to refine their critical thinking 
and analytical skills in a manner that Langdell himself intended to teach, but which he 
never truly managed to achieve. 
The analysis below will begin by exploring Langdell’s style of the Socratic method, 
and then it will discuss how this compares to the method as advocated by Socrates 
himself. 
a) Langdell’s Socratic Method 
To thoroughly cover the Socratic method, it is worth revisiting the character of 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, as introduced earlier in this thesis. As Dean of 
Harvard Law from 1870 to 1895, Professor Christopher Langdell systematically laid 
the foundation of modern legal education.6 His two primary inventions were the case 
method of instruction and the Socratic method. Langdell taught based on ‘a settled 
conviction that law could only be taught or learned effectively by means of cases’.7 
He taught these cases by asking students a series of questions about the ‘principles 
and doctrines’ that were contained within them.8 Students were expected to 
understand the facts and legal principles of a case, as well as how those legal 
principles could be applied to a new set of factual circumstances.9 
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Langdell’s Socratic method was inspired by a similar method outlined by Socrates in 
Maieutics.10 The ancient philosopher outlined a method for interrogating young Greek 
men by asking them questions to draw out fallacious reasoning in their logic.11 
Socrates boasted about an ‘ability to apply every conceivable test to see whether [the] 
young man’s mental offspring [was] illusory and false’.12 This somewhat resembles 
Langdell’s technique of interrogation; by forcing students to justify illusory or false 
understandings of case law, Langdell was applying his own version of Socrates’ 
technique. 
With his Socratic method, Langdell encouraged students to develop different opinions 
regarding the ratio decedendi of a case. However, his method lacked any sustained 
debate regarding the origins of those legal decisions or the methods by which they 
were reached by judges. A student could distinguish a specific case from a new set of 
facts, which suggests that the old legal principle might not apply in a new 
circumstance; however, when a judge provided an opinion, it was not the student’s 
place to disagree with the judge on first principles or mention philosophical 
foundations of that opinion. Indeed, philosophy was not part of the method at all 
(which is ironic, given that the method is named after the most famous philosopher of 
all time: Socrates). If students did question a judge, then they could only do so by 
referencing another case and another judge (i.e., they had to question authority by 
referencing prior authority alone, rather than questioning authority itself).13 In this 
sense, the current Socratic method might prevent students from questioning what they 
are taught. This is similar to how ideologies discourage lateral thinking by 
discouraging followers from questioning the basic foundations of the ideological 
principles. As Yuval Harari suggested, ‘How do you cause people to believe in an 
imagined order[?] First, you never admit that the order is imagined.’14 
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Langdell himself occasionally questioned legal authority—but only if an ‘opinion did 
not square with the original [cases themselves]’.15 He ‘cultivated the intellectual 
autonomy of students’ but only in so far as they had a different, judicial opinion 
regarding how a case should be read and understood.16 If a student uncovered a new 
ratio decedendi in a case, then Langdell was the first to reconsider his opinion on the 
case in question.17 He is cited as doing so three times in a week on one particular 
case.18 However, what mattered to Langdell was not so much the law’s origin but the 
outcome itself: 
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To 
have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant 
facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what 
constitutes a true lawyer.19 
In the above reasoning of law as a ‘science [of] principles’, Langdell closely mirrored 
the German legal philosopher, Hans Kelsen. Like Kelsen, Langdell’s method 
encouraged students to learn that the law was self-justifying, so they would thus have 
to ‘draw boundaries between the spheres of legal, moral and political consideration’.20 
By focusing solely on the reasoning of judges, students were taught that a decision is 
always justified by reference to another prior decision.21 Never is the ‘end point’ or 
the original conception of law (in terms of its derivation from politics, society, 
morality and social values) allowed to be questioned.22 
The final flaw in Langdell’s Socratic method is its tendency to promote inequitable 
power by allowing those in a position of power—the teacher, judge and law—to 
interrogate those in a position of weakness—the student. As Benjamin Franklin once 
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elucidated: ‘I found this [Socratic] method the safest for myself and very 
embarrassing to those against whom I used it’.23 Orin Kerr described the method as 
‘cruel and psychologically abusive’ because it creates a strange power dynamic 
between teacher and student.24 This kind of power dynamic, which Socrates himself 
sought to redress in his actual use of the Socratic method in ancient Greece, will be 
discussed below. 
b) Restoring Socrates to the Socratic Method 
Although Langdell correctly identified a Socratic form of questioning in Maieutics, he 
failed to understand that in the time of Socrates, the Socratic method was primarily 
used on figures of authority rather than on students. This is revealed in wider readings 
of Socrates, such as in his discussions in the Apology. 
The heart of the Apology centres on Socrates’ trial for corrupting the youth of 
Athens.25 Socrates is charged with corrupting the youth by questioning their wisdom 
but also by questioning the social and political institutions of Athenian high society. 
His ‘curious’ nature is what condemns him in the eyes of his Greek accusers.26 At the 
trial, Socrates expresses a vision of what it means to be wise, including a Socratic 
method for analysing the state. Socrates explains that before one can look to his own 
private interests, one must ‘look to himself and seek virtue and wisdom’.27 He 
similarly stated that before one can look to the interests of the state, one must ‘look to 
the state’.28 
By using the term ‘look’, Socrates means ‘examine’—in the sense that one must 
examine the state before blindly following its dictates. One must look to himself in 
the same way that the ‘unexamined life is not worth living’.29 At this point, the idea of 
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the state’s ‘interests’ can be extended to the enforcement of the law. After all, the law 
is a state’s primary interest; it is its existential interest, as a state can only exist on the 
basis that people support the law (foremost of which is the constitutional basis of the 
state’s authority).30 Lawyers who do not examine the law they learn or what the state 
wishes them to do or what the state’s ‘interests’ are in terms of enforcing the law is 
not virtuous or wise, in Socrates’ phrasing. He is not ‘looking’ to the state before 
enforcing its interest. A study of law that neglects to mention that the state has any 
interests in applying a specific law, case or agenda is not a Socratic study of law. 
Instead of using the Socratic method on inexperienced students, the Apology suggests 
that the Socratic method should be used on figures of authority. In the middle of the 
trial, Socrates recounts the story of the Oracle of Delphi, who declared that he was the 
wisest of all men.31 To disprove this claim, Socrates searches for figures of authority 
and wisdom, whom he suspects are wiser than he is. He begins to interrogate these 
figures using his Socratic method, which is what places him in trouble with the Greek 
authorities.32 In this example, the Socratic method is used as a tool to interrogate those 
who hold themselves as wise—to test whether it is the truth. 
To undergo such a test, the relevant figure must have authority—which is why using 
the technique on a student is considered strange. Socrates himself stated that he 
primarily used the method on three particular individuals: a politician who claimed 
himself wise, an artist who did the same and a poet whose wisdom was self-evident in 
his poetry.33 In each of these cases, Socrates questioned the figures of authority on the 
subject matter of their authority. In the case of the politician, Socrates was literally 
‘looking’ to the state in the manner expressed above before following the state’s 
interests.34 
The above examination of the Socratic method (as used in the Apology) reveals three 
distinct claims: that the method should be used to question the interests of the state, 
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that the method should be used to question those in authority, and that the method 
should be used to question those who believe they are wise. A modern version of the 
Socratic method would thus encompass all three. 
The law as an interest of the state, a source of authority and an often self-proclaiming 
source of wisdom would be an ideal target for the modern Socratic method. The 
student as a subject of the state, a subordinate and a self-proclaimed amateur in his or 
her field of training would not be an ideal target for the Socratic method. It is this 
foundational mistake that Langdell made in his formulation; this should be corrected 
and the method adjusted for the use of students. 
This section does not argue that Socrates’ ideas should be accepted without critique or 
further discussion, which may make them more appropriate for a more modern 
educational experience. Indeed, there are aspects of Socratic dialogue that might 
contradict modern notions about science and learning. One complication is Socrates’ 
idea that learning is a form of ‘recollection’.35 In his dialogues, Socrates contends that 
people can ‘recollect’ answers to questions posed in a past life.36 He uses the example 
of someone noting the imperfections in the world (in terms of equality of 
measurement) and recollecting ‘the Equal itself’ from a time before they were born.37 
Socrates contended that answering a Socratic question was sometimes a form of 
‘recollecting’ the answer from this previous life, and that ‘I am confident that there 
truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead’.38 Such a 
statement would seemingly contradict modern notions about education and science, 
and it would have to be discounted from a modern version of Socratic questioning. It 
should be noted here that Socrates’ techniques, not his scientific or religious beliefs, 
are the matter of inspiration in this section. 
Although Langdell’s Socratic method was an improvement compared to prior forms 
of legal education, a new formulation is required to accommodate the actual wisdom 
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and virtue of Socrates, as moderated by modern ideas of education. It is time to adopt 
the originally intended Socratic method that equalises the power dynamics between 
professor and student, and empowers the student to examine legal principles critically. 
Once students are empowered to admit that they do not have all the answers to law 
waiting for them in a casebook—that they must reason through the law for themselves 
by asking questions to those in authority—then they will understand that the 
foundation of knowledge is ignorance (as Socrates suggests) and wisdom originates 
from challenging authority rather than from unquestioningly following it. 
2) The Unjust Case Method 
This subsection seeks to demonstrate an unjust case problem and use it as an example 
to explore how case problems can fail to offer students the chance to question unjust, 
immoral or outdated laws. This thesis argues that by asking students to merely 
identify and apply the law, the typical case problem silences a student’s dissenting 
views and forecloses the possibility of students questioning how the law influences 
their society. Instead, students are trained to perceive the law as a static science—one 
that is built on the internal logic of precedent, which has no extrinsic justification as 
an emergent theme of the Harvard case method.39 
The second part of this section examines public policy considerations, which are often 
regarded as the ‘liberal arts’ component of the case problem format. This subsection 
argues that problem questions have limited scope and marginal utility. This section 
also considers public policy considerations, which might not offer students a proper 
chance to discuss how law affects society. In discussing policy, students are 
encouraged to consider existing frameworks—case law, statute law and international 
law—when they construct their answers rather than to think for themselves. In this 
way, public policy considerations do not ‘fix’ the case problem question. A more 
radical solution is necessary. 
This section argues that fixing the case method would require radically changing it or 
replacing it with more critically engaging teaching tools. These could include 
critically engaging essays, cross-disciplinary research papers and political philosophy 
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questions. Critical assessment tasks have the advantage of contextualising the law for 
students and giving them an understanding of how the law relates to real life, politics 
and society. 
a) The Case Problem 
A case problem is a hypothetical problem question in law in which a party or several 
parties are involved in a legal dispute.40 Case problems are typically presented as a 
series of facts containing legal issues that the student must identify.41 Parties are 
framed as clients who have come to the student for advice regarding the law.42 
Students must advise these hypothetical clients about their legal duties, rights and 
liabilities. To answer a problem question, students tend to resort to the memorisation 
of case law and statute law, as well as, in some cases, foreseeing potential future 
developments in the law in ‘grey’ areas or undecided cases.43 Students must conclude 
their answers by declaring one side of the case the likely ‘winner’ if the case had been 
decided in court. 
Students will generally answer a case problem using a prescribed formula. The most 
common method is the IRAC method: issue, rule, application and conclusion.44 Using 
IRAC, students begin by identifying ‘the relevant legal issues’ that are raised in a 
question.45 They then consider the ‘relevant legal principles’ that those issues 
prompt.46 After this, they apply the legal rules to the issues and known facts.47 Finally, 
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students offer an opinion regarding which party will likely succeed in ‘winning’ the 
case.48 
IRAC is one of many formulas or acronyms that are taught to students. However, 
regardless of which formula is used, students are encouraged to have the same three 
goals: identify the legal issues, state the law and apply the law.49 The theory is that by 
identifying and applying law, students will quickly come to ‘know’ the law, and thus 
have the requisite knowledge to enter private practice after graduating.50 
However, the IRAC method can leave students completely detached from 
understanding the moral ‘cost’ of law or how it affects society. Using IRAC, students 
are merely asked to ‘advise’ a client regarding his or her respective argument in court 
and the likely result.51 The law is thus coldly applied to the facts of the client’s case. 
No regard is given to the extrinsic circumstances, including the client’s mental state, 
social context, political context or origin of the law or norm. Students can be 
penalised for straying too far beyond a ‘policy’ boundary of discussion.52 For 
example, it is irrelevant to term a law a ‘legal technicality’ or ‘bad law’, even in 
situations when the law has led to a substantial injustice to the injured party. The 
law’s effect is typically irrelevant to the problem question. Students must ignore all 
moral and philosophical questions if they are to apply the law strictly and clinically. 
b) The Question 
Below is a problem question and answer that uses the typical IRAC method. The 
intention of using this question is to analyse the boundaries of an acceptable answer to 
a case problem, as well as highlight what these boundaries are and how they 
normalise injustice in the minds of typical law students. The case problem and answer 
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they reflect a typical ‘textbook’ example of a question that is given to students. 
Although Berkahn’s book is situated in the New Zealand context, it reflects broad 
principles and cases from the UK. 
The question in Berkahn’s book considers the legal rule from Salomon v Salomon 
concerning a company’s legal status as a legal person who is separate from its 
directors and shareholders.54 Put simply, the rule stated that ‘a corporation is a distinct 
person with its own personality separate from and independent [to] the persons who 
formed it’.55 The rule is commonly revised as ‘a company is a legal person’: 
Berkhan asks: 
Max holds 800 out of 1000 issued shares in Northland Motels Ltd. He and 
his wife Susan have separated, and Max has transferred most of his valuable 
assets to the company in return for the issue of a further 100 shares, with the 
object of ensuring that these assets are not subject to the property division 
provisions of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976.56 
And answers: 
Max will argue that the property transferred to the company no longer 
belongs to him, and is therefore not available for division under the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976, on the grounds that he and the company are two 
separate legal persons despite his apparent control of the company: Salomon 
v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
It is irrelevant that he is the major shareholder of the company—such a 
person is still considered a separate entity from the company: Lee v Lee’s 
Air Farming Ltd [1961] NZLR 325. Although Max is a shareholder of the 
company, he has no legal or equitable interest in the company’s property: R 
v McCurdy [1983] NZLR 551; Re Grasslands Farms Ltd [1975] 1 NZLR 92. 
The fact that the outcome may be unfair or inequitable to Susan does not 
warrant a departure from the Salomon principle. Such a departure can only 
be justified [in a case of] ‘substantial injustice’: Chen v Butterfield (1996) 7 
NZCLC 261,086; Re Securitibank Ltd (No 2) [1978] 2 NZLR 136.57 
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The question can be summarised succinctly as follows: Max is using his company to 
divert assets away from his wife upon separation. 
The answer can be summarised as follows: Max can avoid liability by using the 
doctrine of separate corporate personhood to prove that his company is legally 
‘separate’ from him. 
The example answer provided above is a typical answer to a case problem. The 
answer follows the IRAC format by raising legal issues and legal rules and then 
applying those rules to the facts at hand.58 The answer is also typical in that it ignores 
ethics, morality and fairness, and it does not question whether the law itself is just or 
whether it should be changed. Although important, a further discussion of these points 
is outside the scope of analysis. 
At first glance, a strict application of the law in this case will clearly result in an 
unjust outcome—namely, that Susan might be denied assets from Max that are owed 
to her in their separation. The fairness of this outcome is irrelevant under a strict 
IRAC analysis. The IRAC method does not concern itself with the ethical result of a 
decision but merely with how that decision was logically reached. The method centres 
on applying the law rather than on questioning whether the law is just or fair. A 
correct answer, as the textbook answer above suggests, is a list of legal rules that are 
applied formulaically to Max’s situation, in which the consequences of that 
application are ignored.59 
That the above case problem results in an unjust answer should promote a careful 
consideration of the case method. If students should merely enforce the law as 
provided in the books when they answer a case problem, then it can be asked whether 
the students are implicit collaborators in unjust and outdated legal norms. What if a 
student reaches an unjust or immoral conclusion that goes against the higher 
principles of humanity? Is it justified to allow students to proceed without questioning 
the conclusion in some explicit way? 
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A stereotypical answer would be that lawyers exist to serve the needs of their clients 
rather than to provide moral advice. A law student’s role is thus to learn the law and 
become a lawyer rather than to learn how to provide moral advice. Under a neoliberal 
paradigm, this belief is heavily encouraged: students are trained in law schools to 
adopt a post-morality perspective.60 They learn to ignore questions of morality and to 
focus on job-relevant knowledge.61 As Nick James suggested, ‘Unless it is going to be 
directly relevant to their future careers, [students] are not really interested’.62 To most 
students, law school merely involves ‘passing all their courses and getting their 
degree as quickly as possible and with a minimum of fuss’.63 They tend to avoid 
‘critical question[s]’ or ‘philosophical questions’, instead preferring skills-based 
questions.64 Students consider critical thinking tasks a ‘waste’ of time.65 
At this point, counterarguments can be made in response to the example answer 
provided above (in the case of Max v Susan). Some of these counterarguments would 
even align within the IRAC framework. Some could even lead to a just outcome. It 
could be argued that the court could perceive Max hiding the assets in a company as 
an injustice, and the court could act to prevent this injustice by relying on exceptions 
to the Salomon rule. Susan might argue that the court should ‘pierce the corporate 
veil’ and hold Max personally liable for the assets due to her in the separation.66 In 
this case, the corporate veil could be lifted if Susan proves ‘substantial injustice’.67 
However, the court could equally decide that Susan is only a victim of minor injustice 
and dismiss her claim. 
Example questions such as the one discussed above tend to present an opportunity for 
a just outcome to occur if the law was twisted in some way. The limitation of the case 
problem is thus as follows: if a student can only answer the question by referring to 
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legal rules, then the student is bound by the limitations of those rules. If those rules 
tolerate minor injustices, then so too must the student. If those rules have a high bar 
for a victim, then so too must the student. If those rules amount to substantial injustice 
when applied, then the student must accept this when applying those rules. 
The case method in this example reinforces a belief that the law is the law, and that 
the law’s authority is self-evident and final. It is beyond the scope of a case problem 
to allow students to ask the most basic moral question: ‘Is the outcome just?’ 
Berkahn’s textbook answer also contains various assumptions about law’s role in 
society, its authority and its status as indisputable. Principally, his answer stated the 
doctrine of separate legal personality upfront, without questioning whether that 
principle should exist. If students state legal rules (the ‘R’ of IRAC) without 
questioning those rules, then they implicitly endorse that rule as already correct, 
authoritative and somehow worth applying. The assumption is that the judge in 
Salomon v Salomon case was correct to decide the doctrine of legal personhood and 
that all the student must do now is apply that doctrine. The doctrine of precedent itself 
suggests that judges are correct in a definite way unless they are contradicted by 
another judge or parliament. 
Realistically, the doctrine of legal personhood as discussed above (Max v Susan) is 
not final, decisive nor indisputable. Corporate legal personhood is an extremely 
controversial area of law.68 The Salomon v Salomon case remains controversial to this 
day.69 Some have argued that the case was badly decided.70 It is also commonly 
argued that the separate legal personhood doctrine had unintended consequences and 
a wide ambit and that it offered company directors a ‘get out of jail free’ card.71 
The doctrine can be criticised in various ways. At the most basic level, the doctrine 
has been described as ‘a legal fiction’.72 Companies are not really people. The court’s 
decision in Salomon v Salomon is an example of an ‘anthropomorphic fallacy: the 
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fallacy of ascribing human traits to a non-human entity’.73 Metaphors like this can 
start ‘as devices to liberate thought [in a courtroom, but] often end by enslaving it’.74 
In this case, judges are enslaved to a narrow perception of what a company is: a 
person. They are then enslaved to a limited amount of discretion in terms of ignoring 
that view, and they ‘lift the veil’ in only some minor cases. All future judges must 
typically rely on the decision of the original judge in Salomon v Salomon. This 
presumption (perhaps the core presumption of precedent itself) suggests that original 
judges are beyond human error, incorrect thinking or poor judgment—when, 
realistically, the opposite is more likely. 
If given the chance to critique the Salomon v Salomon doctrine, law students could 
gain a greater understanding of the law they are learning. For example, they could 
learn that legal doctrines contradict public interest. One argument suggested that when 
‘corporations are seen as private creations, corporate law is insulated from politics 
[and] political pressure’ to change.75 Without public pressure, companies can make 
decisions in their own best interests without feeling threatened by accountability.76 
Following the Wells Fargo incident and the GFC (to name just two examples), this 
can lead to decisions that contradict the public’s best interest to disastrous effects.77 
However, the doctrine in Salomon v Salomon still applies today, even to these 
extreme examples of company dishonesty and negligence. It allows those responsible 
(directors of companies) for harming others economically (e.g., the GFC, in which the 
decisions of a few bankers led to a mortgage and then financial crisis) go 
unpunished.78 Without direct legal responsibility, company directors can exercise 
‘power without responsibility’—the kind of power to make decisions without any 
responsibility for how those decisions affect the public.79 
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Finally, by questioning the example case on legal personhood, a student might argue 
that the original Salomon v Salomon case did not anticipate the globalised world, in 
which the decisions made by a few companies in the US can cause a global financial 
crisis.80 This, again, reveals the inherent problem in precedent and case law itself. 
This problem can be expressed as a question: how can an old rule be applied to new 
facts in a new world that the rule never anticipated? As long as the world continues to 
change, old precedents will become inconsistent with its new realities. 
A strict doctrinal approach to case problems (whereby the law is narrowly identified 
and applied) fails to realise the long-term effect of ‘bad laws’.81 In examining the 
history of law, it is important to recognise that bad laws have had a role in all 
countries since the first laws were written and the first punishments pronounced.82 
Although the laws of slavery in the US and of the apartheid in South Africa were 
considered logical in their own time, they are now considered fundamentally unjust.83 
Blindly applying bad laws to new facts or to a hypothetical problem does not ensure a 
‘good’ law student. Being an effective lawyer involves reaching beyond the technical 
and scientific application of law; it involves understanding ‘not just … what the law 
is, but, secondly … what it might or should become’.84 To be an effective lawyer is to 
understand that the law can be wrong, that its application can be wrong and that a 
question demanding its application can be wrong. It is to understand the ramifications 
of law on society and its ability to control relationships, civic institutions, businesses 
and personal freedom. Being an effective lawyer involves denying the relevance of 
hypothetical questions and proclaiming that laws are never hypothetical but always 
real—with real effects on real people. The role of an effective lawyer is thus to reach 
beyond the strict application of legal rules and attempt to correct the law when it 
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harms society.85 The ability of a lawyer to consider whether the law is just and 
whether it should be reformed and changed is thus an integral part of the profession.86 
If integrated into the curriculum, the ability to consider what the law should be would 
greatly expand the kinds of answer that students could give to a problem question.87 
Students would be empowered to ask whether a case they study is unjust or unfair. A 
top law student could provide suggestions for improving the law, which could thereby 
improve the likelihood of a just outcome in future cases.88 
The above question regarding Susan’s separation would thus trigger an entire string of 
questions about the role of law, purpose of law and effect of law on society. This kind 
of analysis applied against the principle of separate legal personhood would reveal 
several issues that typically exist outside the boundaries of a student’s answers to a 
case problem. As Simon Rice suggested, this is the obligation that law professors 
have to their students: ‘We do our students … a profound disservice when we teach 
them law—and represent law to them—as only doctrine and rules.’89 
This is because law reaches beyond rules and doctrine. It structures society, defines 
relationships and resolves conflicts.90 To teach law as merely an application of legal 
rules is thus to lack the opportunity to contribute to how society should be structured, 
how relationships should be defined and how conflicts should be resolved. These 
missed opportunities are too costly in a law to pay in a law school and university, in 
which learning and knowledge are meant to extend the student. 
Some law schools, both in Australia and in the US, ask their students to consider a 
‘public policy question’, either inside or separate to a case problem analysis.91 A 
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policy question asks a student to consider ‘why’ the law is the way it is or to consider 
competing viewpoints regarding law reform or, in rare cases, posing a new 
perspective of the law.92 In the above example question, students could be asked to 
discuss the doctrine of legal personhood. Occasionally, a policy question can be so 
broad that it is ‘more like undergrad liberal arts exams’.93 However, students should 
mainly base their answers on past precedents and existing discussions in legal circles 
rather than on their own opinions. 
Public policy discussions ‘are of minor importance’ in most law schools, which are 
subsumed by the dominance of the case method and legal positivism.94 One revision 
book for law students has attempted to reassure them: ‘Remember, public policy 
reasons are of minimal importance for excelling on your final exams’.95 Another 
suggested that policy questions ‘are likely to be relevantly short and count for 5 to 20 
percent of your exam’.96 Yet another suggested that ‘policy questions require the 
same three skills as traditional questions—distilling the law, issue spotting and 
argument’.97 Requiring the same three skills signifies that policy questions can be 
considered minor alterations of the traditional case problem format. 
It is argued that public policy questions, despite their rarity, offer students the 
opportunity to critique the law. A student might be asked to justify a particular 
doctrine or discuss a grey area of law that is not completely covered in a course. 
However, this is not the case realistically. Policy questions are generally much 
narrower than their name would suggest. Students are typically expected to narrowly 
reflect on established policy objectives and guidelines.98 They might be asked to 
consider an existing policy objective, such as to limit ‘the scope of a defendant’s 
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liability’ or they might be asked about a government’s existing policy objective of 
reducing reoffending or incarceration rates.99 
Students tend to answer policy questions by referring to existing arguments (i.e., 
judicial, legal, international and academic) rather than their own.100 They are often 
tasked with examining ‘statutory materials, administrative regulations, legal 
documents, articles’ and cases.101 In this way, their opinions are not free flowing or 
critical but ‘evidenced’ and couched in existing legal thought. The intention of 
answering a policy question is much the same as it is for answering a case problem: to 
identify the policy problem, identify the relevant commentary and apply that 
commentary.102 
Far from being robust critical thinking exercises, public policy questions merely hide 
hidden intentions. Students are typically limited by the existing boundaries of legal 
thought. With the ability to refer to dissenting judgements or obscure cases, policy 
questions often result as exercises in which students paraphrase the ‘courts’ 
reasoning’ or their favourite judge’s minority opinion.103 If they refer to the courts’ 
reasoning, then they do not reach beyond precedent in their answers.104 Indeed, at 
best, they only refer to a dissenting view of a minority judge. Sometimes, they will 
refer to an existing discussion in academia or a politician’s new proposal (both of 
which are existing sources) rather than their own novel ideas.105 Students’ inability to 
think for themselves in policy questions goes against the spirit of a critical legal 
education. 
W David Slawson suggested that ‘the inclusion of public policy … has not 
fundamentally changed the case method’.106 Rather than radically challenging the 
status quo, public policy questions can reinforce existing views about the law, which 
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involves justifying the reasons (policies) for the law’s enactment.107 They have 
similarly reaffirmed the importance of case law, as judges themselves often ‘include 
considerations of public policy’ in their judgements.108 To discuss a public policy is 
thus another method for discussing case law, one that does not reach into related 
fields of history, psychology, philosophy or political theory. Even when students are 
allowed to explore public policy (e.g., proposing law reform as aligned with 
government objectives), they do so by referring to those government objectives—to 
an existing document with prescribed legal boundaries.109 
A true public policy discussion would extend beyond to consider students’ own 
perspectives of how law affects society and whether the law is just, fair, moral and 
effective in its aims.110 The role of a law student under this conception would be to 
question and interrogate existing law, not by referencing precedent or dissenting 
judgements, but by referencing higher principles, moral and political philosophy, 
theories and data. This kind of analysis is more like the role of a politician (i.e., 
someone trained in daily public policy decisions) than that of a judge (i.e., someone 
narrowly trained in enforcing and reinterpreting the existing law). 
The case problem format boxes student thinking and dissuades students from thinking 
for themselves about the practical reality of legal principles. Far from being a 
critically engaging research task, case problems tend to reapply the legal status quo, 
justify legal norms and make students complicit in outdated or unjust legal norms. 
Typical methods of discussing a case problem (including the IRAC method) offer 
limited opportunities for students to voice their own opinion, question the law, 
critique the rules or suggest law reforms. In contrast, identifying and applying the law 
makes students blind to its changing nature, its effect on society and the injustices that 
it can perpetuate. 
Despite the ubiquity of the ‘policy’ question in case problems, policy alone does not 
solve the issue discussed above. Rather than freeing students’ minds to discuss their 
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own opinions, Policy questions force students to consider the same sources of legal 
authority: judges, politicians and the legal academic community. Students are limited 
in policy questions by the boundaries of existing legal thought, the whims of minority 
judges or the occasional comments from politicians. This prevents students from 
practically considering the morality of law, the effect of law and students’ internal 
compass regarding whether a law is right or wrong. Without this internal compass, 
law students begin to perceive the law as passive and static rather than active and 
living. 
Section 2: Alternative Teaching Methods & Assessments 
This section argues that alternative assessments should be used in Australian law 
schools to reorient student learning towards a broader liberal arts education in law. 
Students should be given new assessments that challenge them to think for themselves 
about law’s origin, purpose and effect on society. This can include teaching ‘soft’ 
skills (e.g., empathy, compassion, critical thinking and reflection). However, law 
students should also graduate with the capacity to critically reflect on the 
psychological and emotional effects of law on society; they should know how to 
unpack the surface objectivity of judicial decision-making to reveal the subjective 
social forces underneath. It is only through building compassion and an understanding 
of the law that law educators can deconstruct each student’s detached and clinical 
perspective of law, as is currently encouraged by the curriculum.1 
New assessment methods can help with this ‘human’ training by allowing students to 
engage with their own emotional reactions to cases and laws, rather than barring them 
from feeling any emotion in class.2 Alternative assessments can also teach students 
the social, political and economic sides of law, which would reveal hidden agendas 
and subversive injustices.3 
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This section draws from the ideas of various thinkers in the history of educational 
theory and humanities education, in which each theorist will be used as a launching 
pad for more modern ideas about legal education in the liberal arts tradition. One 
source of inspiration is the curricular design of WPM Kennedy, the first dean of the 
University of Toronto Faculty of Law.4 Teaching in the 1930s and 1940s, Kennedy 
suggested various different methods for assessing law outside the traditional and 
clinical (and often ‘cold’) case method; instead, he created innovative new 
assessments that challenged students to think critically about the law from new social 
perspectives.5 At the core of Kennedy’s teaching was the belief that law was a liberal 
art and the intent to place it in its proper context, rather than learning law as an 
objective abstraction. 
Instead of lecturers guiding students to comprehend law through a single method of 
instruction (i.e., the case method), students in Kennedy’s classes had to find their own 
method.6 Instead of regarding law as objective and apolitical, students were 
encouraged to question the social purpose of law and the political ends that it served.7 
Instead of being detached from the cases they read about, students were encouraged to 
have opinions and emotional reactions to each case.8 Kennedy’s law school taught 
students to connect with the political and social forces that underpinned the legal 
system, and, in doing so, students could connect with their own humanity. To this 
end, he described the role of law lecturers as follows: 
The teacher of the law … is no longer merely a contemplative creature 
describing the law as it exists … Law must be designed, assessed, and 
taught, not in the abstract, but in the context of the complex relations and 
processes of modern society.9 
Being connected to modern society allowed students to reflect much more critically 
on the role that the law realistically played within that society. Kennedy advanced the 
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notion that law schools should use more essays, critical thinking tasks, reflective 
tasks, law reform tasks, small class discussions and simulations to achieve this end.10 
These assessments aimed to help students understand critiques of the law, reflections 
on how the law affected society, the social function of law and how to enact law 
reform.11 Taught in this way, students could understand the law in an interdisciplinary 
manner, in which they observed the ‘countless relationships’ that existed between law 
and other fields.12 This helped them gain a greater understanding of law in the context 
of various interdisciplinary narratives linked to it (e.g., politics, philosophy, history 
and anthropology). As Kennedy was not unique in this interdisciplinary idea, this 
section will also draw from various other leading legal theorists and educators—such 
as Margaret Thornton, Markus Dubber, Dean Spade and Robin West. However, a 
specific focus and emphasis on Kennedy will be discussed in greater detail below. 
Australian law schools have been slow to adopt critical and innovative assessment 
methods that diverge from case problems.13 According to a landmark survey from 
2003, unlike Kennedy’s Toronto Law School program, most modern Australian law 
schools still used the case problem—a key component of the case method—as their 
core method of assessment.14 The continued use of case problems was previously 
discussed in Part 2 of this thesis. Sturm and Guinier have suggested that law school 
‘culture is remarkably static, non-adaptive, and resistant to change, even in the face of 
strong pressure from significant constituents of legal education’.15 Despite the 
widespread benefits of new and alternative methods of assessment, a strong allegiance 
to traditional teaching pedagogy yet prevails. This is despite the importance of 
assessment tasks in terms of setting the tone of the curriculum. 
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As BR Snyder in the US and Miller and Parlett in the UK discovered in the 1970s, 
university students value assessment tasks above everything else in the curriculum.16 
Although this study was conducted overseas, it is still considered a landmark study in 
the field of international student motivation because it established the concept of the 
‘hidden curriculum’.17 The study found that students relied on assessments to 
determine what does and does not matter in the curriculum. When asked about ‘all 
aspects of their studies’, it was found that students prioritised assessment tasks above 
teaching and learning. Based on Snyder’s research, it can be concluded that students 
in modern law schools will prioritise the case method and black-letter law above 
everything else (if that is what they are mainly being tested on).18 Their assessments 
will shape the perception they gain about the law. Arguments for introducing students 
to concepts of jurisprudence, ethics, justice, morality and other ‘human’ ideals—
through course guides, teaching or general guidance in the curriculum apart from 
assessments—will thus not be effective.19 Unless specifically tested and assessed in 
terms of their ‘human’ capabilities, students will not prioritise these aspects of law 
school.20 In brief, the only way to change what students prioritise is to change how 
they are tested in law schools. 
The first method for accomplishing this is to assess the law in context—to teach 
students to have an interdisciplinary notion of law through class discussions and 
broad lectures that use multiple different fields. The second method is to teach critical 
thinking through reading groups, in-class questions and essays. The third method is to 
teach reflection through reflective tasks and journals, self-reflection and peer 
feedback. The fourth method is to teach law reform by critiquing the law in class and 
providing law reform tasks. The fifth method is to teach law in small class sizes, 
which would allow students to receive more personal feedback on their assessments. 
Finally, the sixth method is to use simulations and role-plays—to persuade students to 
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visually observe how law affects society. Each of these techniques is examined in the 
following subsections. 
This section will start with two preliminary discussions. First, it will explain why 
WPM Kennedy of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law is considered as the 
inspiration in this section for the alternative teaching methods mentioned above. His 
curriculum existed almost 100 years ago, so objections would naturally arise 
regarding its relevance today. Second, this section will explore how relevant a liberal 
arts education would be to the suggested alternative teaching methods. A brief 
discussion will be provided on the topic of how alternative teaching methods emerge, 
sometimes uniquely, from a liberal arts framework, and what this might mean for law 
schools specifically. This can be contrasted against a vocational curriculum, which 
might prefer technical skills over other forms of learning, and thereby diminish the 
possibilities for alternative teaching methods to gain a foothold. 
1) WPM Kennedy’s Curriculum as a Tentative Blueprint for a Modern Liberal 
Arts Law School 
When searching for an alternative to the modern vocational law school, historical law 
schools that de-emphasised vocational education should be examined, such as the 
Toronto Law School. In the 1930s, Kennedy founded the Toronto Law School, stating 
that it had ‘no professional ends to serve’.21 Instead of preparing students for private 
practice, Kennedy’s curriculum aimed to teach them the ‘social science’ of law.22 
Students would be trained in research and writing from within an interdisciplinary 
curriculum that related the study of law to history, philosophy, anthropology and 
other related subjects.23 This was reflected not just in the curriculum’s content but 
also in his teaching methods—such as class sizes (to encourage long discussions), 
assessments for understanding law in context and reflective tasks that encouraged 
critical thinking.24 
 
21 Kennedy (n 5). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Kennedy, ‘Some Aspects of the Theories’ (n 11) 25; Richard Johnstone, ‘Rethinking the Teaching of Law’ 
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24 Martin Friedland, ‘The Enigmatic W.P.M. Kennedy’ in WPM Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada (Oxford 
University Press, 2014) xxix. 
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Without being restricted to admissions requirements, Kennedy was free to embark on 
a highly experimental curriculum formulation. He sought to teach law as something 
that was larger than vocation alone, and he linked it to other aspects of society 
through the humanities and social sciences.25 Law students in his classes were not 
meant to simply learn the law and apply it as a technical skill; it was intended that 
students extend beyond this technical knowledge and understand how the law relates 
to politics, as well as influence that political process after they graduated.26 
Kennedy’s thoughts can best be understood in how he framed the role of the law 
lecturer: 
The teacher of the law or the jurist is no longer merely a contemplative 
creature describing the law as it exists. The very development of the 
administrative system has forced him to be constructive, not only in 
interpreting the tendencies of social existence, but also in assisting in the 
molding and guiding of them.27 
In this way, the Toronto Law School might be considered a prototypical blueprint for 
a non-vocational law school. Even if other educators at the time and since have 
advocated for a similar focus on the liberal arts, it is Kennedy’s single-mindedness in 
claiming that Toronto Law School had ‘no professional ends to serve’ that marks the 
school as a unique starting point for a discussion based on alternative teaching 
methods.28 Kennedy’s teaching methods were centred on this notion of preparing 
students for a broad role in society, for a fundamental contribution to social and 
political practices.29 This involved a necessary expansion of assessment beyond 
technique; it involved interrogating the law and legal processes for the benefit of 
society through law reform so that the origin of law, its purpose and its social 
functioning could be understood.30 Law students were not simply lawyers in training, 
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but citizens who were ready to help reform society for better social outcomes after 
graduation; the law was social, and law graduates were considered social actors.31 
In this sense, Kennedy’s teaching method can be described as using law for social and 
political change. Students were asked to inquire ‘into the social worth of legal 
doctrines’ and deduce whether laws served ‘the ends of society’.32 Essentially, all law 
students were trained to be law reformers. Seeking to serve ‘the ends of society’ was a 
vague ambition. It could be asked of the students: Whose ends would be served? And 
by what judgement could students understand society’s aims? Kennedy’s answer 
appeared to be democracy. Students required a ‘comprehensive survey of social 
values’ in class, in which ‘survey’ signified a literal undertaking of understanding 
public perception of social or legal issues.33 Specifically, Kennedy highlighted the 
broad principles of governance prevalent in his time, such as ‘the interest of a child in 
a good home, and the interest of the state in conserving resources’.34 Law was a 
means to resolve these ‘problems in political science’, like a functioning arm of 
democratic government.35 Kennedy thus perceived law students in the way that 
politicians are perceived: they are accountable to, and responsible for, upholding the 
will of the people in their pursuit and governance of the law. This teaching framework 
extends well beyond technical skills, and it shifts the focus towards the public 
administration of justice. 
In contrast to the Toronto Law School in the 1930s, modern law schools in Australia 
are restricted by admission requirements (including the Priestley Eleven) that 
naturally limit the curriculum’s scope, content and teaching methods.36 By having 11 
core units that focus on admission requirements for practice (a vocational goal), 
Australian law schools ultimately must change to a more vocational educational 
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framework than that of Kennedy’s.37 This hinders a law school’s capacity to 
experiment with new subjects or teaching styles that diverge from either the core units 
or their admission imperatives.38 When so much of a curriculum is oriented towards 
practice, it logically follows that much of the curriculum will be focused on technical 
skills.39 In this context, alternative and non-vocational ideas about the law’s social 
effect and origin—in addition to jurisprudence, legal philosophy or a critical 
understanding of law in society—can be regarded as either secondary or disregarded 
entirely from the curriculum.40 Instead, law educators might focus on ‘areas of law 
that are believed to facilitate market interests’, including topics ‘such as corporations, 
business, trade practices, competition, international trade, intellectual property and 
taxation law’, which might be ‘taught from a technocratic and applied perspective’.41 
Reaching outside this vocational focus requires the benefit of distance from current 
practices and the modern neoliberal turn in education. In this way, Kennedy’s 
distance in time is perhaps more advantageous than it might first appear. That 
Kennedy’s law school existed before the emergence of neoliberal political philosophy 
is another factor in its favour, as it removes students from modern forces and modern 
biases. In summary, Kennedy’s law school offers an alternative framework through 
which to consider legal education outside admission requirements and the vocational 
imperative. 
The second benefit of considering Kennedy’s curriculum is that it was centred on the 
liberal arts and social sciences, which made it relatively unique among historical law 
schools of the time (or law schools since).42 It is a logical step to examine a historical 
liberal arts law school when searching for a blueprint for a modern liberal arts 
curriculum. From the history, several alternative teaching methods that emerge and 
have emerged simply by nature of having a liberal arts focus can be observed. These 
methods might not emerge in a vocational curriculum. In Kennedy’s case, the ability 
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to extend beyond vocation signified that classes were not limited to a focus on law, in 
terms of both discussions and assessment tasks.43 Without admission requirements, 
there was no imperative to centre education on training future lawyers; therefore, non-
legal topics could be relevant in class. Extending beyond law signified that 
assessments could cross over into other topics (e.g., politics and social theory).44 In 
class, this resulted in interdisciplinary discussions that drew different ideas from 
different disciplines related to law, and students could discuss these cross-over 
assessments in detail.45 This was Kennedy’s key contention when he stated that ‘we 
relate law to life, not life to law’.46 Instead of positioning everything in a student’s life 
into a legal context, the law was positioned within the context of everything else. 
Students at Toronto Law School were taught courses in history, legal philosophy, 
‘economics, psychology [and] political theory’.47 The philosophical foundations of 
law were also taught to students,48 as was the skill of critical thinking. Students were 
encouraged to ‘criticise what is accepted’ and ‘reflect critically on the “why,” not just 
the “what” and the “how,” of the law’.49 Bora Laskin, a student who would later 
become Chief Justice of Canada, wrote that ‘even more important than the law he 
learnt [in Kennedy’s law school], was what he learned “about things that affected the 
law”’.50 Kennedy’s law school ‘gave [Laskin] a feeling that law was something more 
than a narrow discipline’.51 Laskin contrasted this with the type of education that was 
provided at Osgoode Law School (a professional law school at the time), which he 
believed would not have allowed students to gain the same appreciation for law as a 
social science (and for multiple other disciplines like legal philosophy and legal 
history).52 Essentially, the limit of a vocational curriculum was its inability to 
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naturally clarify these connections between law and other disciplines.53 In contrast, 
Kennedy’s curriculum naturally did so by teaching law as a broad liberal art.54 
Another aspect of Kennedy’s teaching methodology was a dedication to small class 
sizes.55 A liberal arts approach to education generally involves allowing students to 
ask the ‘big’ questions about society, and then debate the answers to these questions 
in class.56 These questions can be related to philosophy, science, law or justice, but 
they were mostly interdisciplinary in nature, extending into multiple fields.57 To have 
in-depth discussions of this nature, students had to have the time to speak and be 
listened to in class. This leads to the necessity of small class sizes.58 It is difficult to 
imagine a productive class discussion about philosophical questions that had time for 
each student to talk, when the class had as many as 200 students in a lecture hall.59 
Conversely, a small class allows students time to voice their thoughts and for those 
thoughts to be considered seriously. Kennedy’s classes would only comprise ‘12 or 
14’ people—and they would sometimes even be held in Kennedy’s personal office, 
which encouraged a personalised feel to the education.60 Part of his ability to do this 
was because the law cohort itself was quite small.61 Nevertheless, this approach can 
be contrasted quite starkly to the large lecture hall environment. 
Kennedy’s vision for a liberal arts law school was not only unique in its aims; it also 
obtained concrete results by producing a staggering class of alumni. ‘Canada’s 
greatest criminal lawyer’ was arguably taught at Toronto Law School (G Arthur 
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judge of the Ontario Court of Appeal).62 These alumni were taught in the five years 
that Kennedy was dean of Toronto Law School. Ironically, Kennedy’s non-vocational 
law school produced a class of alumni that succeeded at their vocation—which can be 
considered a testament to the notion that a broad education can produce success, even 
for those who pursue specialist vocational aims. 
Modern educators might object to Kennedy’s teaching methods or curriculum and 
state that it is not progressive enough according to today’s standards. His courses did 
not cover critical race theory, feminist theory, modern ideas about economics and the 
law or the various movements that occurred in the latter part of the twentieth 
century—such as critical legal studies and the law and society movement.63 These 
movements had to be considered for a more modern liberal arts law school to be 
created. However, this does not signify that Kennedy’s teaching methods should be 
discarded all together. If teaching is separated into style and substance, then much can 
be gained from Kennedy’s style of teaching. Further, Kennedy’s methods can be used 
as a launching pad from which newer pedagogical techniques can be discussed. 
Examining his work is merely the start of the conversation regarding what a liberal 
arts law school might comprise. 
2) The Liberal Arts Give Rise to Alternative Teaching Methods 
A liberal arts law school might prompt certain teaching methods that would not 
necessarily emerge in a vocational law school. These include assessment tasks 
covering law in context, law as an interdisciplinary pursuit, broader classroom 
discussions, critical thinking tasks, reading groups, small class sizes, journals, 
reflective tasks and essays. It is worth reflecting briefly on why such ideas might 
emerge in a liberal arts curriculum. Of course, this section does not intend to argue 
that these teaching methods cannot exist in a vocational curriculum, nor to state that 
the methods will individually (aside from interdisciplinarity) create a liberal arts 
curriculum on their own. Teaching methods are simply one component of a liberal 
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arts curriculum, with the second component—the subject matter—also being a 
significant part. 
As a starting point, a liberal arts curriculum might prompt a greater focus on law as an 
interdisciplinary subject, which could lead to interdisciplinary teaching methods. A 
liberal arts education generally refers to an education that is taught across multiple 
different fields of study.64 The term liber originated as the Latin word for ‘to free’.65 
Educators in the Middle Ages thought that a broad study of seven liberal arts subjects 
would somehow ‘free’ the mind.66 At the time, these subjects included ‘arithmetic, 
geometry, astronomy, grammar, rhetoric, logic and music’.67 In modern times, a 
liberal arts education can extend to various subjects in the humanities, such as history, 
philosophy, science, ‘social institutions … ethics and values’, ‘public policy, and 
law’.68 To study the liberal arts is to be a ‘free person’ or ‘whole person’, in the sense 
that a wide-ranging education can help someone understand the ‘whole’ of the human 
experience.69 Students learn about subjects that nurture their moral, social, emotional 
and, in some cases, spiritual understanding of the world.70 
Learning these subjects might be described as a best-case scenario; indeed, some 
authors have challenged the true ‘freedom’ of a liberal arts education.71 For example, 
conservative authors argued that a liberal arts education is often biased towards 
progressive values or is impractical, which ultimately leads students to consider 
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philosophical hypotheticals rather than reality.72 Part of this critique relates to the 
increasing prominence of discussions regarding topics such as race, sex and class, 
which have emerged in liberal arts courses.73 Duke Pesta argued that the notion that 
students must ‘diversify’ their minds in a liberal arts education ‘is a political 
statement, not an educational statement’.74 According to Pesta, liberal arts educators 
want students to adopt ‘non-traditional, non-conservative, non-Christian, [and] non-
patriotic’ views; Pesta cited courses such as gender studies as an example of this.75 
Courses on gender and race are considered challenges to traditional notions of 
hierarchy, patriotism and Christian values (e.g., traditional gender roles).76 
Conversely, the liberal arts are critiqued for being too broad, unfocused and lacking in 
career outcomes, which has prompted some authors to consider them ‘useless’.77 The 
bias of existing liberal arts courses is beyond the scope of this thesis, although any 
proposed liberal arts curriculum should consider bias. 
In terms of practical career outcomes, the various criticisms of the liberal arts can 
often be overstated. A central benefit of a liberal arts education is that it can make 
links between different areas to better illuminate the primary subject of study. This 
can have practical benefits, even for a vocational focus. For example, Boschiero 
described how students who studied science could contextualise their understanding 
of science in a broader study of politics and social forces.78 By understanding ‘the 
social and political aims and interests’ of a scientist, students can understand the 
shortcomings of that scientist’s research objectivity.79 This can help interpret the data 
from studies by uncovering biases in reported figures.80 It should be noted here how 
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contextual knowledge assists students with a technical skill in a manner that would 
not be possible without that contextual knowledge. Similarly, students studying law 
can contextualise their learning in a broader study of politics and social forces.81 By 
understanding the social and political aims and interests of judges, lawyers and 
politicians, students can understand the shortcomings of the law’s objectivity.82 This 
can help them interpret case law by uncovering biases in decision-making and thus 
proposing either law reform or new arguments in court. Again, a practical outcome is 
evident from a contextual starting point. Far from being impractical, the liberal arts 
can have tangible outcomes in relation to how one engages in their profession. 
It is not suggested that students who advocate for a liberal arts curriculum live a less 
practical life or that they ignore vocation altogether. In contrast, it is suggested that 
both civic life and vocation are enhanced by a broader study. A relevant example is 
the art of Leonardo da Vinci, the famed Renaissance painter. Part of the reason why 
da Vinci’s art was so realistic was that he dabbled in medical research—he secured 
corpses from local hospitals for self-study.83 This was not a narrow exercise in the 
mastery of art as a technical skill. Rather, by pursuing medical research, da Vinci 
gained an understanding of the science of the human body, which helped his art, 
assisted his drawings of human figures and thus made his art more realistic. 
Conversely, da Vinci’s skill in art allowed him to effectively capture the human body 
in his dissections, thereby directly assisting him in his ground-breaking medical 
research.84 Briefly said, da Vinci’s art helped his science, and his science helped his 
art. This interrelationship of knowledge is what the liberal arts teach at their core; 
every skill is interrelated with another skill—every piece of knowledge has a 
corollary piece of knowledge in a secondary field that will enhance that primary field. 
Da Vinci’s sketches of human anatomy are still considered some of the most realistic 
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sketches in human history.85 Art has thus contributed to science. The story of da Vinci 
and Boschiero’s students of science has revealed a longstanding myth at the core of 
vocational teaching methods—that a singular study in a field’s technical skills alone 
will lead to a complete mastery of that field of study.86 Instead, da Vinci revealed that 
the interrelationship between knowledge and different fields leads to a mastery of 
both, in which technical skills are expanded through context. Far from being useless, 
a liberal arts education might have tangible and practical outcomes for a student’s 
career. 
It must be admitted that interdisciplinary teaching can be accomplished and that it has 
been desired in vocational institutions.87 Indeed, employers are increasingly seeking 
broadly trained graduates.88 A study by Burning Glass of 25 million job 
advertisements found that employers frequently sought the ‘human factor’ in 
employees, including a set of ‘baseline skills’ that were unrelated to technical ‘hard 
skills’.89 As opposed to specialists, employers sought candidates with ‘soft skills’ that 
can cross disciplines (e.g., communication, critical thinking and writing).90 Those 
skills were more likely found in the liberal arts, in which courses such as English and 
History specifically focus on developing a student’s writing, communication and 
critical thinking skills, as opposed to purely technical skills.91 If a ‘skills gap’ exists in 
the workforce, then it is perhaps in these intangible skills—which are more difficult to 
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quantify in a vocational curriculum that focuses on hard skills alone.92 Breaching this 
skills gap might involve extending the curriculum to include liberal arts subjects. 
It is interesting to consider that both a vocational and purely liberal arts curriculum in 
law might benefit from interdisciplinarity, even if that interdisciplinarity would be 
used to achieve different goals.93 Lawyers in practice require communication, critical 
thinking and writing, in addition to a contextual framework for practice. Democratic 
citizens (as discussed previously) require this training too. However, 
interdisciplinarity has historically been embedded in a liberal arts context rather than 
a vocational one. For example, a survey in 2006 of all private liberal arts colleges in 
the US found that 60 per cent required an interdisciplinary subject and that 94 per cent 
offered ‘at least one’ interdisciplinary major.94 The liberal arts naturally prompted 
interdisciplinarity because students in the liberal arts ask the big questions in their 
fields of study that extend beyond one field of study and into others.95 Concurrently, 
Nutting suggested that a liberal arts education (through interdisciplinarity) might help 
students ‘discern what is missing from an argument, a presentation, or an equation’, 
as well as help them ‘communicate ideas and disseminate knowledge widely and 
effectively to different populations; and work well with others with different 
training’.96 
These arguments may be overstated. For example, Nutting suggested that an 
interdisciplinary education allows liberal arts students to ‘work well with others with 
different training’, implicitly suggesting that a narrow and vocational training might 
not be the same.97 However, it is possible that students, even in a vocational 
curriculum, might gain soft skills (e.g., communication) outside the classroom 
through interactions with their peers, social groups and clubs, which are a natural 
extension of campus life.98 It might be argued that intangible skills do not need to 
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come from the classroom. Therefore, the need for a liberal arts education might be 
challenged. 
However, in the context of law schools, an interdisciplinary education might create a 
different kind of law graduate altogether by changing the focus of teaching. In an 
interdisciplinary law school, students would be allowed to consider the ‘ought’ of the 
law rather than just the ‘is’.99 By reframing their studies to be aligned with history, 
philosophy and other topics, students could extend from the narrow confines of what 
laws exist today into what laws have existed, and what could exist in the future.100 In 
a liberal arts curriculum, students would consider different ‘perspectives, theoretical 
positions and critical methods that transcend a narrow, rules-orientated pedagogy’ of 
law.101 Interdisciplinarity would show the law in context, reveal its origin and allow 
students to discuss its purpose. 
An old saying from the 1950s stated that ‘the study of law sharpens the mind by 
narrowing it’.102 In contrast, an interdisciplinary education in law expands the mind 
by introducing students to the interrelationship between law and other fields, as 
evident in the ‘law and ____’ movements (e.g., law, society, economics, literature and 
history).103 On the one hand, this interrelationship helps students in a vocational 
sense, such as when the application of case and statute law often involves considering 
the history of that case or statute law.104 Conversely, the interrelationship would also 
help expand the minds of students for non-vocational pursuits.105 Teaching law in an 
interdisciplinary manner remains a relatively rare phenomenon in Australia.106 It is 
rarely part of the core curriculum, and interdisciplinary subjects are usually relegated 
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to electives.107 This would have to change if a truly liberal arts law school were to be 
created. 
To consider how teaching methods might appear in a liberal arts law school 
embedded with interdisciplinarity, it is necessary to search overseas. One pertinent 
example is that of Boston College Law School. In 2016, the dean of this law school 
wrote a ‘Defense of the Liberal Arts’, arguing that law schools should maintain a 
liberal arts focus and have science and technology (along with the humanities) in core 
subjects.108 As examples, the dean of Boston College Law School highlighted the 
school’s Center for Law and Public Policy, which trained students to ‘engage with 
policymakers’ after graduation,109 along with the school’s Center for the Study of 
Constitutional Democracy, in which students researched the cross-section of multiple 
fields with law.110 Of course, centres such as these do not necessarily indicate the 
content of classes. However, the dean further described the entire mission of the law 
school as follows: 
BC Law is and will be the place that trains the kind of professionals that a 
world preoccupied with business, science, and technology needs most—men 
and women who can apply ideas from the liberal arts to humanize the 
market and ensure that technology serves people rather than the other way 
around.111 
This mission to humanise ‘the market’ partly derives from Boston College Law 
School’s Jesuit foundation, which gives the school a distinctly religious moral 
character that is associated with a public religious mission.112 This mission has existed 
for a long time. In 1954, the religious purpose of the law school was described as: 
‘advancing the ideals of justice in a democratic society’.113 Students were taught ‘the 
techniques of law, not as positivistic ends in themselves, but as a rational means … to 
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the attainment of objective justice in civil society’.114 Part of this focus was the 
adherence to natural law theory.115 By observing the law through God-given justice, 
the college could repudiate the notion that the law was static and immovable; it could 
instead observe the study of law as a ‘critical search for the better’.116 To enable 
students to reform the law, Boston College Law School had to offer them a broad 
liberal arts education. The ‘search for the better’ required ‘an exhaustive scrutiny of 
the available data of history, politics, economics, sociology, psychology, philosophy, 
and every other pertinent font of human knowledge’.117 Comparisons had to be made 
with other laws and other societies—in the pursuit of justice. Boston College Law 
School contended that it was only through an interdisciplinary education and a search 
through other forms of knowledge that can apply to law that the causes of ‘objective 
justice’ could be advanced through law reform.118 To teach this kind of theory, a law 
school would naturally have to adopt teaching methods that embed interdisciplinarity 
into the curriculum. 
Although natural law has been critiqued over the past century from the perspective of 
legal positivism, not to mention atheism, the mission to search for the best kind of law 
(and the moral order of law) is still relevant today.119 Even when disregarding a 
religious focus, there are certain atrocities (e.g., Nazi war crimes) that illuminate 
notions about a higher standard of justice—one that extends beyond the positivistic 
law of the state.120 The logic of Boston College Law School applies to these sorts of 
atrocities. If a higher moral code above a state regime such as Nazi Germany is 
searched for, then other fields of knowledge (beyond the state’s national law) are 
possibly the only places in which to look.121 Therefore, if law schools are to engage in 
the idea of justice or morality, above a mere adherence to state law, then 
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engagement. At the least, comparative law would be required; at the most, a full-scale 
search among all relevant subjects for moral and ethical critiques and alternatives to 
current legal standards would be required. To empower law students to perform such 
a search would require a different kind of legal assessment. 
Along with interdisciplinarity, the nature of the liberal arts also reveals certain 
assessment tasks that encourage critical thinking.122 For example, a study of 33 
Bachelor of Arts programs in Australia found that ‘critical thinking and skills in 
communication [were] core attributes of programs within the field of Arts’, and that 
they were thus evident in assessments.123 Although there is some ambiguity regarding 
what the term ‘critical thinking’ might mean in this context (as will be discussed 
below), a few propositions can be made.124 It is a student’s job in a liberal arts 
classroom to ask questions, interrogate authors and understand arguments.125 This 
naturally leads to a form of critical thinking, in which students are asked to challenge 
the texts that are given to them, either individually or through peer or self-assessment 
of the own work.126 These kinds of critical thinking assessments, at best, can guide 
students to find fallacious arguments in their own work and in the work of others; this 
would lead to a critical engagement with texts and, through those texts, the wider 
world.127 
Martha Nussbaum described this form of critical thinking as ‘the capacity to reason 
logically, to test what one reads or says for consistency of reasoning, correctness of 
fact, and accuracy of judgment’.128 Engaging in this form of critique might sharpen 
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the students’ minds, which might lead to stronger logical argumentation. As John 
Stuart Mill suggested, the well-reasoned mind will ‘listen to all that could be said 
against him; to profit by as much of it as was just, and expound to himself, and upon 
occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious’.129 This is similar to the 
formation by Socrates that ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’.130 To understand 
themselves, and the world, students might need to engage in this form of critical 
introspection and external interrogation. These arguments can be equally applied in a 
law school context, to the examination of laws, judgements and political decisions—
of which further details will be provided in the ‘critical thinking’ assessment section 
below. 
Finally, the liberal arts prompted the use of essays as a formative assessment task.131 
This partly due to their focus on writing and communication as distinct educational 
outcomes.132 For example, the previously mentioned study of 33 Bachelor of Arts 
courses in Australia found that ‘communication’ was a central feature of all arts 
courses.133 In the US, ‘Creative thinking, written and oral communication, 
quantitative literacy [and] information literacy’ are regarded as the core competencies 
expected of a liberal arts course.134 This leads to using ‘shorter and longer essays’ and 
final ‘research projects’ as standard features in liberal arts courses.135 In brief, testing 
communication requires communication assessments (of which essays are one 
example). 
Essays can similarly be considered a by-product of the liberal arts focus on 
interdisciplinarity, as they might provide the scope that students need to question big 
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ideas. For example, Kennedy’s Toronto Law School included essays as a core part of 
the curriculum and engaged students in cross-disciplinary research.136 Using essays 
can also help students challenge dominant avenues of thought, such as the vocational 
imperative of their education.137 This notion, along with the reason why essays are 
less common in a vocational curriculum, will be discussed in further detail in the 
‘Essays’ section below. 
It follows that a liberal arts educational framework can prompt numerous alternative 
teaching methods—from interdisciplinarity and law in context assessments to critical 
thinking tasks, small class sizes and essays. The rest of this section will outline each 
of these teaching methods and how they can be integrated into a modern law school in 
Australia. 
3) Teaching Law in Context 
When Kennedy founded Toronto Law School, he declared that it had ‘no professional 
ends to serve’.138 Instead of teaching a narrow, black-letter law curriculum, Kennedy 
aimed to teach the law in context.139 He believed that law ‘should not be taught in 
vacuo [in a vacuum], apart from the other social sciences’.140 Instead, lectures and 
class discussions should be used to take students beyond the law and into politics, 
philosophy, history, sociology and other disciplines.141 Students would learn that the 
law originates from social forces, politics, ideas about right and wrong, and social 
movements.142 They would learn why the law exists, who benefits and loses from it, 
and how it affects society. Most importantly, students would learn how the law relates 
to other disciplines in the interplay between one field and another. 
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Today, we would call this an interdisciplinary legal education. Unlike the traditional 
case-based approach (which relies on ‘humiliating students if they bring in other ways 
of thinking or knowing about the world’), interdisciplinary legal education rewards 
students for drawing from other disciplines.143 Although not a popular idea in 
Kennedy’s time, interdisciplinary legal education is expanding across US law schools 
in the present day.144 A new generation of young professors is entering the legal 
academy, with the determination to relate law to other fields.145 New programs are 
also being created—such as law and economics, law and literature, legal philosophy 
and legal history.146 Further, professors are engaging with law students using 
‘different ways of thinking about law … behavioral, economic or classical economic, 
sociological, philosophical, historical, critical, literary and so on’.147 They are doing 
so on the basis that something is gained when combining law with other 
disciplines.148 
Many arguments can be cited for what exactly is gained in this process. Some have 
argued that interdisciplinarity offers students a broader, well-rounded understanding 
of how the law can change in response to social forces.149 Others have argued that 
interdisciplinarity allows students to observe how law affects society.150 Others have 
further argued that interdisciplinarity is a new job requirement in the new, digital and 
globalised economy, in which workers are expected to move rapidly across 
disciplines, languages and countries.151 Regardless of the argument that is used—
there is yet a growing consensus that interdisciplinarity adds something to traditional 
methods of legal education. 
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However, teaching in an interdisciplinary manner is more difficult than it seems. 
Despite a growing movement of interdisciplinary legal research, many law professors 
have themselves been taught in the old-fashioned and traditional case method style, so 
they struggle to change their teaching style to new methods accordingly.152 
Consequently, ‘There is a norm … of teaching in a black letter law manner, despite 
what the professor is researching in their private time’.153 Professors might separate 
their ‘research and teaching’ and expound something ‘in their law review articles’ 
while performing something else in class.154 This is reinforced by the conservatism of 
law faculties—many of whom remain wedded to the case method.155 There is also 
some resistance to, or intransigence towards, the notion of marking assessments when 
the students themselves push beyond the discipline of law (as if this is somehow 
beyond the curriculum’s scope).156 
One way to fix this status quo is by convincing professors to incorporate 
interdisciplinary discussions into their lectures. For example, Kennedy used his 
lectures to take students beyond the law and into other fields. Speaking in front of 
groups of students, he drew extensively from his knowledge of ‘history, politics, 
current events’ and various ‘prominent people he knew’, linking legal principles 
together with ‘problems in political science’.157 The intent was to relate law to life, 
rather than life to law—to unpack the various interconnections between law and other 
fields for students.158 His students greatly appreciated this approach, which they 
described as ‘excellent’, ‘always interesting, often funny’ and enjoyable; they stated 
that Kennedy taught them to think critically and expansively about legal doctrine.159 
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Professors can act as facilitators for interdisciplinarity in this way, by incorporating it 
into the lecture hall. 
A second way to teach in an interdisciplinary manner is through class discussions or 
out-of-class informal reading groups. Markus Dubber, a modern successor to 
Kennedy at the Toronto Law School, takes this approach tin the present day.160 In 
2012, he established the critical analysis of law (CAL) lab at Toronto Law School.161 
The CAL lab is an interdisciplinary legal institute that aims to contextualise law for 
students through a law review, student reading group, student film group, research 
workshops, seminars and flash workshops.162 The reading group, specifically, 
promotes class discussion about law as it relates to other disciplines.163 Students are 
provided with virtual documents that are available for reading online, and informal 
‘read-in’ ‘sessions [are held] in the faculty’.164 Students and professors gather to 
discuss various texts on legal education and teaching/learning the law, with an eye to 
interdisciplinarity and relating the law to politics, sociology and the broader social 
context.165 The CAL film group also encourages class discussion—by persuading 
students to watch topical films that illuminate an aspect of law or that critique current 
legal norms. Discussions after the film screenings have included questions about 
various topics, such as the rule of law, the role of the lawyer, law and order, freedom 
of speech, constitutional law and criminal law.166 In this sense, law is discussed in the 
context of popular culture—which reveals similar psychological insights into the ‘law 
and literature’ movement. 
Kennedy himself held class discussions that joined the law with other disciplines. In 
his classes on law and economics, he drew correlations ‘between the social and 
economic forces in society and those institutional and legal controls [on the 
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economy]’.167 In classes on law and philosophy, students were taught to relate basic 
theories of logic with the legal system.168 In classes on political science, students were 
told to discuss the ‘great texts from Hobbes to Mill’, which allowed them to question 
the purpose of law or why we have law (e.g., to prevent anarchy, as a social 
contract).169 Some of these classes were taught by professors with a background in 
economics or philosophy, as opposed to law. This had several distinct benefits. As 
Robin West expressed it, having legal philosophers in law faculties offers students a 
far ‘richer understanding … of the relationship between law and our canonical works 
of political and moral philosophy, and a greater appreciation of the philosophical 
structure of law’s foundations’.170 Bringing these other disciplines and texts into class 
discussions thus enriches a student’s understanding of the legal system. 
One argument that was often made against interdisciplinarity is that it is somehow 
impossible to achieve in practice or it is poorly established as a teaching 
methodology. For example, Balkin critiqued the various ‘law and ___’ movements 
that have emerged in recent years (e.g., law and literature, law and economics) as 
being taught in bad faith.171 He suggested that a real interdisciplinary education would 
involve observing law as economics and law as literature.172 The popular ‘and’ 
dichotomy maintains a strict separation between the disciplines that are being 
combined—with law on the one hand and, say, economics on the other.173 It is not the 
relationship between law and other fields that makes an education interdisciplinary; it 
is observing law as those of other fields. 
Although this is a valid critique, it seems to miss how interdisciplinarity attracts other 
disciplines into the classroom, so that it can be used to change the way students see 
the law. As Joel Modiri highlighted, ‘Philosophy, the critical social sciences, 
literature, history, and art enter legal discourse to disrupt the purported fixity and 
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determinacy of law and legal discourse’.174 Instead of being ‘rigid’, law is revealed to 
be fluid and changeable, according to the whims of social forces. In the words of the 
legal realists, interdisciplinarity can reveal that the law is ‘living’. For example, 
during the height of apartheid laws in South Africa, art, music, political philosophy 
and other disciplines have helped activists question the laws of segregation in a 
manner that a strict black-letter law approach to law could not.175 Similar examples 
can be observed in the fight for women’s rights, gay rights and environmental 
rights.176 To understand the law in its entirety requires an understanding of this 
interplay between law and other areas of knowledge, between law and society and law 
and social forces. It is perhaps true that the limit of the ‘law and ____’ approach is to 
just offer a new viewpoint to the law, but perhaps a new viewpoint on law (one that 
transgresses the black-letter law approach) is sufficient to persuade students to start 
questioning what they are being taught. 
A second counterargument is that interdisciplinarity reveals how the law affects 
society. ‘Law and ____’ movements typically combine a new discipline with law to 
reveal the psychological, physical or social ramifications of the enforcement of legal 
norms.177 As Weinrib stated, ‘medical misadventure, for example, may raise not only 
issues of liability, but also issues of economics, of sociology, of political science, of 
psychology, and so on’.178 By incorporating other disciplines into law school, law 
students can learn what occurs after a case is decided, who is affected and how, and 
what economic and psychological damage is inflicted to the victim or defendant. This 
brings the law much closer to the other discipline, and it can result in students 
perceiving law as economics. 
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Finally, it has been argued that, in a traditional sense, interdisciplinarity can prepare 
law students for a growing diversity of international graduate jobs.179 This argument 
can be framed in the following sentence: large, transnational companies require 
interdisciplinary thinking in the newly globalised world.180 Students require 
transferable skills to move between different countries, languages and offices.181 
Occasionally, the threat of automation is mentioned here, which heightens the need 
for interdisciplinary skills.182 Law schools owe it to their students to provide broad 
training that would help prepare them for the market.183 It is worth noting that this 
traditional view seems to conflict with the traditional view of protecting the case 
method as the dominant mode of teaching. If graduates require diverse skills, then 
surely, assessments must change to meet those needs. 
4) Critical Thinking Assessments 
A core component of Kennedy’s curriculum involved developing skills to think 
critically about the law. In a lecture in 1931, Kennedy told a group of students: ‘I 
wish you to consider that, behind each particular state, each particular law, there lies a 
political and social concept—the state, the law’.184 Students were encouraged to ask 
questions about whose interests a statute served, where the law came from, who 
benefited from the law and who lost, along with what social ends was law meant to 
serve.185 These critical questions revealed that the law was not objective and 
apolitical, by rather inherently subjective and political. The law actively helped shape 
certain interests and establish and determine the outcome of the competition and 
thereby the socially engineering our world.186 It was nothing like a science; it was 
more like a system of power and social order. This kind of detached, critical 
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understanding of law required students to learn critical thinking in class—something 
that was a relatively new concept at the time. 
Critical thinking has become something of a truism in university education since 
Kennedy’s days. In a 2013 study of 200 US provosts or vice presidents of 
universities, ‘Critical thinking was one of the most frequently mentioned 
competencies … for both academic and career success’.187 
The problem is that no-one can agree on what ‘critical thinking’ denotes exactly.188 
For the purpose of this discussion (and as aligned with WPM Kennedy and others), 
this thesis defines critical thinking as ‘challenging assumed wisdom’ and seeing the 
intent, purpose and structure behind a text189 (a legal text such as a judgement, statute 
or political decision, in this case). This might include some investigation into the 
history or political origins of the law, its motivation and who benefits or loses from 
it.190 In short, it involves the notion of empowering students to see the hidden side of 
law, the underlying power structures, origins and motivations.191 Kennedy suggested 
that a critical education in law reveals that the law is subjective and political, rather 
than objective and apolitical.192 Empowered by critical thinking, law students could 
gain the capacity to ‘ask pertinent questions, recognize and define problems, identify 
arguments on all sides … search for and use relevant data’ and so on.193 However, 
ultimately, critical thinking should empower students to reach their own conclusions 
about the law they are learning (which would radically empower them to think for 
themselves). 
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In a law classroom, critical thinking can be taught by convincing students to answer 
critical questions in class and to work in reading groups or answering essay questions. 
a) Critical Questions in Class 
Critical questions that were asked of students in class can be used to interrogate the 
implications of a law, a student’s view of a law or the different ways of viewing a law 
(e.g., a statute, case or political decision).194 Historical inquiry can help students 
‘overcome the closures and silences generated by orthodox and traditional theories’ of 
law, as well as develop their own understanding of why a law is created.195 At its best, 
this can lead students towards an understanding of ‘justice of the future’ through 
knowledge of the deep past.196 Law is revealed not to be ‘a fully rational, technical 
fair and neutral body of rules’, but rather a product of society, social forces, politics, 
influence and power.197 Without asking critical questions about the history and origin 
of law, students will be unable to fully appreciate what made the law the way it is 
today. 
One important question to ask is: what lies behind the law, aside from the legal 
authority itself? Students should be encouraged to ‘step back’ from their 
preconceptions of the legal system, and correspondingly try to understand ‘not what 
the law is, but why it is and what it is for’.198 This could include asking students to 
consider the political reality behind legal decisions, along with other social and 
economic ‘interests and powers’.199 Laws typically benefit one group more than 
another, and social and power relations are formed along these lines. Questions 
related to this could include: ‘Who created the law and where does it come from? 
Whose interests does a statute serve? Who benefit and loses? 
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Critical questions can also be directed to students regarding the history of law. Case 
law can be contextualised by asking students what had occurred at the time that a 
particular case was decided.200 According to Justice Cardozo, law is ‘intelligible only 
in the light of history’.201 The history underlying a precedent often establishes why a 
law was created, what purpose it serves and who benefits the most from it. To use an 
example, the police power in US constitutional law empowers the states to create 
regulations for the ‘morals, safety and convenience’ of the people.202 As a product of 
case law, the police power evolved over time in accordance with evolving definitions 
of ‘police’.203 The word ‘police’ in the nineteenth century came to mean not only a 
source of authority but a protector of safety in the community.204 The case law at the 
time thus reflected a linguistic evolution of the word.205 Historical questions relating 
to the law can also reveal the prevailing philosophical or social conditions that created 
law at a specific point in time in a particular country.206 Law can embody the 
zeitgeist. For example, the Civil Rights Act 1964 embodied the zeitgeist of the civil 
rights movement (a protest movement that pushed for equal rights for African 
Americans).207 The act resulted in greater equality ‘in the American workforce’, and it 
reached far to ensure an end to decades of racial discrimination in housing and 
politics.208 It benefited both women and the African-American community—as it 
ensured equal rights and protections under the law.209 
When asked critical questions in class, students had be given time to think properly 
about their answers, rather than responding immediately.210 Surface answers should 
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be avoided, and, when possible, students should be tasked with going deeper behind 
the law. They should not be asked a follow-up question until they have answered the 
first question, and they should not be prompted to continue answering.211 To assist 
with this, certain critical questions can also be asked of students outside the class, 
such as on online discussion groups or eLearning software.212 The benefit of 
discussion groups online is that students can answer anonymously, which reveals their 
true impression of a text or law, as well as any biases they find in the legal system. 
This is particularly true if students have a controversial opinion or an opinion that 
questions the status quo of legal authority.213 
Critical questions about the law are already being asked in at least one class at UNSW 
Law School. Lucas Lixinski, a professor of law at UNSW, wrote that he uses this 
style of questioning in his first year ‘Introducing Law and Justice’ class.214 In his first 
year class, Lixinski used the opportunity to persuade students to read ‘a list of 
questions that they should be asking of materials they read’ throughout their law 
degree, including ‘cases, statutes [and] scholarly texts’.215 Lixinski saw this ‘as a 
means to stimulate critical thinking’.216 The questions that were asked of students 
included the following:217 
• Why is the law this way? 
• Who stands to gain? Who loses? 
• What does the law, as is, miss? 
• What are its blind spots? 
• What do other people do when faced with similar legal problems and why? 
Can we learn lessons there? 
• When was this case decided? 
• What was the broader context of this case? 
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• What was the court/law-maker trying to say between the lines? 
• Who is the court/law-maker? (white, male, property owner)? 
• What is this legal statement/assertion/rule a reaction to? 
• How does the private affect the public (and vice versa)? 
This list is not exhaustive, but it offers some indication regarding the type and style of 
questions that can be asked to convince students to think critically about the law. 
b) Reading Groups 
Critical reading groups that extend law students beyond class discussions (as 
extracurricular or seminar-based activities) are becoming increasingly common at 
various law schools in the present day.218 Typically, these reading groups emerge 
from an interdisciplinary framework (i.e., persuading students to read about law in 
context) or from one of many new critical theories on law.219 A popular framework is 
critical race theory, but reading groups also exist for law and feminism, economics, 
film and literature.220 In each case, students are invited to a reading group that centres 
on a specific set of readings that are critical of legal texts (e.g., cases, statutes and/or 
political decisions).221 Students are tasked with reading the texts, teasing out questions 
and interrogating ‘ideas, notions, theories [and] propositions’ presented therein.222 
Students then discuss the reading in the manner of a tutorial or book club and in a 
critically engaging manner. 
Reading groups help students learn critical thinking skills by leading them beyond the 
normal curriculum into self-directed study. Black-letter law classes are typically 
hostile to the notion of critical thinking, with regard to the law and interdisciplinarity. 
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To quote Dean Spade: ‘It took years of social movement engagement for me to shed 
some of the internalized dominance behaviors I gained in law school, to remember 
how to think about solutions that cannot be won in law’.223 One remedy to this 
common complaint is introducing students to contrary perspectives while they are in 
law school, during critical reading groups.224 
Examples of critical reading groups in law exist at the University of Toronto, 
Stanford, Harvard and Wits Law School.225 Of these three, the University of Toronto 
presents the broadest approach. Markus Dubber leads a reading group and seminar on 
critical thinking in regard to the law and ‘Perspectives on Law’.226 In the seminars, 
students are given various readings that critique legal traditions. The reading includes 
topics such as law in perspective, legal realism, legal processes, law and society, 
critical legal studies, law and gender, law and race, law and economics, law and 
literature, law and history, law and film and comparative law.227 In each case, students 
are meant to read the works with a critical eye. They are meant to ‘step back from 
legal rules in various shapes and sizes … and, in this way, to gain some perspective(s) 
on “the law”: the better to assess it with'’.228 Similarly, Witts Law School has a 
‘critical thinking reading group’ that aims to convince students to question legal texts 
and interrogate the author’s intention for bias, balance and validity in legal 
judgements.229 This all-encompassing approach is intended to prepare students for 
their education in law; it introduces them to all sorts of different perspectives and 
manners of understanding the legal system. 
Other law schools take a narrower approach. Stanford, UCLA and Harvard have more 
focused reading groups on topics like critical race theory and feminist theory.230 The 
reading group for critical race theory, as an example, aims to unpack the power 
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structures behind the law that lead to institutional racism and discrimination.231 It 
critiques traditional legal education by suggesting that ‘both liberal and critical legal 
theories marginalized the voices of racial minorities’.232 Reading groups consider the 
founders of critical race theory such as ‘Richard Delgado, Jean Stephancic and Carol 
Aylward’ who are presented in contrast to other law thinkers.233 This narrower 
approach has been criticised as being too prescriptive or ideological; it typically offers 
students a new view of law, but not one they would have derived by themselves.234 
Nevertheless, critical race theory and other new critical modes of thought do allow 
students to see the law from a new perspective, as well as develop their critical 
thinking capacities. 
c) Essays 
Critical thinking can also be taught by way of essay questions. Every law school in 
Australia uses essays as a form of assessment.235 However, essays are not the central 
form of assessment.236 That privilege is bestowed on case problems.237 However, 
essays could play a more central role in legal education, especially if assess is sought 
from student’s critical thinking ability in law.238 In a liberal arts curriculum, essays 
would come to dominate law schools—as well as convince students to compare, 
evaluate and analyse certain legal topics. This section will outline the various benefits 
of using essays as a tool for teaching critical thinking before it addresses the potential 
drawbacks of the format. 
In terms of benefits, essays are generally acknowledged as an effective method for 
testing a student’s critical thinking on a subject matter.239 They are considered a more 
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effective tool than other assessments when it comes to testing ‘analysis, synthesis, and 
evaluation’.240 They help students unpack an idea beyond mere rote memorisation or 
recitation.241 In this sense, essays serve a different role than the more ‘objective’ 
forms of assessments (e.g., case problems).242 When students are asked to respond to 
an essay question, they are tasked with obtaining their own opinions and ensuring 
they are supported y relevant evidence.243 This is uniquely different from the case 
method, in which students are encouraged to lean on the opinions of judges. 
Consequently, essays can be an effective method for students to demonstrate their 
own perspectives and reach their own conclusions. 
A secondary benefit of essays is they encourage ‘reading around’ a topic.244 Essays 
naturally involve independent research and the critical analysis of texts. A student’s 
individual research can extend beyond the course curriculum and prescribed reading 
list. Students who answer essays can consequently learn the important skill of self-
teaching and understand new areas of a topic through research.245 This can prepare 
them for the kind of independent mindset that is required for critical thinking. 
Despite the benefits of essays, they remain a sidelined component of the law school 
curriculum. In Australian law schools today, case problems are still considered more 
‘concrete’ and ‘relevant’ to students than essays.246 Professors regard essays as too 
difficult to create, write and mark—and these professors are otherwise preoccupied 
with both black-letter law and their own professional research.247 It is easier to teach a 
formal ‘doctrinalism’ in law by focusing on ‘known knowledge and “right answers”’ 
than to teach via critically engaging essay tasks.248 Because essays are sidelined, ‘It is 
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paper’.249 Instead, essays are often replaced by short answer, multiple-choice and 
problem questions:250 
Essays are optional for the students. Not many take them up, probably a 
dozen a year out of 250 students—a very low percentage. (3rd Generation law 
school).251 
Essays are also considered incompatible with ‘market orthodoxy’ or the broader 
neoliberal education agenda, in which everything must relate to a job, technical skill 
or graduate attribute.252 Although they teach critical thinking, essays are not in 
themselves a technical skill, which is similar to case problem questions. Due to their 
critical and creative component, essays are generally considered separate from 
professional skills altogether.253 They might relate to the graduate attribute of 
communication; but, again, less critical tasks also relate to this attribute. 
In a cynical interpretation, students who answer too many critical essay questions 
might not become obedient employees after graduation.254 A fear exists that critical 
students will themselves ask too many employees about their law, role and firm.255 
This is partly reflected by what law firms ask law schools to teach. It is rare for a law 
firm to ask for more essay questions, although it is common for law firms to demand 
more practical and technical skills.256 As suggested earlier in this thesis, law schools 
are immensely pressured to obey the dictates of law firms regarding topics to teach. 
Minimising the role of essays is one way of doing accomplishing this. 
A final objection to essays is levelled at the format itself. Comparative studies of 
essays compared to those for other assessments reveal marginal benefits to student 
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semester might actually be detrimental to students, as they are unlikely to pay 
attention to the feedback they receive after the semester is over.258 For essays to be 
effective, they should be spread over multiple occasions throughout the semester—in 
which case, the cost of time becomes insurmountable. Students are also highly 
resistant to reading and receiving feedback on essays, which highlights that a response 
to an individual student’s needs must be carefully managed.259 There is no guarantee 
that students will read the feedback offered, which is, again, why multiple rounds of 
essays are more effective—they incentivise learning.260 
Despite popular belief, essays might not be the most effective method for critically 
engaging students. This is especially true for one-off essays that do not allow students 
the possibility to improve over time. However, when essays are used to their full 
potential, they can empower students to think about the law, its origin, purpose and 
effect. The best essay questions can prompt students to think for themselves, and they 
allow students to think critically about the subject matter (in this case, the law). 
5) Reflective Tasks 
When head of the Toronto Law School, Kennedy suggested that students should pay 
attention to ‘what really happens’ and the reality of law.261 In brief, they should be 
aware of what the courts do and how it affects real people.262 The effect of law on 
society has historically been undervalued in the law curriculum. Properly 
understanding the law in this way requires a reflection on how the law 
psychologically affects real people, how it influences society and how it causes an 
emotional toll on real lawyers. This requires a detachment from the case method 
approach of hypotheticals and an engagement with the law as a real phenomenon (i.e., 
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Reflective learning involves prompting students to reflect on their own biases, pre-
judgments and experiences.263 In law schools, reflective learning can help students 
move beyond ‘surface learning’ to a deeper understanding of the law.264 Students can 
become more conscious of their own way of perceiving the law, and they thus become 
more ‘critically reflective’ of legal realities.265 Over time, reflective learning can help 
students become ‘life-long learners’—that is, they can continue learning and thinking 
critically about law after they graduate.266 However, this can only occur in an 
environment in which students can challenge their own conceptions and those of their 
professors, so that ‘they can construct their own knowledge framework’.267 Reflective 
learning must also occur throughout the curriculum (rather than as one-off subjects) to 
be effective.268 If reflective learning appears in only one or two subjects, then students 
will be resistant to it, as they will find it irrelevant to the rest of their studies.269 
Reflective learning in law schools is best integrated across all subjects via various 
assessment tasks, including reflective statements, journals, peer and self-reflection 
and reflections on clinical legal placements. 
a) Reflective Statements and Journals 
Students can be asked to reflect on the law they have learned in class and present a 
reflective statement about the law, their emotional response to the law and the law’s 
effect on society.270 They can be asked about specific laws and cases or more 
generally about the enforcement of law, the cost of law and other topics. If seeking 
guidance, students should be asked to reflect on the most critical aspect of what they 
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have learned.271 This could include how the law emotionally affects a particular party, 
client or the students themselves, or what the role of the lawyer is in a case. 
A reflective statement is less about obtaining a ‘correct’ answer and more about 
documenting one’s emotions. For example, when reflecting on the emotional effect of 
law on the parties to a case, students should be encouraged to empathise and place 
themselves into the shoes of the victim or defendant.272 This involves students 
engaging with their emotions, morals and values, which is usually discouraged in law 
schools, even though it takes learning to a more ‘real’ plane of meaning (i.e., learning 
that is critically engaged with society).273 It is important that law students learn 
empathy, in the sense that they must empathise with future clients. However, it is also 
more generally important, as reflection helps build and create interpersonal dynamics 
(i.e., understanding how people relate to each other, talk to each other and empathise 
with each other).274 Reflection thus not only makes law students better students but 
also better people. 
This point leads to reflective statements that concern the lawyer’s role and students’ 
feelings about that role. One way to persuade students to reflect on the lawyer’s role 
is to provide them with ‘moral dilemmas that practicing lawyers face’ daily.275 
Writing a reflective statement on the dilemma, students would be able to engage with 
their own opinion of how they would act in that specific situation (this is discussed in 
greater detail below under the ‘Simulations’ subsection). It has been argued that ‘the 
best lawyers are guided by a strong moral compass’.276 One way of obtaining this 
moral compass is by reflecting on the ethical and professional role that one will serve 
in their working life. University is the best time for this reflection, as it involves a 
time before working life has even begun. 
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However, a one-off reflective statement in class is insufficient for creating a deeper 
reflective process. A proper reflective statement typically requires students to ‘grapple 
with an issue, share it with others’ and come to a new understanding.277 This requires 
a lengthier deliberative process or a longer thought process about the intended task. 
Multiple reflective statements over time or a reflective journal, as suggested below, 
might be a more effective method.278 
This is when long-term reflective journals emerge. Instead of receiving a one-off 
reflective task, students can be asked to write reflective journals about the law and 
their experiences learning the law.279 These multiple tasks allow students to analyse 
their opinions or emotions, as well as how these two aspects change over time.280 The 
format of these long-form reflections is not necessarily important, as they can be 
‘learning journals, logs [or] diaries, structured or unstructured’.281 What is important 
is that students engage in a deliberative reflection process over time and learn 
something from these multiple entries.282 
CALD has proposed the following example of a reflective task:283 
Complete 250-word weekly reflective narrative writing tasks related to 
lecture/tutorial materials such as: 
• law in context, or 
• specific skills displayed in performance of a task such as writing/group 
work/study skills, or 
• practical legal knowledge (substantive law and procedures) and write an 
answer to tutorial problem. 
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This example focuses mainly on professional skills, but a similar reflection exercise 
can be applied more generally to a student’s emotional impressions about the law 
itself. One area in which this is pertinent is in controversial or emotionally charged 
areas of law. Students might want to reflect on their emotional reactions to politically 
charged legal issues, cases and legal technicalities, as well as whether they consider 
the outcome of a case just (this will be discussed in further detail below). These 
opinions can shift across a semester or a three-year degree, and students can thus 
understand their own positions, biases and prejudices regarding the law. 
b) Peer and Self-Reflection 
One of the most difficult aspects of reflective tasks is that they need to be free from 
judgement. To reflect honestly, students must feel ‘free to say things which might 
otherwise appear stupid or “un-cool”’.284 This might include an emotional reaction to 
a case or law, a novel idea about the role of a lawyer and others. This requires the 
right sort of environment in class, one that is ‘conducive to quality discussion’.285 In 
this sense, the typical assessment as marked by a tutor or professor might not be the 
best approach to reflection. Instead, students could be asked to assess their own work 
or that of their peers. 
Peer reflection and self-reflection are similar to a typical reflective statement, but the 
students mark their assessments instead.286 In a peer reflection, students ‘can compare 
notes with each other, learning how different people can reflect on the same law or 
the same experience in a different way’.287 This can deepen the reflection process 
beyond what students can do as individuals.288 In contrast, self-reflection offers 
students the benefit of anonymity to reflect on their own experiences and mark 
themselves on the quality of that reflection.289 Self-reflection is an essential life skill 
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that helps students find ‘creative responses to complex problems’.290 Whether through 
self or peer reflection, the task can benefit from repetition—whether it allows the 
students themselves to track their own changes of opinion over time or the class to 
understand shifting attitudes to the law and the role of the lawyer over time.291 
Self-reflection is most useful for topics that are emotionally charged and difficult to 
discuss in the wider classroom environment.292 For example, rape law has historically 
been avoided by tutors and professors in law school out of a general discomfort with 
discussing the topic.293 It is feared that students might have been victims of sexual 
assault and that they might be ‘triggered’ with flashbacks due to the discussions.294 
The rise of ‘trigger warnings’ in places such as Oxford Law School has partly 
addressed this concern.295 A trigger warning denotes when a warning is noticed before 
a discussion when it is understood that a certain topic might make students 
uncomfortable.296 At Oxford Law School, students are given trigger warnings prior to 
discussions about rape law and sexual consent.297 It may be argued that these topics 
are unsuitable for a classroom discussion—in which case, self-reflection offers an 
escape; it allows students to reflect on a topic by themselves in a non-confrontational 
manner. Students can be asked to reflect on rape laws and other emotionally charged 
issues at home, through assigned reading and self-assessment, while they discuss less 
distressing topics in class. 
Another way to assess peer and self-reflection is through clinical legal education. 
Students who work in legal clinics during their time in law school can be asked to 
reflect on their experiences at the clinic.298 This can involve asking themselves and 
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others questions about their role in the clinic and how the law affects and emotionally 
influences their clients.299 Clinical legal education supports this reflective process 
more than regular class due to the firsthand nature of students encountering the legal 
system in practice. Group discussion can also occur with other students who are 
completing similar legal clinic placements. Comparative group discussions about 
clinical legal education experiences can reveal new insights that students would not 
have encountered otherwise, and students can have opportunities for social bonding 
over shared lived experiences.300 In terms of assessment, students can be asked to 
create reflective journals for their experiences with clinical legal education, in which 
they reflect on how their attitudes to law, the role of the lawyer and their clients have 
changed during the placement period.301 
The limitation of the clinical legal education approach is typically the same 
everywhere: the small number of students involved. Even in law schools with 
established legal clinics, very few students are selected to participate in the 
program.302 These students are also frequently selected due to specific criteria that 
make them non-representative of the student body.303 Therefore, although it might be 
the best outlet for peer and self-reflection, clinical legal education provides only a 
limited opportunity for engaging the student body. 
6) Law Reform Tasks 
Instead of accepting the law’s authority at face value, law students should rigorously 
critique cases, statutes and legal norms.304 Having properly engaged in legal critiques, 
students can then proceed to pose new law reform measures in class. According to 
Kennedy, ‘We must turn out graduates in law with a courage to criticise what is 
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accepted’.305 If this is not accomplished, then corrupt, unjust and immoral laws will 
continue to exist—and they will remain uncontested by those who have the relevant 
knowledge of the legal system: graduate lawyers.306 
To engage in law reform, students could confront questions in class regarding current 
laws, such as: Is the law effective? Does the law measure up to its social aims? Is the 
law just? Students should then be asked to create new legislative proposals, either in 
groups or in the form of a mock legislative assembly that debates the proposed 
changes.307 Not only would this empower students to think critically about the law, it 
would also teach students significant lessons about the law-making process. Instead of 
regarding the law as passive or divine, students will learn that the law is flawed but 
salvageable and that it can change. 
It is worth responding to a common objection at this point. Opponents of teaching law 
reform in class typically argue that the law should only be criticised by students after 
they know the law.308 However, this approach is counterproductive. If law can only be 
criticised by students who have learned the law, then legal education becomes a 
system of reinforcing ‘an uncritical, authoritarian acceptance of law as a series of 
rules’ while students are learning them.309 By the time that students reach their final 
year (when traditionalists regard critiques to be acceptable), the ‘ideological 
groundwork has been done’, and the students are already resistant to the idea of 
critiquing the law.310 After spending so many years accepting the law at face value, 
students would find it difficult to suddenly understand how to critique it.311 Further, 
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student learning.312 For this reason, it is vital that students learn how to critique the 
law throughout their degree as they learn it, as well as how to propose law reform. 
There are three essential questions for students to ask when critiquing a specific law: 
Is the law effective? Does the law match its social aims? Is the law just? 
a) Is the Law Effective? 
According to Justice Halsbury: ‘Every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not 
always logical at all’.313 With this claim, he is highlighting that the law has defects 
and flaws, and that it can act in a manner that defies logic.314 When students ask 
whether a law is effective, they are asking whether it matches its logical intention. In 
statutory interpretation, this is often linked to the notion of legislative intent: that the 
people who created a law have a logical intention of how that law should work in 
practice.315 Poorly worded or badly framed legislation will not achieve the intended 
effect, and it could result in illogical or inconsistent outcomes. This section does not 
focus on the political aims of a statute (e.g., reducing poverty, ending crime) but on a 
stricter practical consideration of whether the law works. The Law Society of Western 
Australia provided clear guidance in this regard by presenting a list that indicates 
what features make a law effective (as supported by other cited sources).316 According 
to this list, an effective law is: 
1. known to the public 
2. acceptable in the community 
3. able to be enforced 
4. stable 
5. able to be changed 
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6. applied consistently 
7. able to resolve disputes. 
Although this list is not comprehensive, it provides an effective starting point for the 
intended discussion. The first two list items (known to the public and acceptable to 
the community) relate to the rule of law and the notion that the law should be 
understood and reinforced by community consensus.317 Although ignorance is no 
excuse in the law, it is important for the public to know what punishments exist for 
breaking the law.318 The second two points (able to be enforced and stable) relate to 
the nature of law as a rule that must govern society.319 A law that is unenforceable is 
essentially not a law at all. The last three points relate to the nature of law as a part of 
our democracy—as something that can be changed by consensus, be applied under the 
rule of law and help resolve conflict.320 
A law that fails all the above points can be called ineffective. It is this kind of law that 
requires the most reform and revision. As a technical point, changing laws that are not 
effective is not law reform so much as law revision.321 According to the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘Law reform is about substance, while law reform is 
about form’.322 In critiquing whether or not the law is effective, students consider the 
form of the law and ask questions about wording, structure, framing and intent. This 
is different from a typical law reform task, which would involve considering how to 
change the substance of the law (e.g., from a high tax rate to a low tax rate or from 
one kind of regulation to another). The task for students in law revision is to modify 
the law so that it can achieve its original objective.323 This is closer to the role of a 
judge when judging statutory interpretation and parliamentary intent than it is to a 
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politician who proposes a new law.324 The latter will be discussed in greater detail 
below. 
b) Does the Law Match Its Social Aims? 
The second avenue through which to approach law reform is to prompt students to 
consider a law’s social aims and whether the law matches those social aims. Kennedy 
suggested that legislators frequently fail to achieve the social aims they seek because 
they ignore the unintended consequences of the law and the various ‘social 
implications’ of the law they are drafting.325 According to Kennedy, it is up to law 
students to correct the legislator through a critique of the law.326 If the legislator has 
failed to achieve a social aim, then the critical law student must ask how the aim can 
be achieved with law reform. Kennedy outlined this idea as follows: 
We take each concept, each rule, and we bring it, not before a court of 
justice but before the court of social purposes and we ask how far it is 
serving society. Here the student comes full force … and here he sinks or 
swims.327 
Students are tested not on whether they know the law, but on whether the law matches 
its social purposes; it is at this point that they can pass or fail in terms of the marks 
they will receive as their assessment. With this style of assessment, Kennedy was 
heavily inspired by Roscoe Pound, the Dean of Harvard Law School from 1916 to 
1936.328 Pound was a firm believer in the ‘social aims’ approach to law reform. For 
Pound, the primary social aim was the satisfaction of ‘human needs’ or ‘wants’.329 
This was a modified utilitarian view, similar to Jeremy Bentham’s utility view.330 
However, Bentham valued happiness or desire, while Pound valued human ‘interests’, 
which was a more pragmatic and measurable phenomenon.331 Bentham might ask 
what kind of law would make us happy, while Pound would ask whether the law was 
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serving the interests of humans and meeting our needs and desires. If the law failed 
this precipitous test, then it would require reform to realign itself with this social aim. 
Pound admitted that it is difficult to satisfy ‘infinite human needs’ with a finite system 
of law.332 However, the aim of law is to as successfully as possible satisfy as many of 
humanity’s needs as possible.333 ‘Social’ in this sense signifies the satisfying of 
society to create the optimal conditions for human flourishing. What constitutes a 
‘human need’ is contestable, and it is worth noting that these terms are sometimes 
vague and difficult to determine. It could be that different students would offer 
different human needs when asked to define the term. In classes on law reform, it 
would be up to the students to consider what ‘human interests’ and ‘human needs’ a 
law is failing to satisfy.334 Professors do not need to dictate exact definitions of this 
for students, as it can be part of the exercise. 
Justice Cardozo, another source of inspiration for Kennedy, offered guidance 
regarding how the law can change to meet social aims (once those aims were 
identified). Cardozo posited that there was a danger to believing that the law was 
static and unchangeable with regard to the social demands of its time.335 He had a 
malleable view of precedent, stating that ‘when the social needs demand one 
settlement rather than another, there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore 
history, and bend custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends’.336 The law is 
‘nothing absolute’, and ‘all is fluid and changeable. There is an endless “becoming”’ 
when it comes to law and the legal system, which matches social aims that shift and 
change over time.337 Cardozo closely mirrored the Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, who 
believed that everything was in a constant state of flux—so much so that ‘you could 
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not step twice into the same river’.338 The law is also regarding as being in a state of 
flux, in which it is never to be the same law twice over the course of time. 
The task of a law reformer in a state of flux is to understand that the law must change 
in accordance with social change. Law reforms can thus be proposed accordingly. For 
students, this signifies that they must understand the social mores of their own time, 
and they must place the law within that context to discover if it needs to be changed to 
fit new social aims that did not exist before. 
One method for teaching students about the social aims of law is through in-class 
discussions. At the University of San Francisco, Joshua Rosenberg learned this the 
hard way. At first, he attempted to teach his classes by lecturing students about 
various social aims that were attributable to classic black-letter law courses.339 For 
example, in ‘tax courses [he] tried to convince [students] that its wrong to overtax the 
poor and undertax the wealthy; in contracts classes [he] stressed that it’s important to 
enter into contracts in good faith’.340 The problem with this approach was that it was 
too one-sided. By his own reckoning, students became disengaged when they 
encountered lectures about the morality of the legal system.341 
It is more important to have a two-sided discussion, in which students themselves can 
think about a particular law’s social aim. If a class is framed based on ‘a commitment 
to transformation, renewal and justice’, then students themselves can provide the 
content of what is to be transformed, renewed and made just.342 Students can be 
introduced to a problem (e.g., ‘entrenched hierarchies of power’), but it is up to the 
students themselves to question whether equality is a proper social aim, whether 
power is for everyone or whether specific law apportions power unfairly.343 In brief, it 
is not enough to simply provide answers to students; a critically engaged law course 
allows students to think about the answers for themselves. 
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It is worth responding to a common objection at this point. The opponents of teaching 
the social aims of law often highlight that some laws are private and aimed at private 
purposes, not public ones. In this case, the social aim of law is considered irrelevant. 
This is flawed in two respects. First, all law, even private law, is made through a 
public process—whether that process is by legislative action or judicial decisions.344 
Therefore, all law is governed by the public interest.345 Second, private law, which 
governs the relationships between individuals, ultimately governs the relationships 
between humans in a society. The law of tort pertains to individual wrongdoing, but it 
also pertains to establishing a public insurance system that benefits the greatest 
number of people.346 Rules of private conduct, conducted en masse, become rules of 
public conduct. In this sense, it can be stated that ‘all law is public law’.347 Therefore, 
all law should be measured by the public and the social aims that it serves. 
Consequently, all forms of law are susceptible to the kind of sustained critique that is 
required in a law reform class that teaches the social aims of law. 
c) Is the Law Just? 
A final avenue through which to approach law reform is to prompt students to 
consider the content of law and whether the law is just. On this topic, John Rawls 
suggested that ‘laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must 
be reformed or abolished if they are unjust’.348 Some argue that, again, it is up to law 
students to correct the legislator’s unjust provisions by critiquing the law in class.349 If 
the legislator has failed to achieve a just law, then the critical law student must ask 
how justice can be achieved through law reform. For example, consider how a law 
might allow for the keeping of slaves. The law might be well written and easily 
enforceable, and it could meet the necessary criteria items (as listed in Subsection 6a); 
 
344 Weinrib (n 144) 412. 
345 Ibid. 
346 Gerhard Wagner, ‘Tort Law and Liability Insurance’ (2006) 31(2) The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 
277–80. 
347 Weinrib (n 144) 412. 
348 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971) 3. 
349 Kennedy (n 9) 26. 
 
281 
nevertheless, the law will be unjust.350 The task of a law student in a law reform class 
is to thus ask whether the law is nevertheless unjust, regardless of how effective it is. 
Unfortunately, the concept of justice is sidelined in most current law schools.351 As 
Weinrib expressed it: ‘Students are not encouraged to even ponder, let alone develop 
arguments’ regarding whether the laws they study are just.352 Questions of justice are 
‘routinely marginalized or discouraged’ in the curriculum.353 Students are not meant 
to suggest alternative laws. Law professors do not even ask students whether the law 
they are learning is substantively just, nor whether a statutory interpretation is just, 
nor whether a law ‘offends a student’s [own] sense of justice’ on a personal level.354 
Instead, students are expected to approach the law in a cold, detached manner and 
separate their ideals of justice from their study of the law. This process can breed a 
sense of immorality and cognitive dissonance. As law student Xavier Sanchez 
described: 
The attitude that surprised me the most during my first semester was the 
dismissal of the idea that as law students we were to be concerned about 
fairness and justice … So when my professors told me, maybe only half-
seriously, that we don’t do justice here at law school, they were referring to 
the idea that the student should view the law as the bad man … The bad man 
does not care that the law is just, but he is interested in what the law means 
to his material circumstances.355 
If law school prompts students to regard the law ‘as the bad man’, then it follows that 
law graduates might become bad people in society. A common perception of the 
general public is that all lawyers should be concerned with the notion of justice in 
society.356 However, a crucial question can be asked: how can lawyers be concerned 
about justice, fairness and morality if they are never introduced to the notions in their 
legal training? 
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The current status quo exists despite the desire among the student body for core 
classes on justice and law reform. For example, a recent survey of Harvard Law 
students found that most students wanted classes that taught about justice.357 Students 
were asked: ‘Is it the responsibility of law schools to teach law students about 
justice?’358 Most responded that it was.359 One student responded that ‘laws are 
meaningless without the concept of justice’.360 Another expressed that ‘the role of a 
law school is to enable its graduates to advance the causes of justice’.361 In this view, 
students are meant to graduate as law reformers who can take their critical eyes to the 
laws they encounter. Far from regarding the law as permanently established, students 
should learn that the law can become just over time.362 It then falls to the law schools 
to facilitate this process. According to Kennedy, ‘We must breed a race of graduates 
in law able to utilise the spirit of law reform for the highest uses … a courage to 
criticize what is accepted, to construct what is necessary for new situations, new 
developments and new duties both at home and abroad’.363 
To create a law reform class about justice, it is important to establish what justice 
actually signifies.364 Many different theories of justice exist, which have emerged 
over the years. Broadly speaking, they can be categorised into four schools of 
thought: procedural justice, distributive justice, justice as capability or rights and 
justice as human needs. All these theories originate from leading philosophers and 
legal scholars, including Rawls and Dworkin (distributive justice), Nussbaum and Sen 
(justice as capability), Nozick (justice as rights) and Socrates and Pound (justice as 
human needs). Each of these theories will briefly be explored before the section turns 
to a discussion about how they can be used to critically analyse the law and promote 
 






362 Kennedy (n 5) 101. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Sanchez (n 355). 
 
283 
law reform. These theories are complicated and have entire books written about them, 
so the following section will contain only brief summaries. 
This thesis does not contend that students need to choose one version of justice from 
the following list; rather, it contends that students should consider various theories of 
justice before they decide whether a law is just or unjust. 
i) Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice can be distinguished from substantive justice (i.e., whether an 
outcome is just). For procedural justice, the fairness of the process is more important 
than that of the outcome.365 Procedural justice will sometimes lead to a just outcome, 
but this is not always the case.366 For example, in Australia, people have the right to a 
fair trial (something typically associated with procedural justice), but this does not 
guarantee a fair outcome once the trial is over.367 A lack of evidence, a bad law or 
various other factors could lead to an unjust outcome, even if a defendant has the right 
to defend themselves appropriately. 
Procedural justice is closely tied to the law’s legitimacy. If the law is not procedurally 
just, then it typically lacks legitimacy in the eyes of people.368 This is the primary 
reason why law that is not procedurally just requires reform. Confidence in the legal 
system and the judiciary is a central pillar of a secular, democratic society.369 When 
processes such as trials, arrests and sentences are unjust, the law typically moves 
towards illegitimacy, authoritarianism and dictatorship.370 Unjust procedures have 
been linked historically to authoritarian regimes in places such as the old Soviet 
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Union, the Philippines and Indonesia.371 Examples include secret trials, lack of due 
process, lack of appeals and lack of a fair hearing.372 In places such as these, the 
public lose faith in the law itself and fear any engagement with legal authorities, 
including the police.373 Eventually, this leads to a disengagement with the law and a 
lack of voluntary compliance with the law.374 If this continues for long enough, then 
the law’s illegitimacy can disintegrate into a state of civil disobedience and/or 
revolution.375 Below is an example of procedural injustice: 
‘But how can I be under arrest? And how come it’s like this?’ 
‘Now you’re starting again,’ said the policeman, dipping a piece of buttered 
bread in the honeypot. ‘We don’t answer questions like that.’ 
—Franz Kafka, The Trial.376 
There are many factors that determine whether a law or legal system facilitates 
procedural justice. A non-exhaustive list includes factors such as transparency, 
efficiency, fairness, access to justice, due process, the right of appeal, the right to a 
hearing, neutrality and impartiality.377 All these factors can be applied to the decision-
making process of judges, the law itself and how people interact with the legal system 
through the courts, the police and other avenues. The pertinent question to ask is 
whether the process by which people access, use and are subject to the law is one that 
is procedurally just according to the above criteria. In a law reform class, these 
questions can be posed as a series of questions: 
• Is the law transparent? 
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• Is the law fair? 
• Is the law efficient? 
• Is the law accessible? 
• Has there been due process? 
• Is there a right to a hearing? 
• Is there a right of appeal? 
• Has the legal decision been made impartially? 
This list is not exhaustive. However, it is a starting point for an analysis that examines 
whether a particular law, case or legal system is procedurally just or not. It is worth 
noting that even if the outcome of a law or case is regarded as just, then the law can 
still be viewed as procedurally unjust if the process itself was unjust or corrupted in 
some way.378 The integrity of the justice system is more important than specific 
outcomes, and moreover, the common saying is accurate: a broken clock shows the 
right time twice a day. 
ii) Distributive Justice 
This thesis considers the wider version of distributive justice as advocated by Rawls 
and Dworkin. According to Rawls, laws should be created with the aim of ensuring 
equality by distributing income and wealth evenly across society to provide for 
equality of opportunity but not of outcome.379 Rawls argued that law should be free 
from any inequalities unless they benefit those who are in the worst positions in 
society.380 In his opinion, any law that does not accomplish this is considered unjust. 
He also contended that any unjust law should be ‘reformed or abolished’.381 
To determine whether a law is unjust, Rawls posed a thought experiment: the veil of 
ignorance.382 The idea can be summarised as follows: imagine that someone is born in 
a room without knowing what gender they are, to what class they belong or any other 
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defining feature about them as a person.383 When they leave the room, they will be 
born into the world in their actual circumstances—they will have a new class, gender 
and other traits. In that room, they must decide the rules and laws that will govern 
society.384 According to Rawls, not knowing one’s background or to what class one 
belongs will lead to a natural inclination for demanding equality of opportunity 
between all people; this is so that one can benefit even if one is ultimately poor and in 
a lower class, and so that one is not excessively punished if rich.385 In short, the 
preference will be to advocate for equality of opportunity or the idea that we are 
judged by merit, not birth. The theory has since been replicated in scientific studies 
and experiments, though some reservations exist regarding whether the first step 
(taking yourself outside of your own background) can ever actually occur.386 
According to Dworkin, the veil of ignorance includes various ‘in-built’ aspects of 
humanity that help certain people reach ahead once the competition starts—such as 
intelligence, memory and genetic capabilities beyond class, race and other qualities.387 
Therefore, instead of just giving people the same access to resources at the start of the 
competition (equality of opportunity), they should be given the same access to 
resources continuously (equality of outcome).388 Continued equality must be ensured 
(or insured, according to Dworkin’s logic) beyond the start of the competition through 
a continual redistribution of goods.389 
Whether considering Dworkin or Rawls’s theories, it is evident that the law can be 
analysed from the perspective of distributive justice, and it can be determined as just 
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• A law can be considered just if it ensures equality of opportunity and/or 
outcome between people according to the law.390 
• Inequalities in law can only be justified if they benefit the 
weakest/lowest/poorest of society.391 
Any statute or case can be analysed using this paradigm. This makes it a useful tool 
for students in a law reform class. 
iii) Justice as Capability and/or Individual Rights 
This subsection will consider the version of justice as capability, which was 
established by Nussbaum and Sen. As opposed to distributive justice, which is about 
distributing wealth and resources equally, justice as capability suggests that the law 
should ensure that people are capable of certain things.392 According to Sen, 
distributing resources between people would never work because people are too 
different from one another.393 For example, a man who cannot walk does not require 
greater access to certain walker-friendly resources (e.g., parks or running tracks).394 
Sen argued that instead of providing everyone with resources they might or might not 
need, society should ensure people’s ‘real or effective opportunities to do what they 
want to do and be who they want to be’.395 In brief, justice should protect certain 
fundamental human capabilities and ensure certain freedoms.396 Here, Sen suggested 
that ‘people should have effective possibilities to shape their own life’, and they 
should choose the capabilities that are important to them as individuals.397 However, 
he did not specify what those capabilities were. 
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Nussbaum provided a greater degree of guidance. Rather than allowing the individual 
to decide, she specified various capabilities that should be protected by the law: life, 
bodily health/integrity, the senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical 
reason, affiliation, play, connection with nature and political and material control over 
one’s own environment.398 The aim should always be for ‘equal freedom’—that is, 
the notion that, according to the law, people have capabilities that make them equal to 
others in society.399 These capabilities must be firmly locked in the legal system. For 
example, if someone has freedom of speech today, then they keep it tomorrow.400 
This is why Nussbaum emphasised the importance of constitutional protections for 
capabilities; she linked a country’s constitution to its freedom.401 
There are some similarities with the idea of justice as human rights in international 
law—that is, the idea that justice is intended to protect the rights (legal, political, 
cultural and economic) of individuals and groups in society.402 Instead of measuring 
justice according to resources or means, justice is measured based on whether the law 
protects those individual rights.403 Under this rubric, law reform is necessary when an 
individual’s rights are threatened due to the law, judges or legal institutions.404 In a 
law reform class, students could ask questions such as: 
• Does the law protect fundamental human capabilities? 
• Does the law protect fundamental rights and/or human rights? 
If the answer to both questions is no, then the law is clearly in need of reform. 
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iv) Justice as Human Needs 
The final version of justice worth mentioning is the idea of justice as human needs. 
This thesis will explore the version of justice as human needs that was advocated by 
Socrates and Roscoe Pound. The Socratic ideal of justice in The Republic proposed 
the idea that justice sought to meet basic human necessities or needs to empower 
people to fulfil specific roles in society.405 A just man is someone who fulfils his role 
in society and thereby attains virtue.406 He does so by using personal resources to 
attain justice, wisdom and virtue.407 A just society is one that encourages individuals 
to be just in the same manner.408 
It is worth considering a related theory by Roscoe Pound. Pound believed that justice 
involved the satisfaction of human needs or wants.409 This was a similar form of 
personal justice—or the idea that society must create laws with proper social aims so 
that it could best fulfil the individual’s needs.410 As established above, in classes on 
law reform, the students would decide to consider what ‘human interests’ and ‘human 
needs’ a law fails to align with.411 Professors do not need not dictate exact definitions 
of ‘need’ for students, as this can be part of the exercise. Students could also consider, 
via Socrates, whether the laws that exist today enable individuals to be just, wise and 
virtuous by fulfilling basic human necessities.412 It could be argued that unless basic 
needs, necessities and wants are met, humans cannot reach their full potential. 
Therefore, the law must help people reach this full potential by providing the basic 
necessities of life. 
In a law reform class, students could be asked the following questions: 
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• Does the law fulfil basic human necessities? 
• Does the law fulfil basic human needs? 
Various social movements throughout history have sought to reform the law based on 
the idea of injustice.413 Common examples include the civil rights movement, the gay 
rights movement and the feminist movement. These movements have emerged even 
in highly functioning Western democracies with highly effective legislators.414 It can 
thus be concluded that every country requires lawyers to examine bad laws, and that 
law students, regardless of where they are, can be involved in this process. 
d) Reform the Law 
Critiquing the law alone is not enough. A true education requires the chance to build 
and to create anew. If something is critiqued as being untrue or failing in some way, 
then intellectualism requires that something should be posed in its place, something 
that is true and that might succeed.415 After critiquing the law according to the criteria 
above—Is the law effective? Does the law match its social aims? Is the law just?—
students should be empowered to suggest new law reforms, amendments or the 
abolition of existing law. 
Law students are uniquely placed to play this role in society. Law graduates become 
some of ‘the most influential policy-makers’ who enter roles in government, business 
and politics.416 They work as ‘administrative lawyers, executive branch lawyers, 
legislative aides or legislators’.417 Therefore, law schools are obliged to prepare law 
students for the role they will play in shaping the law and reforming it according to 
the social, political and economic demands of their time.418 It might be argued that 
after graduation, ‘Every lawyer should promote justice’.419 To do so, they must ask 
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questions about justice in class.420 Law school is the primary opportunity to teach 
students that law must be reformed if it is to become an instrument ‘in the service of 
mankind’ rather than one for personal enrichment.421 After graduating, students can 
take a leading role in this regard; they can develop new ways of thinking about the 
law, as well as new ideas and plans for how the law should work for society.422 
New standards must be developed in all fields of human endeavour, which will align 
with the new social philosophy of the age. However, the legal technique and mastery 
necessary for coping with these new demands have been unable to keep pace with 
these theories.423 
e) How Is Law Reform to Be Taught in a Law School? 
One suggestion is to offer students an entire class on law reform, in which they enact 
the critique above before being assessed. Giroux suggested a research-heavy subject, 
in which students conduct critical research on a given law ‘within the realm of social 
justice’.424 This can be completed in a group before group members gather to 
collaborate on new law reform proposals.425 Professors can facilitate this process 
through in-class discussions about ‘the substantive justice of whatever piece of law is 
under review’, along with discussions about the effectiveness and social aims of the 
law in question.426 Law students could be asked in class to search the history of a 
specific law so that they could understand it in context; this could then inform their 
reform initiatives in a manner similar to a public policy debate.427 Together, the class 
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Although this process might initially appear chaotic, it is important to remember that 
law schools already perform this process with regard to ‘public policy’ discussions.428 
Students are already allowed to propose new policy reasons for why a law might be 
ineffective or to investigate the policy behind a law.429 As such, there is no reason 
why this cannot be extended within the broader themes of law reform and justice.430 
Another way to teach law reform is to create a mock legislative assembly. In a mock 
legislative assembly, students act as politicians and legislators, who argue over 
proposed law reform and suggesting alternatives.431 One such assembly existed at the 
first law school in the US (College of William and Mary) in Virginia.432 Under the 
leadership of George Wythe, the college established a mock legislative assembly at 
the school, in which students debated legislative proposals, proposed amendments and 
law reform, and learned about legislative procedures,—all while Wythe acted ‘as 
speaker of the house’.433 He trained students to read further in government and public 
policy, which they then used in the assembly to argue over bills.434 Students not only 
learned to propose laws; they also learned the procedures of government, law-making 
and legislating—all of which are crucial components for legal education.435 
Finally, Giroux suggested an even more radical alternative: that law students be 
formed into committees to advise government regulatory bodies.436 Paired with 
supervisory professors, students could form groups to ‘engage in research and provide 
recommendations for actual legal reform’.437 They could be assessed on the research 
component of their work while simultaneously providing a public service and 
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engaging with the law-making bodies of government.438 This is a ‘clinical legal 
education’ version of law reform—one that is both immensely practical and useful in 
terms of developing a student’s conceptual understanding of how the law can change 
in response to specific political, legal and social forces. 
7) Small Class Sizes 
One essential component for any of the above liberal arts teaching methods is a small 
class size. Small classes are often directly compared to large 200 + person lecture 
halls—in which an image is posited with personal, individualised learning on one side 
and dehumanised, detached learning on the other.439 The personal, small class 
approach is considered essential for a critical liberal arts education.440 Professors who 
teach a small group of students can ‘devote sufficient attention to each one so as to 
fully explore and develop his or her intellectual abilities’.441 This can lead to 
acquiring knowledge and cognition that far exceeds what is achieved in traditional 
lecture halls.442 
One example of this is Kennedy at the Toronto Law School. In the 1930s, Kennedy 
insisted on teaching a small class for his liberal arts curriculum in law.443 He had ‘few 
if any formal lectures’, instead opting to work ‘at problems in small groups with 
students’.444 According to one of his students, classes would comprise ‘12 or 14’ 
people, often in Kennedy’s personal office.445 Students would receive topics to work 
on for the next week, and then they would come a week later to present a paper to the 
class.446 This paper was then criticised directly by Dean Kennedy, with both him and 
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the other students asking questions.447 The students benefited ‘enormously from the 
intellectual discussions that took place’ in these small classes.448 Indeed, they were 
the kind of discussions that are impossible to hold in large lecture halls. Kennedy also 
operated a law club once a month, ‘at which an expert lawyer or jurist’ presented a 
problem for an hour before holding a discussion with the students’.449 This was not a 
club for academics or PhD students alone; it was open to all law students in the 
student body.450 Guest speakers included Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard, Professor 
Manley Hudson of Harvard, Owen Dixon (future Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Australia) and the lawyers JJ Robinette and Joseph Sedgwick.451 
The similarities between Kennedy’s approach to small classes and the approach of 
Oxford Law School were worth noting. Oxford has a long history of limiting its 
classes to one to three students for undergraduate tutorials, something that is unheard 
of at other universities.452 Similar to Kennedy’s method, students at Oxford wrote 
articles each week, which were then examined in tutorials by professors and other 
students.453 Although the students have larger classes for seminars and lectures, the 
cohort of an entire LLM year group is only 50 students.454 Only 42 per cent of Oxford 
students have one hour of class or more each week with over 100 other students in the 
class.455 Small class sizes of this nature can significantly increase student satisfaction 
with their courses and reduce the feeling of alienation and isolation on campus.456 
However, for small classes to be effective, professors had to adopt teaching methods 
that suited that environment.457 Merely lecturing to a smaller class is an ineffective 
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technique.458 Personal, collaborative teaching styles can be the most rewarding in this 
environment, and they can most benefit students who want to think critically about 
their education. It is also worth noting that although such class sizes might be possible 
at Oxford and Cambridge, less prestigious universities struggle to reduce class sizes to 
below 30 (let alone to one to three students).459 
A primary reason for large class sizes has been the implicit effects of the 
government’s neoliberal policies on education. A core aspect of neoliberal philosophy 
is the privatisation of public assets into competitive markets.460 In Australia, 
universities were transformed from public assets into markets of competition in the 
1970s and 1980s due to significant cuts to government funding.461 Within this new 
model, universities were forced to compete on the open market for students so that 
institutional costs could be supported (a new funding source), which led to a surge in 
the number of universities and students.462 Without government funding, universities 
had no option but to rely on increased student debt funding. As more ‘research’ 
universities were created (some with 20,000 or more students), the ‘gulf between 
academic staff and students’ arguably increased, with fewer academics per head of 
students.463 The number of law schools and law students has similarly increased in 
Australia since the 1970s and the advent of neoliberal philosophies in public policy.464 
The rising number of students in this paradigm might lead to larger class sizes if 
universities do not compensate with increased hiring of teaching staff.465 The profit 
imperative to fit as many fee-paying students into a course as possible (even when a 
university lacks public funding) naturally leads to an expansion in the number of 
students per class.466 In brief, the pressure that universities felt to seek new funding 
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sources from more students and their lucrative student debts might lead to an 
imbalance of student–staff ratios and increased class sizes. 
However, this trend is not inevitable, even in institutions that face vocational 
imperatives. In Australia, UNSW Law School has led the way in terms of achieving 
smaller class sizes. Classes in undergraduate law degrees typically seat between 30 
and 44 students, and there is an increasing focus on limiting the number of large-scale 
lectures.467 Conversely, Sydney Law School increased its class sizes from 40 to 70 in 
2007, due to increased demands from students wanting to study law.468 However, the 
increase in class size was condemned for limiting the amount of personal time that 
each student would have with his or her professor.469 Ongoing tensions remain in 
Australia regarding class size and the effectiveness of teaching. For example, the 
University of Queensland cut their intake of new law students in 2017 to reduce class 
sizes from 235 to 185 students per year group.470 According to the dean, this was to 
facilitate ‘small group teaching’ and a more personalised learning environment.471 A 
similar claim was made by the dean of Notre Dame Law School, which has an 
average class size of 31 students.472 The dean explained his reasoning as follows: ‘An 
essential requirement of any lawyer is the ability to consider and explain an argument. 
This is a skill which is difficult to foster in huge lecture theatres overflowing with 
students.’473 
Australian law schools are joining a broader, global movement towards reducing class 
size and encouraging ‘interactive’ forms of teaching.474 In recent years, Harvard and 
Columbia Law Schools have reduced their year cohort sizes from 120 to 80 
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students.475 There is a broader push among various law schools in the US, including 
Vanderbilt, to reduce class sizes and focus on ‘problem-orientated pedagogy’ in small 
classes.476 Some of these outcomes are intentional, while some have been due to 
various economic crises (and the student debt crisis in the US), which have made law 
schools a less-promising option for students; enrolments have decreased, which has 
correspondingly decreasing class size.477 For example, the smaller classes in 
Connecticut Law Schools are forcing a renewed emphasis on experiential learning, 
practical learning and clinical legal education.478 
However, the primary benefit of small class sizes is essentially what has been 
discussed above—it is the opportunity for in-class discussions and debate about the 
law. With smaller classes, students would be empowered to question the law more 
frequently, to pose objections and to critique legal norms.479 The smaller the class, the 
freer student feel in expressing opinions, so that they receive feedback from the 
professor and to debate with other students in the class.480 
8) Role-plays (Real and Virtual) in Law Schools 
Another alternative method of teaching law is simulation or role-play—a teaching 
style that can enhance both critical thinking and a student’s capacity for empathy.481 
A simulation or role-play is a class activity in which students act a given role in class. 
Law schools are brimming with simulation activities, including mock trials, treaty 
negotiations, model UN assemblies and mock legislative assemblies. Typically, role-
plays and simulations have been used solely for the teaching of job-related skills.482 
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century to teach students the practical skills involved in litigation.483 The College of 
William and Mary in Virginia held mock legislative assemblies in 1779 to teach 
students the practical skills of political governance.484 Today, law schools worldwide 
are reaching beyond vocational skills training to experiment with using digital 
technology to create new, virtual simulations that teach non-technical skills. This 
includes using gamification, virtual reality and augmented reality. 
This section contends that simulations should be used for their broader potential to 
teach students ‘human-oriented’ skills, which includes empathy and compassion. 
They also impart knowledge about the origin of law and the effects of law on society. 
This section partially argues that simulations are unique in their ability to engage 
students in the ‘real-world’ effect of law, unlike other, traditional teaching methods. 
Historically, law schools have used simulations as a form of vocational skills training, 
and they have had little regard for their other potential uses. Simulations have 
generally been considered a means of prompting students to ‘act out’ the part of a 
lawyer at work.485 For example, mock trials involve law students acting as an attorney 
for a defendant in a hypothetical, fictionalised case. Law simulations (like mock 
trials) have frequently been said to help students tackle real-world work-related 
problems.486 For example, s student who acts the role of an attorney in a mock trial 
gains real-world knowledge of the practical skills involved in litigation: preparing for 
court, making arguments in court and posing objections to opposing counsel in court. 
They do so without posing any risks to clients or law firms.487 Simulations are thus a 
safe way to practise and hone professional skills.488 Indeed, ‘simulations are 
employed to a greater extent in the vocational institutions where emphasis is placed 
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on advocacy, negotiation and arbitration skills’ rather than on soft skills like 
communication or critical thinking.489 
Little thought has been paid to the potential for simulations to go beyond vocational 
skills training to a more theoretical or abstract level—the bestowing of empathy, 
compassion or ethical integrity. The American Bar Association mandates that all US 
law schools offer ‘one or more experiential courses’, including a ‘simulation 
course’.490 Simulation courses are expected to teach students ‘doctrine, theory, skills 
and legal ethics’.491 The Australian Council for Educational Research suggested ‘that 
experiential learning allows students to develop a better awareness of the workplace 
and how it relates to … academic learning’.492 In each case, simulations are 
considered beneficial for training students for their future jobs. 
In 2011, the Carnegie Report clarified that vocational skills training in law school is 
not enough.493 Law students must also ‘consider their professional identity and social 
and ethical values’.494 The teaching of values can occur via simulated experiences of 
professional situations. Students could act a professional role in class and receive 
feedback from professors regarding how they enacted the role (either ethically or 
unethically).495 Roleplaying in teams can prompt students to realise ‘the need for trust 
and mutual respect [between colleagues] … aspects of professionalism that are rarely 
[seen] in the conventional legal curriculum’.496 
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Simulations can also teach students to be ‘reflective’ about their professional role.497 
Students could be reflective not only about their own work but also for the role of the 
‘prosecutor, the defence and the judge’ in the courtroom.498 By roleplaying these three 
different parties, students can become more objective about how the different parties 
to a legal dispute interact. Accepting one role could encourage subjectivity and bias, 
but accepting multiple roles offers students a broader and clearer picture of how the 
legal system actually functions. 
At their best, simulations can reach beyond critical thinking to raise questions about 
how law affects real people. In one relevant example, Professor Richard Ingleby 
created a simulation of marital disputes in family law. Students acted as parties to the 
marital dispute.499 This helped them understand how family law affected real families. 
Ingleby’s simulation highlighted ‘the role of the legal profession in out-of-court 
activity’.500 He further suggested that technical skills are important. But how should 
lawyers behave when they had to manage complicated emotional circumstances? 
How should lawyers comfort a client who is currently undergoing a difficult divorce? 
These tough, psychological questions are rarely answered in the traditional 
curriculum. One way to answer them is through simulated roleplaying. 
Simulations can also help teach students about the role of law in broader society. 
According to the 2003 Carnegie Report, simulations ‘are effective in developing 
students’ civic and political knowledge, civic and political skills and civic 
attitudes’.501 For example, by simulating the political process, law students can gain 
an understanding of the origin of law, the creation of law and the debates about law 
reform. This can heighten their civic and political knowledge, while also teaching 
them valuable skills of critical analysis and communication. As an example, a US 
simulation called CityWorks aimed to teach high school students their constitutional 
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rights.502 Researchers on the project initially found that high school students were 
bored by civics, which they felt was irrelevant to their lives.503 However, by running a 
civics simulation, they managed to engage students in a form of ‘participatory 
citizenship’, which made students more interested in serving their community.504 
Projects like this could restore the idea of a lawyer as a ‘public servant’ who is there 
to uphold the law for society. 
Any situation in which political parties agree to negotiate on the terms of a law or 
agreement can be turned into a class simulation, such as in the case of international 
law treaties.505 By simulating a political process, students become aware that the 
process exists—and that it creates law. A treaty agreement can be acted in a 
classroom as a form of role-play, in which students observe how both sides of a 
negotiation use political and legal arguments to argue their side of the case.506 The 
resultant legal document is revealed to be an outcome of the political process that 
became established in class. Law students learn that law has an origin, it can be 
changed and it can be reformed. 
Simulations can also teach law students about social justice, empathy and compassion 
for another’s point of view. Indeed, social justice ‘simulations posit specific social 
justice problems, such as the detention of a political dissident or the introduction of 
regressive media laws’.507 In a recent example, students in a law class learned about 
the real-world process of lobbying for law reform, with regard to self-determination in 
West Papua.508 Law students played the role of stakeholders in the dispute. Exercises 
included tactical mapping, fishbowl interviews and lobbying/protesting.509 Tactical 
mapping involved receiving a newspaper article and identifying local actors, 
discussing the nature of the actors’ relationship and creating tactics that each group 
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would try on specific stakeholders fishbowl interviews involved mock interviews 
about human rights violations. Role-play was used extensively in these tasks, 
allowing students to represent particular stakeholders to the legal crisis (e.g., NGO 
groups, government groups). Fake protests were conducted too, to emphasise the 
social element of law.510 In no other law classroom would a student gain an 
understanding of so many stakeholders, how the law affects them and how they each 
individually seek law reform. 
This process of placing students in a stakeholder’s shoes best exemplifies how role-
play builds empathy. In another relevant example, Horan and Taylor-Sands created a 
'Litigation in Action' project—a simulated dispute resolution on DVD.511 Students 
were separated into groups and shown a video clip on alternative dispute resolution 
theory.512 They were then tasked with roleplaying a stakeholder in the dispute, 
including the ‘client, lawyer and/or mediator’.513 Students were demonstrated to be 
more lively in class than usual, after watching the video clips, including students who 
did not normally participate.514 The interactive nature of the simulation made students 
interact with each other more socially.515 Students ultimately gained a greater 
understanding of ADR and stakeholders and greater empathy for those undergoing the 
ADR process. This mitigated the usually ‘dry’ task of teaching civil procedure, and it 
taught students much more than technical knowledge alone.516 
a) Virtual Learning Environments/Video Games as Simulation 
A virtual simulation occurs in a virtual environment, on computers, online or in a 
video game. Examples include refugee, prison and courtroom simulations.517 Virtual 
simulations seemingly have an even greater capacity than physical simulations for 
teaching empathy and compassion, as well as an understanding of how law affected 
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society—because they draw students into the virtual body of a stakeholder. Virtual 
simulations have been shown to increase empathy towards outsider groups, such as 
refugees.518 The immersive nature of new, virtual technologies—such as virtual 
reality and augmented reality—assist with this process.519 By taking students outside 
their own bodies (visually, through audio and film), they allow students to speak, 
explore and act as someone else.520 This gives students an understanding of how 
whomever they are embodying spends a day in his or her life.521 In the case of a 
refugee, a divorcee or a criminal, this can be a very humbling experience; students 
have the chance to understand the human reality of law. This leads students to a 
greater capacity for empathy towards their future clients. 
Historically, law schools ‘have been slow to integrate new technology in the 
classroom’.522 This is despite widespread studies by law academics regarding the 
benefits of new technology.523 As early as the 1990s, law academics began 
researching the use of virtual environments for the teaching of law.524 Sutherland, the 
inventor of computer graphics, foresaw the possibility of these kinds of simulations as 
early as 1963.525 The advent of computers was intended to transform legal education 
so that it would move away from books and towards digital experiences.526 Students 
were meant to become digital natives, who were plugged into a vast hoard of 
worldwide knowledge. Very few of these dreams and aspirations became a reality. 
Today, it is relatively rare for law schools to use virtual simulations.527 
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Concurrently, there is also a growing awareness regarding the capacity for virtual 
simulations to extend beyond the traditional curriculum.528 Simulations are more 
engaging than traditional instructions through lectures, tutorials or rote learning.529 
They are experiential and allow students to feel the difficulties that lawyers face.530 
Simulations help test whether students have internalised knowledge from the 
classroom.531 Role-plays can create exciting environments in which students feel 
more personally engaged with, and related to, the processes of legal decision-making, 
current legal issues or moral and ethical dilemmas.532 
Few law schools have attempted to create virtual simulations—with the few that have 
doing so for vocational uses. In the 1990s, Paul Maharg was involved in an 
experimental virtual law world called ‘SIMPLE’,533 which stands for ‘SIMulated 
professional learning environment’.534 The simulation placed students in the virtual 
world of ‘Ardcalloch’, a place filled with legal disputes and frustrated litigants.535 
Students were tasked with negotiating ‘pre-litigation settlements’, ‘carry[ing] on legal 
research’ and representing clients.536 Experiences in SIMPLE were similar to those of 
a legal clinic, including that students were supervised by actual lawyers.537 
Although SIMPLE was established as a vocational project (to teach students about 
being a lawyer), it had a significant side effect—it taught students how to be 
ethical.538 Students learned the ethics involved in ‘gathering and disclosing 
information relating to a client’, and they gained experience in ‘practice-based 
ethics’.539 Additionally, in terms of ‘values and attitudes’, they simultaneously learned 
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what it meant to be a solicitor in Scotland, simply by ‘interacting with [virtual] clients 
[and] modelling themselves on their practitioner-tutors’.540 Practical mentorship from 
lawyers on the exercise gave students important lessons in professionalism, courtesy 
and client service—all of which would be considered vital ‘soft skills’.541 The 
SIMPLE project revealed that virtual simulations can extend beyond vocational 
training towards the training of soft skills in law students. 
In another relevant virtual simulation called ‘PAJD’, two online virtual law firms 
were established542 in which students were tasked with acting as lawyers. They were 
introduced: ‘Students were introduced to “practice activities” typical in legal firms 
such as meeting partners to discuss files and take instructions, and advising clients’.543 
However, students were not pushed beyond these simple, technical skills to attain 
higher, more abstract principles or values. 
Video games provide a new platform for teaching law in terms of interactive virtual 
learning environments. Games differ from static teaching environments or digital 
websites because they require interaction to function. Games are a ‘hermeneutic 
experience’ that requires players to place themselves ‘before the world, both in 
understanding the rules and forces’ in the game and understanding how to respond to 
those rules and actions.544 This is best explained through the example of Ace 
Attorney—a Japanese law game in which players play the role of a junior lawyer in 
court.545 They gradually learn the rules of the game; players can learn both functional 
skills (e.g., how to object in a court case) and soft skills (e.g., how to talk to a client or 
a judge respectfully).546 
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Establishing win or loss conditions provides an interesting dynamic for any game 
developer designing law simulations. Would law students ‘win’ the game by behaving 
ethically and professionally, even if they lost the court case? Or should law students 
be trained to focus on the demands of their clients exclusively? Games naturally raise 
interesting questions about the nature of law itself and the role of the lawyer in court. 
Professional and ethical dilemmas can thus frequently become a core feature of any 
video game featuring litigation. 
The exploration of a high-risk environment in a game (e.g., warzones, crime scenes) 
allows players to learn new skills they otherwise would not have learned in real life—
due to inherent safety concerns. Games, like other simulations, can thus provide safe 
spaces for experimenting in areas of high-emotional vulnerability. Consequently, 
virtual simulations can be an ‘essential tool in creating rich and situated problems’ 
spaces compatible with deep and meaningful approaches to learning’ and help resolve 
‘meaningful, real-world problems’.547 Safety allows students to consider those 
‘meaningful’ problems in closer detail, propose solutions and suggest possible 
avenues for law reform. 
Certain law video games already exist and have been used by both law students and 
the public to understand the effect of law in action. Two examples include Party for 
Your Rights, ‘an online game created to teach consumer rights and advocacy’, and 
Law Dojo, ‘a set of online games which tests knowledge of the law’.548 The first game 
targets a general audience, while the second is mainly aimed at law students or 
aspiring law students.549 Games like these aim to ‘gamify’ law by adding rewards, 
levels and interactivity to the task of learning. In Law Dojo, players progress through 
several different modules based on criminal law, legalese, evidence, constitutional 
law and other topics—unlocking new categories as they progress.550 The creator of 
the game, Margaret Hagan, stated that ‘she was tired of studying [law] in heavy, 
boring ways’.551 This is a unique aspect of games: they can make learning fun. By 
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creating games like Party for Your Rights and Law Dojo, game designers have 
managed to offer learning about the law to the public in an accessible, easy to use app 
that ultimately helps the public understand the effect of law. 
b) Creating Empathy—Building Simulations 
It is worth considering whether existing virtual simulations in law schools are limited 
by their design—specifically, whether they are limited to the extent that they are not 
designed to teach empathy or the effect of law on society (but they teach vocational 
skills). If the true value of simulations (as has been argued above) is to encourage 
students to perceive a legal issue from someone else’s shoes, then it is worth 
questioning what kind of simulation would achieve this goal. 
First, various aspects of simulation design should be considered. Establishing a 
simulation requires addressing the type of course, the location and the activities that 
are to be undertaken.552 In terms of the type of course, it is important to consider the 
course’s length and its classes.553 For the purpose of this subsection, a standard law 
class might be imagined as wishing to include empathy-building in a virtual 
simulation. To that end, it should be determined whether the simulation will be 
conducted in class or outside. If outside the class, law students would require access 
via learning management software, university websites and other factors. Online 
videos can be used to support the simulation—such as providing background 
information to students about the stakeholders and thus assisting in the empathy-
building process.554 If in the class, it might be best to divide students into groups to 
play the role of ‘different stakeholders’, in which they can learn through multiple 
viewpoints on the legal issue in play.555 Collaborative learning of this kind can help 
students learn from each other and themselves.556 It can also help deconstruct social 
isolation or ‘cellular learning’, which can become a problem in a hyper-competitive 
law school.557 Instead of penalising students for ‘colluding’ on an assessment task, 
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simulations can take advantage of how students like to collaborate. When 
collaborating, students realise ‘the need for trust and mutual respect between team 
members and the value of community learning’.558 These are additional values that 
stand them in good stead for their future workplaces. 
In terms of location, a fictionalised world is preferred, one in which the possibility of 
students gaining empathy or understanding the law in practice is greatly enhanced.559 
This can include fictional locations, characters, transactions and conflicts or cases.560 
For example, students can walk in the shoes of a refugee, make an asylum seeker 
claim and be a wife in a divorce proceeding or a criminal facing time in prison. The 
important point is that students encounter situations they would not typically 
encounter or they face situations that are common among legal clients. Empathy-
building between lawyer and client in this way can occur hypothetically before 
students embark on a real journey with real clients.561 Finally, in terms of activities, 
simulations generally focus on solving a legal problem in some manner while 
engaging in a communicative practice. 
Simulations (specifically virtual simulations) can be time-consuming to create. 
Various law lecturers have stated that simulations ‘were very time consuming’ in 
terms of creating them, finding the relevant problems and preparing additional 
material and traditional materials.562 This is a legitimate concern in the short term. 
However, in the long term, it is worth considering that simulations can be re-used 
indefinitely.563 They can also be modified and/or adapted for future years and other 
relevant courses.564 
Law schools can use simulations to teach students about the human effect of law, 
enhancing their capacity for empathy and compassion. This can balance the otherwise 
dry and detached perspective of law that students encounter in the rest of the law 
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school curriculum. Virtual simulations can extend beyond physical simulations by 
placing students in the shoes of a future client, in which they would speak, act and 
react as that person in a virtual world. This prepares students for the soft skills that are 
necessary in the business environment, including communication skills, critical 
thinking skills and the professional capacity for empathy. The skill of empathy-
building has historically been ignored in traditional simulation activities. However, it 
is worth considering how simulations are uniquely suited to teaching empathy. 
Conclusion 
As outlined in the previous subsections, an alternative curriculum can be used in 
Australian law schools to help reorient students towards a broader liberal arts 
education in law. New assessments can help students gain a ‘human’ training in law; 
they allow students to engage in cases and statutes beyond the black-letter law 
approach, with an emotional and personal perspective. The benefits of different forms 
of assessment are too numerous to mention, but the core benefits as established in 
Section 2 of this part include teaching empathy, compassion, critical thinking and 
reflection. With these soft skills, law students can approach graduation with a clearer 
perspective on the role they can play in the world. They are not only employees who 
are trained in technical skills, but citizens who are endowed with the responsibility to 
critique, refine and reform the law. 
The curriculum examined in this section draws inspiration from the scholarship of 
WPM Kennedy. Kennedy’s vision for a liberal arts education in law is extensively 
required today, and it can only be accomplished by changing the assessment tasks 
themselves. This would allow students to approach assessments as something more 
than a technical skill or jobs-training program; they would be fundamental to who the 
students are as human beings. The assessments listed in this section accomplish this: 
critical thinking tasks and essays, reflection tasks, law reform tasks, small class group 
discussions and other class discussions and simulations. In each assessment, the task 
extends students beyond the normal boundaries of ‘respectable’ discussions in the law 
classroom; students learn to engage with higher-order, intellectual skills. Kennedy’s 
law school taught students to connect with the political and social forces underpinning 
the legal system. It is possible that by embracing his methods, law schools today can 
teach students about the important relationships between law and society, law and 
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politics and the political and social forces that shape the legal order. Without such 
teaching, there is a risk that graduates will continue to emerge from law school as 
‘legal monks’ who are incapable of understanding the role they are to play in wider 
society. 
However, that wider role is paramount. Law graduates are the only trained 
professionals with a knowledge of the law, so it is up to them to provide the moral, 
justice and fairness framework of our legal system, as well as to advocate for changes 
to the law and hold the government accountable in a secular democratic country such 
as Australia. Much can be learned from the new US experience in legal education, 
including the experimentations with new assessment tasks, the creation of 
experimental virtual simulations and the adoption of the humanities into law 
schools—in which law is finally taught as the basic humanities subject, upon which 
other subjects are built. 
By providing students with a broader liberal arts style training, legal education can 
shift away from the dominance of both legal positivism and neoliberal values. 
Students can learn that the market is not the sole determinant of their success, nor the 
only valuable aspect of their intended profession; instead, they can understand that the 
law deserves to be critiqued and questioned. The assessments listed above also 
humanise the study of law for students, allowing them to meld their moral intuition, 
critical thinking and broader ethical framework with their study of the legal system. 
Under this new curriculum, students will not have to split themselves into two (the 
detached lawyer; the concerned citizen) but meld their personal and public selves into 
a unified democratic citizen. 
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Section 3: Core Subjects and a New Law Curriculum 
Significantly changing legal education in Australia would potentially require 
discarding the Priestley Eleven subject requirements for a more refined and shorter 
list of core subjects.1 The Priestley Eleven currently act as a ‘dead hand’ on 
curriculum reform, and they prevent law schools from innovating and experimenting 
with new subject choices for students.2 Heavy with black-letter law subjects, the 
Priestley Eleven might prevent students from properly contextualising the law, given 
its relation to the humanities and social sciences. 
The Productivity Commission has argued that the Priestley Eleven provide a ‘strong 
base knowledge of the law [but] limit the flexibility of universities to compete and 
innovate’.3 Without the flexibility of adapting new core and compulsory subjects, 
every law school begins to mirror the dominant, corporate model of teaching the law. 
Universities would need to move beyond the Priestley Eleven (and the accompanying 
black-letter law focus) if they want to provide students with a more holistic or 
contextualised education in law and a greater variety of possible law schools. 
This section argues that the Priestley Eleven should either be abolished or 
substantially reduced to four or five compulsory subjects. In this regard, this thesis 
contends that Australia can learn from the UK model of six compulsory subjects and 
the US model of no official core subjects (although there is an informal list).4 Foreign 
jurisdictions have demonstrated that a low number of core subjects allows for a 
greater degree of experimentation for the law deans in designing the curriculum and 
innovating subject offerings. With fewer compulsory subjects, law deans could tailor 
subject choices towards different law school experiences, which would create a social 
justice agenda, a clinical education agenda or the simple provision of more elective 
options for students. Reducing the Priestley Eleven would trigger a new era of subject 
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experimentation in Australian law schools, allowing all law schools to offer a broader 
range of subjects to students and thereby greater flexibility to law deans, 
administration and professors. 
Towards the end of this section, this thesis will argue in favour of various subjects 
that could replace the Priestley Eleven as optional electives under a new liberal arts 
theoretical model. These subjects would include humanities subjects that are sorely 
lacking from the current law school curriculum, including law and politics, legal 
history and legal philosophy. In each case, this thesis will argue that a liberal arts 
education (based on humanities subjects) can help contextualise the law for students 
and allow them to understand from where the law originates and how it affects their 
society. Without a proper understanding of the context of law, law students will 
remain unprepared for the broad diversity of graduate careers they will enter. Further, 
they will remain incapable of understanding the law as a field of study, unable to 
explain the proper context of legal rules and decisions, and incapable of successfully 
entering into the myriad job options available to them after graduation. 
1) Downsizing the Priestley Eleven 
With the basic assumption that the Priestley Eleven should be abolished or radically 
downsized, a discussion can be started regarding which Priestley Eleven subjects 
should be targeted. 
First, law schools should consider the question raised by the 2015 LACC meeting, 
which asked ‘whether the following areas of knowledge continue to be fundamental 
threshold knowledge for all entry-level lawyers: Civil Procedure, Company Law, 
Evidence, Ethics and Professional Responsibility’.5 This question was asked partly 
because these subjects are already partially or entirely covered by the PLT 
Competency Standards, so they are thus already taught to students during their PLT 
placement.6 It is necessary to avoid duplicate teaching of the same materials and 
ensure that only relevant subjects are compulsory. Further, abolishing these four 
subjects could significantly open the curriculum to much-needed reform. However, it 
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must be noted that abolishing ‘Ethics’ and ‘Professional Responsibility’ would omit 
the only core subject that explicitly teaches a broader view about the role of the 
lawyer in society. It is thus possible that only three of these subjects could be 
abolished. 
Following this, several remaining subjects can be paired, as has already occurred in 
some Australian law schools in the past. For example, historically, torts and contracts 
have frequently been taught in a single introductory course, with the option of a 
further elective in subsequent years if students wished to undertake it. The same can 
be said of ‘Administrative Law’ and ‘Constitutional Law’. Pairing these subjects can 
significantly reduce the number of core units in the curriculum while not sacrificing 
content. Notably, the list of Priestley Eleven subjects becomes considerably shorter 
after adopting the recommendations suggested above. 
This can be viewed visually below: 
• Administrative Law and Federal and State Constitutional Law 
• Contracts and Torts 
• Criminal Law and Procedure 
• Equity (including Trusts) 
• Property 
• Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
• Civil Procedure 
• Company Law 
• Evidence 
This shorter list of six core subjects reflects the status quo in the UK and other 
European jurisdictions, in which a tighter, more refined subject list is offered. 
In other jurisdictions, fewer subjects have allowed for a greater amount of flexibility 
and uniqueness to each law school’s curriculum. In Canada, the Law Society of Upper 
Canada originally ‘prescribed eleven mandatory’ subjects for students of law.78 This 
 





was reduced from ‘eleven to seven’ in 1969, following a petition from several law 
deans who argued that too many compulsory subjects limited the independence of law 
schools.9 No compulsory subjects exist in the US, but law schools are required to 
teach ‘substantive and procedural law’.10 This results in a fairly standard first year 
offering across law schools, with some room for experimentation allowed.11 
The status quo in the UK, US and Canada involves law schools having the freedom to 
set their own curriculum, with less direct control from the profession or industry 
bodies. This allows law schools to cater their programs to all students rather than just 
to the 50 per cent of students who will enter the legal profession after graduation. It 
also signifies that law schools can adopt a less-vocational, skills-based focus and 
teach the theory and philosophy behind law. 
A shorter list of core units would allow the core areas of black-letter law to be taught, 
but it would also allow the time and room for students to extend beyond black-letter 
subjects into advanced studies or elective units that are non–black letter in nature. 
2) Alternative Subject List 
One step further to reducing the Priestley Eleven is to suggest some elective units that 
could replace the discarded units. In this case, non–black letter elective units in law 
can be added, which would allow students to expand their studies with different 
thinking methods. These subjects do not need to be compulsory, but they could 
become standardised elective offerings in law schools for students who require a more 
theoretical framework in their studies. 
A list of these subjects is offered below: 
• Administrative Law and Federal and State Constitutional Law 
• Contracts and Torts 
• Criminal Law and Procedure 
• Equity (including Trusts) 
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• Political Philosophy 
• History 
• Philosophy 
• Critical Thinking 
• Enforcement 
The benefit of this new list is that it adds necessary components to the law degree that 
do not exist in the current curriculum, and they all help contextualise the law. 
Although broad in scope, subjects such as philosophy, history and critical thinking 
can be specifically taught in relation to the law. Political philosophy would explain 
the origin of the law (in political processes). History would discuss the history of 
unjust law or periods during which the law has failed or helped humanity (e.g., the 
eras of slavery and the apartheid). A general philosophy course can help students 
question what they are being taught. If this course were combined with critical 
thinking (the ability to analyse the motivations, biases and agendas that underlie an 
argument), then students would be taught the real Socratic method, and they would 
learn how to question the law, judges and their own opinions. Empowered by critical 
thinking, students would be able to judge whether a law was good or bad, as well as 
suggest potential law reform. 
These subjects could be created as elective units, which would allow students to 
choose them if desired; alternatively, they could be offered in conjunction with black-
letter law units. With a reduced list of compulsory subjects, elective units could be 
taken as early as first year, with some of these subjects (e.g., political philosophy and 
critical thinking) serving as great introductory courses that help frame students’ 
understanding of law as they start their degree. 
The remainder of this section seeks to justify each of these subjects in turn. It will 





There are several reasons why law students should learn about the political nature of 
law. First, a political understanding of law helps students understand the origin and 
purposes of statute law. Second, by learning politics, students can understand the 
social context of law. Third, learning politics allows students to gain a greater 
understanding of the process involved in creating law. Finally, students will gain a 
greater understanding of how judges can act as political actors, which will be 
discussed in further detail below. 
When he created the first US law school, Thomas Jefferson argued that law students 
should learn law and politics together.12 In Jefferson’s words: ‘Every political 
measure will forever have an intimate connection with the laws of the land’.13 This is 
because so much of modern law is statute law, and it is thus directly created by 
politicians. Never was this more apparent than in the fledgling American Republic. In 
the early 1800s, law graduates frequently became politicians who shaped the laws of 
their own country. Jefferson himself possessed firsthand knowledge of being both a 
student of law and a creator of law as a politician—and, eventually, as an executive 
when he became president. The political nature of law in this case seems clear: 
politicians create, change and amend the law, and all law—at least statute law—is 
thus inherently political. 
In some law schools, students are said to ‘not learn anything about the causal relation 
between politics and law’.14 To achieve this, the law schools have prioritised the 
teaching of case law above legislation (with the exception of corporations law), which 
diminishes the significance of legislation and its political nature.15 By teaching case 
law, law schools can pretend that all law is apolitical.16 Case law can be portrayed as 
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objective, reasonable and fair, without any political agenda.17 Politicians can be 
diminished as side-players who are irrelevant to the main concentration of law in 
casebooks. Students can be taught an ‘imagined order’ in which judges are always 
objective and apolitical, and case law is superior to statute law.18 
Of course, this is considered a legal fiction. A proper understanding of law includes 
understanding the political nature of law—that is, knowing how all law is political 
and how it has political and social origins.19 Properly understanding the law also 
includes understanding the dominant role of statute law and its political origins and 
purposes. Much can be gained here from reflecting on the CLS movement. 
Specifically, the CLS movement aimed to challenge the ‘law’s ideological neutrality’ 
by revealing that all law was political.20 The core subjects of law school have long 
hidden an unseen ideological agenda of hierarchy, status and class; ‘property rights 
are understood to confer power … contractual bargaining is never truly equal’.21 
Students of law should learn from where the law originates, why it exists and whose 
interest it serves. For example, law schools should teach that statute law originates 
from the government, that case law originates from the problems of society and the 
‘community standards’ that are observed by a judge, and that changes to the 
constitution arise from political processes.22 
Last, it should be stated that to teach law as politics is not necessarily the same as 
teaching law progressively or conservatively; simply, it is to reveal the political 
context in which the law is created. Political education can be apolitical. As Max 
Weber suggested, teaching can occur without political indoctrination, and even 
politics should be taught logically and objectively.23 However, there is an ongoing 
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debate regarding whether this kind of critically detached, unbiased education is 
possible. It could be that the law cannot be taught without a political bias (a ‘hidden 
curriculum’ of politics) that the legal educator imparts in his or her class as a core 
functioning of legal content that offers political outcomes.24 For example, Lucy 
Maxwell called legal education a ‘value laden enterprise’ in which the choices of 
lecturers, down to the jokes they tell in class, influence student learning.25 In 1985, at 
the height of the CLS movement, Susan E Keller (a second year Harvard Law 
Student) argued, ‘I haven’t been in a law school class without a political slant. You 
can't teach law neutrally’.26 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer this 
question directly; however, it will note that the discussion is ongoing and important. 
i) Enhancing an Understanding of Legislation 
Law schools can teach students politics to help them gain a better understanding of 
legislation. Statute law is political in origin, and it can only be understood through an 
understanding of the political process of government. Waldron suggested that 
‘everyone knows that argument in Congress [or Parliament] is explicitly and 
unashamedly political’.27 The process of creating statute law is ‘unashamedly 
political’ because it involves politicians acting in the political process for political 
purposes.28 Law is created by the ‘machinations of the legislative branch’.29 
A statute is created by Parliament through the negotiation of various political parties, 
each pursuing its own political agenda.30 Politicians make law reform proposals at 
regular intervals during the lead-up to national elections.31 Theoretically, the public 
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votes on these law reform proposals on election day. Once elected, a political party 
(with a majority in Parliament) essentially has the ultimate power to either keep or 
break their promises.32 Australia’s system empowers majority governments with 
supreme ‘law-making authority’: a statute can be changed by another statute, a case 
law can be overridden by an act of Parliament, and the constitution can be changed by 
a referendum that is triggered by the Executive branch (though this rarely occurs).33 In 
this way, all law is subject to parliamentary rule, and all law is subject to politics.34 
Indeed, case law taught in law schools only remains in effect at the whim of the 
Parliament, so it is a diminutive form of law.35 Sir Edward Coke summarised this 
argument as follows: 
[The Parliament] hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, 
confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and 
expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible determinations, 
ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime or criminal.36 
To properly understand the law, students must be taught how the Parliament and 
politics shape and influence the law.37 More than ever, statute law plays an 
increasingly dominant role over case law in Australian society. It is essential to teach 
students that statute law can override case law in most common-law countries.38 This 
means that the Parliament (and politics) can influence any law.39 Therefore, in this 
context, it does not make sense to teach students ‘nothing—quite literally nothing—
about the legislative’ in the current law curriculum.40 
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Students might also understand the political nature of statute law to know from where 
it came and what bias lies within it (from judges, lawyers or professors).41 The 
Langdell model of legal education liked to present the law as objective. Conversely, 
statute law tends to reflect the bias of its creators. It specifically reflects the political 
party that created it—revealing a progressive, centrist or conservative leaning. 
Friedrich Hayek argued that law derives from the same ‘common aim’ of a 
parliament: the removal of ‘all sources of discontent among the people’.42 However, 
political parties remove discontent in different ways (e.g., progressives by social 
welfare, conservatives by tax cuts). To understand statute law properly is to 
understand these political agendas behind the law. 
Finally, law students might be taught the politics of law to understand why the law is 
subject to change.43 Historically, law schools have been slow to respond to changing 
laws and unable to handle law reform. Cases were considered static and immovable. 
Revealing the truth about legal change was the foundational point of the legal realist 
movement.44 The legal realists suggested that all law is ‘living’ rather than static or 
immoveable.45 The law changes over time in response to changing political pressures 
on society, including the social forces that emerge from society.46 Social pressures 
push the government to change the law, and in this way, all law is political. Typically, 
a social norm would arise in society (e.g., the acceptance of gay marriage), and then it 
would become a law enacted by the government.47 Social habits and customs 
frequently form a primary source of law.48 As habits and society change, so too does 
the law. All law derives from the changing nature that is inherent in the political 
process itself; it fluctuates and changes according to the type, form and power of the 
government, as well as the changing nature of the people under its care.49 
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From the politics of law, students can learn why law differs from country to country. 
The laws of Australia are different from those of the US because the Australian 
people are different from the American people. The laws of a country reflect the 
people that live in that country, their social habits and practices, their political 
opinions and the form of government in charge.50 As Woodrow Wilson suggested, 
‘There is no universal law, but for each nation a law of its own which bears evident 
marks of having been developed along with the national character’.51 
ii) Political Judges 
Even when teaching case law, law schools must be careful to teach how politics can 
interfere with a judge’s reasoning. A judge’s reasoning typically reflects his or her 
political context. On the one hand, a judge can advocate for a particular community 
sentiment; conversely, the judge might actively pursue a political agenda by becoming 
an ‘activist judge’. 
First, it is useful to question whether a judge can be objective at all. Nietzsche argued 
that ‘pure reason’ or pure ‘objectivity’ does not exist.52 Everything that people 
observe and know is observed and known from their own perspectives.53 Everything 
people ‘know’ comes from their subjective experience of the world around them.54 
The CLS movement argued in a similar vein that all judicial decisions emerge from a 
judge’s social and political context—from his or her lifestyle, upbringing and 
privilege.55 A judge ‘does not turn a blind eye to the world outside the courtroom’, but 
instead draws the outside world into the court to assist in the decision-making 
process.56 In this way, judges are a reflection of their social, economic and political 
circumstances. 
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Students must understand how judges can reflect their social and political context 
when they decide a case. Specifically, judges frequently decide cases on the basis of 
the views of the community; they can enforce community standards and sentiments in 
court.57 References to modernity, community standards, community views and other 
concepts (which frequently occurs throughout case law) are not references to some 
abstract objective standards, but a reflection of the community itself; it is a zeitgeist 
that the judge is reflecting.58 For example, when NSW Justice Heilpern declared that 
the word ‘fuck’ no longer constituted offensive language, he did so based on public 
opinion shifting away from conservative views on language.59 Justice Heilpern 
referred to his own experience outside the court, of hearing the word frequently yelled 
on train station platforms.60 The basis of his decision was that people could yell ‘fuck’ 
at a train station without anyone turning around in response. This clearly reflected the 
social context of Justice Heilpern’s life. To use another example, when the US 
Supreme Court legalised gay marriage, it did so on the basis of community sentiment 
shifting towards a more progressive agenda (i.e., an acceptance of a new definition of 
‘equality’).61 
When the views of society affect a judicial decision in this way, it cannot be said that 
a judge is acting apolitically or objectively.62 Instead, judges are revealed to be acting 
within the bounds of their social and political community.63 Given that judges can act 
politically, it is not enough for law students to learn cases without political context. 
Instead, they should be taught the political origin of those cases, as well as the social 
mores that those cases reflect. 
In some cases, judges might reach beyond community values to directly enforce the 
will of Parliament. In the UK, judges can ‘consult the record of parliamentary debate’ 
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to assist in their judgement.64 The court can look to ‘clear statements made in 
Parliament concerning the purpose of legislation … as a guide’.65 By referring to 
parliamentary statements, judges can act as enforcers of the Parliament’s mandate. 
The judiciary is thereby involved in trying to understand the political context in which 
the law is created. Even more so, the judiciary are expected to enforce political 
viewpoints in the interpretation of statutes. They might do so by considering the literal 
meaning of the words of a statute or by referencing the ‘mischief’ that the statute 
wished to resolve in the community.66 Chief Justice Gleeson suggested that 
‘legislation and the common law are not separate and independent sources of law. 
They exist in a symbiotic relationship.’67 
It is important for students to understand this symbiotic relationship; they should 
understand that judges interpret legislation, which is created by politicians in a 
political process. Cases cannot neatly be separated from statute law, nor can they be 
separated from political actors. 
Judges might reach beyond reflecting their political context and become judicial 
activists. So-called ‘activist’ judges use their political opinions to determine a case’s 
outcome based purely on political terms.68 Students should be trained to spot these 
judges and question whether it is objective to decide on a political basis in this 
manner. That judicial activists exist undermines the claim that all judges are 
independent and objective actors. Activist judges might ignore precedent they dislike 
or pursue one line of reasoning in an illogical manner or their own ideology.69 For 
example, a large-scale study of US Federal Appeals Courts from 1995 to 2004 found 
‘strong evidence of ideological voting’ in judges appointed by one political party or 
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another.70 In the US Supreme Court, judges frequently declare themselves ‘liberal or 
conservative’.71 Although individual cases reveal no impression of ideological voting, 
the decisions made over a long period indicate a trend towards a political bias, when 
judges declare their own bias up front.72 
When testing for a liberal bias, the same study found that ‘Democrat appointees 
[were] far more likely to vote in the stereotypically liberal direction than Republican 
appointees’.73 For example, in affirmative action cases, Democrat-appointed judges 
voted in favour of affirmative action 75 per cent of the time, as compared to 
Republican-appointed judges at 47 per cent.74 In regard to environmental policies, 
Republican-appointed judges voted against 60 per cent of the time, as compared to 
Democrat-appointed judges at 24 per cent of the time. The political affiliation of the 
judges on judicial panels had clearly influenced their ‘judicial decisions’.75 
An argument can be made here regarding whether judges act consciously or 
subconsciously when promoting their own bias. According to CLS scholar Duncan 
Kennedy, judicial bias is ‘half-conscious’.76 Judges are consciously aware that legal 
rules are ideological and political; conversely, they ‘plow’ on regardless, acting as if 
‘everything were fine’.77 By adopting the rational and objective language of legalese, 
judges can fool themselves into a form of wilful blindness.78 Judges frequently do this 
by ‘couching’ their bias in legal wording and by referring to higher principles, human 
rights treaties or ‘policy questions’—all of which are a call to the specific social and 
political values of the society in which they live.79 A judge can sound objective when 
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talking about the higher principles of Western society; however, realistically, they are 
outlining a political point that supports their own political perspective. 
Conservative judges have traditionally maintained the doctrine of ‘originalism’—
which involves avoiding references to higher principles and modern social context 
altogether.80 For example, conservative legal philosopher Jeffery Goldsworthy 
claimed that a judge’s duty ‘is to declare the law as enacted in the constitution’.81 The 
constitution ‘pre-exists judicial interpretation of it’, so the role of the judge is thus to 
defend the original interpretation of the constitution from reactionary critics.82 
However, even if this viewpoint is adopted, the original documents that were relied 
upon—the constitutions, statutes and regulations—were initially created by politicians 
for a political purpose. It is impossible to escape the political nature of law itself when 
even our founding documents are politically motivated. 
b) History 
In the 1950s, several Australian law schools taught legal history as a first year 
subject—although the quality of this teaching could be quite poor.83 The subject 
involved the study of legal institutions, such as the rise of the Chancery Courts of 
Equity in England.84 However, over time, the study of legal history became less 
popular.85 Government reports began asking what the purpose was for studying legal 
history, with some even concluding that there was no purpose.86 
With the increasingly vocational outlook of law schools in Australia in the 1990s, 
subjects like legal history were cut and replaced by the Priestley Eleven.87 By 2008, 
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only one out of 31 Australian law schools taught legal history as a compulsory first 
year course.88 Discarding legal history as a compulsory subject decreased the early 
theoretical focus of law schools; it deprived students of an important opportunity to 
contextualise their studies at the start of their degree.89 The lack of history also made 
students less critical about long-standing legal institutions; students did not know how 
those institutions were developed over time, nor of any inherent flaws they might 
have had at their inception or subsequently. 
This section argues that legal history plays an important role in contextualising the 
law, in turning the law student’s mind to a sharper form of critical thinking, and in 
helping students learn from past mistakes to imagine successful law reform in the 
future. This thesis does not argue for a traditional legal history to be taught in law 
schools (a history of legal institutions), but rather for a broader teaching of the history 
of law itself—including when the law has promoted injustices and wrongs. A proper 
history of law would teach students about when the law has been considered good and 
bad in society. It would thus allow students to critically examine current laws as they 
exist today. 
i) The History of Unjust Law 
The common idea of history can be summarised by the phrase ‘history repeats itself’ 
or the variation ‘we must learn from the lessons of history’. These phrases do not 
adequately express the full utility of the study of history. History not only awakens 
one’s sense of wrongdoing in the past, it also inspires people with stories of success. 
History teaches both failures and successes, as well as trials, tribulations and 
jubilation. It also helps contrast the current system with the systems that came before 
it, allowing people to break free from the constraints of believing that the world has 
always permanently been as perceived. Instead, history will allow people to perceive 
the world as an organic structure, a tree of infinite branches that spread outwards 
throughout time—which reveals everything, even the simplest of tasks, that was 
accomplished differently at a different point along the timeline. 
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In law schools, history can serve various purposes. First, it can teach students when 
the law has failed in the past and when the law has caused injustices or the destruction 
of the rights of certain groups (e.g., disadvantaged minorities).90 In history, students 
can discover the various mistakes of the law, and they can try to avoid the ‘repetition 
of [these] historical mistakes’.91 Law can reveal the ‘hiccups’ that occurred along the 
way to legal efficiency. Legal history can reveal errors of judgement made by judges, 
Parliament and society by enforcing unjust laws, slavery and the suppression of 
women or Indigenous populations.92 This prevents the common ‘tendency of students 
to take what they are encountering for granted, as though it was inevitable and 
inexorable’.93 If the law is taught as if it were ‘complete’, then students would not 
understand how it came to be how it is today or whether any alternative was 
possible.94 Indeed, ‘Some lawyers … teach so that students understand the injustices 
of our legal system and become motivated to reform the law’.95 
Along with certain injustices, legal history can also reveal success stories—times 
when judges, Parliament and society rose above legal prejudices. On this topic, the 
message of legal realists is important. If law reflects social values, then the study of 
legal history can reveal how positive social values effected legal change over time.96 
The cause of these effects is the interaction of social movements with the law, which 
substantially changes the history of legal norms. Reflecting on this ‘evolution’ of law 
can help students perceive behind the law they are learning in class.97 It can help them 
understand and question the law’s basis in society and its changeability in the face of 
various social forces:98 
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Not to grasp this is … to fall into a particular kind of error, namely the belief 
that human nature is static, that its essential properties are the same 
everywhere and at all times, that it is governed by unvarying natural laws 
whether they are conceived in theological or materialistic terms … [that] 
rational men, in all ages and countries, must always demand the same 
unfaltering satisfactions of the same unfaltering basic needs.99 
In contrast, the study of legal history allows students to question what the law is by 
observing what it was through the lens of what it could be. Students can learn how far 
law has served ‘social ends, and how far it failed to do so’.100 Legal history acts like 
all social sciences, as it allows students to ‘question values—by testing traditions that 
build up over centuries and millennia’.101 Using their knowledge, students can 
question laws that currently exist, including questioning whether they ‘should 
continue to apply’.102 Knowledge of the past offers imaginatively new solutions 
because a knowledge of history ‘suggests possibilities of action’ that would not have 
otherwise occurred to the student.103 In brief, a legal problem can be resolved in far 
more ways historically then it can with the handful of solutions evident today.104 As a 
practical point, this can help future lawyers manage clients; when lawyers require 
novel and creative solutions to legal problems that do not immediately come to mind, 
they might be found in the history books.105 
Finally, legal history can teach students how ‘our collective assumptions, some going 
back to the nation’s founding, continue to drive decisions about law and policy’.106 
Without a clear knowledge of history, students will not know from where original 
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legal decisions were made or why they were decided.107 Students who are critical of 
the historical origins of legal norms can also benefit from a well-rounded, in-depth 
discussion of this history and the ‘impact’ that these decisions and rules have had over 
time.108 
ii) Methods 
There are many ways to teach legal history in law schools. Legal history is sometimes 
treated as a ‘skills course’, and it is taught as if students would become legal 
historians.109 Such a class involves the discovery of primary documents—‘ship logs, 
birth and death certificates, maps, military and church records’—all to solve some 
legal problem.110 In a skills course, legal history tends to be taught via a casebook, in 
which students learn past cases and how legal principles have evolved through cases 
over time (e.g., the evolution of contract law from the 1800s to the present).111 
However, legal history can equally be taught via an essay or creative task, in which 
students choose their own topic and write about the critical development of law over 
time.112 This kind of task possesses an important critical element: it allows students to 
propose how the law was just or unjust, as well as propose various measures for 
reform.113 
Another way to teach legal history is by way of a ‘moot court’. In some ways, this can 
be considered a legal simulation task in which historical arguments are revised for the 
modern age.114 In one relevant example, a tutor uses ‘timed arguments’ in which 
students argue their side of a case as a historical moot occurring at some distant 
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period in time.115 In this task, students can act as questioners and litigants, while the 
tutor acts as a judge who provides competing and novel perspectives.116 
As a final example, legal history can be taught through the history of legal education 
itself. A course could be constructed in a similar way to this thesis, in which it teaches 
the development of legal education from the Inns of Court in London to the Langdell 
case method.117 From this history, students would learn: ‘Where did the pedagogy for 
the legal education they are experiencing come from?’ They could thus more easily 
and critically examine the education they are receiving.118 In learning the history of 
legal education, students can similarly seek to change it, to make it more alike to a 
particular period in time or to resuscitate a teaching method that has been lost in 
history books.119 
In all these methods, legal history can critically engage law students through a deeper 
and more contextual understanding of their discipline. In addressing the concern 
above that legal history might have no purpose in a law school today, one suggestion 
could be to pair compulsory first year subject in legal history with the teaching of 
statute law, in which the political science behind the creation of statutes is 
emphasised. Teaching legal history in this manner would solve three core deficiencies 
in the current curriculum: a lack of statute law, a lack of legal history and a lack of 
political science. 
c) Philosophy 
Law schools in common-law countries such as the US used to teach legal philosophy 
in introductory courses and lectures.120 This was accomplished as a contextual 
background to a subject, often by referencing the philosophical theory of natural 
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presumed that all law had a ‘moral [and] spiritual basis’, if it did not come directly 
from God.122 Aristotle believed that all law came from nature and that natural law was 
applicable ‘in all communities’.123 Aquinas believed that all law came from the 
‘nature of human beings’ and that God or was human made.124 By teaching natural 
law, law schools could introduce students to the notion that law had emerged from a 
philosophical foundation. 
Despite its religious nature, natural law raised several secular philosophical questions 
about the law itself, including questions about right and wrong, justice and injustice 
and morality and immorality.125 Natural law theory taught students to question why 
the law existed.126 Students could question whether a law was just or unjust or they 
could question the law by referring to its philosophical foundations. Students typically 
learned that ‘an unjust law is no law at all’.127 Martin Luther King Jr stated as much 
when he served a term of imprisonment: 
How does one determine when a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man-
made code that squares with the moral law, or the law of God. An unjust law 
is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of 
St. Thomas Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in 
eternal and natural law.128 
According to Martin Luther King Jr, a law must ‘square’ with its philosophical 
foundations to be just. Breaking the law would be justified if the law moved away 
from these ideals.129 Further, breaking an unjust law would be justified because the 
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breaking of law would serve a higher, natural law.130 In this way, all law was subject 
to higher principles or guidelines that went beyond human action. 
As society became more secular, natural law theory went out of favour in law schools 
in common-law countries—and with it, most of the teachings of legal philosophy, 
aside from a few elective courses.131 Instead of rationalising that natural law was just 
one branch of legal philosophy, writers like Langdell and Kelsen insisted that all 
philosophy (aside from legal positivism) should follow suit and be excluded from the 
curriculum.132 Law students were thus taught that law’s authority was self-evident, 
that the creator of the law was not to be questioned and that law was to be enforced 
regardless of its character.133 In this way, the spiritual doctrine of natural law was 
replaced by the spiritual doctrine of legal positivism.134 
The philosophy of law is much more complicated than the original teaching of natural 
law would suggest. Questions of justice and injustice, right and wrong and morality 
and immorality have numerous potential solutions from numerous schools of 
philosophical thought.135 Thinkers from various schools of thought—including 
Foucault, Nietzsche, Aquinas and Aristotle—had much to say about whether a 
potential law is just or unjust.136 In the same way, philosophers have much to say 
about what the law actually is, from where it originates and how it should be enforced 
in society.137 Courses can comprise readings to this end, prompting intellectual 
inquiry in the classroom.138 Nim Razook proposed an ‘Introduction to Law and Legal 
Reasoning’ subject that could consider the philosophical foundation of legal concepts 
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and thereby promote a student’s ‘general education’.139 Teaching both theoretical and 
philosophical questions of law would extend well beyond the current law school 
curriculum, and it would address issues of purpose and perspective in law. 
Restoring philosophy to the current law school curriculum would have three main 
benefits. First, teaching philosophy would allow law students to understand ‘why they 
should do what they are told to do’.140 Legal philosophy reveals from where the law 
originates and, more importantly, why it exists or why it should be enforced.141 
Instead of blindly learning the legal principles in cases, students could engage with 
the actual purpose of law: examining whether a law was just or unjust, fair or unfair 
or moral or immoral.142 Second, the teaching of philosophy would draw to law 
students with a ‘fresh cultural perspective’.143 They would effectively have the ability 
to step outside themselves and observe the larger picture of the law, as well as escape 
their ‘narrow and limited worldviews’.144 Finally, the teaching of philosophy would 
allow students to question what they are being taught on philosophical grounds. Just 
as Martin Luther King Jr argued above, students could be empowered to question 
whether a law is just or unjust by using the fundamental principles of philosophy, 
rational thinking and critical thought.145 
i) Law and Literature 
Some academics have suggested that the conceptual basis of law should be discovered 
through the teaching of law and literature, in which philosophical issues would be 
revealed through literary texts.146 Novels, short stories and plays are easily digestible 
materials that allow students to consider ‘the place of justice in the legal system’.147 
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Literature offers students a ‘moral education’ that can support the students acquiring a 
vocational knowledge148 Students also learn ‘a capacity for empathy’ regarding 
others, which can help them sympathise with future clients and prevent them from 
becoming disconnected from society.149 
For example, a course on law and literature at Harvard Law School includes texts 
such as Kafka’s The Trial and Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice and Hamlet, in 
addition to short stories by Tolstoy and Chekhov.150 Each of these texts has something 
to say about justice, injustice and the enforcement of law on society. Writers like 
Kafka and Shakespeare typically provide the emotional background behind the law 
through ‘imaginative moral stories’.151 Such stories ‘transcend any limited 
instrumental goals of legal education as professional training’.152 Professor Simon 
Stern of the University of Toronto described his own law and literature course and the 
questions that he asks his classes: 
[Focusing] on two problems that have … occupied literary thinkers: the 
problem of criminal responsibility and literature’s ability to document 
human thought and motives, and the question of privacy in criminal law, tort 
law and fiction.153 
Basic black-letter law subjects like torts and contracts gain an important 
psychological dimension when they are read through literature.154 A dry contractual 
case is revealed to have a fundamentally human motive: the pursuance of a personal 
dream or ambition or the reflection of human emotions of love, regret, anger and 
sadness. Fundamentally, literature allows law to be regarded as something that affects 
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Although common in the US, law and literature programs have ‘only recently been 
adopted by Australian law schools’.155 Typically, law schools teach them as an 
elective, much like the broader humanities subjects, which places it in a subservient 
position in the curriculum. For example, at UTS Law School, law and literature are 
taught as an elective that aims to offer students a chance to ‘examine literary and legal 
responses to violence and trauma’.156 This thematic approach to law and literature is 
common. Melbourne Law School teaches a similar course focusing on the 
‘professional challenges of law’ that are observed through novels.157 In either case, 
law and literature courses offer students the possibility to ‘explore the distinction 
between moral neatness and legal certainty’.158 
For example, is it moral for Shylock to demand a pound of flesh in Shakespeare’s 
Merchant of Venice, for his debtor’s failure to satisfy a debt?159 If it is legal (in that 
time) but immoral (in effect), what right does the law have to enforce this immoral 
act? Can the law always enforce immoral actions, or should such laws be changed? Is 
the last-minute intervention from a female lawyer (an example of law rectifying for its 
own inadequacy) or a justification for law reform? 
Such questions are extremely rare in the classic case method and problem question 
method, due to its strict application of law to facts. However, they reveal a unique 
teaching opportunity if pursued. Part of the allure of law and literature classes is the 
ease with which they provide students ‘critical skills of analysis, research, 
communication and critical thinking’—skills that are said to form the broad part of a 
future career.160 If law schools embrace the use of texts to explore legal thought, then 
this would have a significant ramification on the tone and scope of legal education. 
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Although the ‘main purpose of a law school’ might be to ‘produce lawyers’. lawyers 
are also citizens’; they thus require this broader, general style of education to fit their 
unique role in society.161 
d) Critical Thinking 
In 1997 a US law professor wrote that ‘law students today appear disinterested’ in 
criticising the law.162 Since then, the rise of the neoliberal legal education model has 
driven law students to focus on the use of law as a set of rules to be ‘memorized, 
manipulated and applied’ rather than ‘explored, discussed, critiqued, and perhaps 
challenged’.163 Law schools remain wedded to a vocational teaching of law based on 
the Langdelian model, and they lack the expansive nature of a truly critical liberal arts 
education.164 
Critical thinking in legal education can be defined as: 
Disciplined reasoning about a legal statement, claim, argument, decision, 
rule or action, beginning with an accurate and detailed interpretation, 
progressing through a perceptive and thorough analysis and an appropriate, 
rigorous and balanced evaluation, and concluding with an original, 
persuasive and ingenious synthesis.165 
Critical thinking is the ability to question what is being taught with a reflective and 
critical eye to agendas, biases or contrary viewpoints.166 To be critical is to avoid an 
uncritical acceptance of what is taught, as well as to avoid the simple rote 
memorisation of factual information.167 Critical thinking here can be contrasted with 
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‘surface learning’, which ‘emphasises the ability to memorise and list information’.168 
When compared, critical thinking is a deeper form of learning that involves 
reflection.169 
According to the official ‘qualifications framework’, law students are not merely at 
university to learn facts, theories or technical skills alone; they are there to learn how 
to think independently about their subject matter (in this case, the law).170 To become 
a professional lawyer is to understand the law well enough that one has an informed, 
personal opinion on it. Law schools should be in the business of creating independent 
thinkers who have achieved this ability to think for themselves, reject ‘subordination 
to mere authority’ and free themselves from bias or prejudice.171 In the words of 
Justice Edelman: ‘The primary aim of a law degree ought to be to teach students how 
to think. The goal ought to be to teach students to think about how the law operates 
and how its constituent parts tie together’.172 
In law schools, critical thinking could involve an active criticism of legal institutions, 
laws and judges, including an admission of what is ‘fallacious’ in their reasoning and 
a pursuit of a personal opinion regarding what the law ought to be.173 
Critical thinking poses several distinct benefits to ‘law students … employers and for 
the wider community’.174 First, and most importantly, critical thinking can offer 
students a greater ‘understanding of legal doctrine’.175 Second, critical thinking can 
help students identify the ‘benefits and flaws’ of a doctrine, and thereby the potential 
places for law reform.176 When students learn to question the law, they also learn the 
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law’s agenda and whether it can change.177 In this way, critical thinking engages 
students’ creative imagination and perception of how the law relates to their own 
ideals of philosophy and sociology.178 Finally, critical thinking allows students to 
admit their own flaws in logic and understand when something they say is faulty or 
incorrect.179 
This notion of admitting one’s own faults is ancient, deriving from Socrates, 
Confucius and, more recently, John Stuart Mill.180 As an ancient Greek philosopher, 
Socrates believed that authority figures should constantly be questioned to ensure that 
those who called themselves ‘wise were actually as wise as they claimed’.181 
Institutions and authority figures that are taken for granted as having knowledge (e.g., 
the law and politicians) were revealed to have flaws and deficiencies when they were 
questioned.182 
Socrates believed that someone who was truly wise would admit their own 
deficiencies and understand the deficiencies in others.183 Confucius believed the same, 
that the wise man is someone who knows the limits of their own ignorance.184 In an 
educational setting, Confucian or Socratic critical thinking would require the constant 
questioning of authority or what Foucault termed the ‘permanent critique’ of the 
status quo.185 Lecturers, institutions and factual content would all be examined by 
critical students who will search to find what is and is not true. The students’ ability to 
consider all points of view, open themselves to criticism, admit their faults and correct 
what was faulty are all essential aspects of critical thinking.186 As John Stuart Mill 
expressed: 
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In the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, 
how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his 
opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that 
could be said against him; to profit by as much of it as was just, and 
expound to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was 
fallacious.187 
Understanding what is wrong in one’s own thinking and in the thinking of one’s 
teachers and institutions is to gain an independent state of mind.188 A critical view of 
education thus helps students form their own perspective on the world. The best 
method for encouraging students to think critically is to prompt them to question 
everything they are taught.189 This could involve encouraging students to ask 
questions in class about the laws they are learning, about legal institutions or about 
any presumed assumptions regarding how the law ought to operate in society. Failing 
this, students can be asked questions that prompt them to consider a deeper analysis of 
the law and its systems. 
The Canadian law professor, Harry Arthurs, used this technique in his classes. He 
asked various critical law questions aimed at positioning the ‘rules in a broader 
context’.190 This kind of critical questioning prevents students from passively 
absorbing legal content, and it prompts them to engage with that content actively.191 
Examples of such questions are cited below: 
Do the rules create new norms or codify existing ones developed originally 
without the law? Why do we have those rules and not others? Who benefits 
from the rules, and who is disadvantaged? Why are the rules interpreted in 
one way and not another? Do the rules matter at all?192 
These questions tend to find the unasked assumptions that hid behind the legal 
order—specifically that assumption that the law is objective, that it benefits everyone 
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questions about law that deconstruct these assumptions.193 To this end, Arthurs has 
remarked on his teaching method as so: ‘Law ought to be understood by and subject 
to the critical scrutiny of as many people as possible’.194 
At least three Australian academics have emphasised the necessity for critical 
thinking to be spread throughout the entire law school curriculum.195 Ardill suggested 
that ‘critique must be embedded throughout the curriculum with a proper introduction 
during first year and then appropriately reinforced’.196 Without an entire curriculum 
approach, students might become disengaged from the critique of law or they might 
regard the critique of law as superfluous to the central aim of law school (to learn law 
and apply it to a set of facts).197 
e) Enforcement 
Instead of simply learning and scientifically applying the law, law students should be 
directly confronted in class with the moral, philosophical and sociological effects of 
law on society, including how the law has been enforced in the past. Students should 
be directly confronted with questions such as ‘why do you think the law is the way it 
is?’ and ‘how do you think the law affects people in real life?’, which practically 
address the effects and inherent problems involved in creating, obeying and enforcing 
the law.198 
Lecturers can provide context to the law in a way that allows students to see the issue 
from the perspective of other ‘voices’ that are not typically heard in the classroom 
(e.g., Indigenous, migrants).199 This ensures that what law students learn is ‘relevant’ 
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to the real world, as how the law has been enforced in various groups in society (and 
the consequent effects) has been revealed.200 By questioning the enforcement of law, 
students can ‘develop intellectual insights’ into how the law operates in practice.201 
This can help them develop their own independent ‘standards of justice, of 
effectiveness, by which legal outcomes and doctrines may be judged’.202 
Similar questions should be asked—those with a view towards critical thinking. Role-
plays or class skits can be used to portray realities of how the law affects various 
parties, in which students can play the part of a ‘loser’ or ‘winner’ of the legal system 
or case.203 Examples of such role-plays already exist in the areas of civil procedure, 
matrimonial disputes and dispute resolution and mediation, in which innovative 
lecturers create legal simulations that enliven such content for students.204 In contrast, 
the ‘mere regurgitation off acts’ should not be an option.205 Actual intellectual 
engagement should be encouraged.206 
A course on the enforcement of law can also provide ‘a general view of legal ends and 
aims, with the specific purpose of purging the student’s mind entirely of the 
dangerous tendency to consider law a study of unrelated duties and rights’.207 Instead, 
students can gain the ability to ‘habitually … consider … the social advantages on 
which the law must be justified’.208 Further, they can become more hesitant about 
simply applying legal principles.209 By observing how law affects society, students 
can ‘see that really they were taking sides upon debatable and often burning 
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questions’ in their black-letter law classes.210 It is often the case that what at first 
seemed objective was, in reality, subjective and deeply political. 
Burton and McNamara asserted that law students should extend beyond critiquing the 
enforcement of law and consider whether the law ‘can be improved’.211 Instead of 
simply applying the law, law students can be offered the chance to challenge the 
existing law by prompting questions of law reform before writing down such 
suggestions. Such a task could come in the form of an essay or other critical thinking 
tool.212 
Law students should not be allowed to ‘stand aside’ and wait for a legal argument to 
reach its conclusion. They should be actively engaged in the public debate of the 
latest issues of law.213 This attributes a new purpose to students, in which they are 
intrinsically engaged in their surrounding community rather than in the current role as 
abstract arbiters of hypothetical disputes. Just as Justice Kirby was engaged in the 
fight for gay rights in the 1980s, law students today should be openly involved in 
questioning outdated legal norms that defy basic principles of justice, fairness and 
morality.214 Such questions should be enhanced by a consideration of the law’s prior 
historical context, as well as of how law has been enforced in the past—specifically in 
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Law schools in Australia are at a crossroads. They can continue as they have been 
during the last century, in which they teach law as a vocation and pursue profits over 
principles, private practice over public purpose and graduate attributes over intrinsic 
human values. They can continue to sideline their students’ moral, ethical and critical 
perspectives by moving these perspectives outside the scope of the curriculum. They 
can continue to teach law as apolitical through black-letter assessments that turn the 
hearts and minds of students away from social justice. They can continue teaching law 
through the case method and ignore new and alternative ways of understanding the 
law in context. They can continue to train students for their place in the hierarchy, 
while dismissing concerns about inequality, the disadvantaged and the poor. They can 
continue to ignore pertinent critiques about the law’s injustices on issues of race, 
gender, class and sexuality. 
Alternatively, they can turn in a new direction, break away from the neoliberal agenda 
of the present day and adopt a liberal arts curriculum that places the law in its proper 
context. This thesis has argued for a liberal arts law school curriculum in Australia—
one that is centred on a critical approach to legal education, in which students learn 
the law’s origin, intent and effect on society. The proposed curriculum combines ideas 
of teaching law from history and from modern innovation, along with education 
theory, humanities education and critiques from past and present law students. 
Specifically, this thesis proposes new and alternative teaching methods, assessments 
and subjects that differ from traditional recommendations in their scope and breadth. 
This thesis is ultimately an attempt to transform the rhetoric regarding subversive 
legal education into an actionable plan. 
A true liberal arts curriculum in law would teach students to think for themselves, 
develop their critical and analytical skills, their sense of justice and injustice, their 
ability to propose law reform and their hard and soft transferable skills. Specifically, 
the curriculum would contextualise the study of law in a broader study of politics, 
history, civics, psychology and philosophy by preparing students to become well-
rounded citizens in the broad range of jobs they will obtain after graduation. 
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Achieving this vision requires significant changes to law schools, such as discarding 
the current compulsory subjects (the Priestley Eleven) in favour of electives and/or 
humanities subjects. The curriculum also requires an overhaul in its content, 
assessment methods and modes of measuring outcomes. Legal principles should be 
contextualised in class through philosophical questions about the law. Finally, the 
Socratic method should be reversed, in which it allows students to ask questions of 
their professors, judges and the law itself. These recommendations will now be 
covered in greater detail, including a discussion regarding their means of 
implementation. 
Recommendation 1: Abolish OR Substantially Reduce the Priestley Eleven 
Any significant change to legal education in Australia would require the Priestley 
Eleven subject requirements to be discarded in favour of a more refined and shorter 
list of core subjects.215 The Priestley Eleven currently act as a ‘dead hand’ on 
curriculum reform that prevents law schools from innovating and experimenting with 
new subject choices for students.216 Heavy with black-letter law subjects, the Priestley 
Eleven prevent students from properly contextualising the law, given its relation to 
the humanities and social sciences.217 Despite objections to the contrary, current law 
schools do not ‘experiment’ within the framework of the Priestley Eleven. The 
evidence demonstrates that most law schools teach the subjects as individual units (as 
11 units throughout a law degree).218 One-off experimentations in which the subjects 
were merged, such as that of Macquarie Law School in the 1970s, have been met with 
harsh resistance.219 
As a starting point, LACC’s own 2015 observations can be implemented, by reducing 
subjects that already appear in PLT training courses at graduation, such as civil 
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procedure, company law, ethics and evidence.220 After this, subjects can be paired in 
traditional pairings, such as contracts and torts and administrative law and 
constitutional law. The results are expressed in the following list of five subjects: 
• Administrative Law and Constitutional Law 
• Contracts and Torts 
• Criminal Law and Procedure 
• Equity 
• Property 
• Civil Procedure 
• Company Law 
• Ethics 
• Evidence 
Recommendation 2: Create New, Humanities-Based Electives 
One step beyond abolishing the Priestley Eleven is suggesting the addition of a few 
elective units that can augment the traditional leftover subjects. In this case, the 
elective law units could be of a non–black letter nature, and they could allow students 
to contextualise their study of law within the broader humanities. This builds on the 
broader conclusions that were reached above—that law should be linked to politics, 
history and philosophy, including specific subjects in critical thinking and the effect 
of law on society (titled ‘enforcement of law’). Instead of simply learning the law 
scientifically, law students should be directly confronted in class with the moral, 
philosophical and sociological effects of law on society, including with the knowledge 
of how the law has been enforced in the past (unjustly or otherwise; titled ‘History of 
Laws’): 
• Administrative Law and Constitutional Law 
• Contracts and Torts 
• Criminal Law and Procedure 
• Equity 
 




• Political Philosophy 
• History of Laws 
• Legal Philosophy 
• Critical Thinking 
• Enforcement of Law 
Recommendation 3: Teach the Law in Context 
Existing subjects could also move the distance in terms of teaching law in context. 
Law schools should move away from the concept of ‘pure law’, or the teaching of law 
as an isolated discipline, and towards an interdisciplinary education. In practical 
terms, this signifies that subjects such as contracts and torts need to show the political 
and historical origin of the law in class, in addition to how that law affected society. 
This can be linked to current events that affect the social fabric of the nation. From 
the research above, class discussions are an excellent method for facilitating this kind 
of learning.221 
Recommendation 4: Abolish OR Amend the Case Method 
The case method teaches students to separate their own innate sense of morality and 
ethics from the law and the outcomes of legal cases.222 Instead of simply forcing 
students to learn and apply the law, they should be empowered to question the law.223 
This could be accomplished by abolishing the case method entirely and replacing it 
with critically engaging essays and reflective tasks. Conversely, the case method 
could be sustained if a third, follow-up question is added to every case problem: what 
is the effect of this decision on the individuals concerned and society? Extending the 
case method in this manner would force students to reconcile with how law has been 
enforced on society, as well as with the psychological toll of legal decisions and the 
long-term ramifications of legal injustices. 
 
221 ‘Critical Analysis for Law Students’, Critical Analysis for Law Students (Web Page) 
<http://individual.utoronto.ca/dubber/CALreading.html>. 




Recommendation 5: Reverse the Socratic Method 
In a truly Socratic law school, students would be instructed to ask questions to those 
in authority instead of answering them. Nothing would be beyond a student’s 
questioning, especially in terms of claims of authority or expertise alone. Students 
would be empowered to question the wisdom of professors, judges, politicians and the 
law itself, and they would learn how to unpack the hidden values, ideological 
motivations and the philosophical foundations of legal principles. By questioning the 
origins of law, students would learn to refine their critical thinking and analytical 
skills in a manner that Langdell himself intended to teach, though never fully 
achieved. 
Recommendation 6: Reduce Class Sizes to 15 or Fewer 
The personal small class approach is considered essential for a critical and liberal 
education.224 Limiting classes to 15 students or fewer would greatly facilitate class 
discussions, boost student learning and allow for critically engaged and in-depth 
teaching that extends beyond surface-level absorption.225 This would effectively 
signify abolishing 200 + person lectures, leading to the opposite outcomes of passive 
absorption, uncritical learning and disengagement.226 
Recommendation 7: Introduce Critical Thinking Assessments 
Critical thinking can be assessed in class through critical questions about the 
implications of a law, a student’s view of the law or the different ways of perceiving a 
law (e.g., a statute, case or political decision).227 Critical thinking assessments should 
encourage students to challenge ‘assumed wisdom’ about a specific law, the 
motivation for the law and who benefits or loses from the law.228 
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Questions asked to students could include:229 
• Why is the law this way? 
• Who stands to gain? Who loses? 
• What does the law as is, miss? 
• What are its blind spots? 
• What do other people do when they face similar legal problems, and why? Can 
we learn lessons there? 
• When was this case decided? 
• What was the broader context of this case? 
• What was the court/law-maker trying to say between the lines? 
• Who is the court/law-maker? (White, male, property owner)? 
• What is this legal statement/assertion/rule a reaction to? 
• How does the private affect the public (and vice versa)? 
Recommendation 8: Introduce Reflective Thinking Assessments 
Students can be asked to present a reflective statement on the law they have learned in 
class and their emotional responses to the law and how it affects society.230 They can 
be asked to reflect on specific cases that have been covered in class or more generally 
about the enforcement of the law or the costs and benefits of the law on certain parties 
or individuals.231 This could include how the law emotionally affects the students or 
their clients or the role of the lawyer in a more general sense. It might also be possible 
for reflections to be contained in an ongoing journal or diary. That way, students can 
track their opinions and reactions to the content they are learning in law school—
which empowers themselves to stand at a distance and gain a critically reflective eye. 
Recommendation 9: Introduce Law Reform Assessments 
Students can be given the chance to propose, write and collaborate on law reform 
proposals in class. The law reform assessment could be both rigorous and 
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comprehensive. Students could begin with a broad-ranging critique of a current law 
that is seen as ineffective in some way: 
• Questions could be asked regarding whether the law is effective, in line with it 
being known to the public, acceptable in the community, able to be enforced, 
stable, able to be changed, applied consistently and able to resolve disputes.232 
• Questions could be asked regarding whether the law is living up to its social 
aims, in line with it benefiting the public, serving people’s wants or needs, 
serving the need of a democratic society or in some way keeping up with 
changing social standards.233 
• Questions could be asked regarding procedural justice, and whether the law is 
fair, transparent, efficient, accessible, impartial, with a right to due process, a 
hearing and an appeal.234 
• Questions could be asked regarding distributive justice, whether the law 
ensures equal opportunity and/or outcome between people under the law235 
and if inequalities benefit the weakest in society.236 
Once the law is critiqued in such a way, students should have the chance to build and 
to create anew. Here, students should be empowered to suggest amendments, the 
abolition of the existing law or the introduction of a new law—that addresses the 
concerns raised by the questions asked above. 
Recommendation 10: Introduce Role-play/Simulation/Gamification Assessments 
Students can be given the opportunity to engage in simulations or role-plays in class. 
If necessary, this can be facilitated by gamification, virtual reality or traditional video 
gaming. Law schools already have simulation activities in the form of mock trials and 
treaty negotiations. However, these could be extended to include mock general 
assemblies, dispute resolution and informal sentencing practices, such as circle 
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sentencing. It may also be possible to bring in external activities, like Model United 
Nations, into law schools, to add a further extension of learning into the international 
arena. 
These recommendations, taken together, would form a liberal arts curriculum that 
would fundamentally transform law schools in Australia. Far from teaching a 
vocational, neoliberal education in law, this new curriculum would help law schools 
challenge their students to think for themselves, think critically about the law and play 
an active role in their society. A broad education would facilitate students in the 
multitude of career paths they seek, but more essentially, train them for their role as 
democratic citizens, as moral agents and as instigators of law reform. It is this vision, 
this higher calling, which law schools should dedicate themselves to, moving beyond 
corporate profit and towards a focus on critical engagement, social justice and public 
advocacy. Australia needs an actively engaged legal community, and our law schools 
are in a prime position to deliver on this function. 
Law schools have an opportunity here to change legal education for the better and 
give students the kind of education they deserve. One that empowers them rather than 
belittling them, one that challenges them rather than converts them, and one that seeks 
to reveal the true reality of law itself: its political, social, economic and historical 
nature. For much of their modern history, many law schools have remained 
conservative in instigating change and adapting to new styles of education. There is 








Abate, Duncan, The Use of Social Media in the Workplace (Mayer Brown, 2011) 
Abel, Richard L and Phillip SC Lewis (eds), Lawyers in Society: The Common Law 
World (Beard Books, 2005) 
Abrams, Douglas E, ‘Teaching Legal History in the Age of Practical Legal Education’ 
(2013) 53 American Journal of Legal History 485 
Aquinas, Thomas, ‘Divine Law, Natural Law, Positive Law’ Summa Theologiae 
(1225) 362 <http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/Blackwell-proofs/MP_C45.pdf> 
Adelaide University Law Students’ Society, Lipman Karas First Year Guide 
(AULSS, 2019) <https://www.aulss.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FYG-2019-
FOR-AULSS-PAGE.pdf> 
‘AG Jeff Sessions Talks Faith and Religious Freedom on Faith Nation’, CBN News 
(online at 10 November 2017) 
<https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/politics/2017/october/ag-jeff-sessions-talks-faith-
and-religious-freedom-on-faith-nation> 
Against All Odds (UNHCR, 2006) <https://www.unhcr.org/against-all-odds.html> 
Agarwal, Brina Jane Humphries and Ingrid Robeyns (eds), Armatya Sen’s Work and 
Ideas: A Gender Perspective (Routledge, 2005) 
Aiken, Juliet Elizabeth D Salmon and Paul Hanges, ‘The Origins and Legacy of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964’ (2013) 28(4) Journal of Business and Psychology 
A-Khavari, Afshin, ‘The Opportunities and Possibilities for Internationalising the 
Curriculum of Law Schools in Australia’ (2006) 16(1–2) Legal Education Review 75 
Ali, Aftab, ‘Oxford University Law Students Being Issued with “Trigger Warnings” 





Allen, Judy and Paula Baron, ‘Buttercup Goes to Law School: Student Wellbeing in 
Stressed Law Schools’ (2004) 29(6) Alternative Law Journal 286 
Allott, Anthony, ‘The Effectiveness of Laws’ (1981) 15(2) Valparaiso University Law 
Review 
Alstah (User #445836), ‘What Is Law?’ (Whirlpool Forum, 26 May 2013) 
<https://forums.whirlpool.net.au/archive/2104857> 
American Council of Learned Societies, Liberal Arts Colleges in American Higher 
Education: Challenges and Opportunities (ACLS Occasional Paper, 2005) 
Anderson, Jerry L, ‘Law School Enters the Matrix: Teaching Critical Legal Studies’ 
(2004) 54 Journal of Legal Education 201 
‘Answering Questions in Contract Law—2 Ways to Structure Your Answer’, 
Routledge Textbooks (Routledge, 2016) 
<http://www.routledgetextbooks.com/textbooks/optimize/data/Contract_Podcast_2.pd
f> 
anti23 (User #582820), ‘How to Improve Prospects for Law Grads—Part 3’ 
(Whirlpool Forum, 13 December 2013) <http://forums.whirlpool.net.au/forum-
replies.cfm?t=2193169&p=4> 
‘ANU Clinical Legal Education’, Canberra Community Law (Web Page, 2017) 
<https://www.canberracommunitylaw.org.au/anu-clinical-legal-education.html> 
‘Apology: By Plato’, The Internet Classics Archive (Web Page, 2009) 
<http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html> 
Apolloni, David, ‘Plato’s Affinity Argument for the Immortality of the Soul’ (1996) 
34 Journal of the History of Philosophy 5 
 
353 
Ardill, Allan, ‘Critique in Legal Education: Another Journey’ (2016) 26(1) Legal 
Education Review 1 
Armitage, David and Jo Guldi, ‘The Role of History in a Society Affected by Short-
Termism’ (2 October 2014) Aeon Magazine <https://aeon.co/essays/the-role-of-
history-in-a-society-afflicted-by-short-termism> 
Arnold, Bruce, ‘Legal Warming’, Barnold Law (Blog Post, 9 April 2011) 
<http://barnoldlaw.blogspot.com/2011_04_03_archive.html?m=1> 
Arthurs, Harry W and the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, 
Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
of Canada (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1983) 
Arthurs, Harry W, Connecting the Dots: The Life of an Academic Lawyer (MQUP, 
2019) 
Astleitner, Hermann, ‘Teaching Critical Thinking Online’ (2002) 29(2) Journal of 
Instructional Psychology 53 
Astudillo, Perla, ‘More Plans to Deregulate and Privatize Tertiary Education in 
Australia’, World Socialist Web Site (Web Page, 13 November 1999) 
<https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/1999/11/edu-n13.html> 
Association of American Colleges and Universities, The Essential Learning Outcomes 
of LEAP (AAC&U, 2005) 
Auri (User #553253), ‘More Effective Way to Study Law?’ (Whirlpool Forum, 6 July 
2014) <https://forums.whirlpool.net.au/archive/2240864> 
Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal 
Civil Justice System’ (Report No 89, ALRC, 2000) Section 2.20 
‘The Australian Legal System’ in Introduction to Business Law (Oxford University 
Press, Unpublished) <http://lib.oup.com.au/he/samples/ciro_LAB4e_sample.pdf> 
 
354 
Australian National University Faculty, ‘Academic Staff Response to Breaking the 
Frozen Sea’, Law School Reform: ANU International Law Society (21 November 
2012) 
‘Australians Struggle on Our Own Citizenship Test’, News.com.au (online at 21 
January 2013) <http://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/australians-struggle-
on-our-own-citizenship-test/news-story/ddaa5b756a94eee76ff8e6530dbb734d> 
Ayers, Andrew B, A Student’s Guide to Law School: What Counts, What Helps and 
What Matters (University of Chicago Press, 2013) 
Babie, Paul, ‘125 Years of Legal Education in South Australia’ (2010) 31 Adelaide 
Law Review 107 
Baker, Jacob, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Parliamentary Intention’ (1993) 52(3) The 
Cambridge Law Journal 
Baker, G Blaine and Jim Phillips (eds), Essays in the History of Canadian Law: In 
Honour of R.C.B. Risk (University of Toronto Press, 1999) 
Balkin, Jack M, ‘Interdisciplinarity as Colonisation’ (1996) Faculty Scholarship 
Series 266 
Ball, Molly, ‘How Gay Marriage Became a Constitutional Right’ (1 July 2015) The 
Atlantic <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/gay-marriage-
supreme-court-politics-activism/397052/> 
Banki, Susan et al, Social Justice Simulations: Social Justice Exercise Manual 
(Australian Government Office for Learning and Teaching, 2016) 
Bar Standards Board and Solicitors Regulation Authority, Academic Stage Handbook 
(Bar Standards Board and Solicitors Regulation Authority, 2014) 
<https://www.sra.org.uk/globalassets/documents/students/academic-stage/academic-
stage-handbook.pdf?version=4a1ac3> 
Barcan, Alan, A History of Australian Education (Oxford University Press, 1980) 
 
355 
Barker, David, A History of Australian Legal Education (Federation Press, 2017) 
Barnett, Ronald, Improving Higher Education (Open University Press, 1992) 
Barolsky, Joel, ‘Good Times Roll but Law Graduates Miss Out on a Harvey Specter 
life’, Financial Review (online at 31 January 2019) 
<https://www.afr.com/opinion/good-times-roll-but-law-graduates-miss-out-on-a-
harvey-spector-life-20181213-h1920w>  
Baron, Paula, ‘A Dangerous Cult: Response to “the Effect of the Market on Legal 
Education”’ (2013) 23(2) Legal Education Review 283 
Barrigos, Rebecca, ‘The Neoliberal Transformation of Higher Education’ [2013] (6) 
Marxist Left Review 3 
Bartie, Susan, ‘A Full Day’s Work: A Study of Australia’s First Legal Scholarly 
Community’ (2010) 29(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 67 
Bartie, Susan, Free Hands and Minds (Hart Publishing, 2019)  
Bartie, Susan, ‘Towards a History of Law as an Academic Discipline’ (2014) 38(2) 
Melbourne University Law Review 13 
Bastow, Simon, Patrick Dunleavy and Jane Tinkler, The Impact of the Social 
Sciences: How Academics and Their Research Make a Difference (SAGE Publishing, 
2014) 
Basu, Kaushik and Ravi Kanbur (eds), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in 
Honour of Armatya Sen (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2008) 
Bautista, Lowell, ‘The Socratic Method as a Pedagogical Method in Legal Education’ 
in Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts—Papers (University of Wollongong, 
2014) 
Bear, Ashley and David Skorton, ‘The World Needs Students with Interdisciplinary 
Education’ (2019) 35(2) Issues in Science and Technology 61 
 
356 
Beattie, Scott and Stephen Colbran, ‘From Phoenix Wright to Atticus Finch: Legal 
Simulation Games as an Aid to Self-Represented Litigants’ (Conference Paper, 
International World Wide Web Conference, 3–7 April 2017) 426 
<http://papers.www2017.com.au.s3-website-ap-southeast-
2.amazonaws.com/companion/p425.pdf> 




Belgiorno-Nettis, Anna, ‘Student Perspectives on Talking about Sexual Assault in 
Australian Law Classes’ (2017) 27(1) Legal Education Review 9 
Benjamin, Roger et al, The Case for Critical-Thinking Skills and Performance 
Assessment (Council for Aid to Education, 2016) 
Benjamin, Spencer A, ‘The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective’ (2012) 69 
Washington and Lee Law Review 4 
Bentham, Jeremy, The Works of Jeremy Bentham: Now First Collected (William Tait, 
1843) 
Bentley, Duncan and Joan Squelch, ‘Employer Perspectives on Essential Knowledge, 
Skills and Attributes for Law Graduates to Work in a Global Context’ (2014) 24(1) 
Legal Education Review 96 
Berard, Timothy J, ‘The Relevance of the Social Sciences for Legal Education’ 
(2019) 19(1) Legal Education Review 189 
Berkahn, Matt, ‘The Company as a Legal Entity’ in Company Law: Questions and 
Answers (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2016) 





Berlin, Isaiah, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press, 1969) 
‘Best Practices for Experiential Courses’ in Roy Stuckey et al (eds), Best Practices for 
Legal Education (CLEA, 2007) 
Beyond Billables, ‘The Hidden Costs of Law Firm Attrition’, Beyond Billables (Web 
Page) <https://www.beyondbillables.com/blog/the-hidden-costs-of-law-firm-attrition> 
Bingham, Tom, The Rule of Law (Penguin, 2011) 
Bix, Brian, ‘On the Dividing Line between Natural Law and Legal Positivism’ (2000) 
75(5) Notre Dame Law Review 1615 
Black, Donald J, ‘Law, Society and Industrial Justice’ (Book Review) (1972) 78(3) 
American Journal of Sociology 709 
Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765–
1769) 
Blatt, William S, ‘Teaching Emotional Intelligence to Law Students: Three Keys to 
Mastery’ (2015) 15 Nevada Law Journal 464 
Bligh, Donald A, Ian McNay and Harod Thomas, Understanding Higher Education: 
An Introduction to Parents, Staff, Employees and Students (Intellect Books, 1999) 
Blocq, Daniel and Maartje van der Woude, ‘Making Sense of the Law and Society 
Movement’ (2018) 11(2) Erasmus Law Review 135 
Boag, Anna et al, Breaking the Frozen Sea: The Case for Reforming Legal Education 
at the Australian National University (Law School Reform Committee, 2010) 
Boehringer, Gill H, ‘Historical Documents’ (1988–1999) 5 Australian Journal of Law 
& Society 57 
Boetsche, Laurent et al, Guide to Emerging Liberal Arts and Sciences Practices in the 
EU (Erasmus+, 2017) 
 
358 
Bok, Derek, Our Underachieving Colleges: A Candid Look at How Much Students 
Learn and Why They Should Be Learning More (Princeton University Press, 2006) 
‘Book Notes: Duncan Kennedy’s Stiff Knees’ (1998) 111(7) Harvard Law Review 
2118 
Boon, Andrew and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and Training in England and 
Wales: Back to the Future’ (2008) 58(1) Journal of Legal Education 
Bosanquet, Agnes, ‘Brave New Worlds, Capabilities and the Graduates of Tomorrow’ 
(2011) 17(2) Cultural Studies Review 101 
Boutcher, Steven A and Lynette J Chua, ‘Introduction: Law, Social Movements and 
Mobilization across Contexts’ (2018) 40(1) Law & Policy 
Bowcott, Owen, ‘Televising of Court of Appeal Proceedings Start This Week’, The 
Guardian (30 October 2013) 
Bowman, Sam, ‘In Defence of Neoliberalism’ (2017) 33(3) POLICY 38 
Boyne, Shawn Marie, ‘Crisis in the Classroom: Using Simulations to Enhance 
Decision-Making Skills’ (2012) 62(2) Journal of Legal Education 311 
Bradley, Michael, ‘Law Grad Employment: Hard Truths from a Managing Partner’, 
Survive Law (Web Page, 1 May 2014) 
<http://survivelaw.com/index.php/blogs/careers/1812-law-grad-employment-hard-
truths-from-a-managing-partner> 
Branco et al, ‘Games in the Environmental Context and Their Strategic Use for 
Environmental Education’ (2013) 75(2) Brazilian Journal of Biology 115 
Brett, Peter, ‘Review of Julius Stone, Legal Education and Public Responsibility’ 
(1960) 2 Melbourne University Law Review 569 
Brockbank, Anne and Ian McGill, Facilitating Reflective Learning in Higher 
Education (Open University Press, 1998) 
 
359 
Bromberg, Howard, ‘Teaching Legal History through Legal Skills’ (2013) 53(4) 
American Journal of Legal History 489 
Brooks, Christopher and Michael Lobban (eds), Lawyers, Litigation & English 
Society Since 1450 (Bloomsbury, 1998) 
Brown, Ashley C, ‘Regulators, Policy-Makers and the Making of Policy: Who Does 
What and When Do They Do It?’ 3(1) International Journal of Regulation and 
Governance 1 
Brown, Neil M and Stuart M Kelly, Asking the Right Questions: A Guide to Critical 
Thinking (Englewood Cliffs, 1986) 
Brown, Wendy and Janet Halley (eds), Left Legalism/Left Critique (Duke University 
Press, 2002) 
Brown, Wendy, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (MIT Press, 
2015)  
Brown, William Jethro, ‘The American Law School’ (1905) 21(1) Law Quarterly 
Review 69 
Brownell, Herbert and John P Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General 
Herbert Brownell (University Press of Kansas, 1993) 
Brun, Marlene le and Carol Bond, ‘Law Teaching Reconceptualised’ (1995) 6(1) 
Legal Education Review 
Bujdoui, Nicolae Razvan, ‘The Validity and Effectiveness of Law’ (2015) 8(1) 
Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Brasov 
Burning Glass Technologies, The Human Factor: The Hard Time Employers Have 
Finding Soft Skills (Burning Glass Technologies, 2015) <https://www.burning-
glass.com/wp-content/uploads/Human_Factor_Baseline_Skills_FINAL.pdf>  
Burton, Kelley and Judith McNamara, ‘Assessing Reflection Skills in Law Using 
Criterion’ (2009) 19(1) Legal Education Review 171 
 
360 
Burton, Kelley, ‘Teaching and Assessing Problem Solving: An Example of an 
Incremental Approach to Using IRAC in Legal Education’ (2016) 13(5) Journal of 
University Teaching and Learning Practice 
Burns, Kylie and Lillian Borbin, ‘E-Professionalism: The Global Reach of the 
Lawyer’s Duty to Use Social Media Ethically’ (2016) Journal of the Professional 
Lawyer 161 
Burrows, Scott, ‘Precarious Work, Neoliberalism and Young People’s Experiences of 
Employment in the Illawarra Region’ (2013) 24(3) The Economic and Labour 
Relations Review 380 
Burton, Kelley, FI Oprescu, Gwynn MacCarrick and PR Grainger, ‘Enhancing the 
Reflective Practice of First Year Law Students Using Blended Learning Simulations 
in the USC Moot Court’ in Learning and Teaching Week Program Book (2015)  
Busch, Lawrence, Knowledge for Sale: The Neoliberal Takeover of Higher Education 
(MIT Press, 2017) 
Bush, Jonathon and Alan D Wijfells, Learning the Law: Teaching and Transmission 
of English Law, 1150–1900 (Bloomsbury, 1999) 
byebye (User #640826 ), ‘First Year Law: What Do I Do?’ (Whirlpool Forum, 20 
October 2015) <https://forums.whirlpool.net.au/archive/2461828> 
Byrnes, Rebecca and Peter Lawrence, ‘Bringing Diplomacy into the Classroom: 
Stimulating Student Engagement through a Simulated Treaty Negotiation’ (2016) 
26(1) Legal Education Review 25 
Byron, Ibijoke Patricia. ‘The Relationship between Social Justice and Clinical Legal 
Education: A Case Study of the Women’s Law Clinic’ (2014) 20(2) International 
Journal of Clinical Legal Education 564 
Caban, Geoffrey (ed), Education through the Liberal Arts (Warrane College, 2019) 
‘CAL Flix: Student View-ins: A CAL Lab Project’, Critical Analysis of Law CAL 
Flix (Web Page) <http://individual.utoronto.ca/dubber/CALFlix/CALFlix.html> 
 
361 
‘CAL Perspectives Seminar’, CAL Lab: Critical Analysis of Law in Action (Web 
Page) <https://criticalanalysisoflaw.wordpress.com/cal-perspectives-seminar/> 
Calavity, Kitty, Invitation to Law and Society: An Introduction to the Study of Law 
(University of Chicago Press, 2010) 
Campbell, Susan and Alan Ray, ‘Specialist Clinical Legal Education: An Australian 
Model’ [2003] (June) Journal of Clinical Legal Education 68 
Cane, Peter, ‘Taking Law Seriously: Starting Points of the Hart/Devlin Debate’ 
(2006) 10(1) The Journal of Ethics 1 
Cantatore, Francina, ‘Boosting Law Graduate Employability: Using a Pro Bono 
Teaching Clinic to Facilitate Experiential Learning in Commercial Law Subjects’ 
(2015) 25(1) Legal Education Review 147 
Caparas, Perfecto, ‘Right to Due Process of Law and Fair Trial: Issues and Challenges 
in the Philippines’ (2000) Asian Seminar on Fair Trial 
Capozzi, NA, Law School in Plain English (Primedia E-Launch, 2014) 
‘Carbon Tax: A Timeline of Its Tortuous History in Australia’, ABC News (online at 
17 July 2014) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-10/carbon-tax-
timeline/5569118> 
Cardozo, Benjamin N, ‘The Game of the Law and Its Prizes’ in Benjamin N Cardozo, 
Law and Literature and Other Essays and Addresses (Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
1931) 
Cardozo, Benjamin, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press, 1921) 
‘The Case Study Teaching Method’, Harvard Law School: The Case Studies (Web 
Page, 2021) <http://casestudies.law.harvard.edu/the-case-study-teaching-method/> 
Casey, Terence, ‘In Defense of Neoliberalism’ (Conference Paper, Political Studies 
Association Annual Conference, 21–23 March 2016) 
 
362 
Casper, Rachel, ‘The Full Weight of Law School: Stress on Law Students Is 
Different’, Lawyer Well-Being & Mental Health: Massachusetts LAP Blog (Blog 
Post, 18 January 2019) <https://www.lclma.org/2019/01/18/the-full-weight-of-law-
school-stress-on-law-students-is-different/> 
Castles, Margaret, Rachel Spenser and Deborah Ankor, ‘Clinical Legal Education in 
South Australia’ (2014) 36(4) Bulletin (Law Society of South Australia) 
Carey, Christen Civiletto and Kristen David Adams, The Practice of Law School: 
Getting in and Making the Most (ALM Publishing, 2013) 
Carrington, Paul D, ‘The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education’ (1990) 
31(3) William and Mary Law Review 535 
Cendra, Javier de, ‘Legal Education in the Era of Globalization—What Should We 
Expect from Law Schools?’, Law Ahead (Web Page, 2021) 
<https://lawahead.ie.edu/legal-education-in-the-era-of-globalization-what-should-we-
expect-from-law-schools/> 
Cerar, Miro, ‘The Relationship between Law and Politics’ (2009) 15(1) Annual 
Survey of International and Comparative Law 19 
Cervini, Erina, ‘Law and the New Order’, Sydney Morning Herald (online at 12 June 
2012) <http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/law-and-the-new-order-20120611-
205o5.html#ixzz3g9Px7ltB> 
Chadwick, Vince, ‘It’s Law but Strictly by the Book’, Sydney Morning Herald (online 
at 1 November 2011) <http://www.smh.com.au/national/education/its-law-but-
strictly-by-the-book-20111031-1mrxd.html> 
Channell, Wade, ‘Making a Difference: The Role of the LLM in Policy Formulation 





Chapman, Bruce, Austudy: Towards a More Flexible Approach (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1992) 
Charlesworth, Hilary, ‘Critical Legal Education’ (1988) 5 Australian Journal of Law 
and Society 33 
Chayes, Abram et al, ‘Critical Legal Studies Movement’, The Bridge (Web Page) 
<https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/CriticalTheory/critical2.htm> 
Chee, Jonathan, ‘THINK Like Your Examiner: Demonstrate the SKILLS Lecturers 
Look For to Succeed in Law Exams’, Success at MLS (Web Page, 4 June 2020) 
<https://successatmls.com/2020/06/04/think-like-your-examiner-demonstrate-the-
skills-lecturers-look-for-to-succeed-in-law-exams/> 
Chesterman, John, Poverty Law and Social Change: The Story of the Fitzroy Legal 
Service (Melbourne University Press, 1996)  
Chesterman, Simon, ‘The Globalisation of Legal Education’ [2008] (July) Singapore 
Journal of Legal Education 61 
Cho, Jeena, ‘Quitting Someone Else’s Dream’, Above the Law (Web Page, 13 July 
2015) <http://abovethelaw.com/2015/07/quitting-someone-elses-dream/> 
Christensen, Sharon and Sally Kift, ‘Graduate Attributes and Legal Skills: Integration 
or Disintegration’ (2000) 11 Legal Education Review 7 
Chroust, Anton-Herman, ‘Legal Profession in Colonial America’ (1958) 34(1) Notre 
Dame Law Review 45 
Civics Expert Group, Whereas the People: Civics and Citizenship Education 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994) 
Clark, Peter, British Clubs and Societies 1580–1800: The Origins of an Associated 
World (Oxford University Press, 2000) 
Clark, Eugene, ‘Australian Legal Education a Decade after the Pearce Report’ (1997) 
8(2) Legal Education Review 213 
 
364 
‘Class of 1951’, University of Toronto Faculty of Law (Web Page) 
<https://www.law.utoronto.ca/about/brief-history/class-1951> 
Clayton, Cornell W, The Politics of Justice: The Attorney General and the Making of 
Legal Policy (M.E. Sharpe, 1992) 
Clayton, Martin and Ron Philo, Leonardo Da Vinci: Anatomist (Royal College 
Publications, 2014)  
‘Clinical Legal Education Program’, The University of Adelaide (Web Page, 2020) 
<https://law.adelaide.edu.au/free-legal-clinics/clinical-legal-education-program> 
‘Clinics: Clinical Program’, Duke Law (Web Page, 2020) 
<https://law.duke.edu/clinics/clinical/> 
‘Clinics’, UNSW Sydney (Web Page) <http://www.law.unsw.edu.au/current-
students/law-action/clinics> 
Clutton-Brock, Arthur, The Ultimate Belief (E.P. Dutton and Company, 1916) 
Coade, Melissa, ‘Law School Makes “Significant” Cuts to Student Numbers’, 
Lawyers Weekly (online at 31 July 2017) 
<https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/careers/21591-law-school-makes-significant-
cuts-to-student-numbers> 
Cody, Anna, ‘Developing Students’ Sense of Autonomy, Competence and Purpose 
through a Clinical Component in Ethics Teaching’ (2019) 29(1) Legal Education 
Review 3 
Cohen, Morris L, ‘Thomas Jefferson Recommends a Course of Law Study’ (1971) 
119 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 828 
Cohen, Steve et al (eds), Virtual Decisions: Digital Simulations for Teaching 




Coleman, William T, Counsel for the Situation: Shaping the Law to Realize 
America’s Promise (Brookings Institution Press, 2010) 
Collier, Richard, ‘Naming Men as Men in Corporate Legal Practice: Gender and the 
Idea of “Virtually 24/7 Commitment” in Law’ (2015) 83(5) Fordham Law Review 
2401 
Combe, Malcolm M, ‘Selling Intra-Curricular Clinical Legal Education’ (2014) 48(3) 
The Law Teacher 281 
Commonwealth Secretariat, Changing the Law: A Practical Guide to Law Reform 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2017) 
Condlin, Robert, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education (Centre for 
Philosophy and Public Policy, 1981) 
Confucius, The Works of Confucius, ed Joshua Marshman (Mission Press, 1809) 
Connell, Raewyn, The Good University: What Universities Actually Do and Why It’s 
Time for Radical Change (Zed Books, 2019) 
Connell, Raewyn, ‘What Are Good Universities?’ (2016) 58(2) Australian 
Universities Review 70 
Connolly, Tim, ‘Plato: Phaedo’, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Web Page) 
[xx] <https://iep.utm.edu/phaedo/> 
Cook, Walter Wheeler, ‘What Is the Police Power?’ (1907) 7(5) Columbia Law 
Review 322 
Cooper, Jeremy and Louise G Trubek (eds), Educating for Justice: Social Values and 
Legal Education (Dartmouth, 1997) 
Coper, Michael, Kevin Lindgren and Francois Kunc (eds), The Future of Australian 
Legal Education (Thomson Reuters, 2018) 
 
366 
Coplan, Karl S, ‘Legal Realism, Innate Morality, and the Structural Role of the 
Supreme Court in the U.S. Constitutional Democracy’ (2011) 86 Tulane Law Review 
189 
Corker, John, ‘How Does Pro Bono Students Australia (PBSA) Fit with Clinical 
Education in Australia?’ (Conference Paper, Australian Clinical Legal Education 
Conference, 13–15 July 2015) 
Council of Australian Law Deans, ‘Data Regarding Law School Graduate Numbers 
and Outcomes’ (Online Document, 2017) 1–2 <https://cald.asn.au/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/Factsheet-Law_Students_in_Australia.pdf> 
Council of Australian Law Deans, ‘Submission: Regarding: Review of Academic 
Requirements for Admission to the Legal Profession (2015) 4 
<http://www1.lawcouncil.asn.au/LACC/images/Review_of_Academic_Requirements
_-_Submission_by_CALD.pdf> 
Council of Australian Law Deans, ‘Submission to the Review of the Impact of Higher 
Education Support Act 2003: Funding Cluster Mechanism’ (2007) 
Council for Cultural Co-Operation, Project on ‘Education for Democratic 
Citizenship’ (Council of Europe, 2000) 
‘Course Catalog: Law and Literature’, Harvard Law School (Web Page, 2021) 
<http://hls.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/index.html?o=65681> 
Cownie, Fiona and Anthony Bradney, ‘Gothic Horror? A Response to Margaret 
Thornton’ (2005) 14(2) Social and Legal Studies 277 
Crary, Jonathan, 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (Verso Books, 2013) 
Craven, Gregory, Conversations with the Constitution: Not Just a Piece of Paper 
(UNSW Press, 2004) 




Critical Legal Students Network, University of Sydney, ‘About’ (Facebook Group, 
2013) <https://www.facebook.com/groups/494410394007875/about/> 
‘Critical Legal Studies Network (CLSN) Discussion #1 Intro’ (Facebook, 10 March 
2014) <https://www.facebook.com/events/526515474134575/> 
‘Critical Race Theory (Reading Group)’, Stanford Law School (Web Page, 2017) 
<https://law.stanford.edu/courses/critical-race-theory-reading-group/> 
‘Critical Race Studies’, UCLA Law (Web Page, 2021) 
<https://law.ucla.edu/centers/social-policy/critical-race-studies/about/>. 
‘Critical Race Theory’, Harvard Law School (Web Page, 2018) 
<https://hls.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/default.aspx?o=67956>. 
‘Critical Thinking Reading Group @ Wits Law School’, Critical Thinking Reading 
Group @ Wits Law School (Web Page, 2015) 
<https://criticallyreadingatwls.wordpress.com/about/> 
Currie, Brainerd, ‘The Place of Law in the Liberal Arts College’ (1953) 5 Journal of 
Legal Education 428 
Cushing, Luther Stearns, Elements of the Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies 
in the United States (Little Brown and Company, 1856)  
Daly, Yvonne Marie and Noelle Higgens, ‘The Place and Efficacy of Simulations in 
Legal Education: A Preliminary Examination’ (2011) 3(2) All Ireland Journal of 
Teaching and Learning in Higher Education 58.4 
Da Vinci, Leonardo, Leonardo’s Anatomical Drawings (Dover Publications, 2012)  
Davies, Bronwyn and Peter Bansel, ‘Neoliberalism and Education’ (2007) 20(3) 
International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 
Davis, Peggy Cooper, ‘Desegregating Legal Education’ (2010) 26 Georgia State 
University Law Review 1275 
 
368 
Deakin Law Students’ Society, First Year Guide 2020 (DLSS, 2020) 
<https://www.deakinlss.org/first-yearguide> 
Deeechuay, Anapat and Kasamakorn Chanwanpen, ‘The Law Is the Law: PM’ (Web 
Page, 1 July 2015) <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/The-law-is-the-law-
PM-30263485.html> 
Denbow, Jennifer M, ‘Pedagogy of Rape Law: Objectivity, Identity and Emotion’ 
(2014) 64(1) Journal of Legal Education 25 
Derrington, Sarah, ‘Dean’s Welcome’, TC Beirne School of Law 
<http://www.law.uq.edu.au/deans-welcome> 
Deresiewicz, William, ‘Don’t Send Your Kids to the Ivy League’ (22 July 2014) The 
New Republic <https://newrepublic.com/article/118747/ivy-league-schools-are-
overrated-send-your-kids-elsewhere> 
Deresiwicz, William, Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American Elite and 
the Way to a Meaningful Life (Simon & Schuster, 2014)  
Deresiewicz, William, ‘The Neoliberal Arts’ (September 2015) Harper’s Magazine 
2.9 
Dirksen, Jacob Tonda et al (eds), What Is Liberal Education and What Could It Be? 
(LESC, 2017) 
Dixon, David, ‘Welcome from the Dean’, UNSW Sydney (Web Page) 
<http://www.law.unsw.edu.au/about-us/who-we-are/welcome-dean> 
Documentation Center of Cambodia, ‘Building Democracy in Cambodia through 
Legal Education Witnessing Justice 30 Years Later’ in ECCC: A Model to Help 
Ensure that the Rule of Law Prevails (28–30 April 2013) 
Doğanay, Ahmet, ‘A Curriculum Framework for Active Democratic Citizenship 
Education’ in Murray Pint and Dirk Lange (eds), Schools, Curriculum and Civic 
Education for Building Democratic Citizens (SensePublishers, 2012) 
 
369 
Doorey, David J, ‘Harry and the Steelworker: Teaching Labor Law to Non-Lawyers’ 
(2008) 14 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 109 
Doormouse1 (User #443828), ‘More Effective Way to Study Law?’ (Whirlpool 
Forum, 6 July 2014) <https://forums.whirlpool.net.au/archive/2240864> 
Douglas, David M, ‘Jefferson’s Vision Fulfilled’ (Winter 2010) William & Mary 
Alumni Magazine <http://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/index.php> 
Douglas, Michael and Nicholas van Hattem, ‘Australia’s Law Graduate Glut’ (2016) 
41(2) Alternative Law Journal 3–5 
Douzinas, Costas and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing, 2005) 
Drahos, Peter (ed), Regulatory Theory: Foundations and Applications (ANU Press, 
2017) 
Dror, Yehezkel, ‘Values and the Law’ (1957) 17(4) The Antioch Review 1 
D’Souza, Dinesh, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus (The 
Free Press, 1991) 
Dubber, Markus, ‘Legal History as Legal Scholarship: Doctrinalism, 
Interdisciplinarity, and Critical Analysis of Law’ in Markus D Dubber and 
Christopher Tomlins (eds), Oxford Handbook of Historical Legal Research (Oxford 
University Press, 2018) 
Dubber, Markus and Simon Stern, ‘Critical Analysis of Law and the New 
Interdisciplinarity’ (2014) 1(1) Critical Analysis of Law 1 
Du, Ruiqing, Chinese Higher Education: A Decade of Reform and Development 
(1978–1988) (Martin’s Press, 1992) 
Duffy, Ann and Norene Pupo, ‘Unpaid Work, Coercion and the Fear Economy’ 
(2018) 29(1) Alternate Routes: A Journal of Critical Social Research 14 
 
370 
Duke, Chris, ‘Is There an Australian Idea of a University’ (2004) 26(3) Journal of 
Higher Education Policy and Management 307 
Durkheim, Emily, The Division of Labour in Society (MacMillan, 1984) 
Dunnewold, Mary, ‘A Tale of Two Issues: “Applying Law to Facts” Versus 
“Deciding What the Rule Should Be”’ (Fall, 2002) 11(1) Perspectives: Teaching 
Legal Research and Writing 12. 
Easteal, Patricia, ‘Teaching About the Nexus between Law and Society: From 
Pedagogy to Andragogy’ (2008) 18(1–2) Legal Education Review 163 
Edelman, James, ‘The Role of Specialized Legal Knowledge’ (Speech, Council of 
Australian Law Deans, 22 March 2012) 
Edgaloe, Victor Allen, ‘The Adelaide Law School 1883–1983’ (1983) 9(1) Adelaide 
Law Review 1 
Edwards, Hannah, ‘It’s Unjust M’lud! Law Classes Too Big’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald (22 April 2007) 
Elkins, James R, ‘A Humanistic Perspective in Legal Education’ (1983) 62(3) 
Nebraska Law Review 498 
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Inns of Court: British 
Legal Association’ <https://www.brittanica.com/topic/Inns-of-Court> 
Epstein, Lee et al, ‘Ideological Drift among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When and 
How Important?’ (2007) 101(4) Northwestern Law Review 1 
Erlanger, Howard S, ‘Organizations, Institutions, and the Story of Shmuel: 
Reflections on the 40th Anniversary of the Law and Society Association’ (2005) 39 
Law and Society Review 1 
Erlanger, Howard S and Douglas A Klegon, ‘Socialization Effects of Professional 
School: The Law School Experience and Student Orientations to Public Interest 
Concerns’ (1978) 13(1) Law & Society Review 11 
 
371 
Eskridge Jr, William N and Philip P Frickey, ‘The Making of the Legal Process’ 
(1994) Yale Faculty Series 2040 
Evans, Adrian et al, Australian Clinical Legal Education: Designing and Operating a 
Best Practice Clinical Program in an Australian Law School (ANU Press, 2017) 
Evans, Adrian, ‘Para-Legal Training at La Trobe University’ (1978) 3(2) Legal 
Service Bulletin 65 
Evans, Carolyn, ‘Welcome from the Dean’, Melbourne Law School (Web Page, 2015) 
<http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/melbourne-law-school/community/welcome-from-
the-dean> 
Evrard, Laurent, ‘On Universities Ranking: Hype or Substance?’ (2010) 4(1) Nawa: 
Journal of Language and Communication 83 
‘Fair Trial and Fair Hearing Rights’, Attorney-General’s Department (Web Page) 
<https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/HumanRights/Human-rights-
scrutiny/PublicSectorGuidanceSheets/Pages/Fairtrialandfairhearingrights.aspx> 
Feldman, Zeena and Marisol Sandoval, ‘Metric Power and the Academic Self: 
Neoliberalism, Knowledge and Resistance in the British University’ (2018) 16(1) 
TripleC 221 
Flaherty, David H (ed), Essays in the History of Canadian Law (Osgoode Society, 
2012)  
Flood, John, ‘Legal Education in the Global Context: Challenges from Globalization, 
Technology and Changes in Government Regulation’ (Research Paper No 11–16, 
University of Westminster School of Law, 8 August 2011) 
Forde, Susan, ‘If the Government Listened to Business Leaders, They Would 
Encourage Humanities Education, Not Pull Funds from It’, The Conversation (online 





Foucault, Michel, The Birth of Biopolitics (Palgrave Macmillan, 1978–1979) 
Frank, Jerome, ‘Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?’ (1933) 81(8) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 907 
Franklin, Benjamin, Benjamin Franklin: His Autobiography (Harpers & Collins, 
1849) 
Fraser, Drew and Patrick Kavanagh, ‘Readings in the History and Philosophy of Law’ 
(1995) Macquarie University School of Law 2 
French, Chief Justice Robert, ‘Legal Education in Australia—A Never Ending Story’ 
(Conference Paper, Australian Law Teachers’ Association Conference, 4 July 2011)  
Freeman, Damien, Roddy’s Folly: R.P. Meagher, Art Lover and Lawyer (Connor 
Court Publishing, 2012)  
Freitag, Charlotte and Nick Hillman, How Different Is Oxbridge (Higher Education 
Policy Institute, 2018) 
Friedland, Martin, Searching for WPM Kennedy: The First Dean of Law and the Law 
Character in the University (2019) 
Friedman, M, ‘Coming of Age: Law and Society Enters an Exclusive Club’ (2005) 1 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 2 
Friedman, Lawrence M, ‘The Law and Society Movement’ (1986) 38 Stanford Law 
Review 764 
Fritz, Christian G, ‘Teaching Legal History in the First Year Curriculum’ (2013) 
53(4) American Journal of Legal History 380 
Frug, Gerald E, ‘A Critical Theory of Law’ (1989) 1(1) Legal Education Review 43 
Frykholm, Joel, ‘Critical Thinking and the Humanities: A Case Study of 
Conceptualizations and Teaching Practices at the Section for Cinema Studies at 
Stockholm University’ [2020] (August) Arts and Humanities in Higher Education 6 
 
373 
Forsyth, Hannah, A History of the Modern Australian University (NewSouth, 2014) 
Foster, Brian and Jared Craig, ‘The Lawyer and the Media: What Can a Lawyer Say 
to the Media?’ (2014) 43 The Advocates Quarterly 60 
Fuller, Lon, Legal Fictions (Stanford University Press, 1969)  
Fuller, Lon, ‘On Teaching Law’ (1950) 3 Stanford Law Review 47 
Fuller, Lon, ‘The Place and Uses of Jurisprudence in the Law School Curriculum’ 
(1949) 1 Journal of Legal Education 495 
Fuller, Lon, ‘What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers’ 
(1948) 1(2) Journal of Legal Education 200 
Fulton, Kathleen, Ethan T Leonard and Kathleen McCormally, Education & 
Technology: Future Visions (Diane Publishing, 1995) 
Gale, Trevor and Stephen Parker, Widening Participation in Australian Higher 
Education (CFE, 2013) 
Galloway, Kate, ‘The Legal Profession’s “Black Swan” Problem’, Kategallow (Blog 
Post, 17 June 2017) <https://kategalloway.net/2017/06/17/the-legal-professions-
black-swan-problem/> 
Gannaway, Deanne and Faith Trent, Mapping the Terrain: Trends and Shared 
Features in BA Programs across Australia 2001–2008 (DASSH, 2008) 
Gargarella, Roberto, ‘Human Rights, International Courts and Deliberative 
Democracy’ (Working Paper, The University of Texas at Austin, 3 December 2008) 2 
<http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/etext/llilas/vrp/gargarella.pdf> 
Gascón-Cuenca, Andrés et al, ‘Acknowledging the Relevance of Empathy in Clinical 
Legal Education’ (2018) 25(2) International Journal of Clinical Legal Education 218 
Gee, E Gordon and Donald W Jackson, ‘Current Studies of Legal Education: Findings 
and Recommendations’ (1982) 32 Journal of Legal Education 4 
 
374 
‘Geoffrey Robertson’s Hypotheticals’, ABC Library Sales (Web Page) 
<https://www.abccommercial.com/librarysales/program/geoffrey-robertsons-
hypotheticals> 
George, Robert P, ‘Kelsen and Aquinas on the Natural-Law Doctrine’ (2000) 75(5) 
Notre Dame Law Review 1626;  
German, Svetlana and Robert Pelletier, ‘Clinical Legal Experience: The Benefits of 
Practical Training in Teaching—Student Perspectives’ (Conference Paper, The Future 
of Australian Legal Education Conference, 13 August 2017) 
Gibbs, Graham, Using Assessment to Support Student Learning (Leeds Metropolitan 
University, 2010)  
Giddings, Jeff, ‘Clinical Legal Education in Australia: A Historical Perspective’ 
(2003) 3 International Journal of Clinical Legal Education 8–10 
Gilmore, Grant, ‘Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure’ (1961) 70(7) Yale Law Journal 
1038–9 
Girard, Philip, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (University of Toronto Press, 2005) 
Girard, Philip, Lawyers and Legal Culture in British North America: Beaming 
Murdoch of Halifax (University of Toronto Press, 2011)  
Giridharadas, Anand Winner Takes All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World 
(Knopf, 2018) 
Giroux, Kathryn, ‘The Direction of Legal Education Reform: Facilitating Access to 
Justice’ (Working Paper, McGill Faculty of Law) 
<https://www.mcgill.ca/law/files/law/les-paper-kathryn_giroux.pdf> 
Glendinning, Simon, ‘Varieties of Neoliberalism’ (LEQS Paper No 89, 2015) 
Gobby, Brad and Rebecca Walker (eds), Powers of Curriculum: Sociological 
Perspectives on Education (Oxford University Press, 2017) 
 
375 
Godwin, Kara A and Philip G Altbach, ‘A Historical and Global Perspective on 
Liberal Arts Education: What Was, What Is, and What Will Be’ (2016) 5 
International Journal of Chinese Education 8 
Gold, Neil (ed), Essays on Legal Education (Buttersworth, 1982) 
Golder, Ben et al (eds), Imperatives for Legal Education Research: Then, Now and 
Tomorrow (Routledge, 2019) 
Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, ‘Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation’ (1997) 25 
Federal Law Review 1 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/FedLRev/1997/1.pdf> 
Goldsworthy, Jeffrey and BW Miller (eds), The Challenge of Originalism: Theories 
of Constitutional Interpretation (Cambridge University Press, 2011)  
Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, ‘The Law and the Profits’ (2013) 55(1) Australian Universities 
Review 92 
Golinski, Jan, Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
Gordon, Robert W, ‘The Law School, the Profession, and Arthurs’ Humane 
Professionalism’ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 157 
Green, Leslie, ‘Introduction’ in Joseph Raz and Penelope A Bulloch, The Concept of 
Law (Clarendon Law Series, 2012) 
Greenawalt, Kent, ‘How Persuasive Is Natural Law Theory’ (2000) 75(5) Notre Dame 
Law Review 1650 
Greenbaum, Lesley A, ‘Foundations of South African Law: Teaching Legal History 
from a Thematic Perspective’ (2003) 9 Fundamina 95 
Greenfield, Kent, The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and 
Progressive Possibilities (University of Chicago Press, 2010)  
 
376 
Grossberg, Michael and Christopher Tomlins (eds), The Cambridge History of Law in 
America (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
Grossman, William L, ‘The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound’ (1935) 44 Yale Law 
Journal 608 
Gubbins, Roberta M, ‘A Bit of History on Law Clinics and Law Schools’, Detroit 
Legal News (online at 5 July 2011) <http://legalnews.com/detroit/1001293> 
Guidelines on the Ethical Use of Social Media (Law Institute Victoria, 2016) 
Guinier, Lani, Michelle Fine and Jane Balin, Becoming Gentlemen: Women, Law 
School, and Institutional Change (Beacon Press, 1997) 
Haberberger, Clara, ‘A Return to Understanding: Making Liberal Education Valuable 
Again’ (2017) 50(11) Educational Philosophy and Theory 
Hacker, Daphna, ‘Law and Society Jurisprudence’ (2011) 4 Cornell Law Review 729 
Hadden, Sally E and Alfred L Brophy (eds), A Companion to American Legal History 
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) 
Hager, Paul and Susan Holland (eds), Graduate Attributes, Learning and 
Employability (Springer Science & Business, 2007) 
Hahn, Carole L, ‘Teachers’ Perceptions of Education for Democratic Citizenship in 
Schools with Transnational Youth: A Comparative Study in the UK and Denmark’ 
(2015) 10(1) Research in Comparative & International Education 102 
Hall, RW, ‘Justice and the Individual in the “Republic”’ (1959) 4(2) Phronesis  
Halpern, Stephen C, ‘On the Politics and Pathology of Legal Education (or Whatever 




Han, Misa, ‘University No “Trade School” for Lawyers’ (23 October 2014) Financial 
Review <http://www.afr.com/news/policy/education/university-no-trade-school-for-
lawyers-20141023-11awap> 
‘Handbook 2021: 76902 Law and Literature’ UTS (Web Page, 2021) 
<http://handbook.uts.edu.au/subjects/76902.html> 
Harari, Yuval Noah, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (Random House, 2014) 
Harfitt, Gary James, ‘Why “Small” Can Be Better: An Exploration of the 
Relationships between Class Size and Pedagogical Practices’ (2012) 28(3) Research 
Papers in Education 1 
Hartwell, Steven and Sherry L Hartwell, ‘Teaching Law: Some Things Socrates Did 
Not Try’ (1990) 40(4) Journal of Legal Education 
Harvard, John, ‘“Hard Problems” in the Social Sciences’ (July–August 2010) 
Harvard Magazine <https://harvardmagazine.com/2010/07/hard-problems-in-the-
social-sciences> 
Harvey, Andrew et al, Globalization Opportunities for Low Socio‐Economic Status 
and Regional Students (La Trobe University, 2016)  
Harvey, David, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press, 2005) 
Hawkins-León, Cynthia G, ‘The Socratic Method–Problem Method Dichotomy: The 
Debate over Teaching Method Continues’ [1998] (1) Brigham Young University 
Education and Law Journal 14 
Hayek, Friedrich, Law, Legislation and Liberty (Routledge, 1973) 
Hayek, Frederick August, The Road to Serfdom (Psychology Press, 2001) 
Hayhoe, Ruth, ‘Knowledge and Modernity’ in Ruth Hayhoe (ed), China’s 
Universities and the Open Door (M.E. Sharpe, 1989) 
 
378 
Haynes, Thomas and Glenn Bailey, ‘Are You and Your Basic Business Students 
Asking the Right Questions?’ (2003) 57(3) Business Education Forum 33 
Heath, Mary, ‘Encounters with the Volcano: Strategies for Emotional Management in 
Teaching the Law of Rape’ (2005) 39(2) Law Teacher 133 
Heath, Mary et al, ‘Learning to Feel Like a Lawyer: Law Teachers, Sessional 
Teaching and Emotional Labor in Legal Education’ (2018) 26(3) Griffith Law Review 
16 
Heath, Mary and Peter D Burdon, ‘Academic Resistance to the Neoliberal University’ 
(2013) 23 Legal Education Review 380 
Heller, James S, ‘From Oxford to Williamsburg: Part 2—The College of William & 
Mary Law School and Wolf Law Library’ (2012) 12(4) Legal Information 
Management 290 
Helyer, Ruth and Helen Corkill, ‘Flipping the Academy: Is Learning from outside the 
Classroom Turning the University Inside Out?’ (2015) 16(2) Asia–Pacific Journal of 
Cooperative Education 131 
Hickel, Jason, ‘Neoliberalism and the End of Democracy’ (2016) London School of 
Economics Papers 142 
Hil, Richard, Selling Students Short: Why You Won’t Get the University Education 
You Deserve (Allen & Unwin, 2015) 
Hill, Dave and Ravi Kumar (eds), Global Neoliberalism and Education and Its 
Consequences (Routledge, 2009) 
Hinett, Karen, Developing Reflective Practice in Legal Education, ed Tracey Varnava 
(Centre for Legal Education, 2002) 




‘History of the Faculty’, University of Cambridge: Faculty of Law (Web Page) 
<http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/about-faculty/history-faculty> 
Hodgson, Doug, ‘Higher Legal Education in Australia: Historical Perspectives’ 
(2016) 43(10) Brief 
Holmes Jr, Oliver Wendell, The Common Law (Dover Publications, 1991) 
Holmes Jr, Oliver Wendell, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 
457 
Holst, Catherine, ‘Martha Nussbaum’s Outcome-Oriented Theory of Justice: 
Philosophical Comments’ (Working Paper No 16/2010, Arena: Centre for European 
Studies, University of Ohio, 2010) 
<https://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-working-
papers/2001-2010/2010/wp-16-10.pdf> 
Horan, Jaqueline and Michelle Taylor-Sands, ‘Bringing the Court and Mediation 
Room into the Classroom’ (2008) 18(1) Legal Education Review 202 
Horrigan, Bryan, ‘Dean’s Message’, Monash University (Web Page, 2015) 
<http://www.monash.edu/law/about-us> 
‘How Neoliberals Reinvented Democracy: An Interview with Niklas Olsen’, Jacobin 
(Web Page, 4 June 2019) <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/04/neoliberalism-
democracy-consumer-sovereignty> 
Howe, Brian, Weighing Up Australian Values: Balancing Transitions and Risks to 
Work and Family in Modern Australia (UNSW Press, 2007) 
Huffman, Max, ‘Online Learning Grows Up—And Heads to Law School’ (2015) 
49(1) Indiana Law Review 57 
Hull, NEH, ‘Vital Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound, Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, and the Promotion of an Academic Jurisprudential Agenda, 1910–1919’ 
(1995) 45(2) Journal of Legal Education 236 
 
380 
Humphreys, Courtney, ‘New Harvard Law School Program Aims for “Systematic 
Justice”’, The Boston Globe (online at 6 February 2015) 
<https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2015/02/06/new-harvard-law-school-program-
aims-for-systemic-justice/PeGBqIenWhqqCuJ37Y20kJ/story.html> 
Humphrys, Elizabeth and Damien Cahill, ‘How Labour Made Neoliberalism’ (2016) 
43(4–5) Critical Sociology 2 
Hunt, Alan, ‘The Theory of Critical Legal Studies’ (1986) 6(1) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 11 
Huston, Luther A et al, The Roles of the Attorney General of the United States 
(American Enterprise Institute, 1968) 
Hutchison, Terry and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: 
Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 17 Griffith Law Review 1 
Hutchsion, Terry, ‘Educating the Transnational Lawyer: Globalisation and the Effects 
on Legal Research Skills Training’ in Legal Knowledge: Learning, Communicating 
and Doing—Australasian Law Teachers Association Annual Conference Published 
Conference Papers (ALTA Secretariat, 2006) 
Hyland, Terry, ‘Vocationalism, Work and the Future of Higher Education’ (2001) 
53(4) Journal of Vocational Education and Training 677 
Ingleby, Richard, ‘Translation and the Divorce Lawyer: Stimulating the Law and 
Society Interface’ (1989) 1(2) Legal Education Review 
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 3 Equality of Resources, ‘3a Initial Resources’ 
<https://www.iep.utm.edu/dist-jus/#H3> 
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Plato: The Republic’ 
<https://www.iep.utm.edu/republic/> 
‘Interview for Woman’s Own (“No Such Thing as Society”)’, Margaret Thatcher 
Foundation (Web Page) <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689> 
 
381 
Iskander, Marie, ‘The Ugly Truth about Being a Law Student’, Lawyers Weekly 
(online at 3 October 2013) <https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/opinion/14765-the-
ugly-truth-about-being-a-law-student> 
Jacotine, Keshia, ‘Was Embracing the Market a Necessary Evil for Labour and 
Labor?’, The Conversation (online at 25 August 2017) 
<https://theconversation.com/was-embracing-the-market-a-necessary-evil-for-labour-
and-labor-81612> 
James, Nickolas J, ‘A Brief History of Critique in Australian Legal Education’ (2016) 
Melbourne University Law Review 37 
James, Nick and Kelley Burton, ‘Measuring the Critical Thinking Skills of Law 
Students Using a Whole-of-Curriculum Approach’ (2017) 27(1) Legal Education 
Review 1 
James, Nickolas, ‘The Marginalisation of Radical Discourses in Australian Legal 
Education’ (2006) 16(1) Legal Education Review 64 
James, Nick ‘More Than Merely Work-Ready: Vocationalism Versus Professionalism 
in Legal Education’ (2017) 40(1) UNSW Law Journal 186 
Janoff, Sandra, ‘The Influence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning’ (1991) 76 
Minnesota Law Review 193 
Jarvis, Robert M, ‘Legal History: Teaching Skills Practicing Lawyers Need’ (2013) 
53 American Journal of Legal History 498 
‘Jesuit Educational Philosophy’, Fordham University (Web Page) 
<https://www.fordham.edu/info/21418/teaching_and_scholarship/10848/jesuit_educat
ional_philosophy> 
‘John Curtin Law Clinic’, Curtin Law School (Web Page) 
<https://businesslaw.curtin.edu.au/law/john-curtin-law-clinic/> 




Johnstone, Richard and Sumitra Vignaendra, ‘Learning Outcomes and Curriculum 
Developments in Law’ (Report, Australian Universities Teaching Committee, 2003) 
Jones, Daniel Stedman, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman and the Birth of 
Neoliberal Politics (Princeton University Press, 2014) 
Joy, Peter A and Kevin C McMunigal, ‘Clients, Lawyers and the Media’ (2004) 19 
Criminal Justice 78 
Kafka, Franz, Before the Law, tr Ian Johnston (Kurt Wolff, 1919) 
Kafka, Franz, The Trial (Penguin Books, 1925) 
Kahn-Freund, Otto, ‘Some Reflections on Company Law Reform’ (1994) 7 Modern 
Law Review 56 
Kahne, Joseph, Bernadette Chi and Ellen Middaugh, ‘CityWorks Evaluation 
Summary’ (Mills College, 2002) 
Kam, Linda et al, ‘Get Real! A Case Study of Authentic Learning Activities in Legal 
Education’ (2012) 19(2) Murdoch University Law Review 17 
Kariv, Schachar and William R Zame, ‘Piercing the Veil of Ignorance’ (Working 
Paper No 2009–06, University of California Berkeley: Center for Risk Management, 
September 2009) 
Katz, MB, ‘The Origins of Public Education: A Reassesment’ (1976) 16(4) History of 
Education Quarterly 381 
Kavanagh, Patrick, ‘Legal Education and the “Functionalisation” of the University’ 
(1988–1989) 5 Australian Journal of Law & Society 16 
Kelsen, Hans, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press, 2007) 
Kennedy, David and William Fisher III (eds), The Canon of American Legal Thought 
(Princeton University Press, 2018) 
 
383 
Kennedy, Duncan, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic 
Against the System (NYU Press, 1983) 
Kennedy, Duncan, ‘Liberal Values in Legal Education’ (1986) 10 Nova Law Journal 
605 
Kennedy, Duncan, ‘Politicizing the Classroom’ (1994) 4(81) Review of Law and 
Women’s Studies 87 
Kennedy, WPM, ‘A Project of Legal Education’ (1937) Scots Law Times 1 
Kennedy, WPM, The Constitution of Canada: An Introduction to Its Development 
and Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 
Kennedy, WPM, ‘Law as a Social Science’ (1934) 3 South African Law Journal 100 
Kennedy, WPM, ‘Legal Subjects in the Universities of Canada’ (1933) 23 Journal of 
Society of Public Teachers of Law 27 
Kennedy, WPM, ‘Some Aspects of Family Law’ (1937) 49 Judicial Review 18 
Kennedy, WPM, ‘Some Aspects of the Theories and Workings of Constitutional 
Law’, Lectures on the Fred Morgan Kirby Foundation for Civil Rights (Macmillan, 
1931) 
Kennedy, WPM, ‘Tendencies in Canadian Administrative Law’ (1934) 46 Juridicial 
Review 203  
Kessler, Friedrich, ‘Arthur Linton Corbin’ (1969) 78(4) Yale Law Journal 521 
Kift, Sally et al (eds), Excellence and Innovation in Legal Education (LexisNexis, 
2011) 
Kimball, Bruce, The Liberal Arts Tradition: A Documentary History (University 
Press of America, 2010) 
 
384 
Kimball, Bruce A, ‘The Proliferation of Case Method Teaching in American Law 
Schools: Mr. Langdell’s Emblematic “Abomination,” 1890–1915’ (2006) 46(2) 
History of Education Quarterly 
Kinderman, Robin, ‘Useless College Majors’ (3 April 2017) 33(7) The New American 
<https://thenewamerican.com/useless-college-majors/> 
King, Agnes and Katie Walsh, ‘Big Four Accounting Firms Push into Legal Services’ 
(22 July 2015) Australian Financial Review 
<http://www.afr.com/business/accounting/afr8acclawyers-vs-accountants-20150721-
ghq715> 
Kingsford Legal Centre, Clinical Legal Education Guide (2019/20) (UNSW, 2019) 
<https://www.klc.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/documents/2924%20CLE%20guide-
WEB.pdf> 
‘Kingsford Legal Centre’, UNSW Sydney (Web Page) <https://www.klc.unsw.edu.au> 
‘Kirby: Bring Cameras into Court’, ABC AM Radio (14 November 2008) 
Kirby, Michael, ‘Legal Professional Ethics in Times of Change’ (1998) 72 Australian 
Law Reform Commission 5 
<http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ALRCRefJl/1998/2.html> 
Kirby, Michael, ‘Legal History: Teaching Legal History in Australia—Decline and 
Fall?’ (2009) 13(1) Legal History 6 
Klare, Karl E, ‘The Law School Curriculum in the 1980s: What’s Left?’ (1982) 32 
Legal Education 336 
Kniest, Paul, ‘Universities Expected to Drag Business out of the Dark Ages’ (2016) 
23(1) Advocate: Journal of the National Tertiary Education Union 
Knot, Matthew, ‘Gough Whitlam’s Free University Education Reforms Led to Legacy 





Koblik, Steven and Stephen Richards Graubard (eds), Distinctively American: The 
Residential Liberal Arts Colleges (Routledge, 2000) 
Kolb, David A, Experiential Learning: Experience as a Source of Learning and 
Development (Englewood Cliffs, 1984) 
Krinks, Kate, ‘Creating the Active Citizen? Recent Developments in Civics 
Education’ (Research Paper No 15 1998–99, Department of the Parliamentary 
Library: Information and Research Services, 23 March 1999) 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamenta
ry_Library/pubs/rp/rp9899/99RP15> 
Kritzer, Herbert M (ed), Legal Systems of the World: A Political Social and Cultural 
Encyclopaedia (ABC–CLIO, vol 2, 2002) 
Krook, Joshua et al, ‘An Open Letter to Professor Wayne Courtney on Sydney Law 
School’s 100% Examinations’ (June 2013) Dissent 
Krook, Joshua, ‘Clerking Mad’, Honi Soit (Web Page, 12 May 2014) 
<https://honisoit.com/2014/05/clerking-mad/> 
Krook, Joshua, ‘The Role of the Corporate Mega-Firm: Law Firm Influence on Law 
Students’ (2016) 4(2) Griffith Law Review 66 
Krook, Joshua, ‘What Law Students Need to Know About Legal Ethics Won’t Be 
Taught to Them in Law School’, New Intrigue (Web Page, 15 August 2014) 
<http://newintrigue.com/2014/08/15/what-law-students-need-to-know-about-legal-
ethics-wont-be-taught-to-them-in-law-school/> 
Kronman, Anthony, History of the Yale Law School: The Tercentennial Lectures 
(Yale University Press, 2008) 
Kronman, Anthony, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 
(Harvard University Press, 1993) 
Kruse, Kate, ‘Legal Education and Professional Skills: Myths and Misconceptions 
about Theory and Practice’ (2013) 45 McGeorge Law Review 48 
 
386 
Kuh, George D, ‘In Their Own Words: What Students Learn outside the Classroom’ 
(1993) 30(2) American Educational Research Journal 278 
Kuliukas, Zemyna et al (eds), First Year Guide (Curtin Student Law Society, 2016) 
<https://issuu.com/curtinstudentlawsociety/docs/fyg> 
Kwan, A et al (eds), Research and Development in Higher Education: Higher 
Education in a Globalized World (HERDSA, 2014)  








LACC, ‘Redrafting the Academic Requirements for Admission’ (Web Document, 
2019) <https://www.legalservicescouncil.org.au/Documents/redrafting-the-academic-
requirements-for-admission.pdf> 
LACC, ‘Review of Academic Requirements’ (2015–16) 
<https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/resources/law-admissions-consultative-
committee/review-of-academic-requirements> 
Langdell, Christopher Columbus and Samuel Williston, A Selection of Cases on the 
Law of Contracts (Brown & Little, 2nd ed, 1879) 
Lasswell, Harold D and Myres S McDougal, ‘Legal Education and Public Policy: 
Professional Training in the Public Interest’ (1943) 52(2) The Yale Law Journal 203 
Laster, Kathy (ed), Law as Culture (Federation Press, 2001) 
Lau, Enoch, ‘Uproar over Law School Class Size Changes: A Perspective’, 





‘Law and Literature (LAWS50121)’, The University of Melbourne (Web Page) 
<https://handbook.unimelb.edu.au/2017/subjects/laws50121/> 
‘Law: Public Policy and Law’, Macquarie University Sydney Australia (Web Page) 
<https://www.mq.edu.au/study/find-a-course/law/public-policy-and-law> 
Law Society of NSW Legal Technology Committee, ‘Guidelines on Social Media 
Policies’, The Law Society of New South Wales (Web Page, 2021) 
<https://www.lawsociety.com.au/resources/resources/my-practice-area/legal-
technology/guidelines-social-media> 
The Law Society of South Australia, Submission in Relation to the Review of the 
Demand Driven Funding System (The Law Society of South Australia, 2013) 
<http://www.lawsocietysa.asn.au/submissions/131213_Oversupply_of_Law_Students
_and_Law_Graduates.pdf> 
The Law Society of Western Australia, ‘Characteristics of an Effective Law’ (2015) 
‘LAWS5078—Macquarie University Social Justice Clinic’, Macquarie University 
(Web Page) <https://coursehandbook.mq.edu.au/2020/units/LAWS5078> 
Lawton, Julie D, ‘Teaching Social Justice in Law Schools: Whose Morality Is It?’ 
(2017) 50 Indiana Law Review 821 
Ledvinka, Georgina, ‘Reflection and Assessment in Clinical Legal Education: Do 
You See What I See?’ (2006) 9 Journal of Clinical Legal Education 
Lefcourt, Robert, ‘Democratic Influences on Legal Education from Colonial Times to 
the Civil War’ (PhD Thesis, The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities, 
1983) 





‘Legal Clinics Get a Boost from UQ Law Students’, The University of Queensland 
Australia (Web Page, 2021) <https://www.uq.edu.au/news/article/2020/05/legal-
clinics-get-boost-uq-law-students> 
Legarre, Santiago, ‘Historical Background of the Police Power’ (2007) 9 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 781 
Leitner, Helga, Jamie Peck and Eric S Sheppard (eds), Contesting Neoliberalism: 
Urban Frontiers (The Guilford Press, 2007) 
‘Legal Education in Canada’ (1933) 4 Society of Public Teachers of Law 34. 
Lemmings, David, Gentlemen and Barristers: The Inns of Court and the English Bar: 
1680–1730 (Clarendon Press, 1990) 
Letter from Margaret Thornton to Law Admissions Consultative Committee, Law 
Council of Australia, 31 March 2015 <https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/files/web-
pdf/LACC%20docs/30.Submission%20-
%20Professor%20Margaret%20Thornton.pdf> 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Larkin Smith, 15 April 1809, Founders Online 
<https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-01-02-0118> 
Lerman, Lisa G, ‘Teaching Moral Perception and Moral Judgment in Legal Ethics 
Courses: A Dialogue About Goals’ (1998) 39(2) William & Mary Law Review 461 
Lewellyn, Karl N, On Our Law and Its Study (Oceana Publications, 1969) 
Lievrouw, Leah A (ed), Challenging Communication Research (Peter Lang, 2014) 
Lijima, Chris and Beth Cohen, ‘Reflections of IRAC’ (November 1995) 10(1) Legal 
Writing Institute: The Second Draft 9 
Lipton, Philip, ‘The Mythology of Salomon’s Case and the Law Dealing with the Tort 
Liabilities of Corporate Groups: An Historical Perspective’ (2014) 40(2) Monash 
University Law Review 473 
 
389 
Liu, Ou Lydia, Lois Frankel and Katrina Crotts Roohr, ‘Assessing Critical Thinking 
in Higher Education: Current State and Directions for Next-Generation Assessment’ 
(ETS Research Report No 14–10, ETS, June 2014) 
Lixinski, Lucas, ‘Critical Thinking in Legal Education: What? Why? How?’, Law 
School Vibe (Blog Post, 23 November 2016) 
<https://lawschoolvibe.wordpress.com/2016/11/23/critical-thinking-in-legal-
education-what-why-how-by-lucas-lixinski/> 
Lizza, Ryan, ‘Why Sally Yates Stood Up to Trump’ (29 May 2017) The New Yorker 
Llewellyn, Karl N et al, ‘Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. Teacher’ (1919) 28(8) Yale Law 
Journal 796 
Lloyd, Harold Anthony, ‘Raising the Bar, Razing Langdell’ (2016) 51 Wake Forest 
Law Review 231 
Loughrey, John, Corporate Lawyers and Corporate Governance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011) 
Lumb, Martin, ‘The 43rd Parliament: Traits and Trends’ (Research Paper, Parliament 
of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services, 2 October 2013) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentar
y_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/43rdParl#_Toc368474619> 
Luxton, Meg and Susan Braedley, Neoliberalism and Everyday Life (McGill-Queen’s 
Press, 2010) 
Lynch, Kathleen, ‘New Managerialism, Neoliberalism and Ranking’ (2013) 13 Ethics 
in Science and Environmental Politics 2 
MacDonald, Heather, ‘Law School Humbug’ (Autumn, 1995) City Journal Magazine 
<https://www.city-journal.org/html/law-school-humbug-11925.html> 
MacDougal, Donald, ‘Review of Norval Morris and Colin Howard, Studies in 
Criminal Law’ (1963–1966) 2 Adelaide Law Review 270 
 
390 
MacDuff, Anne, ‘Deep Learning, Critical Thinking and Teaching Law Reform’ 
(2005) 15(1) Legal Education Review 125 
Macfarlane, Alan, ‘What Makes Law Effective?’ (Times Higher Education 
Supplement, April 2005) 
<http://www.alanmacfarlane.com/TEXTS/law_effective.pdf> 
Macintyre, Stuart, Andre Brett and Gwilym Croucher, No End of a Lesson: 
Australia’s Unified National System of Higher Education (Melbourne University 
Press, 2017) 
‘Macquarie University Graduate Destination Survey’ (MQGDS April 2016 Final 
Report, Macquarie University, 4 July 2016) 
<https://www.mq.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/193000/MQGDS-April-
2016_Report_15-July-2016_for-web-Publication.pdf> 
Maharg, Paul, ‘Assessing Legal Professionalism in Simulations: The Case of 
SIMPLE’ (2012) OUC 1 
Maharg, Paul and Martin Owen, ‘Simulations, Learning and the Metaverse: Changing 
Cultures in Legal Education’ (2007) 1 Journal of Information Law and Technology 29 
‘Maieutics’ in Plato, Theaetetus, tr R Waterfield (Penguin, 1987) 
Maitles, Henry, ‘What Type of Citizenship Education; What Type of Citizen?’ (2012) 
50(4) UN Chronicle 
‘Making Students Pay—30 Years Since the End of Free Education’, Solidarity (Web 
Page, 19 February 2019) <https://www.solidarity.net.au/highlights/making-students-
pay-30-years-since-the-end-of-free-education/> 
Markus Dubber, ‘About CAL Lab’, CAL Lab: Critical Analysis of Law in Action 
(Web Page) <https://criticalanalysisoflaw.wordpress.com/> 
Martin, Linda, ‘From Apprenticeship to Law School: A Social History of Legal 




Martin Luther King Jr’s letter from Birmingham Jail, 16 April 1963, 3 
<https://web.cn.edu/kwheeler/documents/Letter_Birmingham_Jail.pdf> 
Masic, Izet, ‘H-Index and How to Improve It?’ (2016) 10(1) Journal of Ultrasound in 
Obstetrics and Gynecology 83 
Maxwell, Lucy, ‘How to Develop Law Students’ Critical Awareness? Change the 
Language of Legal Education’ (2012) 22(1) Legal Education Review 5 
Mays, Jennifer, Basic Income, Disability Pensions and the Australian Political 
Economy (Macmillan, 2020) 
McCann, Michael (ed), Law and Social Movements (Ashgate, 2006) 
McCusker, Claire, ‘Between Natural Law and Legal Positivism: Plato’s Minos and 
the Nature of Law’ (2010) 22(1) Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 88 
McDonald, Brent, How I Beat Law School at Its Own Game, and You Can Too: The 
Step-by-Step Techniques Used by an Average Undergraduate Student to Ace Law 
School (Brent McDonald, 2014) 
McDougal, Myres S, ‘Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the 
Public Interest’ (1943) 52 The Yale Law Journal 204 
McGowan, John, Postmodernism and Its Critics (Cornell University Press, 1999) 
McIntyre, Stuart, The Poor Relation—A History of Social Sciences in Australia 
(Melbourne University Press, 2010) 
McMahon, Neil, ‘Future-Proof Your Law Degree’ (3 August 2015) The Sydney 
Morning Herald 
McMahon, Neil, ‘Law of the Jungle: Lawyers Now an Endangered Species’, The 





McManus, Matt, ‘Conservative Critiques of the Liberal Arts’ (31 March 2019) Areo 
<https://areomagazine.com/2019/03/31/conservative-critiques-of-the-liberal-arts-a-
reply-to-ben-shapiro/> 
McQueen, Rob and William Wesley Pue (eds), Misplaced Traditions: British 
Lawyers, Colonial Peoples (Federation Press, 1999) 
McWilliams, Susan and John E Seery (eds), The Best Kind of College: An Insider’s 
Guide to America’s Small Liberal Arts Colleges (SUNY Press, 2015) 
‘Meet the Students Helping Local People with Legal Problems’ (Web Page, 2018) 
<https://www.sussex.ac.uk/about/community/community-features/law-clinics> 
Merritt, Grace, ‘Fewer Applications Mean Smaller Classes, More Experiential 
Learning at CT Law Schools’, The CT Mirror (online at 25 October 2013) 
<https://ctmirror.org/2013/10/25/fewer-applications-mean-smaller-classes-more-
experiential-learning-ct-law-schools/> 
Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty (Ticknor and Fields, 1863) 
Miller, Arthur Selwyn, ‘Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and 
Reflections’ (1970) 35 Law and Contemporary Problems 69 
Miller, Jason C, Excelling in Law School: A Complete Approach (Wolters Kluwer 
Law & Business, 2012)  
Miller, Nick, ‘More Than One Third of Australians Have Not Heard of the 
Constitution, Survey Finds’, Sydney Morning Herald (21 February 2015) 
Mirabella, Daniel, ‘The Death and Resurrection of Natural Law’ (2011) 2 The 
Western Australian Jurist 254 
Modiri, Joel, ‘The Crises in Legal Education’ (2014) 46(3) Acta Academia 13 
Mohamed, Feisal G and Gordon Hutner (eds), A New Deal for the Humanities: 








Morgan, Thomas D, ‘Educating Lawyers for the Future Legal Profession’ (Research 
Paper No 189, George Washington University Law School Public Law Scholarly 
Commons, 2005) 26 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=881846> 
Morss, John R, ‘Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution? Legal Positivism and 
Legal Education’ (2008) 18(1–2) Legal Education Review 3 
Morrisey, Sarah, ‘The Value of a Liberal Arts Education’ (2013) 8 Philosophy, 
Politics and Economics Undergraduate Journal 131  
Moss, David M and Debra Moss Curtis (eds), Reforming Legal Education: Law 
Schools at the Crossroads (Information Age Publishing, 2012) 
Munro, Vanessa E, ‘Legal Education at the Intersection of the Judicial and the 
Disciplinary’ (2003) 2(1) Journal of Commonwealth Law & Legal Education 39 
Murphy, Jaan and Michelle Brennan, ‘Legal Aid and Legal Assistance Services’ 
(Budget Review Research Paper Series No 2016–17, Parliamentary Library, 19 May 
2017) 
Ndulo, Muna, ‘Legal Education in an Era of Globalisation and the Challenge of 
Development’ (Research Paper 987, Cornell Law Faculty Publications, 2014) 
Neal, David, ‘The New Lawyer Bloke’ (1978) 3(4) Legal Service Bulletin 148 
Neil, Benjamin A, ‘Activist Judge—It Means Different Things to Different People’ 
(2017) <http://www.aabri.com/LV2010Manuscripts/LV10032.pdf> 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, On the Genealogy of Morals, ed Walter Kaufman (Vintage 
Books, 1989)  
 
394 
Nelken, David, ‘Eugene Ehrlich, Living Law and Plural Legalities’ (2008) 9 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 453 
Neuhaus, Richard John, ‘Law and the Rightness of Things’ (1979) 14(1) Valparaiso 
University Law Review 8 
Ngyuen, Tan, ‘An Affair to Forget: Law School’s Deleterious Effect on Students’ 
Public Interest Aspirations’ (2005) 7(2) Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 
‘Now History Will Be the Judge’, Sydney Morning Herald (online at 31 January 
2009) 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2009/01/30/1232818725589.html?page=fullpage> 
Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974) 
Nussbaum, Martha C, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in 
Liberal Education (Harvard University Press, 1997)  
Nussbaum, Martha, ‘Cultivating Humanity in Legal Education’ (2003) 70 University 
of Chicago Law Review 271 
Nussbaum, Martha, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species 
Membership (Harvard University Press, 2006)  
Nussbaum, Martha C, ‘The Liberal Arts are Not Elitist’ (2010) The Chronicle of 
Higher Education 56 
Nussbaum, Martha C, ‘The Struggle within: How to Educate for Democracy’, ABC 
Religion and Ethics (online at 7 June 2019) <https://www.abc.net.au/religion/martha-
nussbaum-education-for-democracy/11191430> 
Nutting, Maureen Murphy, ‘How Interdisciplinary Liberal Arts Programs Prepare 
Students for the Workforce and for Life’ [2013] (163) New Directions for Community 
Colleges 70 
O’Brien, Molly Townes, ‘Facing Down the Gladiators: Addressing Law School’s 
Hidden Adversarial Curriculum’ (2011) 37(1) Monash University Law Review 47 
 
395 
O’Brien, Shannon, ‘Legal Criticism as Storytelling’ (1991) Legal Theory 3  
O’Brien, Molly Townes, Stephen Tang and Kath Hall, ‘Changing Our Thinking: 
Empirical Research on Law Student Wellbeing, Thinking Styles and the Curriculum’ 
(2011) 21(1/2) Legal Education Review 149 
O’Sullivan, Carmel and Judith McNamara, ‘Creating a Global Law Graduate: The 
Need, Benefits and Practical Approaches to Internationalise the Curriculum’ (2015) 
8(2) Journal of Learning Design 
‘Office of the Attorney General: About the Office,’ The United States Department of 
Justice (17 July 2018) 
Ogden, Gregory L, ‘The Problem Method in Legal Education’ (1984) 34(4) Journal 
of Legal Education 655 
Ogilvy, JP Sandy, ‘Celebrating CLEPR’s 40th Anniversary: The Early Development 
of Clinical Legal Education and Legal Ethics Instruction in U.S. Law Schools’ (2009) 
16(1) Clinical Law Review 4 
Olson, Carl, ‘Social Media in Law: Take Ownership or Risk the Consequences’, 
Thomson Reuters (Web Page, 2021) <https://legal.thomsonreuters.com.au/about-
us/news/social-media-in-law.aspx> 
‘On Trial’, ABC iView (Web Page, 23 June 2015) 
<https://www.abc.net.au/tv/programs/on-trial/> 
Ormsby, Grace, ‘Priestley 11 “Not Keeping Up” with Reality’, Lawyers Weekly (26 
May 2019) 
Owen, Susanne and Gary Davis, ‘Law Graduate Attributes in Australia: Leadership 
and Collaborative Learning within Communities of Practice’ (2010) 4(1) Journal of 
Learning Design 18 
Owen, Susanne and Gary Davis, Some Innovations in Assessment in Legal Education 
(Council of Australian Law Deans, 2009) 
 
396 
Pack, Justin Micah, ‘Academics No Longer Think: How the Neoliberalization of 
Academia Leads to Thoughtlessness’ (PhD Thesis, University of Oregon, 2015) 
Patterson, Dennis (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2nd ed, 2010) 
Papadakis, Marianna, ‘Over 60pc of Law Students Want to Practice Law Despite 
Grim Market’ (27 July 2015) Australian Financial Review 
<http://www.afr.com/business/legal/over-60pc-of-law-students-want-to-practice-law-
despite-grim-market-20150727-gil580#> 
Parker, Jean, ‘Labor’s Accord: How Hawke and Keating Began a Neo-Liberal 
Revolution’ (12 October 2012) Solidarity 
<https://www.solidarity.net.au/mag/back/2012/50/labors-accord-how-hawke-and-
keating-began-a-neo-liberal-revolution/> 
Parr, Nick, ‘Who Goes to University? The Changing Profile of Our Students’, The 
Conversation (online at 25 May 2015) <https://theconversation.com/who-goes-to-
university-the-changing-profile-of-our-students-40373> 
Patterson, Dennis (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2nd ed, 2010) 




Pearce, Dennis, Enid Campbell and Don Harding, Australian Law Schools: A 
Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission 
(AGPS, 1987) 





Pearson, Rose and Albie Sachs, ‘Barristers and Gentlemen: A Critical Look at Sexism 
in the Legal Profession’ (1980) 43(4) The Modern Law Review 411 
Peden, Elisabeth and Joellen Riley, ‘Law Graduates’ Skills—A Pilot Study into 
Employers’ Perspectives’ (2005) 15(1/2) Legal Education Review 94 
Pen, Justin, ‘Consider the Law School’, Honi Soit (Web Page, 13 March 2014) 
<http://honisoit.com/2014/03/consider-the-law-school/> 
Persak, Nina, ‘Procedural Justice: Elements of Judicial Legitimacy and their 
Contemporary Challenges’ (2016) 6(3) Onati Socio-Legal Series 754 
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, ‘Theories of Justice, Human Rights and the Constitution of 
International Markets’ (2003) EUI Working Paper 
Petrarca, Francesco, ‘On His Own Ignorance and That of Many Others’ (1368) 
Plato, The Apology, as quoted in Plato in Twelve Volumes, tr Harold North Fowler 
(Harvard University Press, 1966) 
Plato, Theaetetus, tr R Waterfield (Penguin, 1987) 
Post, Robert and Reva Siegel, ‘Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial 
Confirmation Hearings’ (2006) 115(38) Yale Law Journal 49 
Pound, Roscoe, The Evolution of Legal Education: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered 
September 19, 1903 (Thomson Gale, 2004) 
Pound, Roscoe, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (Yale University Press, 
1922) 
Pound, Roscoe, Interpretations of Legal History (Macmillan, 1923)  
Pound, Roscoe, Social Control through Law (Archon Books, 1968) 
Pound, Roscoe, ‘Taught Law’ (1912) 3 American Law School Review 172 
 
398 
Pound, Roscoe, The Evolution of Legal Education: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered 
September 19, 1903 (Thomson Gale, 2004) 
Powers, Elia, ‘Harvard Law Alters First-Year Program’, Inside Higher Ed (Web Page, 
9 October 2006) <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/10/09/harvard-law-
alters-first-year-program> 
‘Practice-Centric Legal Teaching: Clinical Legal Education’, University of Tasmania 
Australia (Web Page, 2020) <https://www.utas.edu.au/law/study/practice-centric-
legal-teaching> 
Prest, Wilfrid, ‘Antipodean Blackstone: The Commentaries “Down Under”’ (2002) 6 
Flinders Journal of Law Reform 154 
Prest, Wilfred, William Blackstone (Oxford University Press, 2008) 
Preston, Susan and Jordan Aslett, ‘Resisting Neoliberalism from within the Academy: 
Subversion through an Activist Pedagogy’ (2014) 33(4) Social Work Education 1 
Price, Jonathan, ‘Size Matters: Lessons Learned at Oxford’, Leiden Law Blog (Blog 
Post, 14 February 2013) <https://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/size-matters-lessons-
learned-at-oxford> 
Pue, William Wesley, Lawyers’ Empire: Legal Professions and Cultural Authority, 
1780–1950 (UBC Press, 2016) 
Pue, William Wesley, ‘Guild Training vs. Professional Education: The Committee on 
Legal Education and the Law Department of Queen’s College, Birmingham in the 
1850s’ 33(3) (1989) The American Journal of Legal History 242 
Puig, Gonzalo Villalta, ‘A Two-Edged Sword: Salomon and the Separate Entity 
Doctrine’ (2000) 7(3) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 3 
Puig, Gonzalo Villalta, ‘Legal Ethics in Australian Law Schools’ (2008) 42(1) The 
Law Teacher 34 
 
399 
Quacquarelli Symonds Limited, ‘QS Graduate Employability Ranking’, QS Top 
Universities (Web Page, 2017) <https://www.topuniversities.com/university-
rankings/employability-rankings/2017> 
The Queen’s College, Birmingham: 1851–52 (Tonks, 1851) 
Quinlin, Michael, ‘Message from the Dean’, Notre Dame School of Law (Web Page, 
2018). 
‘Radicalism and the Law’ (18 April 1985) The Harvard Crimson 
<https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1985/4/18/radicalism-and-the-law-pmost-
reserved/> 
Raleigh, T, ‘Legal Education in England’ (1898) 10 Juridicial Review 1 
Rakoff, Todd D and Martha Minow, ‘A Case for Another Case Method’ (2007) 60(2) 
Vanderbilt Law Review 599 
Rathjen, Gregory J, ‘The Impact of Legal Education on the Beliefs, Attitudes and 
Values of Law Students’ (1977) 44 Tennessee Law Review 85 
Ramsay, Ian M and David B Noakes, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil in Australia’ 
(2001) 19(4) Company and Securities Law Journal 250 
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971) 
Razook, Nim, ‘Leviathans, Critical Thinking, and Legal Philosophy: A Proposal for a 
General Education Legal Studies Course’ (2003) 21(1) Journal of Legal Studies 
Education 1 
Rea, Jeannie, ‘Critiquing Neoliberalism in Australian Universities’ (2016) 58(2) 
Australian Universities Review 9 
‘Real-Time Rotisserie Responses’, The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at 
Harvard Law School (Web Page) <https://cyber.harvard.edu/eon/ei/justice-rot.html> 
 
400 
Redish, Martin H, The Federal Courts in the Political Order (Carolina Academic 
Press, 1991) 
Reed, Alfred Zantzinger, ‘Scholarship or Opinion?’ (1921–1922) 35(3) Harvard Law 
Review 355 
Reed, Alfred Zantzinger, Training for the Public Profession of the Law: Historical 
Development and Principal Contemporary Problems of Legal Education in the United 
States, with Some Account of Conditions in England and Canada (Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1921) 
Reno, RR, ‘Critical Thinking and the Culture of Skepticism’ (2016) 2(3) Principles: A 
Publication of Christendom College 1 
Rice, Simon, ‘A Place for Critical Perspectives in Legal Education’ (Conference 
Paper, The Future of Australian Legal Education Conference, 12 August 2017)  
Rice, Simon, ‘Prospects for Clinical Legal Education in Australia’ (1991) 9(2) 
Journal of Professional Legal Education 158 
Riley, Joellen, ‘Response to Student Petition on 100% Examinations’, Sydney 
University Law Society (July 2013) 
Riley, Joellen, ‘Welcome from the Dean’, Combined Law—The Sydney LLB (Web 
Page, 2015) <http://sydney.edu.au/law/fstudent/undergrad/> 
Risk, RCB ‘My Continuing Legal Education’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 326 
Risk, RCB, ‘The Many Minds of W. P. M. Kennedy’ (1998) 48(3) The University of 
Toronto Law Journal 366 
Risk, Richard, ‘Canadian Law Teachers in the 1930s: When the World Was Turned 
Upside Down’ (2004) 27(1) Dalhousie Law Journal 7 
Rhode, Deborah L, ‘Into the Valley of Ethical Professional Responsibility and 
Educational Reform’ (1995) 58(3) Law and Contemporary Problems 140 
 
401 
Rhode, Deborah L, ‘Legal Ethics in Legal Education’ (2009) 16(1) Clinical Law 
Review 51 
Rhoten, Diana et al, ‘Interdisciplinary Education at Liberal Arts Institutions’ (White 
Paper, Teagle Foundation, 2006)  
Robertson, Geoffrey, ‘In the Balance’ (2009) 38(3) Index on Censorship 
Robertson, Geoffrey, ‘Put Cameras in British Courtrooms, and Make Justice Truly 
Transparent’, The Guardian (24 April 2018) 
Robertson, Michael et al (eds), The Ethics Project in Legal Education (Routledge, 
2011)  
Robison, Wade L (ed), The Legal Essays of Michael Bayles (Springer, 2002) 
Robson, Robert, The Attorney in Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge University 
Press, 2013) 
Roche, Mark William, Why Choose the Liberal Arts (University of Notre Dame Press, 
2010)  
Rodriguez, Martina, ‘The Seven Liberal Arts: The Foundation of Modern Education’ 
STMU History Media (Web Page, 4 November 2018) 
<https://stmuhistorymedia.org/the-seven-liberal-arts-the-foundations-of-modern-day-
education/comment-page-8/> 
Rogers, Nicolette, ‘Improving the Quality of Learning in Law Schools by Improving 
Student Assessment’ (1993) 4(1) Legal Education Review 136 
Romano, Maria Concetta, ‘The History of Legal Clinics in the US, Europe and around 
the World’ (2016) 16 Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche 27 
Roodhouse, Simon, ‘Revisiting “Technical” Education’ (2008) 50(1) 
Education + Training 56 
 
402 
Rosenberg, Joshua D, ‘Teaching Empathy in Law School’ (2002) 36 University of 
San Francisco Law Review 637 
Rougeau, Dean Vincent, ‘In Defense of the Liberal Arts’ (Summer 2016) Boston 
College Law School Magazine <http://lawmagazine.bc.edu/2016/06/in-defense-of-
the-liberal-arts/> 
Rowe, William, ‘Legal Clinics and Better Trained Lawyers—A Necessity’ (1916–
1917) 11 Illinois Law Review 591 
Royse, Cameron, ‘Tips for Law Assessments and Exams’ in Monash Law Guide 2015 
(Monash University, 2015) <https://studylib.net/doc/8161615/law-guide---monash-
law-students--society> 
Rubin, Edward, ‘What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method’ (2007) 60(2) Vanderbilt 
Law Review 610 
Russel, Bertrand, The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell (Routledge, 2010) 
Russell, Dean, ‘Sources of Government Authority’ (1963) Foundation for Economic 
Education 3 
Salahuddin, Asif, ‘Robert Nozick’s Entitlement Theory of Justice, Libertarian Rights 
and the Minimal State: A Critical Evaluation’ (2018) 7(1) Journal of Civil and Legal 
Sciences 
Sales, Philip, ‘Use of Language in Legislation’ (2019) 40 Statute Law Review 1 
Sampford, Charles JG, Sophie Blencowe and Suzanne Condlin (eds), Educating 
Lawyers for a Less Adversarial System (The Federation Press, 1999) 
Sampford, Charles and Ralph Simmonds (eds), New Foundations in Legal Education 
(Cavendish Publishing, 1998)  
Sample, Ian, ‘Blow to 10,000-Hour Rule as Study Finds Practice Doesn’t Always 





Samuels, Linda B and Richard L Coffinberger, ‘Balancing the Needs to Assess Depth 
and Breadth of Knowledge: Does Essay Choice Provide a Solution?’ (2005) 22(2) 
Journal of Legal Studies Education 




Sandefur, Rebecca and Jeffrey Selbin, ‘The Clinic Effect’ (2009) 16 Clinical Law 
Review 57 
Sankoff, Peter, ‘Learning by Doing: The Benefits of Experiential Learning in Animals 
and the Law’ (2017) 27(1) Legal Education Review 7 
Sanson, Michelle and Thalia Anthony, Connecting with Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2018)  
Sarat, Austin (ed), Law in the Liberal Arts (Cornell University Press, 2005) 
Sarat, Austin, Catherine O Frank and Matthew Anderson (eds), Teaching Law and 
Literature (Modern Language Association, 2011)  
Sarit, Austin and Stuart A Scheingold (eds), Cause Lawyers and Social Movements 
(Stanford University Press, 2006) 
Saunders, Kurt and Linda Levine, ‘Learning to Think Like a Lawyer’ (2005) 29(121) 
University of San Francisco Law Review 1 
Schlag, Pierre, ‘Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing 
Happening (A Report on the State of the Art)’ (2009) 97 Georgia Law Review 803 
Schleef, Debra J, Managing Elites: Socialization in Law and Business Schools 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2005)  
 
404 
Schlegel, Henry, ‘More Theory, More Practice’ (1988) 13 Legal Service Bulletin 71 
Schlegel, John Henry, ‘Wesley Newcomb Hohfield: On the Difficulty of Becoming a 
Law Professor’ (Research Paper No 2016–036, University at Buffalo Law School, 
2016) 
Schneider, Carol G, ‘Practicing Liberal Education: Formative Themes in the 
Reinvention of Liberal Learning’ (2004) 90(2) Liberal Education 6 
Schofield, William, ‘Christopher Columbus Langdell’ (1907) 55(5) The American 
Law Register 278 
Schutte, Nicola S and Emma J Stillinovic, Facilitating Empathy through Virtual 
Reality (Springer, 2017)  
Scoccia, Danny, ‘In Defense of “Pure” Legal Moralism’ (2013) 7(3) Criminal Law 
and Philosophy 519 
Seifert, Tricia A et al, ‘The Effects of Liberal Arts Experiences on Liberal Arts 
Outcomes’ (2007) 49(2) Research in Higher Education 109 
Segre, Michael, Higher Education and the Growth of Knowledge: A Historical 
Outline of Aims and Tensions (Routledge, 2015) 
Selvin, Molly, ‘The History of Contemporary Law and Policy’ (2013) 53(4) The 
American Journal of Legal History 503 
Selznick, Philip, ‘Law in Context Revisited’ (2003) 30 Journal of Law and Society 
177 
Seters, Paul van, ‘From Public Sociology to Public Philosophy: Lessons for Law and 
Society’ (2010) 35(4) Law & Social Inquiry 1140 
Shain, Ralph, ‘Legal Education and Hierarchy: A Reply to Duncan Kennedy’ (2012) 
23(1) Quarterly Journal of Ideology 14 
 
405 
Shakespeare, William, The Merchant of Venice, ed Cedric Watts (Wordsworth 
Classics, 2000) 
Sheppard, Steve, ‘Teach Justice’ (2008) 43 Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law 
Review 602 
Sheppard, Steve (ed), The History of Legal Education in the United States (The 
Lawbook Exchange, 1999) 
Shumway, David R, ‘The University, Neoliberalism, and the Humanities: A History’ 
(2017) 6(4) Humanities 83 
Siems, Mathies, ‘Legal Originality’ (2008) 28(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 147 
Simon, Rita J and James P Lynch, ‘The Sociology of Law: Where We Have Been and 
Where We Might Be Going’ (1989) 23 Law and Society Review 830 
Simmonds, Alecia, ‘Why Do Australians Hate Thinkers?’ (30 October 2014) 
Womankind Magazine <http://www.womankindmag.com/articles/why-do-australians-
hate-thinkers/> 
Siri, Aaron, The Siri Method: The Formula for Top Law School Grades with Minimal 
Effort (Kay Cee Press LLC, 2007) 
Slawson, W David, ‘Changing How We Teach: A Critique of the Case Method’ 
(2000) 74 Southern California Law Review 343 
Smith, Brett WB, ‘The Case for Further Integration of Clinical Legal Education in 
Australian Law Schools’ (2007) 2 <http://www.collaw.edu.au/assets/Final-Brett-
Smith.pdf> 
Smyth, John and Robert Hattam, ‘Intellectual as Hustler: Researching Against the 
Grain of the Market’ (2000) 26(2) British Educational Research Journal 157 
Snyder, Benson R, The Hidden Curriculum (MIT Press, 1971) 
 
406 
Snyder, Lisa Gueldenzoph and Mark J Snyder, ‘Teaching Critical Thinking and 
Problem-Solving Skills’ (2008) 50(2) The Delta Pi Epsilon Journal 95 
‘Social Science Disciplines’, Economic and Social Research Council (Web Page, 
2021) <https://esrc.ukri.org/about-us/what-is-social-science/social-science-
disciplines/> 
Soederberg, Susanne et al, Internalizing Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalism and 
the Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism (Springer, 2005) 
Solum, Lawrence B, ‘Procedural Justice’ (2004) 78 California Law Review 277 
‘Solving the Social Sciences’ Hard Problems’ (27 April 2010) Harvard Magazine 
<https://harvardmagazine.com/2010/04/social-sciences-hard-problems> 
Spade, Dean, ‘For Those Considering Law School’ (Online Document, October 2010) 
<http://www.deanspade.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/For-Those-Considering-
Law-School.pdf>  
Stanford Center for the Study of Language and Information, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2019) Heraclitus 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heraclitus/#Flu> 
Stanford Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (at 9 January 2017) John Rawls, ‘4. Justice as Fairness: Justice within a 
Liberal Society’ <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/#JusFaiJusWitLibSoc> 
Stanford Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (2017) 2 Justice, ‘2.3 Procedural versus Substantive Justice’ 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice/#ProcVersSubsJust> 
Stanford Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (2016) 1 The Pure Theory of Law 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/> 
Stein, Ralph Michael, ‘The Path of Legal Education from Edward I to Langdell: A 
History of Insular Reaction’ (1981) 57 Chicago–Kent Law Review 429 
 
407 
Stellios, James (ed), New Ways Forward: Reform and Renewal in Constitutional 
Interpretation and Legal Education: Essays in Honour of Professor Michael Coper 
(Federation Press, 2018) 
Sterling, Petra et al, How to Educate Lawyers in the Digital Information Age 
(InfoTrack, 2018) 
Stern, Simon, ‘Law & Literature: Draft Syllabus’ (Online Document, 8 November 
2008) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1297690> 
Stevens, Robert, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 
1980s (University of North Carolina Press, 1983) 
Strong, SI and Brad Desnoyer, How to Write Law Exams: IRAC Perfected (West 
Academic, 2015) 
‘Student Legal Clinics’, Caxton Legal Centre (Web Page) 
<https://caxton.org.au/connect/student-legal-clinics/> 
Sturm, Susan and Lani Guinier, ‘The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education 
in a Culture of Competition and Conformity’ (2007) 60(2) Vanderbilt Law Review 
534 
Sullivan, William M et al, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law 
(Jossey–Bass, 2007) 
Summerford, Letitia, ‘Residents Think “The Law Is the Law” When It Comes to Bali 
9’, Daily Mercury (online at 24 February 2015) 
<http://www.dailymercury.com.au/news/residents-think-law-law-when-it-comes-bali-
9/2554362/> 
Summers, Robert S, ‘Fuller on Legal Education’ (1984) 34(1) Journal of Legal 
Education 8 




Sunstein, Cass R et al, Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Federal 
Judiciary (Brookings, 2006) 
Swarts, Jonathan, Constructing Neoliberalism: Economic Transformation in Anglo-
American Democracies (University of Toronto Press 2013) 
Sydney University Law Society, SULS Education Guide (SULS, 2017) 
<https://issuu.com/sydneyuniversitylawsociety/docs/edguide> 
Symes, Colin et al, ‘Working Knowledge: Australian Universities and “Real World” 
Education’ (2000) 46(6) International Review of Education 566 
Tadros, Edmund, ‘Graduate Glut: 12,000 New Lawyers Every Year’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online at 14 February 2014) 
<https://www.smh.com.au/business/graduate-glut-12000-new-lawyers-every-year-
20140214-32qnm.html> 
Tadros, Edmund, ‘Oversupply Leaves Law Students Without Jobs’ (21 February 
2014) Australian Financial Review <http://www.afr.com/news/policy/industrial-
relations/oversupply-leaves-law-students-without--jobs-20140221-jgec6> 
Tamanaha, Brian, Failing Law Schools (Chicago University Press, 2012) 
Tani, Massimilo and Prue Vines, ‘Law Students’ Attitudes to Education: Pointers to 
Depression in the Legal Academy and the Profession?’ (2009) 19(1) Legal Education 
Review 24 
Taskforce on the Canadian Common Law Degree, Consultation Paper (Federation of 
Law Societies of Canada, 2008) 
<https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/Website/media/Shared/docs/publications/notices/08-
10_consultation-paper.pdf> 
Taub, Jennifer S, ‘Unpopular Contracts and Why They Matter: Burying Langdell and 
Enlivening Students’ (2013) 88 Washington Law Review 1451 
Tempany, TW, ‘The Legal Profession in England—Its History, Its Members, and 
Their Status’ (1885) 19 American Law Review 677 
 
409 
Terrell, Timothy P, ‘What Does and Does Not Happen in Law School to Prepare 
Students to Practice Law: A View from Both Sides of the Academic/Practice 
Dichotomy’ (1991) 83(3) Law Library Journal 493 
Thanaraj, Ann, ‘Evaluating the Potential of Virtual Simulations to Facilitate 
Professional Learning in Law: A Literature Review’ (2016) 6(6) World Journal of 
Education 89 
Thorne, Danielle, People That Changed the Course of History: The Story of Andrew 
Jackson: 250 Years after His Birth (Atlantic Publishing, 2016) 
Thornton, Margaret, ‘Legal Education in the Corporate University’ (2014) 10(1) 
Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences 19 
Thornton, Margaret, ‘Portia Lost in the Groves of Academic Wondering What to Do 
about Legal Education’ (1991) 9(2) Law in Context 19 
Thornton, Margaret, Privatizing the Public University (Taylor and Francis, 2011) 59–
61 
Thornton, Margaret, ‘The Idea of the University and the Contemporary Legal 
Academy’ (2004) 26(4) Sydney Law Review 481 
Thornton, Margaret, ‘The Law School, the Market and the New Knowledge 
Economy’ (2008) 17(2) Legal Education Review 10 
Thornton, Margaret, ‘The New Knowledge Economy and the Transformation of the 
Law Discipline’ (2012) 19(2–3) International Journal of the Legal Profession 
Thorson, Dag Einer and Amund Lie, ‘What is Neoliberalism?’ (Research Paper, 
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, 2007) 
Torney‐Purta, Judith et al, Citizenship and Education in Twenty‐Eight Countries: 
Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen (International Association for the 
Evaluation of Educational Achievement, 2001) 
 
410 
‘Trial by Media: Where Should Lawyers Draw the Line?’, Lawyers Weekly (online at 
4 March 2012) <https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/sme-law/9191-trial-by-media-
where-should-lawyers-draw-the-line> 
Tushnet, Mark, ‘Scenes from the Metropolitan Underground: A Critical Perspective 
on the Status of Clinical Legal Education’ (1984) 52(2) George Washington Law 
Review 273 
Twining, William, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Stevens and Sons, 
1994) 
Twining, William, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Cambridge University Press, 
2000) 
Twining, William, ‘Preparing Lawyers for the Twenty-First Century’ (1992) 3(1) 
Legal Education Review 1 
Tyler, Tom R, ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts’ (2007) 44 Court Review 30 
<https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2018/Tyler%20
-%20Procedural%20Justice%20and%20the%20Courts%20-%20Copy.pdf> 
Tyler, Tom R, ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law’ (2003) 
30 Crime and Justice 283 
Tyler, Tom R, Why People Obey the Law (Yale, 1990)  
Tyler, Ralph S and Robert S Catz, ‘The Contradictions of Clinical Education’ (1980) 
29 Cleveland State Law Review 694 
‘Undergraduate Courses: Bachelor of Laws’, University of Wollongong Australia 
(Web Page, 2021) <http://www.uow.edu.au/handbook/yr2015/ug/H15000273.html> 





Uniform Admission Arrangements (2008) 5 
<lawcouncil.asn.au/LACC/images/pdfs/212390818_1_LACCUniformAdmissionRule
s2008.pdf> 
‘Units of Study: Law Clinics’, The University of Sydney (Web Page) 
<https://www.sydney.edu.au/law/study-law/experiential-learning/law-clinics.html> 
‘The University of Newcastle Legal Centre’, The University of Newcastle Australia 
(Web Page, 2021) <https://www.newcastle.edu.au/school/newcastle-law-school/legal-
centre> 
‘University of Oxford—Faculty of Law’, LLM Guide (Web Page, 2021) <https://llm-
guide.com/schools/uk-ireland/uk/university-of-oxford-faculty-of-law> 
‘University of Sydney Law School—Social Justice’, Redfern Legal Centre (Web 
Page, 2020) <https://rlc.org.au/social-justice> 
University of Wollongong, Studying Law (University of Wollongong, 2007) 
<https://lha.uow.edu.au/content/groups/public/@web/@law/documents/doc/uow0156
58.pdf> 
University of Wollongong, ‘Undergraduate Handbook 2015: School of Law’ 
(University of Wollongong, 2015) 
<http://lha.uow.edu.au/content/groups/public/@web/@lha/@law/documents/doc/uow
188835.pdf> 
UNSW Law School, Law Undergraduate Guide 2014 (UNSW Law School, 2014)  
Van Klink, Bert and Bald de Vries, ‘Skeptical Legal Education: How to Develop a 
Critical Attitude?’ [2013] Law and Method 1 
Varga, Csaba, ‘The Philosophy of Teaching Legal Philosophy in Hungary’ [2009] (2) 
Iustum Aequum Salutare 165 
Victoria State Government, Access to Justice Review (Finsbury Green, 2016) 
 
412 
Vieru, Simona, ‘Aristotle’s Influence on the Natural Law Theory of St Thomas 
Aquinas’ (2010) 1 The Western Australian Jurist 117 
Wagner, Gerhard, ‘Tort Law and Liability Insurance’ (2006) 31(2) The Geneva 
Papers on Risk and Insurance 277 
Wald, Nave and Tony Harland, ‘Graduate Attributes Frameworks or Powerful 
Knowledge’ (2019) 41(4) Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 2 
Waldron, Jeremy, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
Walkden-Brown, Jackson and Lindsey Stevenson-Graf, ‘Preparing for Practice: 
Clinical Legal Education through the Lens of Legal Education Discourse’ (2018) 3(1) 
Australian Journal of Clinical Legal Education 7 
Walsh, Colleen, ‘The Harvard Legal Aid Bureau at 100: A Lifeline to the Poor: For a 
Century, Harvard Law Students Have Toiled to Ensure Legal Rights for All’, Harvard 
Law Today (Web Page, 21 November 2013) 
<https://today.law.harvard.edu/feature/the-harvard-legal-aid-bureau-at-100/> 
Walsh, Tamara, ‘Putting Justice Back into Legal Education’ (2008) 17(1–2) Legal 
Education Review 126 
Waugh, John First Principles: The Melbourne Law School, 1857–2007 (Melbourne 
University Press, 2007) 
Webb, Julian, ‘The “Ambitious Modesty” of Harry Arthurs’ Humane 
Professionalism’ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 122 
Weinberg, Jackie, ‘The Common Missions of ADR and Clinical Legal Education 
Provide a Solid Foundation for Teaching ADR in Clinic’, The Australian Dispute 





Weinberg, James and Matthew Flinders, ‘Learning for Democracy: The Politics and 
Practice of Citizenship Education’ (2018) 44(4) British Educational Research Journal 
1 
Weinrib, Ernest J, ‘Can Law Survive Legal Education?’ 60(2) Vanderbilt Law Review 
428 
Weisbrot, David, Australian Lawyers (Longman, 1990) 
Weisbrot, David, ‘Recent Statistical Trends in Australian Legal Education’ (1991) 
2(1) Legal Education Review 11 
‘Welcome from the Dean’ (by Erika Techera), as found in ‘Law School’, University 
of Western Australia (Web Page) <http://www.law.uwa.edu.au/the-school/deans-
wlcome> 
Weller, Sally and Phillip O’Neill, ‘An Argument with Neoliberalism: Australia’s 
Place in a Global Imaginary’ (2014) 4(2) Dialogues in Human Geography 110 
West, Robin, Teaching Law: Justice, Politics, and the Demands of Professionalism 
(Kindle eBook, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
Westwood, Fiona and Karen Barton (eds), The Calling of Law: The Pivotal Role of 
Vocational Legal Education (Ashgate Publishing, 2014) 
‘What is Social Science?’, Economic and Social Research Council (Web Page, 2021) 
<https://esrc.ukri.org/about-us/what-is-social-science/> 
Whiteley, Paul, ‘Does Citizenship Education Work? Evidence from a Decade of 
Citizenship Education in Secondary Schools in England’ (2014) 67(3) Parliamentary 
Affairs 513 
Whittington, Keith E, ‘Is Originalism Too Conservative?’ (2011) 34(1) Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 31 
‘Why Are Problem Questions Given as Assessment Tasks?’ Sydney Law School 





‘Why Indonesia Is So Bad at Lawmaking’ (21 June 2018) The Economist 
‘Why Teachers Should Use Simulations in Civic Education’ (2006) 10 Trainers 
Times 1 
Whyte, John D, ‘Finding Reality in Legal Education’ (2013) 76 Saskatchewan Law 
Review 99 
Willoughby, Westel Woodbury, The Constitutional Law of the United States 
(Hardpress, 1766) (2nd ed, 1929) 
Wilson, Richard J, The Global Evolution of Clinical Legal Education: More Than a 
Method (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 
Wilson, Woodrow, The State (D.C. Heath and Co, 1889) 
Winke, Paula and Susan M Gass (eds), Foreign Language Proficiency in Higher 
Education (Springer, 2019) 
Wohl, Alexander, Father, Son, and Constitution (University Press of Kansas, 2013) 
Wolfram, Charles W, ‘Lights, Camera, Litigate: Lawyers and the Media in Canada 
and the United States’ (1996) 19(2) Dalhousie Law Journal 374 
Woodhill, Samantha, ‘Law Students Don’t Want to Be Lawyers, Survey Finds’, 
Australasian Lawyer (Web Page, 27 July 2015) 
<http://www.australasianlawyer.com.au/news/law-students-dont-want-to-be-lawyers-
survey-finds-203171.aspx?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter> 
Woodhill, Samantha, ‘No Need to Limit Law Student Numbers’, Australasian Lawyer 




Worley, Loyita and Sarah Spells (eds), BIALL Handbook of Legal Information 
Management (Routledge, 2nd ed, 2016) 
Yates, Lyn, ‘My School, My University, My Country, My World, My Google, Myself 
… What Is Education for Now?’ (2012) 39 Australian Education Research 265 
Yaxley, Louise, ‘Don’t Study Law Unless You Really Want to Be a Lawyer, Malcolm 
Turnbull Says’, ABC News (online at 2 February 2018) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-02-02/malcolm-turnbull-says-too-many-kids-do-
law/9387508> 
Zander, Michael, The Law Making Process (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 
2004) 
B. Cases 
Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury [2013] UKSC 38 
Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512 
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v New Brunswick [1991] 3 SCR 459 
Comcare v Banerji [2019] HCA 23 
Fitzgerald v Smith t/as Escape Hair Design (2010) 204 IR 292 
Hinch v Attorney General (Vic) [1987] 164 CLR 15 
Klein v Law Society of Upper Canada (1985) 16 DLR (4th) 489 (Superior Court of 
Justice of Ontario) 
Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1992] UKHL 3 
Police v Dunn (Dubbo Local Court, Heilpern D, 27 August 2009) 
R v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159 
Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 
 
416 
Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 
Quinn v Leathem (1901) AC 495 
Vancouver Sun (Re) [2004] 2 SCR 332 
 
C. Other 
Achtertof, Jeffrey L, ‘A Grand Bloodbath: The Western Reaction to Joseph Stalin’s 
1930s Show Trials as Foreign Policy’ (Thesis, University of North Carolina, 2007)  
Araujo, Robert John and John Courtney Murray, ‘The Law as a Moral Enterprise’ 
(Speech, Fifth Annual Courtney Murray Lecture, Loyola University Chicago, 14 
November 2013) 
Brian Tamanaha, in Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, ‘Failing Law 
Schools—A Moral Disaster: An Interview with Brian Tamanaha’ (YouTube, 2 
August 2012) 00:00:00–01:00:00 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2oyEQOcTgow> 
Brown, Wendy as seen in New Economic Thinking, ‘How Neoliberalism Threatens 
Democracy’ (YouTube, 26 May 2016) 00:00:00–00:19:41 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMMJ9HqzRcE> 
Dibley-Maher, Paul, ‘Friend or Foe? The Impact of the Hawke–Keating Neoliberal 
Reforms on Australian Workers in the Australian Public Sector’ (Master’s Thesis, 
Queensland University of Technology, 2012) 
Dicey, Albert Venn, ‘Can English Law Be Taught at the Universities?’ (Speech, All 
Souls College, 21 April 1883) 
Duncan Kennedy and others at a Students for Inclusion Event (Law School Matters: 
Reassessing Legal Education Post-Ferguson) at Harvard Law School; Systemic 
Justice Videos, ‘Contextualization in Legal Education: A Teach In’ (YouTube, 13 
 
417 
August 2015) 00:00:00–01:29:41 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RE8wG89_Jkw&feature=emb_logo> 
Edelman, James, ‘The Role of Specialized Legal Knowledge’ (Speech, Council of 
Australian Law Deans, 22 March 2012) 
Family Action Network, ‘William Deresiwicz, Ph.D. Excellent Sheep: The 
Miseducation of the American Elite’ (YouTube, 18 November 2014) 00:00:00–
01:01:22 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=595&v=mrOAkfKCSpQ> 
Ford, Christopher M, ‘The Socratic Method in the 21st Century’ (Master’s Thesis, 
United States Military Academy West Point, 2008) 
<http://www.usma.edu/cfe/literature/ford_08.pdf> 
French, Chief Justice Robert, ‘University of New South Wales Law School 40th 
Anniversary’ (Speech, University of New South Wales, 17 September 2011) 
Gleeson, Justice Murray, ‘Public Confidence in the Courts’ (Speech, National Judicial 
College of Australia, 9 February 2007) 
Haggqvist, Linn, ‘Taking the Law into Your Own Hands: Violent Vigilantism in Post-
War Societies’ (Master’s Thesis, Uppsala University, 2017) 
Helsinki, Uniarts, ‘Professor Martha Nussbaum: Capabilities Approach and the Role 
of Public Services’ (YouTube, 20 June 2016) 00:00:00–00:25:00 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nBqfiPMIIBQ> 
Hemphill, W Edwin, ‘George Wythe, America’s First Law Professor’ (Master’s 
Thesis, Emory University, 1933) 
Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, ‘A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: How 
American Universities Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities 
of the Present Day’ (1915) Address to the Association of American Law Schools 24 
Kirby, Michael, ‘Improving the Discourse between Courts and the Media’ (Speech, 




Kirby, Michael, ‘Right Now’ (Speech, Melbourne Law School, January 2007) 
Luukkonen, Dave, ‘You Never Run Out of Why: Critical Thinking and Pre-Service 
Teachers’ (Master’s Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2008) 
Mason, Justice Anthony, ‘The Courts and Public Opinion’ (Speech, the National 
Institute of Government and Law, 20 March 2002) 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/NSWBarAssocNews/2002/11.pdf> 
McLeod, Fiona, ‘Looking to the Future of Legal Education’ (Speech, Australian 
Academy of Law Conference, 13 August 2017) 
Nussbaum, Martha, ‘Not for Profit: Why Legal Education Needs the Humanities’ 
(Speech, Annual Hal Wooten Lecture, UNSW Faculty of Law, 11 August 2011) 
<https://www.law.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/imce/files/wootten/prof_martha_nus
sbaum_-_2011_hal_wootten_lecture.pdf> 
Rees, Neil, ‘I Look Ahead’ (Speech, Sir Ninian Stephen Lecture, University of 
Newcastle, 10 September 2015) 
Riley, Shantal, ‘Anatomy Professor Uses 500-Year-Old da Vinci Drawings to Guide 
Cadaver Dissection’, PBS Body + Brain (online at 13 November 2019) 
<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/leonardo-da-vinci-anatomy-dissection/> 
Scruton, Roger, ‘Free Speech and Universities’ (Speech, Future of Higher Education 
Conference, Buckingham University, September 2020) 
Stewart, James Gilchrist, ‘Demistifying Critical Legal Studies’ (PhD Thesis, 
University of Adelaide, 2019) 
Sydney University Law Society, ‘Final Year Dinner—2013’ (YouTube, 28 March 
2014) 00:08:00–00:08:25 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K7JbGLaifS8> 
‘The Case against Alan Shore’, The Practice (David E. Kelley Productions, 28 March 
2004) 
The Paper Chase (Thompson Paul Productions, Twentieth Century Fox, 1973) 
 
419 
UNSW Law, ‘UNSW Law Human Rights Clinic’ (YouTube, 24 October 2012) 
00:00:00–00:02:58 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bMV7PjC-5Ek>. 
Weber, Max, ‘Science as a Vocation’ (Speech, Lecture at Munich University, 1917) 
